Appendix C
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL OCS PROGRAM: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

by B. Cicin-Sain, R. Gramling, R. Johnson, and C. Wolf

The development of oil and gas resources found in the federally controlled outer continental shelf (OCS) of the United States has, since its inception in 1954, yielded significant national benefits—the provision of energy supplies, positive contributions to the balance of payments, contributions to the federal treasury, and the generation of jobs and other economic activity. At the same time, the federal offshore oil and gas development program has been marked by extensive and recurrent intergovernmental controversy that has significantly influenced the course of the OCS program and, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has in effect halted the expansion of the program.

To understand the status of the OCS program, it is important to understand its historical context—the evolution of the program since the 1940s, when the federal government first asserted a role in the development of the outer continental shelf. This appendix first provides a national overview of the evolution of federal offshore oil and gas policy and the conflicts that have accompanied it. It then examines the course of offshore oil development in the regions of the United States where OCS development has either taken place or been proposed—the Gulf of Mexico; Alaska; California; Oregon and Washington; and the Atlantic. This section concludes with observations about the factors that have either facilitated or impeded the program's progress in the various regions.

NATIONAL OVERVIEW

The importance of the OCS program is difficult to overestimate. Since the mid-1970s, 8-10% of total domestic production of crude oil, and 20-25% of domestic natural gas production have come from the OCS leasing program (Manuel, 1984; MMS, 1989, 1991).

In addition to constituting a major portion of production for domestic use, OCS oil and gas revenues contribute significantly to the U.S. treasury; they are the fourth largest source of federal revenue, after personal income taxes, social insurance receipts, and corporate income taxes. The federal government has received more than $100 billion from OCS activity during the life of the program (MMS, 1992).

Offshore oil and gas development also generate significant economic activity by creating new



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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies Appendix C THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL OCS PROGRAM: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES by B. Cicin-Sain, R. Gramling, R. Johnson, and C. Wolf The development of oil and gas resources found in the federally controlled outer continental shelf (OCS) of the United States has, since its inception in 1954, yielded significant national benefits—the provision of energy supplies, positive contributions to the balance of payments, contributions to the federal treasury, and the generation of jobs and other economic activity. At the same time, the federal offshore oil and gas development program has been marked by extensive and recurrent intergovernmental controversy that has significantly influenced the course of the OCS program and, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has in effect halted the expansion of the program. To understand the status of the OCS program, it is important to understand its historical context—the evolution of the program since the 1940s, when the federal government first asserted a role in the development of the outer continental shelf. This appendix first provides a national overview of the evolution of federal offshore oil and gas policy and the conflicts that have accompanied it. It then examines the course of offshore oil development in the regions of the United States where OCS development has either taken place or been proposed—the Gulf of Mexico; Alaska; California; Oregon and Washington; and the Atlantic. This section concludes with observations about the factors that have either facilitated or impeded the program's progress in the various regions. NATIONAL OVERVIEW The importance of the OCS program is difficult to overestimate. Since the mid-1970s, 8-10% of total domestic production of crude oil, and 20-25% of domestic natural gas production have come from the OCS leasing program (Manuel, 1984; MMS, 1989, 1991). In addition to constituting a major portion of production for domestic use, OCS oil and gas revenues contribute significantly to the U.S. treasury; they are the fourth largest source of federal revenue, after personal income taxes, social insurance receipts, and corporate income taxes. The federal government has received more than $100 billion from OCS activity during the life of the program (MMS, 1992). Offshore oil and gas development also generate significant economic activity by creating new

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies jobs and stimulating existing enterprises to meet the need for materials for the exploration, development, and production of oil and gas. For example, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of the Interior estimates that in the Gulf of Mexico (where most of the OCS development has occurred) some 130,000 jobs depend directly or indirectly on the program; in southern California (the only other site of current OCS development), 40,000 to 60,000 jobs depend directly or indirectly on the program (MMS, 1988, 1989, 1991). Notwithstanding such obvious benefits, the development of offshore oil and gas resources in the United States has been marked by extensive and recurrent conflict between the federal government and the affected states and localities. These conflicts, which began in the 1940s, have involved questions of resource ownership, of management control, of spillover effects on adjacent communities, and of the distribution of benefits (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1987). Together with other influences—the status of world energy supply and demand, the actions of the oil industry, the orientations of various U.S. administrations, the patterns of public consumption of energy resources, and public attitudes toward the environment—these conflicts have molded the nature, shape, and pace of the federal offshore oil program. To explore the forces that have affected the evolution of the federal OCS program, we begin with a brief history. Historical Overview The first offshore oil and gas development in the United States took place in 1897 off the south-central coast of California (in Summerland) from a wooden pier that extended into the Pacific Ocean. The success of this first attempt brought quick emulation, and by 1902 a photograph of the Summerland development "at its peak" shows more than 40 derricks on piers over the Pacific (Lankford, 1971). The second push for overwater drilling took place at Caddo Lake, southeast of Shreveport, Louisiana, beginning in 1910. The Caddo Lake development required the solving of several technical problems, which were to have later implications for the move offshore into the Gulf of Mexico. First, the pressures were beyond anything encountered before, and many of the early wells blew out, caught fire, and burned uncontrollably. The movement into the Caddo field and subsequently into the deeper, and higher pressure fields common to the Gulf coast, was quickly followed by the emergence of increasingly reliable blowout preventers (see especially Brantly, 1971). A second requirement of the Caddo development was the ability to drill and produce without direct connection to land, although the initial exploration and development was little more than creative use of existing land-based drilling techniques. Platforms were constructed on pilings driven into the lake bottom, and drilling equipment was taken by barge to the site. Finally, another technological innovation, an underwater pipeline connecting the production wells to one of four gathering stations on the lake, was a precursor of the collection lines now used offshore. This technology surged ahead in 1924 with the development of the Maracaibo field, one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, ultimately producing about 4.6 billion barrels of oil (Lankford, 1971). Lake Maracaibo in northern Venezuela differed from Caddo Lake in three important ways. First, it is larger, approximately two-thirds the size of Lake Erie. Second, it is up to 120 feet deep. Finally, it is connected to salt water. This last characteristic required the first modification in drilling practices when in 1924 Lago Petroleum Company brought in the first well over water in Lake Maracaibo. The problem was the teredo, or shipworm, a marine mollusc that thrives in the brackish water of the lake and that destroyed pilings in six to eight months. This forced a movement to alternative materials, eventually leading to concrete pilings and steel decks for marine platforms. Finally, the frequent drilling in Lake Maracaibo led to the use of the steam drilling barge.

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies The derrick was still mounted on the platform but the engines and machinery for drilling were mounted on a barge that could be moved easily from platform to platform. This increased mobility led to considerable savings, and provided a model for the drilling tenders first used in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico. An additional breakthrough came in 1933 with introduction by the Texas Company (later to become Texaco) of the submersible drilling barge. The barge could be towed to a site and sunk to provide a stable base for the drilling rig, which was mounted on the barge. Once drilling was complete, the barge could be raised and moved to a new location. The drilling barge eliminated the sunk cost of platform construction for exploratory drilling, and was a prototype for the mobile drilling rigs that came into use in the 1950s and 1960s. Offshore development continued through the 1930s and 1940s in near-shore state waters in California and Louisiana. The state of California first began issuing leases in 1929, and Louisiana began issuing leases for near-shore waters in 1936. Before 1940, both the federal government and the coastal states assumed that the states owned any oil and gas deposits in the submerged "tidelands" adjacent to their coasts as a remnant of the jurisdiction of the original 13 colonies over the marginal sea (Miller, 1984). However, with the discovery of significant oil and gas resources and given the growing economic importance of these resources, in the 1940s the federal government began to assert its own claims to resource ownership. In September 1945, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation asserting U.S. jurisdiction over continental shelf resources (Executive Order 9633, Federal Register 12304 (1945); 59 Stat. 885). In administrative action in 1937 and in a 1945 landmark suit brought to the Supreme Court, United States v. California, the federal government argued that because the territorial sea concept of the marginal sea did not arise until after the American Revolution, there were no existing property rights for the states to succeed to at the time of independence (Miller, 1984). In 1947, the Court surprised many observers by handing down its decision that the federal government required "paramount rights" in coastal waters to fulfill its responsibilities to the nation as a whole for foreign policy, national security, and interstate commerce and that it was impossible to split the resource questions from these broader issues (United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)). The coastal states and ultimately the Congress reacted sharply to the Supreme Court decision and, in 1952, ownership of the submerged lands became a prominent issue in the presidential election, with Dwight D. Eisenhower supporting the case of the states. The compromise finally attained through congressional action in 1953 was a strict division of authority between federal and state governments, and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315) gave the states title to the submerged lands and resources of the territorial sea (then to three miles offshore), including "the right and power to manage, lease, develop, and use" them. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356) established that the "subsoil and seabed of the outer continental shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." OCSLA was a brief and general law that gave the federal government (through the secretary of the interior) the mandate to lease offshore lands to the highest bidders in the petroleum industry with few conditions or strings attached. OCSLA generally followed the Truman proclamation of 1945 in affirming the rights of the United States to the natural resources of the continental shelf, while stating that the character of the superadjacent waters remained unchanged with regard to fishing and navigation rights (Mangone, 1977). It became clear that substantial amounts of oil and gas existed in the Gulf of Mexico, probably off the coasts of California and Alaska, and perhaps off the East Coast as well. The coastal states individually and in groups sued the federal government to extend state boundaries. All efforts failed except for those of Florida and Texas. The Supreme Court ruled that in these two cases, the preadmission boundaries of about nine nautical miles had been approved by the U.S. government on

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies admission of these states into the Union (United States v. Florida et al., 363 U.S. 121 (1960) and United States v. Louisiana et al., 363 U.S. 1 (1960)). Conflicts over resource ownership were settled, at least temporarily, with the enactment of the two laws in 1953. Discussion of the questions of ownership and management of offshore resources was reopened briefly after the December 1988 proclamation by President Ronald W. Reagan extending the U.S. territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles offshore, in accordance with the practice established of most other nations. However, in the 1990 reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Management Act (16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464), Congress amended the definition of "coastal zone." Section 1543 of Title 16 of the U.S. Code had previously defined "coastal zone" as extending ''seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea." The 1990 amendment changed that definition to provide that the zone extends "seaward to the outer limit of State title and ownership under the Submerged Lands Act.'' This clarification was part of a package of amendments in the reauthorization bill that had the effect of increasing the management authority of the coastal states, through the consistency process, over federally conducted or licensed activities outside the coastal zone that affect "any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone" (16 U.S.C. §1456(c)). Federal Leasing, 1954-1978 The first federal lease sale of OCS rights occurred for the Gulf of Mexico in 1954, the year after the passage of OCSLA. From that point, with a few exceptions, lease sales have occurred at least annually in the Gulf (and usually two or three times a year). Federal waters off the coasts of Florida, California, and Oregon and Washington were gradually added to the program, and there were lease sales in these areas in 1959, 1963, and 1964, respectively (MMS, 1986, 1989). With these expansions the Department of the Interior began to meet resistance to its leasing program. The rapid momentum in federal leasing that characterized the 1960s came to an abrupt halt in 1969 in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara, California, oil spill. On Jan. 29, 1969, Union Oil's Platform A in the Santa Barbara Channel blew out and some 3 million gallons of oil spewed forth to affect a 660-square-mile area and more than 150 miles of coastline, killing birds and other marine life (Nash et al., 1972). The Santa Barbara oil spill proved a catalytic event in the rise of the environmental movement. Images of the extensive damage to beautiful beach areas, the plight of seabirds covered with oil, the dead marine life—widely transmitted through the extensive media coverage the event received—contributed to a growing awareness that resource development could pose a serious threat to the environment. An immediate effect of the spill was the postponement of additional lease sales in the Pacific region for five years; initial sales in the Atlantic and Alaska regions also were put off. Moreover, partly as a result of the spill, the 1970s were to see the enactment of several major actions aimed at regulating and protecting the environment, particularly ocean and coastal resources. These actions significantly affected the operation of the OCS program. They included the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. §§1361-1407, 50 CFR 216), the Clean Air Act of 1972, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. §§1401-1445; P.L. 92-352), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543, 50 CFR 17), the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, and the OCSLA amendments of 1978 (43 U.S.C. §§1801-1866). For energy questions, however, the situation was to significantly change again in the mid-1970s as new pressures for accelerated development of the outer continental shelf were prompted by the oil embargoes of 1973 and 1974. The embargoes resulted in significant shortages and long lines at gasoline pumps for U.S. consumers and in a dramatic rise in the price of crude oil. From

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies October 1973 to January 1974 the price of Arabian light crude oil increased from $5.12 to $11.65 per barrel. This increase came on top of a doubling of the price from $2.59 per barrel in January 1973 (Darmstadter and Landsberg, 1976; Oil and Gas Journal, 1988). The escalation provided an additional incentive for the exploration and development of the OCS reserves. After the embargoes, President Richard M. Nixon responded to the shortages and price rises with Project Independence, which was to provide the mechanism for increased OCS activity. The plan called for the secretary of the interior to expand the OCS area offered to 10 million acres in 1975 (about triple what had been planned earlier) and to begin lease sales in all frontier areas. In 1975 lease sales resumed for the Pacific OCS; the first lease sales occurred for the Atlantic in 1976 and for Alaska in 1977. The number of acres leased in the Gulf of Mexico in 1975 exceeded that of any previous year (MMS, 1989). In response to these developments, coastal states, local governments, fishermen, and environmentalists mobilized to amend OCLSA to incorporate more stringent and elaborate environmental review as part of the oil leasing, exploration, and development process. The groups also set out to provide an enhanced role for the states and the public in the decision-making process. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 19781 Congress had sought two major goals in amending the 1953 version of OCSLA: to expedite the development of offshore resources and, while doing so, to protect the marine, coastal, and human environment. The energy crisis and widespread public alarm over blowouts and tanker spills had compelled a general reexamination of the nation's energy policy and its program for developing offshore oil and gas resources. By the mid-1970s almost 50% of the oil consumed in the United States came from foreign sources; 36% came from the Middle East. It was widely believed that this amount of dependence on energy resources from volatile and politically unstable sources made the U.S. economy vulnerable to oil embargoes, reduced what was then a favorable balance of trade, and jeopardized national security. OCS resource estimates encouraged the view that energy independence could be achieved by accelerating OCS production (U.S. Congress, 1977). Upon examination, the 1953 act looked woefully inadequate to its critics in the Congress for the task of bringing about a dramatic increase in offshore energy production in the 1970s. Coastal states, environmentalists, and the public, in turn, focused attention on the act's lack of environmental planning, standards, and safeguards. The Department of the Interior's preference for large, up-front bonus payments in addition to royalties on production from OCS leases was strongly criticized because this practice was thought to exclude small companies and to reduce competition. Administration of the leasing program was viewed as essentially a closed process involving the secretary of the interior and the oil industry (U.S. Congress, 1977). The 1953 act did not provide a mechanism to remedy the damage caused by OCS development to the states or to communities, which feared they would bear the burden of any expansion in offshore energy production. It also did nothing to compensate other users of ocean space and resources, such as fishermen. The act offered no assistance to state and local governments in planning for, nor did it compensate fishermen for economic loss resulting from, OCS development. Finally, a frequently expressed criticism of the 1953 act was that it was essentially a total delegation of authority for the use of the outer continental shelf to the secretary of the interior. The Congress intended the OCSLA amendments to address these perceived inadequacies in the 1953 act. To limit the broad discretion allowed the secretary under the earlier Act to manage 1   This discussion is taken from Cicin-Sain et al. (in preparation).

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies OCS development, the amendments required a five-year leasing program, which would describe the size, timing, and location of proposed lease sales and prohibit the lease of any area not included in the plan. Alternative bidding methods (in addition to bonus bids and fixed royalties) were authorized and required on an experimental basis. Studies were mandated to assess the effects of OCS projects on the human, marine, and coastal environments. OCS development was divided into four stages: preparation of a five-year lease plan, lease sales, exploration, and development. Separate plans for exploration and development were required. Before conducting lease sales and approving OCS exploration and development plans and projects, the secretary had to consult with the governors of the affected states and accept their recommendations if the secretary found them to be in the national interest. Funds were created for oil spill contingencies and to compensate fishermen for damages and loss of fishing gear due to OCS activities. Amending OCSLA involved a very protracted and divisive four-year effort in Congress. Environmental and conservation groups, joined by national associations representing state and local governments and fishing interests, supported passage of the legislation. The oil companies, their trade associations, and other business groups generally opposed it. Before January 1977 and the beginning of the Carter administration, the Department of the Interior strongly opposed any effort at reforming OCSLA; but after President Jimmy Carter's inauguration and his appointment of Cecil Andrus as secretary of the interior, the new administration also urged OCS legislative reform. It should be noted that although the coalition that supported the passage of the amendments (the states and the environmental groups) was successful in achieving a more stringent and elaborate environmental review process for oil leasing, exploration, and development, the gains made by the states in the 1978 amendments were limited. Sections 18 and 19 of OCSLA charge the secretary of the interior with preparing five-year plans for leasing lands on the outer continental shelf and with consulting with the governors of the affected states on the content of these plans as well as of specific plans for development and production. The consultation with the states required by the act, however, is only that—consultation—and the secretary is quite free to override state objections on the grounds of national interest. Implementing the 1978 Amendments: Conflict and Controversy Implementation of the 1978 amendments has been fraught with serious controversy, extensive litigation, and circumvention of the decision processes established by OCSLA. Only in the Gulf of Mexico did increased oil activity proceed without incident, largely as a result of the longstanding and powerful presence of the oil industry in that region, which predates the rise of the environmental movement. However, in coastal areas where no oil development had yet taken place (the Northeast, parts of California, Alaska), extensive conflicts resulted that involved state and local interests, fishermen, and environmentalists on one side, and the Department of the Interior and the oil industry on the other. In 1982, Secretary of the Interior James Watt combined all of the leasing, regulation, and research functions pertaining to the OCS program into the Minerals Management Service (MMS). In 1983, Watt made another change, to allow going areawide leasing on the OCS. This procedure opened entire areas (such as the central portion of the Gulf of Mexico) rather than designated tracts for leasing. This greatly increased the acreage offered for lease. Areawide leasing was a major element of the increasing conflict between federal agencies and most of the governing bodies of the coastal states (Goldstein, 1982). State pressure was felt nationally, and Congress got into the act. By the mid-1980s, Congress was regularly limiting which portions of the outer continental shelf could be leased by MMS by attaching stipulations on how funds could be spent to the

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies Department of the Interior's appropriation bill. The debate intensified until President George Bush in his budget address of January 1989 delayed three controversial sales off Florida and California until a presidential task force (OCS Leasing and Development Task Force, 1990) and the National Academy of Sciences could examine the issues and information available for decision making (NRC, 1989). The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences found the information lacking in all three sale areas. Particularly noted as lacking was information required by OCSLA about the effects on the human environment. On June 26, 1990, President Bush announced a moratorium on lease sales for much of the continental United States until the year 2000. In the same statement, he directed the secretary of the interior to change the federal leasing policy. The secretary was directed to collect the information necessary to determine the effects of OCS development, including conducting the studies recommended by the National Academy of Sciences more carefully select the areas offered for lease prepare legislation that would give states directly affected by OCS activities a greater share of the financial benefits of development and a greater voice in decision making. Although the Department of the Interior has sent a revenue sharing bill to Congress, it is quite safe to say that, in terms of a greater voice in decision making, increased information collection, and more careful selection of areas to lease, few of the requested changes have been made. Another significant action in 1990 also affected OCS activities. As described by a secretarial committee on ocean policy of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1978), "The Coastal Zone Management Act is an experiment in federalism. It involves an intricate pattern of intergovernmental relationships and a redistribution of political power among state, federal, local, and regional governments." How far that redistribution went in the case of OCS oil and gas leasing was temporally defined by the five-to-four Supreme Court decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California, which held that consistency provisions do not apply to Department of the Interior sales (Eichenberg and Archer, 1987). In the fall of 1990 Congress reauthorized the Coastal Zone Management Act specifically to overturn this decision. Thus, the sociopolitical realities to which consistency was addressed remain and will probably have major implications for the OCS program. In the fall of 1991, Congress passed the most restrictive appropriations bill yet (as far as limitations on OCS lease sales) for the department. The result of this political conflict has been for all practical purposes to close down the outer continental shelf of most of the continental United States for development. REGIONAL VARIATIONS In each of the regions where offshore oil development has either taken place or been proposed (Figs. 1-1 and 1-2 of Socioeconomics Panel report), there have been somewhat different adaptations or reactions by the adjacent local and state communities. In some areas (such as Louisiana), offshore oil activities became an integral part of state and local communities and were warmly received; in others (such as northern California), vehement local opposition preempted lease sales. In still other areas (south-central California), development was accommodated only after protracted and complex negotiations that resulted in the adoption of extensive permit conditions and mitigation measures. Similarly, socioeconomic effects appear to vary according to location, although there are some general patterns of effects associated with each stage of development (prelease, exploration, development, production, termination) that appear to have occurred everywhere. Here we review various regional experiences with offshore oil development. It is important

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies to gain some understanding of the apparent effects in various localities and of the dynamics of public responses to them. Our discussion, however, is hindered by the scarcity of information about the social, economic, and political evolution of offshore oil development throughout the United States and by the lack of studies that compare experiences in various regions. Within these limitations we review three major topics for each large area where OCS development either has taken place or has been proposed (the Gulf of Mexico; Alaska; California; Washington and Oregon; and the Atlantic): the nature and extent of OCS development public responses to the development actual or potential illustrative effects. By way of clarification, we mean by public responses to OCS development the responses or adaptations of local and state governments or local and state organized groups to OCS activities. On the basis of the data available and from the Socioeconomics Panel's visits to the various regions, it appears that the differences in public responses in various regions around the country are related to the following variables: the time period during which the first announcement of a proposed lease sale or actual development occurred the physical characteristics of the ocean and the coastal zone in the region the socioeconomic and cultural context of the affected localities and states (including their relationship to the environment) the extent to which there were other major users of the ocean the degree of political mobilization of the affected communities. Actual or potential illustrative effects are the intended or unintended consequences that are expected to or appear to have accompanied offshore oil development. We emphasize "illustrative effects" and "appear to have accompanied offshore oil development" because there are few systematic studies that have isolated, in a causal manner, the social, economic, and political effects of OCS oil development. Gulf of Mexico Region Most of the petroleum products produced from on the OCS have come from the Gulf of Mexico (well over 90% of the oil and about 99% of the gas; MMS, 1989). And most of that production (97.6% of the oil and 88.1% of the gas) has been supported from Louisiana in the central region of the Gulf (MMS, 1989). Because most OCS development in the United States has occurred off of, or has been supported from, the central and western Gulf, particularly Louisiana, the discussion of the Gulf will be broken into two sections, the central and western Gulf (primarily Louisiana, but also Texas, to provide an example of extended effects), and Florida (which has taken a different position on OCS development from that of the other states in the region). Central and Western Gulf Nature and Extent of Development Although development in protected waters contiguous to the Gulf began in the 1920s and

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies early 1930s, the initial exploration and development amounted to little more than creative use of existing land-based drilling technology. Pilings were driven into the seabed, a platform was constructed, and drilling equipment was taken by barge to the site. As interest in deeper prospects grew, these techniques became too expensive; the nonrecoverable cost of platform construction (which became considerable in deeper water and with exposure to larger waves) was constant, regardless of the outcome of the drilling. The 1933 creation of the drilling barge pointed the way for the movement offshore. Although the Texas Company's barge was designed for use in protected inland waters, by the mid-1950s marine drilling barges were working in the shallow Gulf (Brantly, 1971; Stallings, 1984). Because its leaders saw the potential of the Gulf waters for petroleum extraction, the state of Louisiana in 1936 created the State Mineral Board, which was directed to competitively lease the waters adjacent to the state. The claims of the various states and the federal government concerning the ownership and jurisdiction of submerged lands led to the Truman proclamation of 1945, which asserted federal rights to submerged lands. Despite the proclamation, in the absence of clear legal precedent, Louisiana (and Texas, which soon followed) continued to lease offshore lands, including those later defined as part of the OCS (Mead et al., 1985). The first exploratory drilling on what is now the OCS was carried out in 1946 by Magnolia Petroleum Company southeast of Eugene Island, Louisiana, six miles from land. The first federal OCS lease sale was held in the Gulf of Mexico in October 1954 (MMS, 1989). In all, 394,721 acres were leased and the federal government received cash bonuses of more than $116 million. A second sale was held later that year. From that point, with a few notable exceptions (1956, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1965), lease sales have occurred at least annually (and usually two or three times a year; Table C-1). In 1954, 64 new wells were started in Louisiana OCS, most of them as a result of earlier lease sales. By 1964, there were 647, an annual figure that remained fairly constant for the next two decades. The value of OCS production rose similarly. The value of Louisiana OCS oil and natural gas produced in 1954 was about $5.4 million. By 1980, this had risen to more than $11.4 billion (Manuel, 1984). There have been several incidents or trends that have affected (or failed to affect) OCS activity in the central and western Gulf. First, what did not happen in the Gulf was a slowdown of OCS activity in the aftermath of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. Lease sales in the Pacific were postponed for five years, as were initial sales in the Atlantic and Alaska. In the Gulf, it was business as usual (Table C-1). Second, the 1973-1974 oil embargo had a massive effect on OCS activity in the Gulf. Two factors directly affected OCS operations in the Gulf. First, the dramatic rise in the price of domestic and foreign crude oil provided an economic incentive for exploration and development, and second, early in 1974 President Nixon offered the country a quick fix in the form of Project Independence, which provided the mechanism for the secretary of the interior to increase the OCS acreage offered for lease and to begin lease sales in all frontier areas. Magnuson and Hollings (1975) noted four problems with the plan: Reexamination of the U.S. Geological Survey's overly optimistic estimates of reserves called into question the ability of the OCS tracts to produce not only the quantities needed, but for the length of time required. The increased offerings would probably result in fewer dollars per acre for bonus bids for OCS leases. Increased effects on coastal areas would result from the increased activities. The capacity industry needed to explore the increased acreage (drilling rigs, support vessels) did not exist.

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies TABLE C-1 OCS Activities in the Gulf of Mexico Year Tracts offered Acres offered Tracts leased Acres leased Total $ bonuses $ Bonuses per acre Expl. wells Developed wells 54 237 860,608 109 461,870 139,735,505 303 3 61 55 210 674,095 121 402,567 108,528,726 270 18 117 56 0 0 0 0 0 NA 41 182 57 0 0 0 0 0 NA 47 282 58 0 0 0 0 0 NA 56 172 59 118 539,813 42 171,300 89,746,992 524 86 213 60 385 1,610,254 147 704,526 282,641,815 401 114 259 61 0 0 0 0 0 NA 110 335 62 830 3,718,115 420 1,929,177 489,481,061 254 148 351 63 0 0 0 0 0 NA 188 357 64 28 34,028 23 32,671 60,340,626 1,847 200 474 65 0 0 0 0 0 NA 169 619 66 70 263,891 41 139,773 188,010,893 1,345 260 596 67 206 971,489 158 744,456 510,079,178 685 287 604 68 195 775,375 126 570,983 743,767,835 1,303 294 651 69 65 190,153 36 108,657 110,945,535 1,021 215 607 70 161 666,845 138 598,510 945,064,773 1,579 201 628 71 18 55,872 11 37,222 96,304,523 2,587 254 556 72 210 970,771 178 826,195 2,251,347,556 2,725 296 545 73 276 1,514,940 187 1,032,570 3,082,462,611 2,985 291 527 74 1,006 5,006,881 356 1,762,158 5,022,860,815 2,850 336 459 75 1,143 5,989,734 265 1,369,828 670,821,011 490 310 517 76 193 942,092 77 337,413 555,125,455 1,645 278 782 77 223 1,074,536 124 605,427 1,170,093,432 1,933 322 851 78 362 1,865,423 206 1,052,467 1,666,298,621 1,583 305 808 79 247 1,166,118 171 812,702 3,160,826,960 3,889 334 753 80 273 1,367,883 183 934,977 4,094,889,184 4,380 349 754 81 421 2,159,295 258 1,308,213 3,893,097,504 2,976 327 808 82 378 1,952,417 171 871,478 1,802,832,942 2,069 372 792 83 13,023 71,153,488 1,040 5,393,997 4,906,889,551 910 378 717 84 20,816 115,413,886 970 5,125,178 2,478,473,398 484 559 710 85 15,754 87,028,709 670 3,529,325 1,542,346,514 437 490 617 86 10,724 58,670,104 142 734,427 187,094,747 255 263 396 87 10,926 31,846,415 640 3,447,825 497,247,006 144 399 416 88 11,282 61,492,451 917 4,829,523 514,083,346 106 550 423 89 11,013 60,097,672 1,049 5,580,867 645,646,870 115 475 501 90 10,459 56,788,766 825 4,263,446 584,301,918 137 451     Source: MMS, 1991a.

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies Despite this analysis, increased leasing moved ahead. In the Gulf, acreage sold in 1975 exceeded that of any previous year (MMS, 1989). It should be noted that movement into many of the "frontier" regions was supported from the Gulf of Mexico. Because of the nature of the concentrated work scheduling associated with offshore employment (workers generally spend 14 days on duty and 14 days off) it is possible for individuals to live at a considerable distance from where they regularly work (Gramling, 1989). In addition, many of the products purchased for offshore exploration and development are inherently mobile, so they can be constructed in any coastal region in the world. Of the five production platforms in place in the Pacific OCS before 1975, two were built in Morgan City, Louisiana (MMS, 1989). Thus, the support sector (both for capital investment and for labor) in the Gulf of Mexico grew throughout the 1970s in response to continued activity in the Gulf, as well as in response to development in frontier OCS areas. The third factor that has affected OCS activity in the Gulf was the decision by Secretary of the Interior Watt to allow areawide leasing in 1983. This opened up large areas (such as the western Gulf of Mexico) and drastically increased the number of acres and tracts offered for lease in the Gulf. (Prior to areawide leasing the record number of acres offered (Sale 37, February 24, 1975) was 2,870,344, the first areawide sale in the Gulf offered 37,867,762 acres, an increase of 1,219.3%). The final major factor that has affected Gulf OCS activities is the recent decline in the price of crude oil on the world market. Although the other factors tended to support rapid development and consumption of Gulf resources, the decline in crude oil prices, coupled with declining reserves, has led to massive alterations of activity in the Gulf and a clear recognition of the area's dependence on offshore activities. Today there are more than 3,800 production platforms in the central and western Gulf. There is no other area of the planet in which OCS activities even approach this extent of development, and there is no other area where the effects of development are as clear. Public Response In general, OCS activities in the central and western Gulf have met with ready acceptance by local and regional residents. There are several factors—historical, social, and geographic—which have led to this public response. Historical Factors. Perhaps the most significant historical factor lies with the sequence of OCS development in Louisiana. Several points are important: First, OCS activity in the Gulf occurred as a gradual extension of land-based gas and oil production through the coastal marshes and into ever deeper federal waters. The initial push toward the Gulf of Mexico came in the early 1920s and 1930s as land-based drilling technology was adapted for drilling in the marshes of southern Louisiana and Texas. After the passage of OCSLA in 1953, the technology evolved rapidly. The evolution of offshore technology was paralleled by the emergence of a support sector and by new forms of work scheduling in answer to the logistical problems of operating at remote sites (Gramling, 1989). By the 1960s, development on the OCS off Louisiana and Texas was well under way—a trend that was exacerbated by the oil embargo of 1973 and 1974. Most of the history of offshore drilling, and most of the developments that allowed drilling to move into ever more hostile environments, happened in Louisiana and Texas as a gradual extension of land-based practices. Not only was the growth incremental, but it was focused on the solution of local problems for local use, and it was largely isolated from the mainstream economy and industrial

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (Bush, 1990). The lease area contains approximately 1.1 million acres and is estimated to contain between 20 million and 820 million barrels of oil and about 1.0 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Bush, 1990). Sale 119, announced in 1988 and scheduled for March 1991, has similarly been put on hold through congressional moratoria and the presidential action, until the year 2000. Moreover, the president directed the secretary of the interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration administrator to adopt the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary proposed by NOAA, permanently prohibiting oil and gas exploration and development within the sanctuary (Bush, 1990). Public Response Because reactions to proposed development in central and northern California were largely similar, we concentrate here on the responses in northern California, which the Socioeconomics Panel visited in July 1989. Public reaction to proposed offshore oil development must be viewed in the context of the northern California coast—a beautiful, rugged, and sparsely populated coastline. Many of its residents have moved to the area precisely because of its beauty, ruggedness, and isolation. The region is truly a spectacular coastal area. It has an abundance of marine mammals, birds, and fish, and its magnificent redwoods run to the sea's edge. Dominant industries include timber (which has declined in recent years), commercial fishing, and tourism. Reactions to the proposed development off the shore of northern California have been almost consistently negative and highly emotionally charged. Since the time leasing was first proposed in 1986, public groups in the small coastal communities have coalesced into an anti-oil movement, lobbying local, state, and federal officials to prevent the sale from taking place. Citizen participation reached a peak in February 1988 when several thousand residents jammed a public hearing in Fort Bragg on Sale 91. As a long-time student of OCS development and public reaction to high-level radioactive waste disposal, sociologist William Freudenburg reported he was dazed by what he saw in the tiny northern California coastal town (W. Freudenburg, pers. comm., University of Wisconsin, 1989). Freudenburg reported he had never seen such intensity on the part of citizens at a public hearing. One sign spoke for the community, "Save the Kansas Coast." Residents believe that the northern California coast is a national treasure; it is the coast of the citizens of Kansas, too. Citizen concerns focused on the following issues. Perhaps first and foremost was their unwillingness to take any risks with the special northern California environment for the sake of supplying oil to the nation for "only 28 to 45 days" (the estimated available resource offshore). This theme was emphasized again and again in various public fora ("there is no such thing as 'reasonable' degradation to the marine environment"). In particular, opposition to offshore oil development was tied to the absence of a national energy policy: "Why risk an area that depends on its natural resources for its social and economic health for a very small amount of oil when the federal government is doing nothing about energy conservation?'' Other major concerns were with economic losses to tourism, recreation, and the fishing and timber industries. Fears of a boom and bust cycle were expressed for an area already unstable because of the decline in the timber industry. Threats to the marine environment and the fishing industry were repeatedly echoed at public hearings. It is interesting to note, that, with very few exceptions and in contrast to other regions, the question of obtaining potential benefits from offshore oil development was not a factor.

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies Illustrative Effects The effects experienced in this case are primarily the same as the opportunity-threat impacts evident in Florida and Alaska, which the Socioeconomics Panel has noted earlier (NRC, 1989). However, in northern California these are perhaps clearer than they are in any other OCS region. The intensity and breadth of protest, community organization, and commitment in opposition to OCS activities leaves little doubt that significant social impacts have occurred, despite the fact that no lease sale has taken place. Oregon and Washington4 Nature and Extent of Development Several sedimentary basins are located on Oregon's and Washington's outer continental shelf that could contain commercially recoverable quantities of oil and gas. Federal lease sales were held in 1964 (MMS, 1989), and although several exploratory wells located petroleum-bearing strata, none registered commercial quantities. There are no active leases today in state or federal waters. In 1985 MMS conducted additional exploratory sampling off the coast of Oregon and Washington (Cook, 1985). Results from that study, although highly speculative, are the most often-quoted offshore oil and gas deposit estimates for development in the region. According to MMS, 180 million to 300 million barrels could lie off the Oregon and Washington coasts, of which 50 million to 60 million barrels might be recoverable at 1987 prices. This amount represents roughly enough oil to fuel the nation for three days (Good et al., 1987). Natural gas estimates of 3.26 trillion cubic feet were much more promising. The annual national demand is approximately 16 trillion cubic feet. Public Response With those potential resource estimates in hand, the Department of the Interior's Sale 132 was set to take place in April 1992. The planning area encompassed 190,900 square miles (12.7 million acres) off the Oregon and Washington coasts. The sale was strongly opposed by Oregon Governor Goldschmidt and Washington Governor Gardner, who requested the secretary of the interior to postpone "Minerals Management Service's ill-conceived proposal to open the entire outer continental shelf off the Oregon/Washington coasts to oil and gas leasing and development" (Governors' Letters, 1989). Illustrative Effects As with northern California, the existing effects have been limited to opportunity-threat impacts, and these appear to be less than those in northern California. Strictly considering the potential resource itself, it appears unlikely that substantial oil and gas development would occur off the coast of Oregon or Washington in the next 15 years. The estimates of the resource are low, and the costs of exploration and development stand as significant obstacles to any substantial oil and gas 4   This section is adapted from Cicin-Sain et al. (1990).

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies production near the two states. Three factors, in particular, contribute to these high expenses. First, the area's severe weather, especially during the winter, would hamper operations and endanger workers and equipment. Second, unless the oil is located within the shallow state waters, costs would increase rapidly because the water is much deeper off Oregon and Washington than it is elsewhere. Third, both states lack oil pipeline networks common in the Gulf of Mexico. Because resource estimates are so small, the construction of a pipeline is unlikely. Consequently, oil transportation would likely be by tanker—a much more expensive method than pipeline (Good et al., 1987). In his June 26, 1990, policy statement on offshore oil development, President Bush accepted the recommendations of the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing and Development Task Force (1990). The president's decision affecting Oregon and Washington was to conduct a series of additional environmental studies of the effects of oil and gas development off Washington and Oregon, including the Sale 132 area, before any environmental impact statement would be completed. These studies are expected to take 5 to 7 years, but have not begun. No sale will be considered until after the year 2000 and then only if studies show that development can be pursued in an environmentally safe manner (Bush, 1990). Atlantic Region Nature and Extent of Development Five geological formations in federal waters along the Atlantic continental shelf have been identified as potential sources of oil and gas recovery: the Georges Bank Basin off Cape Cod, Massachusetts; the Baltimore Canyon Basin off Atlantic City, New Jersey; the Carolina Basin off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina; the Southeast Georgia Embayment; and the Blake Plateau Basin off Florida's east coast (Weise, 1986). To date, however, there has been little OCS exploration and no production. There are three planning areas in the Atlantic OCS region: north, mid-Atlantic, and south. To these the Straits of Florida was added in 1986. Since OCS leasing began in 1976, activity in the region has centered on Georges Bank in the north Atlantic; Baltimore Canyon and, more recently, the Carolina Basin in the mid-Atlantic; and the Southeast Georgia Embayment in the south Atlantic. Leasing activity in the Atlantic OCS region began shortly after the oil embargo in 1973. The first—and still most profitable in the history of the region—was Sale 40 (Baltimore Canyon) in 1976. Summarizing the first 10 years, Wiese (1986) reports that [nine] lease sales have been conducted by MMS, 410 leases have been issued to the offshore industry, and 46 exploratory wells have been drilled. To date, these efforts have not produced a commercially recoverable discovery of oil or gas. This drilling history together with the current declining market for oil and gas has reduced OCS related activities in the Atlantic OCS region…. There are no announced plans for additional drilling on the Atlantic OCS by offshore operators. One exception is the exploration plan submitted by Mobil Oil Company recently for the Manteo Exploration Unit off of Cape Hatteras. Otherwise the picture has not changed materially since 1986. The leasing history of the region is given in a list of scheduled sales and their current status (Table C-2).

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies TABLE C-2 Leasing History of the Atlantic OCS Region Through 1991 Sale Year* Location Status 49 1976 Mid-Atlantic Lapsed 43 1978 South Atlantic Lapsed 42 1979 North Atlantic Lapsed 49 1979 Mid-Atlantic Lapsed 54   South Atlantic Canceled 56 1981 Mid-Atlantic (Carolina Basin) Active 59 1981 Mid-Atlantic Inactive RS-2 1982 South & Mid-Atlantic (reoffering) Inactive 52 1983 North Atlantic Canceled 76 1983 Mid-Atlantic Inactive 78 1983 Mid-Atlantic (Carolina Basin) 1-year moratorium (1990-91) 82 1985 North Atlantic Canceled 90 1986 South Atlantic Canceled 108 1990 South Atlantic Deferred 111 1986 Mid-Atlantic Canceled 96 1988 North Atlantic (Georges Bank) Canceled; 10-year moratorium (to ~2000) 121 1989 Mid-Atlantic Deferred 108 1990 South Atlantic Deferred 134 1991 Mid-Atlantic Pending * Year of sale Totals for the Atlantic OCS Region through 1986: North Atlantic: 1 sale, 2 COST and 8 exploratory wells, no commercial discoveries; South Atlantic: 4 sales, 1 COST and 6 exploratory wells drilled, no commercial discoveries Source: Adapted from Weise, 1986; MMS, 1988. Public Response After the oil embargo in the fall of 1973, President Nixon directed the secretary of the interior to increase the OCS acreage leased to 10 million acres beginning in 1975—an amount equal to all the acreage leased since the program began in 1953. "The basic objective of the proposed action in OCS development was to increase domestic production as rapidly as possible and reduce dependence on expensive and unstable foreign supplies" (Committee on Commerce, 1975). Of the 16 "frontier" states affected, 14 were on the Atlantic coast. A report by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1978) noted that although the states would support orderly development, the Department of Interior's "lack of awareness of the issues and concerns at the state level" might retard instead of accelerate OCS development. Indeed, "Following the decision to accelerate leasing, numerous bills that would amend the OCS Lands Act were introduced in the 94th Congress. None [was] enacted. Largely because of strong State objections and DOI's efforts to provide more meaningful public and State involvement, the OCS leasing

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies timetable has been slowed down since 1975" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1978). During the Reagan administration, the shift to areawide leasing and streamlined procedures introduced by Secretary Watt evoked similar public and community responses. In the 1980s, Sales 82 and 96 (Georges Bank) became focal points of OCS controversy. Sale 96 was scheduled for 1988, despite the fact that since 1982 congressional moratoria attached to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior had prohibited drilling on Georges Bank. Massachusetts also requested the exclusion of Georges Bank from Sale 96 (MMS, 1986). The Canadian government had already instituted a 12-year moratorium affecting its sector of Georges Bank, more for political than for environmental reasons. (Exploratory drilling was permitted by the Canadian government in the similarly productive Grand Banks area—the Hibernia Development Project.) Sale 96 was finally canceled by presidential decree on June 26, 1990. In his statement, President Bush declared that he was canceling Sale 96 and directing that no leasing and development take place in this area until after the year 2000. This will allow time for additional studies to determine the resource potential of the area and address the environmental and scientific concerns which have been raised (Bush, 1990). At the request of North Carolina, drilling in Manteo Exploratory Unit also was placed under a one-year moratorium in recent congressional action to permit further environmental studies. Illustrative Effects It does not follow from the lack of OCS development that there has been a lack of impacts. Chief among these have been the opportunity-threat impacts linked to scheduled lease sales and, in turn, to public and community response. The public response took place against a background of controversies over the siting of oil ports, terminals, and refineries for landing and processing imported oil (Carter, 1978; University of New Hampshire, 1974). Although public and community response must count heavily in assessing the socioeconomic impacts of Atlantic OCS region activities, there have been few socioeconomic studies undertaken by MMS or its predecessor, the Bureau of Land Management. A critical review of the adequacy of environmental information for Sale 96 was recently issued by the National Research Council's Committee to Review the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program (NRC, 1990). There have been state- and county-sponsored studies prompted by the anticipated impacts, however, funded under the (former) Coastal Energy Impact Program (Section 308 of the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976) and other legislative authorization, particularly the Sea Grant Program. Community impacts were experienced in the early stages of mid-Atlantic exploration in the case of the Brown and Root proposal for siting a 2,000-employee platform fabrication plant in the rural community of Cape Charles, Virginia (Urban Pathfinders, 1975a,b). There also have been effects on institutional arrangements for increasing local and regional planning capability in regard to managing OCS development. One example is the formation of the Mid-Atlantic Governors Association (Wilson, 1982). A related category of institutional impacts is that of intergovernmental relations, especially in the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act (Section 307(c)(1)). In large part, the story of the Atlantic region has been one of inflated resource estimates and disappointing finds. In his statement, President Bush called for additional studies of Georges Bank

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Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies "to determine the resource potential of the area and address the environmental and scientific concerns which have been raised." The crisis in the Persian Gulf revived concerns about disruptions of the oil supply and renewed interest in onshore and offshore production of domestic oil and gas. Widespread concern over global warming has promoted natural gas as a fuel of choice; and gas is more likely than oil to be found on the Atlantic OCS (Kerr, 1979). The story of the Atlantic region is also one of failure to adapt or create institutional arrangements for forging a consensus among interested parties. President Bush continued his statement of June 26, 1990, "My goal is to create a much more carefully targeted OCS program—one that is responsive to local concerns, to environmental concerns, and to the need to develop prudently our nation's domestic energy resources" (emphasis in the original). He concluded, "My desire is to achieve a balance between the need to provide energy for the American people and the need to protect unique and sensitive coastal and marine environments" (emphasis in the original). The lesson learned in the Atlantic region underscores both the difficulty and the necessity of achieving that balance. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Although the contrasting perceptions of the risks and benefits of OCS development arise from differing historical, physical, and social circumstances in the geographical and cultural areas where they are born and nurtured, through the political process these competing perspectives spread and become the anchor points for a national debate over OCS development. Since the OCS leasing program was developed in the Gulf of Mexico, in an ironic twist, the unique perspective that had evolved in the Gulf became more or less the perspective of the federal agencies initially charged with the OCS program (U.S. Geological Survery and Bureau of Land Management), and resulted in increasing conflict between these federal agencies and the majority of the coastal states. Today for all practical purposes the outer continental shelf of most of the continental United States is closed to development, and MMS—the agency whose primary goal is "orderly development of the marine mineral resources" (MMS, 1987)—finds its position in conflict with that of most of the coastal states. This has resulted in MMS being denied access to the majority of those resources. The Gulf "model" simply has not worked outside the socioeconomic and political environment where it emerged, and it is instructive to note that the only other successful OCS development has occurred under an almost diametrically opposite model in the southern California area. It is interesting that this development, unlike that in the Gulf, clearly follows the requirements of OCSLA to monitor the effects of OCS activities subsequent to leasing. The implications of this fact are not lost on the Socioeconomics Panel. REFERENCES Alarcon, S., J. Friedman, and S. Krieg. 1987. Joint review panels: A cooperative approach. Pp. 3734-3741 in Coastal Zone '87. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers. Amy, D.J. 1983. Environmental mediation: An alternative approach to policy disputes. Policy Sciences 15:345-365. Amy, D.J. 1987. The Politics of Environmental Mediation. New York: Columbia University Press. Albrecht, S.L. 1978. Sociocultural factors and energy resource development in rural areas in the west. J. Environ. Mgmt. 7:73-90.

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