National Academies Press: OpenBook

Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (1992)

Chapter: Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives

« Previous: Appendix B: The Human Environment
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Appendix C
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL OCS PROGRAM: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

by B. Cicin-Sain, R. Gramling, R. Johnson, and C. Wolf

The development of oil and gas resources found in the federally controlled outer continental shelf (OCS) of the United States has, since its inception in 1954, yielded significant national benefits—the provision of energy supplies, positive contributions to the balance of payments, contributions to the federal treasury, and the generation of jobs and other economic activity. At the same time, the federal offshore oil and gas development program has been marked by extensive and recurrent intergovernmental controversy that has significantly influenced the course of the OCS program and, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has in effect halted the expansion of the program.

To understand the status of the OCS program, it is important to understand its historical context—the evolution of the program since the 1940s, when the federal government first asserted a role in the development of the outer continental shelf. This appendix first provides a national overview of the evolution of federal offshore oil and gas policy and the conflicts that have accompanied it. It then examines the course of offshore oil development in the regions of the United States where OCS development has either taken place or been proposed—the Gulf of Mexico; Alaska; California; Oregon and Washington; and the Atlantic. This section concludes with observations about the factors that have either facilitated or impeded the program's progress in the various regions.

NATIONAL OVERVIEW

The importance of the OCS program is difficult to overestimate. Since the mid-1970s, 8-10% of total domestic production of crude oil, and 20-25% of domestic natural gas production have come from the OCS leasing program (Manuel, 1984; MMS, 1989, 1991).

In addition to constituting a major portion of production for domestic use, OCS oil and gas revenues contribute significantly to the U.S. treasury; they are the fourth largest source of federal revenue, after personal income taxes, social insurance receipts, and corporate income taxes. The federal government has received more than $100 billion from OCS activity during the life of the program (MMS, 1992).

Offshore oil and gas development also generate significant economic activity by creating new

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

jobs and stimulating existing enterprises to meet the need for materials for the exploration, development, and production of oil and gas. For example, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of the Interior estimates that in the Gulf of Mexico (where most of the OCS development has occurred) some 130,000 jobs depend directly or indirectly on the program; in southern California (the only other site of current OCS development), 40,000 to 60,000 jobs depend directly or indirectly on the program (MMS, 1988, 1989, 1991).

Notwithstanding such obvious benefits, the development of offshore oil and gas resources in the United States has been marked by extensive and recurrent conflict between the federal government and the affected states and localities. These conflicts, which began in the 1940s, have involved questions of resource ownership, of management control, of spillover effects on adjacent communities, and of the distribution of benefits (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1987).

Together with other influences—the status of world energy supply and demand, the actions of the oil industry, the orientations of various U.S. administrations, the patterns of public consumption of energy resources, and public attitudes toward the environment—these conflicts have molded the nature, shape, and pace of the federal offshore oil program. To explore the forces that have affected the evolution of the federal OCS program, we begin with a brief history.

Historical Overview

The first offshore oil and gas development in the United States took place in 1897 off the south-central coast of California (in Summerland) from a wooden pier that extended into the Pacific Ocean. The success of this first attempt brought quick emulation, and by 1902 a photograph of the Summerland development "at its peak" shows more than 40 derricks on piers over the Pacific (Lankford, 1971).

The second push for overwater drilling took place at Caddo Lake, southeast of Shreveport, Louisiana, beginning in 1910. The Caddo Lake development required the solving of several technical problems, which were to have later implications for the move offshore into the Gulf of Mexico. First, the pressures were beyond anything encountered before, and many of the early wells blew out, caught fire, and burned uncontrollably. The movement into the Caddo field and subsequently into the deeper, and higher pressure fields common to the Gulf coast, was quickly followed by the emergence of increasingly reliable blowout preventers (see especially Brantly, 1971). A second requirement of the Caddo development was the ability to drill and produce without direct connection to land, although the initial exploration and development was little more than creative use of existing land-based drilling techniques. Platforms were constructed on pilings driven into the lake bottom, and drilling equipment was taken by barge to the site. Finally, another technological innovation, an underwater pipeline connecting the production wells to one of four gathering stations on the lake, was a precursor of the collection lines now used offshore.

This technology surged ahead in 1924 with the development of the Maracaibo field, one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, ultimately producing about 4.6 billion barrels of oil (Lankford, 1971). Lake Maracaibo in northern Venezuela differed from Caddo Lake in three important ways. First, it is larger, approximately two-thirds the size of Lake Erie. Second, it is up to 120 feet deep. Finally, it is connected to salt water. This last characteristic required the first modification in drilling practices when in 1924 Lago Petroleum Company brought in the first well over water in Lake Maracaibo. The problem was the teredo, or shipworm, a marine mollusc that thrives in the brackish water of the lake and that destroyed pilings in six to eight months. This forced a movement to alternative materials, eventually leading to concrete pilings and steel decks for marine platforms. Finally, the frequent drilling in Lake Maracaibo led to the use of the steam drilling barge.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

The derrick was still mounted on the platform but the engines and machinery for drilling were mounted on a barge that could be moved easily from platform to platform. This increased mobility led to considerable savings, and provided a model for the drilling tenders first used in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

An additional breakthrough came in 1933 with introduction by the Texas Company (later to become Texaco) of the submersible drilling barge. The barge could be towed to a site and sunk to provide a stable base for the drilling rig, which was mounted on the barge. Once drilling was complete, the barge could be raised and moved to a new location. The drilling barge eliminated the sunk cost of platform construction for exploratory drilling, and was a prototype for the mobile drilling rigs that came into use in the 1950s and 1960s.

Offshore development continued through the 1930s and 1940s in near-shore state waters in California and Louisiana. The state of California first began issuing leases in 1929, and Louisiana began issuing leases for near-shore waters in 1936.

Before 1940, both the federal government and the coastal states assumed that the states owned any oil and gas deposits in the submerged "tidelands" adjacent to their coasts as a remnant of the jurisdiction of the original 13 colonies over the marginal sea (Miller, 1984). However, with the discovery of significant oil and gas resources and given the growing economic importance of these resources, in the 1940s the federal government began to assert its own claims to resource ownership.

In September 1945, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation asserting U.S. jurisdiction over continental shelf resources (Executive Order 9633, Federal Register 12304 (1945); 59 Stat. 885). In administrative action in 1937 and in a 1945 landmark suit brought to the Supreme Court, United States v. California, the federal government argued that because the territorial sea concept of the marginal sea did not arise until after the American Revolution, there were no existing property rights for the states to succeed to at the time of independence (Miller, 1984). In 1947, the Court surprised many observers by handing down its decision that the federal government required "paramount rights" in coastal waters to fulfill its responsibilities to the nation as a whole for foreign policy, national security, and interstate commerce and that it was impossible to split the resource questions from these broader issues (United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)).

The coastal states and ultimately the Congress reacted sharply to the Supreme Court decision and, in 1952, ownership of the submerged lands became a prominent issue in the presidential election, with Dwight D. Eisenhower supporting the case of the states. The compromise finally attained through congressional action in 1953 was a strict division of authority between federal and state governments, and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315) gave the states title to the submerged lands and resources of the territorial sea (then to three miles offshore), including "the right and power to manage, lease, develop, and use" them. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953 (43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356) established that the "subsoil and seabed of the outer continental shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." OCSLA was a brief and general law that gave the federal government (through the secretary of the interior) the mandate to lease offshore lands to the highest bidders in the petroleum industry with few conditions or strings attached. OCSLA generally followed the Truman proclamation of 1945 in affirming the rights of the United States to the natural resources of the continental shelf, while stating that the character of the superadjacent waters remained unchanged with regard to fishing and navigation rights (Mangone, 1977).

It became clear that substantial amounts of oil and gas existed in the Gulf of Mexico, probably off the coasts of California and Alaska, and perhaps off the East Coast as well. The coastal states individually and in groups sued the federal government to extend state boundaries. All efforts failed except for those of Florida and Texas. The Supreme Court ruled that in these two cases, the preadmission boundaries of about nine nautical miles had been approved by the U.S. government on

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

admission of these states into the Union (United States v. Florida et al., 363 U.S. 121 (1960) and United States v. Louisiana et al., 363 U.S. 1 (1960)).

Conflicts over resource ownership were settled, at least temporarily, with the enactment of the two laws in 1953. Discussion of the questions of ownership and management of offshore resources was reopened briefly after the December 1988 proclamation by President Ronald W. Reagan extending the U.S. territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles offshore, in accordance with the practice established of most other nations. However, in the 1990 reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Management Act (16 U.S.C. §§1451-1464), Congress amended the definition of "coastal zone." Section 1543 of Title 16 of the U.S. Code had previously defined "coastal zone" as extending ''seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea." The 1990 amendment changed that definition to provide that the zone extends "seaward to the outer limit of State title and ownership under the Submerged Lands Act.'' This clarification was part of a package of amendments in the reauthorization bill that had the effect of increasing the management authority of the coastal states, through the consistency process, over federally conducted or licensed activities outside the coastal zone that affect "any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone" (16 U.S.C. §1456(c)).

Federal Leasing, 1954-1978

The first federal lease sale of OCS rights occurred for the Gulf of Mexico in 1954, the year after the passage of OCSLA. From that point, with a few exceptions, lease sales have occurred at least annually in the Gulf (and usually two or three times a year). Federal waters off the coasts of Florida, California, and Oregon and Washington were gradually added to the program, and there were lease sales in these areas in 1959, 1963, and 1964, respectively (MMS, 1986, 1989). With these expansions the Department of the Interior began to meet resistance to its leasing program.

The rapid momentum in federal leasing that characterized the 1960s came to an abrupt halt in 1969 in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara, California, oil spill. On Jan. 29, 1969, Union Oil's Platform A in the Santa Barbara Channel blew out and some 3 million gallons of oil spewed forth to affect a 660-square-mile area and more than 150 miles of coastline, killing birds and other marine life (Nash et al., 1972).

The Santa Barbara oil spill proved a catalytic event in the rise of the environmental movement. Images of the extensive damage to beautiful beach areas, the plight of seabirds covered with oil, the dead marine life—widely transmitted through the extensive media coverage the event received—contributed to a growing awareness that resource development could pose a serious threat to the environment. An immediate effect of the spill was the postponement of additional lease sales in the Pacific region for five years; initial sales in the Atlantic and Alaska regions also were put off. Moreover, partly as a result of the spill, the 1970s were to see the enactment of several major actions aimed at regulating and protecting the environment, particularly ocean and coastal resources. These actions significantly affected the operation of the OCS program. They included the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. §§1361-1407, 50 CFR 216), the Clean Air Act of 1972, the Clean Water Act of 1972, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. §§1401-1445; P.L. 92-352), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543, 50 CFR 17), the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, and the OCSLA amendments of 1978 (43 U.S.C. §§1801-1866).

For energy questions, however, the situation was to significantly change again in the mid-1970s as new pressures for accelerated development of the outer continental shelf were prompted by the oil embargoes of 1973 and 1974. The embargoes resulted in significant shortages and long lines at gasoline pumps for U.S. consumers and in a dramatic rise in the price of crude oil. From

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

October 1973 to January 1974 the price of Arabian light crude oil increased from $5.12 to $11.65 per barrel. This increase came on top of a doubling of the price from $2.59 per barrel in January 1973 (Darmstadter and Landsberg, 1976; Oil and Gas Journal, 1988). The escalation provided an additional incentive for the exploration and development of the OCS reserves. After the embargoes, President Richard M. Nixon responded to the shortages and price rises with Project Independence, which was to provide the mechanism for increased OCS activity. The plan called for the secretary of the interior to expand the OCS area offered to 10 million acres in 1975 (about triple what had been planned earlier) and to begin lease sales in all frontier areas. In 1975 lease sales resumed for the Pacific OCS; the first lease sales occurred for the Atlantic in 1976 and for Alaska in 1977. The number of acres leased in the Gulf of Mexico in 1975 exceeded that of any previous year (MMS, 1989).

In response to these developments, coastal states, local governments, fishermen, and environmentalists mobilized to amend OCLSA to incorporate more stringent and elaborate environmental review as part of the oil leasing, exploration, and development process. The groups also set out to provide an enhanced role for the states and the public in the decision-making process.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 19781

Congress had sought two major goals in amending the 1953 version of OCSLA: to expedite the development of offshore resources and, while doing so, to protect the marine, coastal, and human environment. The energy crisis and widespread public alarm over blowouts and tanker spills had compelled a general reexamination of the nation's energy policy and its program for developing offshore oil and gas resources. By the mid-1970s almost 50% of the oil consumed in the United States came from foreign sources; 36% came from the Middle East. It was widely believed that this amount of dependence on energy resources from volatile and politically unstable sources made the U.S. economy vulnerable to oil embargoes, reduced what was then a favorable balance of trade, and jeopardized national security. OCS resource estimates encouraged the view that energy independence could be achieved by accelerating OCS production (U.S. Congress, 1977).

Upon examination, the 1953 act looked woefully inadequate to its critics in the Congress for the task of bringing about a dramatic increase in offshore energy production in the 1970s. Coastal states, environmentalists, and the public, in turn, focused attention on the act's lack of environmental planning, standards, and safeguards. The Department of the Interior's preference for large, up-front bonus payments in addition to royalties on production from OCS leases was strongly criticized because this practice was thought to exclude small companies and to reduce competition. Administration of the leasing program was viewed as essentially a closed process involving the secretary of the interior and the oil industry (U.S. Congress, 1977). The 1953 act did not provide a mechanism to remedy the damage caused by OCS development to the states or to communities, which feared they would bear the burden of any expansion in offshore energy production. It also did nothing to compensate other users of ocean space and resources, such as fishermen. The act offered no assistance to state and local governments in planning for, nor did it compensate fishermen for economic loss resulting from, OCS development. Finally, a frequently expressed criticism of the 1953 act was that it was essentially a total delegation of authority for the use of the outer continental shelf to the secretary of the interior.

The Congress intended the OCSLA amendments to address these perceived inadequacies in the 1953 act. To limit the broad discretion allowed the secretary under the earlier Act to manage

1  

This discussion is taken from Cicin-Sain et al. (in preparation).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

OCS development, the amendments required a five-year leasing program, which would describe the size, timing, and location of proposed lease sales and prohibit the lease of any area not included in the plan. Alternative bidding methods (in addition to bonus bids and fixed royalties) were authorized and required on an experimental basis. Studies were mandated to assess the effects of OCS projects on the human, marine, and coastal environments. OCS development was divided into four stages: preparation of a five-year lease plan, lease sales, exploration, and development. Separate plans for exploration and development were required. Before conducting lease sales and approving OCS exploration and development plans and projects, the secretary had to consult with the governors of the affected states and accept their recommendations if the secretary found them to be in the national interest. Funds were created for oil spill contingencies and to compensate fishermen for damages and loss of fishing gear due to OCS activities.

Amending OCSLA involved a very protracted and divisive four-year effort in Congress. Environmental and conservation groups, joined by national associations representing state and local governments and fishing interests, supported passage of the legislation. The oil companies, their trade associations, and other business groups generally opposed it. Before January 1977 and the beginning of the Carter administration, the Department of the Interior strongly opposed any effort at reforming OCSLA; but after President Jimmy Carter's inauguration and his appointment of Cecil Andrus as secretary of the interior, the new administration also urged OCS legislative reform.

It should be noted that although the coalition that supported the passage of the amendments (the states and the environmental groups) was successful in achieving a more stringent and elaborate environmental review process for oil leasing, exploration, and development, the gains made by the states in the 1978 amendments were limited. Sections 18 and 19 of OCSLA charge the secretary of the interior with preparing five-year plans for leasing lands on the outer continental shelf and with consulting with the governors of the affected states on the content of these plans as well as of specific plans for development and production. The consultation with the states required by the act, however, is only that—consultation—and the secretary is quite free to override state objections on the grounds of national interest.

Implementing the 1978 Amendments: Conflict and Controversy

Implementation of the 1978 amendments has been fraught with serious controversy, extensive litigation, and circumvention of the decision processes established by OCSLA. Only in the Gulf of Mexico did increased oil activity proceed without incident, largely as a result of the longstanding and powerful presence of the oil industry in that region, which predates the rise of the environmental movement. However, in coastal areas where no oil development had yet taken place (the Northeast, parts of California, Alaska), extensive conflicts resulted that involved state and local interests, fishermen, and environmentalists on one side, and the Department of the Interior and the oil industry on the other.

In 1982, Secretary of the Interior James Watt combined all of the leasing, regulation, and research functions pertaining to the OCS program into the Minerals Management Service (MMS). In 1983, Watt made another change, to allow going areawide leasing on the OCS. This procedure opened entire areas (such as the central portion of the Gulf of Mexico) rather than designated tracts for leasing. This greatly increased the acreage offered for lease.

Areawide leasing was a major element of the increasing conflict between federal agencies and most of the governing bodies of the coastal states (Goldstein, 1982). State pressure was felt nationally, and Congress got into the act.

By the mid-1980s, Congress was regularly limiting which portions of the outer continental shelf could be leased by MMS by attaching stipulations on how funds could be spent to the

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Department of the Interior's appropriation bill. The debate intensified until President George Bush in his budget address of January 1989 delayed three controversial sales off Florida and California until a presidential task force (OCS Leasing and Development Task Force, 1990) and the National Academy of Sciences could examine the issues and information available for decision making (NRC, 1989). The National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences found the information lacking in all three sale areas. Particularly noted as lacking was information required by OCSLA about the effects on the human environment.

On June 26, 1990, President Bush announced a moratorium on lease sales for much of the continental United States until the year 2000. In the same statement, he directed the secretary of the interior to change the federal leasing policy. The secretary was directed to

  • collect the information necessary to determine the effects of OCS development, including conducting the studies recommended by the National Academy of Sciences

  • more carefully select the areas offered for lease

  • prepare legislation that would give states directly affected by OCS activities a greater share of the financial benefits of development and a greater voice in decision making.

Although the Department of the Interior has sent a revenue sharing bill to Congress, it is quite safe to say that, in terms of a greater voice in decision making, increased information collection, and more careful selection of areas to lease, few of the requested changes have been made.

Another significant action in 1990 also affected OCS activities. As described by a secretarial committee on ocean policy of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1978), "The Coastal Zone Management Act is an experiment in federalism. It involves an intricate pattern of intergovernmental relationships and a redistribution of political power among state, federal, local, and regional governments." How far that redistribution went in the case of OCS oil and gas leasing was temporally defined by the five-to-four Supreme Court decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California, which held that consistency provisions do not apply to Department of the Interior sales (Eichenberg and Archer, 1987). In the fall of 1990 Congress reauthorized the Coastal Zone Management Act specifically to overturn this decision. Thus, the sociopolitical realities to which consistency was addressed remain and will probably have major implications for the OCS program.

In the fall of 1991, Congress passed the most restrictive appropriations bill yet (as far as limitations on OCS lease sales) for the department. The result of this political conflict has been for all practical purposes to close down the outer continental shelf of most of the continental United States for development.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

In each of the regions where offshore oil development has either taken place or been proposed (Figs. 1-1 and 1-2 of Socioeconomics Panel report), there have been somewhat different adaptations or reactions by the adjacent local and state communities. In some areas (such as Louisiana), offshore oil activities became an integral part of state and local communities and were warmly received; in others (such as northern California), vehement local opposition preempted lease sales. In still other areas (south-central California), development was accommodated only after protracted and complex negotiations that resulted in the adoption of extensive permit conditions and mitigation measures. Similarly, socioeconomic effects appear to vary according to location, although there are some general patterns of effects associated with each stage of development (prelease, exploration, development, production, termination) that appear to have occurred everywhere.

Here we review various regional experiences with offshore oil development. It is important

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

to gain some understanding of the apparent effects in various localities and of the dynamics of public responses to them.

Our discussion, however, is hindered by the scarcity of information about the social, economic, and political evolution of offshore oil development throughout the United States and by the lack of studies that compare experiences in various regions. Within these limitations we review three major topics for each large area where OCS development either has taken place or has been proposed (the Gulf of Mexico; Alaska; California; Washington and Oregon; and the Atlantic):

  • the nature and extent of OCS development

  • public responses to the development

  • actual or potential illustrative effects.

By way of clarification, we mean by public responses to OCS development the responses or adaptations of local and state governments or local and state organized groups to OCS activities. On the basis of the data available and from the Socioeconomics Panel's visits to the various regions, it appears that the differences in public responses in various regions around the country are related to the following variables:

  • the time period during which the first announcement of a proposed lease sale or actual development occurred

  • the physical characteristics of the ocean and the coastal zone in the region

  • the socioeconomic and cultural context of the affected localities and states (including their relationship to the environment)

  • the extent to which there were other major users of the ocean

  • the degree of political mobilization of the affected communities.

Actual or potential illustrative effects are the intended or unintended consequences that are expected to or appear to have accompanied offshore oil development. We emphasize "illustrative effects" and "appear to have accompanied offshore oil development" because there are few systematic studies that have isolated, in a causal manner, the social, economic, and political effects of OCS oil development.

Gulf of Mexico Region

Most of the petroleum products produced from on the OCS have come from the Gulf of Mexico (well over 90% of the oil and about 99% of the gas; MMS, 1989). And most of that production (97.6% of the oil and 88.1% of the gas) has been supported from Louisiana in the central region of the Gulf (MMS, 1989). Because most OCS development in the United States has occurred off of, or has been supported from, the central and western Gulf, particularly Louisiana, the discussion of the Gulf will be broken into two sections, the central and western Gulf (primarily Louisiana, but also Texas, to provide an example of extended effects), and Florida (which has taken a different position on OCS development from that of the other states in the region).

Central and Western Gulf
Nature and Extent of Development

Although development in protected waters contiguous to the Gulf began in the 1920s and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

early 1930s, the initial exploration and development amounted to little more than creative use of existing land-based drilling technology. Pilings were driven into the seabed, a platform was constructed, and drilling equipment was taken by barge to the site. As interest in deeper prospects grew, these techniques became too expensive; the nonrecoverable cost of platform construction (which became considerable in deeper water and with exposure to larger waves) was constant, regardless of the outcome of the drilling. The 1933 creation of the drilling barge pointed the way for the movement offshore. Although the Texas Company's barge was designed for use in protected inland waters, by the mid-1950s marine drilling barges were working in the shallow Gulf (Brantly, 1971; Stallings, 1984).

Because its leaders saw the potential of the Gulf waters for petroleum extraction, the state of Louisiana in 1936 created the State Mineral Board, which was directed to competitively lease the waters adjacent to the state. The claims of the various states and the federal government concerning the ownership and jurisdiction of submerged lands led to the Truman proclamation of 1945, which asserted federal rights to submerged lands. Despite the proclamation, in the absence of clear legal precedent, Louisiana (and Texas, which soon followed) continued to lease offshore lands, including those later defined as part of the OCS (Mead et al., 1985). The first exploratory drilling on what is now the OCS was carried out in 1946 by Magnolia Petroleum Company southeast of Eugene Island, Louisiana, six miles from land.

The first federal OCS lease sale was held in the Gulf of Mexico in October 1954 (MMS, 1989). In all, 394,721 acres were leased and the federal government received cash bonuses of more than $116 million. A second sale was held later that year. From that point, with a few notable exceptions (1956, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1965), lease sales have occurred at least annually (and usually two or three times a year; Table C-1).

In 1954, 64 new wells were started in Louisiana OCS, most of them as a result of earlier lease sales. By 1964, there were 647, an annual figure that remained fairly constant for the next two decades. The value of OCS production rose similarly. The value of Louisiana OCS oil and natural gas produced in 1954 was about $5.4 million. By 1980, this had risen to more than $11.4 billion (Manuel, 1984).

There have been several incidents or trends that have affected (or failed to affect) OCS activity in the central and western Gulf. First, what did not happen in the Gulf was a slowdown of OCS activity in the aftermath of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. Lease sales in the Pacific were postponed for five years, as were initial sales in the Atlantic and Alaska. In the Gulf, it was business as usual (Table C-1).

Second, the 1973-1974 oil embargo had a massive effect on OCS activity in the Gulf. Two factors directly affected OCS operations in the Gulf. First, the dramatic rise in the price of domestic and foreign crude oil provided an economic incentive for exploration and development, and second, early in 1974 President Nixon offered the country a quick fix in the form of Project Independence, which provided the mechanism for the secretary of the interior to increase the OCS acreage offered for lease and to begin lease sales in all frontier areas. Magnuson and Hollings (1975) noted four problems with the plan:

  • Reexamination of the U.S. Geological Survey's overly optimistic estimates of reserves called into question the ability of the OCS tracts to produce not only the quantities needed, but for the length of time required.

  • The increased offerings would probably result in fewer dollars per acre for bonus bids for OCS leases.

  • Increased effects on coastal areas would result from the increased activities.

  • The capacity industry needed to explore the increased acreage (drilling rigs, support vessels) did not exist.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

TABLE C-1 OCS Activities in the Gulf of Mexico

Year

Tracts offered

Acres offered

Tracts leased

Acres leased

Total $ bonuses

$ Bonuses per acre

Expl. wells

Developed wells

54

237

860,608

109

461,870

139,735,505

303

3

61

55

210

674,095

121

402,567

108,528,726

270

18

117

56

0

0

0

0

0

NA

41

182

57

0

0

0

0

0

NA

47

282

58

0

0

0

0

0

NA

56

172

59

118

539,813

42

171,300

89,746,992

524

86

213

60

385

1,610,254

147

704,526

282,641,815

401

114

259

61

0

0

0

0

0

NA

110

335

62

830

3,718,115

420

1,929,177

489,481,061

254

148

351

63

0

0

0

0

0

NA

188

357

64

28

34,028

23

32,671

60,340,626

1,847

200

474

65

0

0

0

0

0

NA

169

619

66

70

263,891

41

139,773

188,010,893

1,345

260

596

67

206

971,489

158

744,456

510,079,178

685

287

604

68

195

775,375

126

570,983

743,767,835

1,303

294

651

69

65

190,153

36

108,657

110,945,535

1,021

215

607

70

161

666,845

138

598,510

945,064,773

1,579

201

628

71

18

55,872

11

37,222

96,304,523

2,587

254

556

72

210

970,771

178

826,195

2,251,347,556

2,725

296

545

73

276

1,514,940

187

1,032,570

3,082,462,611

2,985

291

527

74

1,006

5,006,881

356

1,762,158

5,022,860,815

2,850

336

459

75

1,143

5,989,734

265

1,369,828

670,821,011

490

310

517

76

193

942,092

77

337,413

555,125,455

1,645

278

782

77

223

1,074,536

124

605,427

1,170,093,432

1,933

322

851

78

362

1,865,423

206

1,052,467

1,666,298,621

1,583

305

808

79

247

1,166,118

171

812,702

3,160,826,960

3,889

334

753

80

273

1,367,883

183

934,977

4,094,889,184

4,380

349

754

81

421

2,159,295

258

1,308,213

3,893,097,504

2,976

327

808

82

378

1,952,417

171

871,478

1,802,832,942

2,069

372

792

83

13,023

71,153,488

1,040

5,393,997

4,906,889,551

910

378

717

84

20,816

115,413,886

970

5,125,178

2,478,473,398

484

559

710

85

15,754

87,028,709

670

3,529,325

1,542,346,514

437

490

617

86

10,724

58,670,104

142

734,427

187,094,747

255

263

396

87

10,926

31,846,415

640

3,447,825

497,247,006

144

399

416

88

11,282

61,492,451

917

4,829,523

514,083,346

106

550

423

89

11,013

60,097,672

1,049

5,580,867

645,646,870

115

475

501

90

10,459

56,788,766

825

4,263,446

584,301,918

137

451

 

 

Source: MMS, 1991a.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Despite this analysis, increased leasing moved ahead. In the Gulf, acreage sold in 1975 exceeded that of any previous year (MMS, 1989).

It should be noted that movement into many of the "frontier" regions was supported from the Gulf of Mexico. Because of the nature of the concentrated work scheduling associated with offshore employment (workers generally spend 14 days on duty and 14 days off) it is possible for individuals to live at a considerable distance from where they regularly work (Gramling, 1989). In addition, many of the products purchased for offshore exploration and development are inherently mobile, so they can be constructed in any coastal region in the world. Of the five production platforms in place in the Pacific OCS before 1975, two were built in Morgan City, Louisiana (MMS, 1989). Thus, the support sector (both for capital investment and for labor) in the Gulf of Mexico grew throughout the 1970s in response to continued activity in the Gulf, as well as in response to development in frontier OCS areas.

The third factor that has affected OCS activity in the Gulf was the decision by Secretary of the Interior Watt to allow areawide leasing in 1983. This opened up large areas (such as the western Gulf of Mexico) and drastically increased the number of acres and tracts offered for lease in the Gulf. (Prior to areawide leasing the record number of acres offered (Sale 37, February 24, 1975) was 2,870,344, the first areawide sale in the Gulf offered 37,867,762 acres, an increase of 1,219.3%).

The final major factor that has affected Gulf OCS activities is the recent decline in the price of crude oil on the world market. Although the other factors tended to support rapid development and consumption of Gulf resources, the decline in crude oil prices, coupled with declining reserves, has led to massive alterations of activity in the Gulf and a clear recognition of the area's dependence on offshore activities.

Today there are more than 3,800 production platforms in the central and western Gulf. There is no other area of the planet in which OCS activities even approach this extent of development, and there is no other area where the effects of development are as clear.

Public Response

In general, OCS activities in the central and western Gulf have met with ready acceptance by local and regional residents. There are several factors—historical, social, and geographic—which have led to this public response.

Historical Factors. Perhaps the most significant historical factor lies with the sequence of OCS development in Louisiana. Several points are important: First, OCS activity in the Gulf occurred as a gradual extension of land-based gas and oil production through the coastal marshes and into ever deeper federal waters. The initial push toward the Gulf of Mexico came in the early 1920s and 1930s as land-based drilling technology was adapted for drilling in the marshes of southern Louisiana and Texas. After the passage of OCSLA in 1953, the technology evolved rapidly. The evolution of offshore technology was paralleled by the emergence of a support sector and by new forms of work scheduling in answer to the logistical problems of operating at remote sites (Gramling, 1989). By the 1960s, development on the OCS off Louisiana and Texas was well under way—a trend that was exacerbated by the oil embargo of 1973 and 1974.

Most of the history of offshore drilling, and most of the developments that allowed drilling to move into ever more hostile environments, happened in Louisiana and Texas as a gradual extension of land-based practices. Not only was the growth incremental, but it was focused on the solution of local problems for local use, and it was largely isolated from the mainstream economy and industrial

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

development. Unlike OCS oil and gas production in other regions, it did not appear suddenly, full-blown and threatening to the environment or to the local way of life.

A second historical consideration concerns not just the gradual nature of offshore development in the central and western Gulf, but the period in which it began. The initial development was well under way by the late 1930s. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, the period during which most of the opposition to OCS activity took place, the 1930s and 1940s antedated a general environmental awareness; it was an "exuberant" time (Catton and Dunlap, 1980) of nationwide growth and faith in technology. There was little conception of the marsh as a fragile and finite ecosystem. Drilling procedures consisted of the most efficient way to get a job done, often allowing the construction of canals through marshes to allow submersible drilling barges to operate. In this sense, offshore drilling evolved in the Gulf as an environmentally insensitive activity.

These factors contributed to making the central and western Gulf coast in the 1930s and 1940s very different from the rest of the country in the 1970s and 1980s, and to producing a local image of offshore development that is not likely to be repeated in the future.

Social, Economic, and Political Factors. Several social factors affected public response to OCS activities in the central and western Gulf. First, the states of Louisiana and Texas at the time were actively and aggressively marketing the offshore waters for oil production.

Second, at least in coastal Louisiana, the economy was traditionally based on extractive activities. Products for export from the Atchafalaya Basin (cypress lumber, fish, crawfish, moss [for furniture stuffing], water fowl) and from the coastal marsh (furs, shrimp, oysters) were the mainstay of the local economy at the turn of the century (Comeaux, 1972). Oil was simply another extractable resource that emerged in conjunction with more traditional pursuits.

The primary extractive activities in coastal Louisiana prior to World War II were in the coastal marsh and contiguous swamps (Comeaux, 1972). There was no long tradition of offshore fisheries as, for example, exists on the East Coast. In fact, the current major commercial species in the Louisiana Gulf, shrimp, wasn't known to be available in the open Gulf until the 1950s. As a consequence, both offshore activities—oil and gas development and fishing and other types of extraction of renewable resources—grew up together. In fact, early exploration for oil was done from shrimping vessels leased by the oil companies (Morgan City Historical Society, 1960).

Finally, adaptation to OCS activities has affected the public response to them. Through the first OCS lease sale in 1954, spurred on by the oil embargo, and until the 1982 explosion in offshore activities, the support sectors for those activities grew steadily in the Gulf of Mexico. Thus, for over two generations offshore development and support have expanded to become a mainstay of the Louisiana coastal economy, and they are an accepted regional institution.

Geographic Factors. Another factor that leads to the difference between the public response in the central and western Gulf and that of the rest of the country is the geography of the Gulf. In most of the coastal areas of the United States much of the population lives on or near the coast, and virtually all of the coast is accessible by road. In the central and western Gulf very little of the population lives on or near the coast, and with the exception of Galveston, Texas, there is little coastal access by road in the area of most intense OCS development, which stretched from Corpus Christi, Texas, to Mississippi. This is a result of the extensive band of marsh that runs parallel to the coastline, mainly in Louisiana. Because of this, not only are proximity and access different in the Gulf, but perceptions of the coast are radically different. In much of the country the coast is seen as a valuable public resource, a thing of beauty, and a source of popular recreation. In Louisiana, particularly, the coast is rarely visited for recreation, and descriptions are more likely to involve alligators and mosquitos than spectacular scenery.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Nor does the Gulf inspire the type of awe commonly associated with the coast in other parts of the country. The wife of a salmon fisherman wrote concerning the meeting of the Socioeconomics Panel in Fort Bragg, California:

Did anyone mention the nature of our coast here? We live on a lee shore, our weather comes right from the Gulf of Alaska. It is spectacular but nonetheless common to watch 25 and 30 foot seas break clear across Mendocino Bay as they roll in from thousands of miles of unbroken ocean, driven by the winter storms.

The geography and topography of the area also have led to fewer conflicts over use, particularly compared with the West Coast. Louisiana and Texas are characterized by an abundance of waterways that provide coastal access and docking space. Thus dock space in Louisiana is limited not by a lack of suitable harbors, but by a lack of facilities, a shortage which can be easily remedied by construction. This is not true in California and much of the rest of the country.

Marine use conflicts have been notably absent in the Gulf, not only because of the incremental nature of the growth of offshore oil and gas activities and because of the greater availability of dock space, but also because of the topography of the continental shelf. The continental shelf of the Pacific and the Atlantic slopes much more dramatically into the ocean basin and is much narrower than that in the Gulf. The Gulf has a much larger area available for use, and loss of area is correspondingly less critical than it is along the Atlantic or Pacific coasts. Likewise, because the area available for use is less critical, avoidance of offshore oil and gas installations to loss of fishing gear is less of an issue.

Illustrative Effects

Development of OCS oil and gas in Louisiana has followed a pattern of boom and bust. For the first 40 years, there were new jobs, rapid population growth, and a good deal of change in the social, economic, and physical environment in coastal communities and other centers of offshore support development. All of this created new demands for goods, services, and labor, and put strains on existing transportation networks, community infrastructures, and the delivery of social services.

The communities most affected by the OCS boom were those such as Morgan City, which became a staging area for offshore activities, or Lafayette City, which became a managerial center. Although many parts of the communities were affected, some of the most evident effects occurred as a direct result of the population increases. Between 1940 and 1980 Lafayette City's population grew from 19,210 to 81,861 and that of Lafayette Parish increased from 43,941 to 150,017. These are increases of 327% and 241% respectively; there was a 78% increase for the state and a 72% increase nationwide for the same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940, 1980). Other affected locations grew at similar (if less dramatic) rates. Housing was in short supply and prices increased as demand exceeded supply. Local services (sewage treatment, water supplies, roads, utilities, recreational facilities, medical facilities, policy departments, schools) remained behind the population growth throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Mumphrey et al., 1977; Stallings et al., 1977; Gramling, 1980, 1983; Gramling and Brabant, 1984, 1986).

News of employment opportunity in coastal Louisiana appeared in national publications during this period, and a transient labor force was attracted for work offshore. The general economic growth attracted significant numbers of the transient, chronically unemployed (Brabant and Gramling, 1985). Labor camps that sold bare necessities (bed, food, and job contacts) for exorbitant prices sprung up in Morgan City, and shelters and agencies that provided basic human services (food, clothing, shelter) often were strained beyond their capacity (Brabant, 1991). Crime rates also

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

increased: By the mid-1970s, the violent crime rate in Morgan City was two or three times the average rate for U.S. cities of comparable size (Gramling and Joubert, 1977).

By the late 1970s, much of coastal Louisiana exhibited many of the characteristic stresses associated with the classical boomtown syndrome (Albrecht, 1978; Bates, 1978; Gramling and Brabant, 1986). The growth-related problems moderated somewhat with the decline in crude oil prices in 1982. However, when the crash in crude oil prices came in 1986, it became quite clear that growth of the offshore industry had led to a modification of the social, economic, and physical environment, and an entirely new set of problems developed. The crash of world oil markets led to radically reduced OCS activity and to a recognition of the problems associated with extensive adaptation to an extractive activity.

Because extractive enterprises such as OCS development must locate near the resource, they cannot necessarily take advantage of existing concentrations of labor, supplies, or other support, and often must develop these from scratch (Bunker, 1984). This building of the local social, economic, and physical environment to support a particular extractive activity has several consequences. First, the development (social, economic, and physical) surrounding the extractive activity is highly specialized, and often it is not transferable to new forms of economic production. Second, creation of a new support sector can exhaust local resources and capital, precluding or limiting future forms of development. Third, high-paying jobs in the extractive sector can make diversification difficult because enterprises with lower profit margins cannot compete for labor. Finally, extractive economies have a finite life, and they are notoriously susceptible to fluctuations in commodity markets. The first three of these consequences lead to a situation that Freudenburg and Gramling (1992) call ''overadaptation,'' and that others call "loss of adaptive flexibility" (Bateson, 1972; Rappaport, 1977, 1979; Slobodkin and Rapoport, 1974). The last consequence guarantees that overadaptation eventually becomes a problem. Freudenburg and Gramling argue that the problem with development is not that communities fail to adapt, but rather that they will, indeed they cannot fail to, adapt to new specialized conditions and that the adaptation itself becomes a problem. When the extractive activity declines, as it must, the area's economy is more specialized than it was before the activity started, and there are fewer local resources and less capital available.

In addition to replacing the traditional economic activities of long-term residents, the growth associated with offshore development attracts workers to fill jobs in the expanding labor market. Using data available for the past 20 years, it is possible to statistically explain more than 95% of the variance in total employment in several coastal parishes in Louisiana, using only the price of oil on the world market and the world rig count as predictor variables (Gramling and Freudenburg, 1990). Thus, not only have offshore oil and gas activities in coastal Louisiana been around for two generations, but they have come to almost completely dominate the coastal economy.

The region's social and economic systems adapted to the circumstances, and they did so at a variety of levels. Individual workers made career decisions based on the expectation that trends would continue. Seventeen-year-olds dropped out of high school to gain and use (often esoteric) skills in the support and fabrication sectors surrounding offshore activities. Those who graduated frequently pursued specialized skills (associated with the offshore and support sectors) instead of other skills more basic to a diverse, or more flexible higher education.

Small businesses specialized. Mechanics' shops became marine diesel repair facilities (with considerable investment in tools and equipment to make the transition). New specialty businesses opened to take advantage of the growing opportunities (offshore catering services, for example). Both of these phenomena became trends in an economy that grew so fast that good business practices were not necessary for success. Because profit margins were so high, inventory control, billing, and equipment purchases could be marginal, and still enterprises prospered. This too is an adaptation.

Regional adaptation occurred as the interaction between the resources associated with human and social capital—skills; knowledge; experience; teamwork; networks of supply and distribution; and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

the physical capital of buildings equipment, and other physical infrastructure—developed over time. Vocational schools shifted their curricula to focus on skills with ready application in the oil business (Gramling and Reilly, 1980), and entirely new occupations arose ("hot shot" drivers, who owned a truck and provided rapid delivery to staging areas of parts and equipment needed offshore). All of these changes, both obvious and subtle, constitute investment of time, skills, or money in a particular activity in a particular sector of the economy.

The central and western Gulf Coast has experienced massive change as a result of OCS activity since 1954. At the time that OCSLA was passed in 1953, coastal Louisiana's economy was primarily based on agriculture (sugar cane, rice, soy beans) and on the extraction of renewable resources (shrimp, fish, crayfish, furs). Lafayette City was the "hub city" of a regional distribution center, and Morgan City was the self-proclaimed shrimp capital of the world (Gramling, 1980, 1983). By 1980 OCS activities dominated the economy of much of coastal Louisiana and Texas, from Galveston to the Mississippi River (Manuel, 1983; Gramling and Brabant, 1984, 1986; Gramling and Freudenburg, 1990), and led to a reorientation of the social and economic environment throughout the region.

Eastern Gulf (Florida)
Nature and Extent of Development

The first OCS lease sale in Florida waters occurred in 1959. Although 23 tracts were leased in the Florida Keys and several exploratory wells were drilled, nothing was found and the leases expired. Leasing resumed off the Florida coast in the 1970s; the primary area of interest has been in the Destin Dome and De Soto Canyon areas off the Florida panhandle. The exception to this general trend happened with Sale 79 (1984) when the new areawide leasing program allowed 73 tracts to be leased in the Charlotte Harbor area, south of the 26th parallel. Florida has generally been cautious concerning OCS activity in general, but these tracts northwest of the Keys have created the greatest controversy. To date, all drilling in Florida has been exploratory, although there are now plans for production off the panhandle.

Public Response

There have been two consistent themes in Florida's communications with the Department of the Interior about OCS development. First, the state government has, through two governors (Bob Graham and Bob Martinez), maintained that it is not opposed to OCS development as long as sufficient consideration is given to Florida's unique coastal environment. Second, the state has maintained at least since 1979 that there is insufficient information to be able to determine impacts from oil and gas activity in the environmentally sensitive and economically important area south of 26°N latitude.

Notwithstanding the state's opposition, offerings south of 26°N latitude did occur during the five-year areawide leasing plan in Sales 79 and 94, and 73 tracts were sold. Although Congress did not delete the area from the sales, congressional appropriations language imposed a moratorium on exploratory drilling until two stipulations were met: First, no exploratory drilling would be approved by the Department of the Interior until 3 years of physical oceanographic and biological research data had been collected. Second, lessees would be required to perform biological surveys prior to drilling and they would be required to work with the department to monitor subsequent drilling.

The issue again arose as the proposed five-year plan for 1987 to 1992, was being developed

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

and made final. Again citing a lack of information, Governor Bob Martinez recommended to Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel several deletions, including portions of the area south of 26°N, both before and after the proposed final five-year leasing plan was developed. In addition, on May 5, 1987, Governor Martinez released the draft report of an independent scientific review of MMS's studies of the southwest Florida shelf. The review found that the studies "added a significant body of information regarding the biology and physical oceanography of the shelf off southwest Florida" but it concluded that they "did not provide the type of information nor detail to determine the specific impacts of oil and gas activities on certain sensitive habitats off southwest Florida" (Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, 1987).

OCSLA allows states to request judicial review of the five-year program within 60 days of program approval, and on Aug. 14, 1987, Governor Martinez announced he was requesting such a review. Following a visit to Florida in November by Secretary Hodel, a letter of agreement was signed between Martinez and Hodel on March 24, 1988. In it, Governor Martinez agreed to move to dismiss the petition Florida filed challenging the five-year program (Martinez et al. v. Department of the Interior ), and Secretary Hodel agreed to exclude portions of the area south of 26°N (and some other areas) from the 1987-92 five-year plan.

In an apparent move to simplify Sale 116 (originally an areawide sale for the eastern Gulf of Mexico), Secretary Hodel informed Governor Martinez on June 15, 1988, that he was dividing Sale 116 into two parts. Part I—consisting of the area north of 26°N latitude and west of 86°W longitude (less excluded areas)—would proceed on schedule. Part II—south of 26°N latitude and east of 86°W longitude—would be delayed for at least six months.

In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior Feb. 9, 1989, Governor Martinez supported the continuation of the delay of Part II of Sale 116. In his budget address of February 1989, President Bush further postponed Part II, and the area was the subject of study by a presidential task force (along with Sales 91 and 95 off California; OCS Leasing and Development Task Force, 1990) and a review by the National Research Council (NRC, 1989). As a result of that review, the area was placed under a presidential moratorium, and discussions for a federal buyback of the leases are under way.

Illustrative Effects

Actual impacts in Florida have been limited primarily to what Freudenburg and Gramling (1992) call "opportunity-threat" impacts. Unlike biological or physical systems, for which no impacts occur prior to concrete alterations of the physical environment, social systems can be affected by changes in the social environment. Observable, measurable effects begin as soon as there are changes in social conditions, which, in the case of OCS activities, can mean the announcement of a lease sale. Opportunity-threat impacts include those to environmental and health systems, and to economic, social, cultural, and psychological systems (Freudenburg and Gramling, 1992). In Florida these effects included community organizating and political opposition to OCS activities.

Alaska

Nature and Extent of Development

The outer continental shelf in Alaska comprises 74% of the total in the United States; it is 830,000 square miles of a national total of 1.12 million square miles. This predominance stems both

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

from the length of the Alaska coastline and from the width of the Alaskan continental shelf. Alaska's coastline is 6,640 miles long, 54% of the U.S. total of 12,383 miles. In addition, the Alaska continental shelf is 200 to 300 miles wide. This compares with an average width of 40 miles off the Atlantic Coast, 60 miles in the Gulf of Mexico, and 20 miles off the Pacific Coast.

The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that an undiscovered but recoverable 12.2 billion barrels of oil and 64.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas lies beneath the outer continental shelf in Alaska. The Department of the Interior considers Alaska OCS development the linchpin of its OCS program (Jones, 1984), and President Bush has referred to OCS reserves in Alaska, along with onshore reserves, as the most promising prospects for discovering major new U.S. oil reserves.

Alaska OCS development also must be considered in the context of other successful oil and gas production in that region. Alask's North Slope oil fields are the twelfth largest in the world and the largest yet discovered in North America. They are estimated to contain more than 10 billion barrels of recoverable oil. The North Slope oil reserves were discovered beneath Prudhoe Bay in 1968, and developed amid considerable controversy, particularly pertaining to oil transport issues. The 800-mile-long Trans-Alaska pipeline was selected as the best transportation method after Congress waived the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347). Since 1977, more than 6.7 billion barrles of crude oil has been pumped from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, Alaska. At Valdez, the oil is loaded onto oil tankers and shipped to terminals and refineries throughout the continental United States (Townsend and Heneman, 1989). MMS estimates that the remaining North Slope reserves are at least 5 billion barrles of oil and 26 trillion cubic feet of gas (MMS, 1989).

The Department of the Interior is exploring the potential for a second, major onshore development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in the far northeastern corner of the state. Oil reserves there are estimated at between 3.2 and 9.2 billion barrels of oil, but the project has engendered enormous opposition because of its potential to harm protected fish and wildlife habitat (Dolan, 1987).

Within the Alaska region there are 15 planning areas consolidated into three subregions. Since 1976, a total of 16 lease sales have been held in the Alaska region. In all, 98 million acres have been offered and 8.1 million acres, in 1,477 tracts, have been leased. As of September 1988, 996 active leases were owned by 41 operators (MMS, 1989). The three most recent lease sales are notable, each for different reasons. The sale of March 1988 in the Beaufort Sea was the first outside of the Gulf of Mexico since 1984. The May 1988 sale of leases in the Chukchi Sea set several new records for the Alaska region, including those for the number of tracts and acres bid on and leased. The Northern Aleutian sale was held in October 1988. However, a congressional moratorium has prevented any exploratory activity on leases from that sale. The 1992 MMS five-year leasing schedule includes eight lease sales for the Alaska region (MMS, 1991b).

Federal exploration in Alaska began in 1975. As of March 1990, 71 exploratory wells had been drilled on the Alaska outer continental shelf, but no development or production has begun (MMS, 1989). Initial interest focused on the northern Gulf of Alaska, where 10 wells were drilled between 1976 and 1978. All were dry. Interest then shifted to Cook Inlet, but the six wells drilled there between 1978 and 1984 also were dry. Industry began to explore the Beaufort Sea, in the Arctic subregion, in 1979. Twenty wells have been drilled in that planning area, and eight were determined by MMS to be producible. Two have been temporarily abandoned, and a third has been permanently abandoned. Exploration continues on the other five, and Shell Oil Company has announced that one of its Beaufort Sea wells on Seal Island could contain commercial quantities of oil. MMS describes these discoveries as "subcommercial" (MMS, 1989), but because of their proximity to Prudhoe Bay, production is economically feasible. Recoverable reserves in this area are estimated at 300 million barrels of oil (MMS, 1989). Three wells were drilled recently in the Chuckchi Sea; however, no information about producibility is available.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

In addition to OCS oil and gas exploration, MMS is also considering the potential for recovery of heavy-mineral placers offshore of Alaska. A federal-state coordination team was established in 1988 to examine the resource potential, particularly in Norton Sound, where a lease sale was scheduled for early 1990.

Public Response

Alaska and its outer continental shelf are unique in many respects and these qualities must be kept in mind in the evaluation of the social and economic effects of OCS oil and gas activity and in the explanation of state and local responses. Alaska is the most sparsely populated state in the nation. Its 1989 population of 527,000 is spread over a land area of 365,481,600 acres; the density of 0.89 persons per square mile is the lowest in the nation. Most of the population (64.3%) lives in urban areas. About 17% of the population (91,000) is native, mostly living in small coastal villages where OCS oil activity would have the greatest impact. About 47% of the natives are listed as unemployed, which indicates in part their dependence on subsistence hunting and fishing, which can account for a major part of their diet, sometimes as much as 80%.

Oil is clearly the dominant economic activity in Alaska, providing almost 85% of annual state revenues. In most years, the state pays each citizen a certain sum instead of collecting taxes. Fluctuations in oil prices worldwide have a major effect on the Alaska economy. Dependence on oil revenues gives the oil companies a dominant position in political power in the state.

Alaska has relatively less power in Congress than other coastal states do. Although it has two senators, as do all states, its small population allows it just one member in the House of Representatives. It has distinctly less political clout than states such as California (1989 population 29,063,000, 45 representatives), Texas (1989 population 16,991,000, 27 representatives), and Florida (1989 population 12,671,000, 19 representatives).

Alaska's climate is also a factor. The Bering Sea and many coastal waters are covered with ice for much of the year, posing special technical problems for OCS exploration, drilling, and production. Transportation also is difficult.

Environmental groups throughout the nation have taken a special interest in Alaska, which is distinctly different from the interest they have demonstrated for the Gulf of Mexico—where most of the drilling occurred before the environmental movement became widespread. In many respects environmental groups perceive Alaska as a "national" resource rather than as a resource held by and for the benefit of the residents of Alaska.

Alaska natives deserve special concern with respect to OCS activity because their culture could be at stake if significant changes occur to their environment. Certainly this is a perception held by most coastal natives, and is a possibility according to environmental impact statements. In general, Alaska natives are far more bound to their region than are citizens in other areas. Native Alaskans often lack the employment and cultural mobility enjoyed by nonnatives.

In the past decade, three Alaska governors, Hammond, Sheffield, and Cowper, have consistently raised objections to aspects of the Alaska region OCS oil- and gas-leasing program. The state government generally approves of the OCS program, but has voiced concerns over specific tracts of the lease sales and specific elements of the exploration and drilling plans.

In the early 1980s, Governor Jay Hammond raised serious objections to the Department of the Interior's accelerated leasing program, brought about by areawide leasing. In testimony before Congress, he questioned both the magnitude and the pacing of the OCS program. The state's specific concerns included the inability of the regional MMS office to adequately analyze and process lease sales; inadequate safety technology, particularly in the extreme northern seas; and the potential for

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

harm to state fisheries. The governor convinced the department to reduce and defer some lease sales. The proposed leasing of tracts in Bristol Bay was dropped.

The state's interests in fisheries of the Bristol Bay region were, in fact, the initial force behind objections to the OCS program, and they remain so. All Alaska governors have denounced oil exploration and drilling activities in that area. After the Exxon Valdez spill, the state legislature passed a resolution calling for Congress to impose a moratorium on OCS activity in Bristol Bay. Congress obliged in 1989, and it is now considering a lease buy-back program, pending an MMS study of the region.

Past objections to Alaska Regional OCS activity also focused on the environmental hazards attendant to exploration and drilling in the sea ice covering the Beaufort and Chuckchi seas. The state persuaded the Department of the Interior to include additional oil spill contingency expertise and equipment at exploration and drilling sites in those leases.

State comments on the department's proposed 1992-1997 five-year plan include objections to drilling in the Chukchi Sea; requests for buffer zones in other sensitive areas; a suggestion to establish a biological task force to advise MMS on each lease sale; and an independent panel to review environmental impact statements, additional oil spill contingency planning, and a revenue-sharing program.

Public concern over the oil and gas program has increased over the past decade, and is now at an all-time high. Alaska's citizenry, including commercial and native fishers, object not only to any OCS activity on Bristol Bay, but also to the potential for harm to whales and fisheries from current activity in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. Various interest groups have organized to participate in administrative processes with relevant agencies, including MMS and the National Marine Fisheries Service, and to lobby Congress for moratoria, studies, and additional restraints on exploratory activity.

Illustrative Effects

As for Florida, many of the effects to date have been of the opportunity-threat type, and these were certainly evident in the Socioeconomics Panel's visit to the Bristol Bay area. Attempts to assess these current impacts have been limited primarily to the native population, although the effect on the nonnative population was obvious. The question becomes what negative effects might accrue to the native population from their anticipation of the OCS lease sales.

That portion of the native population that still depends on hunting and fishing for subsistence is particularly concerned because of fear that OCS development will harm wildlife habitat. The group tends to view the environment holistically, as a critical element in their survival, rather than as a commodity with a monetary value, and there is a fear that OCS oil development might have subtle but significant impacts on the wildlife environment.

To the Inupiat, for example, the availability of native food is closely related to the quality of life and to their spiritual well-being, as well as their physical health. Because the Inupiat believe that they will have to return to a subsistence livelihood when the era of oil development is over, any prolonged or permanent disruption of their subsistence lifestyle is particularly threatening (TR 85). To the nonnative an oil spill threatens recreation, business, and environmental and economic values, but it seldom is seen to jeopardize the entire culture, history, tradition, and value system.

The native population of St. Lawrence Island has similar fears. They are concerned that air and water pollution will kill significant numbers of marine mammals, avian and fish species, and land and sea plants (TR 89). Even if this did not occur they fear that air, water, noise, and visual pollution could drive wildlife from their traditional habitat or alter annual migration routes. The

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Gambell Village natives believe that the development would result, at a minimum, in less to eat. At maximum there would be severe damage, either to their culture or to the health of the people (TR 89). To assure such a community that a major spill might occur only once every 30 or 50 years does not allay their fears; they have been in place for centuries. The potential for long-term harm to the community is too great and the prospect is too frightening for any risk.

Although it is true that a major oil spill might not affect an entire fishery, such as Bristol Bay, it could have a profound effect on a particular village or community. Such an effect, even for a year or two, could substantially alter the community's culture, economics, and lifestyle. Even high-level production, without any spills, could introduce enough new residents to an area to produce deterioration of the highly important patriarchal structure (TR 89).

Disruptions to bearded and spotted, or ringed, seals or disruptions to walrus and any of the whale species could severely threaten the food supply to the Village of Gambell. Moreover, the Gambell natives are fearful that, if this occurs, state and federal agencies could not, or would not, move rapidly enough to prevent famine, especially among the infirm.

The future effects of OCS activity on the native population are expected to vary depending on the degree to which the village or community is assimilated into the white culture, and on the degree to which alternative employment opportunities exist. In the the case of the Beaufort Sea leasing, the sale occurred in 1988 and production is expected to begin in 1996. One assumption is that the new pipelines and shore bases would add a maximum of $400 million to borough property values in 1995, with this value depreciating by about 5% annually in subsequent years. Total oil industry employment was estimated to increase by a maximum of 2010 during the peak construction year of 1995; the increase in operating employment would be between 600 and 700 after 1997 (TR 120).

In the Chukchi Sea lease sale, borough property values were estimated to increase a maximum of $1,428 per acre in 1998 and depreciate 5% annually thereafter. Total oil industry employment would increase by up to 4,887 during the peak construction year of 1998, and operating employment would increase by about 2000 jobs after the turn of the century (TR 120). This increase in jobs does not, however, translate into a proportional increase in new employment for the native population, most of whom do not have the needed skills or training. If no sale took place, native employment would be expected to increase modestly from 799 jobs by the year 2000; if the sale does go through, only 151 new jobs (an increase to 900) would be created for natives in the same period (TR 120). A general decline in native population is predicted without the lease sales. The sales would presumably slow this emigration for about 10 years.

It is estimated that without the lease sales, operating revenues for the North Slope Borough will continue to decline. The lease sales would presumably slow this decline. Yet on St. Lawrence Island, which has not been so invaded by nonnative culture to date, the very real possibility for serious disruptions of marine mammal, bird, and sea plant harvests are not balanced by promises of increased taxes, local employment, locally owned business, or governmental subsidies (TR 89). The experiences of North Slope Eskimos make such promises appear empty. Substantial economic gains to rank-and-file Eskimos have simply not accompanied energy developments on or near native islands (TR 89).

If North Aleutian Sale 92 proceeds, the draft environmental impact statement predicts a modest to negligible effect on fisheries and marine mammals, but the statement concedes that in some areas, such as the area west of Port Moller, there could be major damage if a spill occurred.

Pacific Region

Development of California's offshore oil resources is long-standing, dating back to the end of

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

the nineteenth century. Offshore oil development, however, has invariably been marked by controversy. In south-central and southern California, where there is extensive experience with offshore oil development, the debate has centered on whether and how additional development should proceed. In the central and northern part of the state, where there has been no history of development, debate in recent years has involved mainly the question of whether offshore leasing, the first step toward development, should take place. Because these areas and their situations are essentially different, each is treated separately.

South-Central California
Nature and Extent of Development2

Offshore development made its debut in the United States off the coast of Summerland (about five miles south of Santa Barbara) in 1896 when wooden piers and platforms were erected along the shoreline. Offshore oil development was conducted mainly by means of piers close to shore through the 1920s and 1930s. In 1929, the first state leases were issued in the ocean area away from shore, but until the 1950s, offshore oil operations remained confined to the shoreline or to nearshore waters. It was not until the late 1950s that new technology allowed oil companies to extend the range of their exploration. The first truly offshore oil platform, Hazel, was built in 1958 in state waters, in 100 feet of water off the shore of Summerland.

With the availability of new technology came new discoveries, and pressure began to mount to explore and exploit California's offshore oil resources as quickly as possible. Fearing that further development of oil fields in the state-controlled area would drain oil pools in ocean areas beyond three miles (those areas were under federal control), the federal government began to lease offshore lands in 1963; other lease sales were held in 1964 and 1966. In a major lease sale in 1968, 71 tracts were leased in the federal zone.

This upsurge in offshore activity was brought to an abrupt halt on Jan. 28, 1969, by the blowout at Union Oil's Platform A in the Santa Barbara Channel. The spill proved to be a catalyst for the rise of the environmental movement of the 1970s, both locally and nationally. Local groups, such as GOO (Get Oil Out), mobilized to impose significant restrictions on oil development. Nationally, coalitions of environmental groups succeeded in getting Congress to enact a wide range of environmental protection laws, about a dozen of them concerned with ocean resources and activities.

The first part of the 1970s thus saw a significant decrease in offshore oil activity in California. In the Santa Barbara area, significant restrictions were placed on offshore leasing and drilling. The state legislature established sanctuaries that put certain areas along the coast off limits to oil and gas development and imposed a moratorium on drilling in existing state leases until 1973. Not until 1983 did the California State Lands Commission consider resuming offshore leasing in the Santa Barbara Channel.

The Arab oil embargoes of 1973 and 1974, however, led to new pressure to develop domestic oil reserves, and in several controversial and heavily litigated lease sales between 1975 and 1983, the federal government leased 217 additional tracks covering about 1.2 million acres off the coast of southern and central California. In 1984, 23 federal tracts were leased off the coast of southern California. Since 1984, Congress has prevented the Department of the Interior from conducting any further OCS lease sales through the imposition of moratoria on department expenditures for these purposes.

2  

This section is adapted from Cicin-Sain (1986).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

As of 1989, there were 123 existing leases encompassing 637, 757 acres in the Pacific outer continental shelf. Most of the leases were in the Santa Barbara Channel (67 leases off the shore of Santa Barbara and Ventura counties) and in the Santa Maria Basin (44 leases off the shore of San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara counties); 12 leases were south of the Santa Barbara Channel (MMS, 1990).

Intensified exploration in federal waters from 1980 to 1985 made it clear that there were large oil reserves in the Santa Barbara Channel and Santa Maria Basin; estimates ranged up to 2.2 billion barrels of oil and 6.2 trillion cubic feet of gas (MMS, 1990). These reserves could represent the largest discovery in the United States since the discovery in 1968 of reserves in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, and the area could become one of the world's major oil provinces (Williams, 1984).

After these discoveries, several large offshore oil projects (involving large platform complexes as well as related onshore processing facilities and marine terminals) were proposed by lease holders, most prominently Exxon, ARCO, Chevron, and Unocal. Initial projections estimated a peak production of 500,000 barrels a day by 1992, which would require doubling the number of offshore platforms, significant increases in exploratory seismic activity, construction of new pipelines and marine terminals, and a 4,000% increase in the capacity of onshore processing facilities. These initial figures, however, have since been revised downward for several reasons, including declines in the price of oil and extensive delays in the permitting process.

Public Response

Responses to the significant increases in offshore oil development in the 1980s must be understood in the context of the great natural beauty of the Santa Barbara area and the culture of its citizenry. This coastal area of California is a well-known tourist destination. It is a highly attractive natural environment, flanked by the ocean on one side and a coastal mountain range on the other. The ocean is generally visible and accessible from the state's major coastal highway, in contrast to other oil-rich coastal communities, such as those in Louisiana where the shoreline is often difficult to reach, or even to identify exactly, given the presence of extensive wetlands. Because most of the oil deposits in the federal OCS lie near the three-mile federal-state boundary, any offshore development is highly visible from shore. The ocean in the Santa Barbara area, too, is home to many users, including recreationists, commercial fishermen, the military, marine scientists, and shipping companies. The area's citizens are very environmentally aware (partly as a result of the 1969 oil spill) and well organized into several public advocacy groups. Over the years, citizens' groups have pushed for a series of limited-growth policies (including restrictions on water supplies) aimed at conserving the environmental beauty and quality of life of the area.

Thus, when significant new development was proposed in the early 1980s, residents and local governments strongly reacted, first in opposition, and later in efforts to mold the pace and nature of the development. The period from 1983 saw an extensive set of negotiations between local and state authorities, the oil companies, commercial fishermen, and environmental groups over the pace, nature, and magnitude of development. The county of Santa Barbara was instrumental in these negotiations—using its authority over the permitting of onshore resources and, together with the state, over air quality out to three miles offshore—to mold the nature of development in federal waters.

There were several major issues of concern (Cicin-Sain, 1986):

  • Industrialization of the region and proliferation of support facilities was opposed by local officials and community groups, who feared that the inevitable large increase in shoreside support facilities and services for offshore oil production would radically alter the quality of life of the area by industrializing the coastline.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
  • Deterioration of air quality was an issue in this area, which already fell below federal standards. Local authorities were concerned that pollutants released by diesel engines on drillships and support vessels, as well as by processing facilities, could significantly increase the existing air pollution problem. Offshore air pollution is a problem in California that is not present in other oil-producing regions in the country (with the possible exception of the West Coast of Florida). Atmospheric conditions peculiar to coastal California involve a combination of the amount of sunlight, the mixture of pollutants already present, the direction of prevailing winds, and the presence of coastal mountain ranges—all of which work to trap smog along the coastal strip. A major problem here has been that air quality standards for air above federal waters were not as stringent as those for state waters.3

  • State and local officials called for oil transportation by pipeline rather than by tanker to reduce the risk of oil spills and to decrease pollutant emissions into the air. After a marine emergency management study, the county also called for stringent measures for oil spill prevention and cleanup.

  • Concerns were raised about the toxicity of the lubricating fluids used in the drilling processes and their potential to harm marine life. Also at issue were the possible effects of acoustic signals transmitted during the geophysical exploration process on fish eggs and larvae and on fish dispersal.

  • Increased vessel traffic and the presence of a variety of marine structures (platforms, drillships, pipelines) can, because of the limited size of the continental shelf, displace such other users of the marine environment as commercial fishermen, recreational boaters, commercial transportation operators, and ocean scientists. It was feared, in particular, that commercial fishermen could lose their traditional fishing grounds and periods, suffer loss or damage of gear, and even experience the loss of their livelihoods.

  • Considerable controversy also surrounded the potential for population growth (from the influx of oil workers) in an area where water resources are scarce and population growth controls are in effect. Questions were raised, for example, about the effects on housing, schools, and transportation. Similarly, concerns about the distribution of benefits (who would get the new jobs) were frequently voiced.

  • The effect on local governments was given attention because of the expected increased burdens in planning for and regulating the onshore effects of oil development.

With support from the California Coastal Commission, Santa Barbara County exacted several compromises from the oil companies and imposed several permit conditions to ensure that development would be compatible with the preservation of the south-central coast and the many uses of its offshore waters. The negotiations were complex and protracted and involved local, state, and federal bargaining and litigation. The compromises involved permit conditions that were the most stringent the oil industry had seen in the United States. (As an Exxon executive put it, "Santa Barbara permitting is the toughest…. There is an extreme amount of mitigation requirements attached to our permit and to the other operators that are successful in permitting in the county" (Cicin-Sain and Lee, 1990)).

Conditions required the consolidation of onshore processing facilities (to prevent the

3  

However, in 1990 Congress acted in two ways to solve this problem. First, as noted earlier, it increased the authority of the coastal states, through the consistency process, to manage effects that occur outside the coastal zone that affect coastal zone resources (16 U.S.C. 1456(c)). Second, in the 1990 reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, Congress mandated that "to control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources" (excluding the Gulf Coast except Florida) air pollution requirements "shall be the same as would be applicable if the source were located in the corresponding onshore area" (42 U.S.C. 7627(a)(1)).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

industrialization of the coast through the proliferation of facilities); oil transportation by pipeline; the creation of several mitigation funds; and the establishment of a detailed program to monitor the socioeconomic effects of offshore oil development and to provide the basis for additional mitigation, if needed.

Illustrative Effects

With the exception of two studies (Centaur Associates, Inc., 1984a,b), offshore oil development prior to the discoveries in the 1980s is not well documented. The reports conclude that neither state nor federal oil and gas activities were a dominant force in the development of Santa Barbara or Ventura counties. The studies excluded such socioeconomic effects as the mobilization of the local community as a result of the 1969 oil spill and the periodic displacement of commercial fishermen as various offshore facilities were erected, used, and later abandoned (Kallman and Wheeler, 1984).

Effects that occur as a result of the discoveries of the early 1980s also are difficult to detail because there are no baseline studies of the population or affected groups (such as commercial fishermen). However, observations during the past decade by several analysts, including one member of the Socioeconomics Panel (Amy, 1983, 1987; Cicin-Sain, 1986; Cicin-Sain and Tiddens, 1989; Cicin-Sain and Lee, 1990), suggest the following: There have been significant effects in terms of the activation of community groups; there has been great growth in the planning capacity of local governments and in intergovernmental experimentation; significant effects have been seen in commercial fishing; and fewer socioeconomic effects (narrowly defined in terms of population growth and related issues) were experienced than had been anticipated.

Increased citizen participation was an important ingredient in the negotiations, and such groups as the Citizens Planning Association and the Sierra Club were instrumental in the outcome. Citizen involvement has been manifested not only in the Santa Barbara area but in other coastal areas of California as well. Concern over offshore oil development statewide led to the adoption of citizen initiatives in 13 coastal cities and counties; all of them require some kind of citizen approval before onshore oil facilities can be constructed (MMS, 1990).

In the early 1980s Santa Barbara County had little involvement or expertise in offshore oil development, but the county government has since greatly built its oil-planning capacity. In addition, the county has displayed considerable ingenuity and aggressiveness and has pioneered such successful intergovernmental coordination as the Joint Review Panel, the vehicle used by representatives from local, state, and federal agencies to prepare the required state and federal environmental impact reports and environmental impact statements (EIR/EIS) (Alarcon et al., 1987; Kahoe, 1987; Hershman et al., 1988).

Another county-initiated innovation has been the institutionalization of four mitigation programs. The first, the Environmental Quality Assurance Program, requires full-time on-site staff from the county to monitor compliance with complex project regulations. The second, the Coastal Resources Enhancement Project, reduces residual or cumulative effects that cannot be mitigated by a project-specific measure. The third, the Socio-Economic Monitoring and Mitigation Program ensures that oil companies pay for public services or infrastructure resulting from new oil and gas development. The fourth, the Local Fishermen's Contingency Fund and the Fisheries Enhancement Fund, provide money to offset fishermen's gear losses and to support projects designed to offset harm to commercial fishermen (Cicin-Sain and Tiddens, 1989).

Effects on commercial fishermen have been extensive, although not well documented. As reported in a survey conducted on behalf of Santa Barbara County (Cicin-Sain and Tiddens, 1989),

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

fishermen have been kept out of fishing grounds (entailing costs not only for fishermen in the area but also increased competition in other areas and losses to fish processors). Increased vessel traffic has resulted (entailing congestion at sea and increased competition for harbor space). There also have been possible effects on fishery resources, loss or damage to fishing gear, and division of the fishing community (some fishermen are paid for moving gear or for not fishing while others are not). Some of these effects have been mitigated through various local and state funds and through the efforts of a joint oil-and-fishing committee. Mitigation has been partial and the full effects have not been measured (Cicin-Sain and Tiddens, 1989).

Effects on population growth, job distribution, and attendant issues have been reviewed by the Socio-Economic Monitoring Program (SEMP), initiated by the county in 1985 to measure and track expenditures made by the oil industry (including subcontractors) in the area. A computer model developed for SEMP uses expenditure data to predict immigrant population effects generated by each project. The data are combined with baseline data provided by the tri-county governments to estimate each project's effect on public services, public finances, and housing availability. This program is used by local governments to mitigate significant impacts (MMS, 1990). Preliminary findings from SEMP data suggest two major conclusions: The amount of expenditure that seems to be ''sticking locally'' is insubstantial compared with the overall size of the capital investment in these projects (J. Patton, pers. comm., Resource Management Division, Santa Barbara County, 1989), and the number of new workers who have moved to the area has been smaller than suggested by the worst-case scenarios in the environmental impact reports (M. Powers, pers. comm., Tri-County Socio-Economic Monitoring Program, 1989). This is partly a result of the phased nature of the development that Santa Barbara's citizens and government were able to require—precisely to avoid falling prey to the boom and bust cycle.

The Santa Barbara case is an interesting example of the coexistence of an attractive community and offshore oil development. The keys to this coexistence appear to be the phased nature of the development, the extensive permitting required for each project (numbering in the hundreds for each), the various mitigation measures that have been put into effect, socioeconomic monitoring, the presence of an ever-watchful local citizenry and an able local government, and the general willingness of the oil industry to remain at the negotiating table.

The Santa Barbara story, however, is far from over: Construction is just beginning on some of the projects. Future challenges center primarily on the monitoring and enforcement of conditions that have been agreed to, and the pressures that will arise as proposals to develop other parts of the Santa Barbara Channel and Santa Maria Basin are put forward.

Central and Northern California
Nature and Extent of Development

In contrast to the situation along the south-central coast of California, where the controversies revolved around how oil should be developed, the issues in northern California centered on whether proposed leasing should be allowed at all. Both of the lease sales proposed for these two areas—Sale 119 for central California and Sale 91 for northern California—have been thwarted by a coalition of environmental groups, tourism interests, coastal governments, commercial fishermen, and coastal residents who have mobilized to block the development.

Sale 91, first proposed in 1986 and scheduled for February 1989, has been put on hold, first through a series of congressional moratoria and more recently by President Bush, following the advice of his OCS task force (OCS Leasing and Development Task Force, 1990), until the year 2000

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

(Bush, 1990). The lease area contains approximately 1.1 million acres and is estimated to contain between 20 million and 820 million barrels of oil and about 1.0 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Bush, 1990).

Sale 119, announced in 1988 and scheduled for March 1991, has similarly been put on hold through congressional moratoria and the presidential action, until the year 2000. Moreover, the president directed the secretary of the interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration administrator to adopt the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary proposed by NOAA, permanently prohibiting oil and gas exploration and development within the sanctuary (Bush, 1990).

Public Response

Because reactions to proposed development in central and northern California were largely similar, we concentrate here on the responses in northern California, which the Socioeconomics Panel visited in July 1989.

Public reaction to proposed offshore oil development must be viewed in the context of the northern California coast—a beautiful, rugged, and sparsely populated coastline. Many of its residents have moved to the area precisely because of its beauty, ruggedness, and isolation. The region is truly a spectacular coastal area. It has an abundance of marine mammals, birds, and fish, and its magnificent redwoods run to the sea's edge. Dominant industries include timber (which has declined in recent years), commercial fishing, and tourism.

Reactions to the proposed development off the shore of northern California have been almost consistently negative and highly emotionally charged. Since the time leasing was first proposed in 1986, public groups in the small coastal communities have coalesced into an anti-oil movement, lobbying local, state, and federal officials to prevent the sale from taking place. Citizen participation reached a peak in February 1988 when several thousand residents jammed a public hearing in Fort Bragg on Sale 91. As a long-time student of OCS development and public reaction to high-level radioactive waste disposal, sociologist William Freudenburg reported he was dazed by what he saw in the tiny northern California coastal town (W. Freudenburg, pers. comm., University of Wisconsin, 1989). Freudenburg reported he had never seen such intensity on the part of citizens at a public hearing. One sign spoke for the community, "Save the Kansas Coast." Residents believe that the northern California coast is a national treasure; it is the coast of the citizens of Kansas, too.

Citizen concerns focused on the following issues. Perhaps first and foremost was their unwillingness to take any risks with the special northern California environment for the sake of supplying oil to the nation for "only 28 to 45 days" (the estimated available resource offshore). This theme was emphasized again and again in various public fora ("there is no such thing as 'reasonable' degradation to the marine environment"). In particular, opposition to offshore oil development was tied to the absence of a national energy policy: "Why risk an area that depends on its natural resources for its social and economic health for a very small amount of oil when the federal government is doing nothing about energy conservation?'' Other major concerns were with economic losses to tourism, recreation, and the fishing and timber industries. Fears of a boom and bust cycle were expressed for an area already unstable because of the decline in the timber industry. Threats to the marine environment and the fishing industry were repeatedly echoed at public hearings. It is interesting to note, that, with very few exceptions and in contrast to other regions, the question of obtaining potential benefits from offshore oil development was not a factor.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Illustrative Effects

The effects experienced in this case are primarily the same as the opportunity-threat impacts evident in Florida and Alaska, which the Socioeconomics Panel has noted earlier (NRC, 1989). However, in northern California these are perhaps clearer than they are in any other OCS region. The intensity and breadth of protest, community organization, and commitment in opposition to OCS activities leaves little doubt that significant social impacts have occurred, despite the fact that no lease sale has taken place.

Oregon and Washington4

Nature and Extent of Development

Several sedimentary basins are located on Oregon's and Washington's outer continental shelf that could contain commercially recoverable quantities of oil and gas. Federal lease sales were held in 1964 (MMS, 1989), and although several exploratory wells located petroleum-bearing strata, none registered commercial quantities. There are no active leases today in state or federal waters.

In 1985 MMS conducted additional exploratory sampling off the coast of Oregon and Washington (Cook, 1985). Results from that study, although highly speculative, are the most often-quoted offshore oil and gas deposit estimates for development in the region. According to MMS, 180 million to 300 million barrels could lie off the Oregon and Washington coasts, of which 50 million to 60 million barrels might be recoverable at 1987 prices. This amount represents roughly enough oil to fuel the nation for three days (Good et al., 1987). Natural gas estimates of 3.26 trillion cubic feet were much more promising. The annual national demand is approximately 16 trillion cubic feet.

Public Response

With those potential resource estimates in hand, the Department of the Interior's Sale 132 was set to take place in April 1992. The planning area encompassed 190,900 square miles (12.7 million acres) off the Oregon and Washington coasts. The sale was strongly opposed by Oregon Governor Goldschmidt and Washington Governor Gardner, who requested the secretary of the interior to postpone "Minerals Management Service's ill-conceived proposal to open the entire outer continental shelf off the Oregon/Washington coasts to oil and gas leasing and development" (Governors' Letters, 1989).

Illustrative Effects

As with northern California, the existing effects have been limited to opportunity-threat impacts, and these appear to be less than those in northern California. Strictly considering the potential resource itself, it appears unlikely that substantial oil and gas development would occur off the coast of Oregon or Washington in the next 15 years. The estimates of the resource are low, and the costs of exploration and development stand as significant obstacles to any substantial oil and gas

4  

This section is adapted from Cicin-Sain et al. (1990).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

production near the two states. Three factors, in particular, contribute to these high expenses. First, the area's severe weather, especially during the winter, would hamper operations and endanger workers and equipment. Second, unless the oil is located within the shallow state waters, costs would increase rapidly because the water is much deeper off Oregon and Washington than it is elsewhere. Third, both states lack oil pipeline networks common in the Gulf of Mexico. Because resource estimates are so small, the construction of a pipeline is unlikely. Consequently, oil transportation would likely be by tanker—a much more expensive method than pipeline (Good et al., 1987).

In his June 26, 1990, policy statement on offshore oil development, President Bush accepted the recommendations of the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing and Development Task Force (1990). The president's decision affecting Oregon and Washington was to conduct a series of additional environmental studies of the effects of oil and gas development off Washington and Oregon, including the Sale 132 area, before any environmental impact statement would be completed. These studies are expected to take 5 to 7 years, but have not begun. No sale will be considered until after the year 2000 and then only if studies show that development can be pursued in an environmentally safe manner (Bush, 1990).

Atlantic Region

Nature and Extent of Development

Five geological formations in federal waters along the Atlantic continental shelf have been identified as potential sources of oil and gas recovery: the Georges Bank Basin off Cape Cod, Massachusetts; the Baltimore Canyon Basin off Atlantic City, New Jersey; the Carolina Basin off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina; the Southeast Georgia Embayment; and the Blake Plateau Basin off Florida's east coast (Weise, 1986). To date, however, there has been little OCS exploration and no production.

There are three planning areas in the Atlantic OCS region: north, mid-Atlantic, and south. To these the Straits of Florida was added in 1986. Since OCS leasing began in 1976, activity in the region has centered on Georges Bank in the north Atlantic; Baltimore Canyon and, more recently, the Carolina Basin in the mid-Atlantic; and the Southeast Georgia Embayment in the south Atlantic.

Leasing activity in the Atlantic OCS region began shortly after the oil embargo in 1973. The first—and still most profitable in the history of the region—was Sale 40 (Baltimore Canyon) in 1976. Summarizing the first 10 years, Wiese (1986) reports that

[nine] lease sales have been conducted by MMS, 410 leases have been issued to the offshore industry, and 46 exploratory wells have been drilled. To date, these efforts have not produced a commercially recoverable discovery of oil or gas. This drilling history together with the current declining market for oil and gas has reduced OCS related activities in the Atlantic OCS region…. There are no announced plans for additional drilling on the Atlantic OCS by offshore operators.

One exception is the exploration plan submitted by Mobil Oil Company recently for the Manteo Exploration Unit off of Cape Hatteras. Otherwise the picture has not changed materially since 1986. The leasing history of the region is given in a list of scheduled sales and their current status (Table C-2).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

TABLE C-2 Leasing History of the Atlantic OCS Region Through 1991

Sale

Year*

Location

Status

49

1976

Mid-Atlantic

Lapsed

43

1978

South Atlantic

Lapsed

42

1979

North Atlantic

Lapsed

49

1979

Mid-Atlantic

Lapsed

54

 

South Atlantic

Canceled

56

1981

Mid-Atlantic (Carolina Basin)

Active

59

1981

Mid-Atlantic

Inactive

RS-2

1982

South & Mid-Atlantic (reoffering)

Inactive

52

1983

North Atlantic

Canceled

76

1983

Mid-Atlantic

Inactive

78

1983

Mid-Atlantic (Carolina Basin)

1-year moratorium (1990-91)

82

1985

North Atlantic

Canceled

90

1986

South Atlantic

Canceled

108

1990

South Atlantic

Deferred

111

1986

Mid-Atlantic

Canceled

96

1988

North Atlantic (Georges Bank)

Canceled; 10-year moratorium (to ~2000)

121

1989

Mid-Atlantic

Deferred

108

1990

South Atlantic

Deferred

134

1991

Mid-Atlantic

Pending

* Year of sale

Totals for the Atlantic OCS Region through 1986: North Atlantic: 1 sale, 2 COST and 8 exploratory wells, no commercial discoveries; South Atlantic: 4 sales, 1 COST and 6 exploratory wells drilled, no commercial discoveries

Source: Adapted from Weise, 1986; MMS, 1988.

Public Response

After the oil embargo in the fall of 1973, President Nixon directed the secretary of the interior to increase the OCS acreage leased to 10 million acres beginning in 1975—an amount equal to all the acreage leased since the program began in 1953. "The basic objective of the proposed action in OCS development was to increase domestic production as rapidly as possible and reduce dependence on expensive and unstable foreign supplies" (Committee on Commerce, 1975). Of the 16 "frontier" states affected, 14 were on the Atlantic coast.

A report by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1978) noted that although the states would support orderly development, the Department of Interior's "lack of awareness of the issues and concerns at the state level" might retard instead of accelerate OCS development. Indeed, "Following the decision to accelerate leasing, numerous bills that would amend the OCS Lands Act were introduced in the 94th Congress. None [was] enacted. Largely because of strong State objections and DOI's efforts to provide more meaningful public and State involvement, the OCS leasing

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

timetable has been slowed down since 1975" (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1978). During the Reagan administration, the shift to areawide leasing and streamlined procedures introduced by Secretary Watt evoked similar public and community responses.

In the 1980s, Sales 82 and 96 (Georges Bank) became focal points of OCS controversy. Sale 96 was scheduled for 1988, despite the fact that since 1982 congressional moratoria attached to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior had prohibited drilling on Georges Bank. Massachusetts also requested the exclusion of Georges Bank from Sale 96 (MMS, 1986). The Canadian government had already instituted a 12-year moratorium affecting its sector of Georges Bank, more for political than for environmental reasons. (Exploratory drilling was permitted by the Canadian government in the similarly productive Grand Banks area—the Hibernia Development Project.) Sale 96 was finally canceled by presidential decree on June 26, 1990. In his statement, President Bush declared that he was canceling Sale 96

and directing that no leasing and development take place in this area until after the year 2000. This will allow time for additional studies to determine the resource potential of the area and address the environmental and scientific concerns which have been raised (Bush, 1990).

At the request of North Carolina, drilling in Manteo Exploratory Unit also was placed under a one-year moratorium in recent congressional action to permit further environmental studies.

Illustrative Effects

It does not follow from the lack of OCS development that there has been a lack of impacts. Chief among these have been the opportunity-threat impacts linked to scheduled lease sales and, in turn, to public and community response. The public response took place against a background of controversies over the siting of oil ports, terminals, and refineries for landing and processing imported oil (Carter, 1978; University of New Hampshire, 1974).

Although public and community response must count heavily in assessing the socioeconomic impacts of Atlantic OCS region activities, there have been few socioeconomic studies undertaken by MMS or its predecessor, the Bureau of Land Management. A critical review of the adequacy of environmental information for Sale 96 was recently issued by the National Research Council's Committee to Review the Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program (NRC, 1990). There have been state- and county-sponsored studies prompted by the anticipated impacts, however, funded under the (former) Coastal Energy Impact Program (Section 308 of the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976) and other legislative authorization, particularly the Sea Grant Program.

Community impacts were experienced in the early stages of mid-Atlantic exploration in the case of the Brown and Root proposal for siting a 2,000-employee platform fabrication plant in the rural community of Cape Charles, Virginia (Urban Pathfinders, 1975a,b). There also have been effects on institutional arrangements for increasing local and regional planning capability in regard to managing OCS development. One example is the formation of the Mid-Atlantic Governors Association (Wilson, 1982). A related category of institutional impacts is that of intergovernmental relations, especially in the consistency provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act (Section 307(c)(1)).

In large part, the story of the Atlantic region has been one of inflated resource estimates and disappointing finds. In his statement, President Bush called for additional studies of Georges Bank

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

"to determine the resource potential of the area and address the environmental and scientific concerns which have been raised." The crisis in the Persian Gulf revived concerns about disruptions of the oil supply and renewed interest in onshore and offshore production of domestic oil and gas. Widespread concern over global warming has promoted natural gas as a fuel of choice; and gas is more likely than oil to be found on the Atlantic OCS (Kerr, 1979).

The story of the Atlantic region is also one of failure to adapt or create institutional arrangements for forging a consensus among interested parties. President Bush continued his statement of June 26, 1990, "My goal is to create a much more carefully targeted OCS program—one that is responsive to local concerns, to environmental concerns, and to the need to develop prudently our nation's domestic energy resources" (emphasis in the original). He concluded, "My desire is to achieve a balance between the need to provide energy for the American people and the need to protect unique and sensitive coastal and marine environments" (emphasis in the original). The lesson learned in the Atlantic region underscores both the difficulty and the necessity of achieving that balance.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although the contrasting perceptions of the risks and benefits of OCS development arise from differing historical, physical, and social circumstances in the geographical and cultural areas where they are born and nurtured, through the political process these competing perspectives spread and become the anchor points for a national debate over OCS development. Since the OCS leasing program was developed in the Gulf of Mexico, in an ironic twist, the unique perspective that had evolved in the Gulf became more or less the perspective of the federal agencies initially charged with the OCS program (U.S. Geological Survery and Bureau of Land Management), and resulted in increasing conflict between these federal agencies and the majority of the coastal states.

Today for all practical purposes the outer continental shelf of most of the continental United States is closed to development, and MMS—the agency whose primary goal is "orderly development of the marine mineral resources" (MMS, 1987)—finds its position in conflict with that of most of the coastal states. This has resulted in MMS being denied access to the majority of those resources.

The Gulf "model" simply has not worked outside the socioeconomic and political environment where it emerged, and it is instructive to note that the only other successful OCS development has occurred under an almost diametrically opposite model in the southern California area. It is interesting that this development, unlike that in the Gulf, clearly follows the requirements of OCSLA to monitor the effects of OCS activities subsequent to leasing. The implications of this fact are not lost on the Socioeconomics Panel.

REFERENCES

Alarcon, S., J. Friedman, and S. Krieg. 1987. Joint review panels: A cooperative approach. Pp. 3734-3741 in Coastal Zone '87. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.

Amy, D.J. 1983. Environmental mediation: An alternative approach to policy disputes. Policy Sciences 15:345-365.

Amy, D.J. 1987. The Politics of Environmental Mediation. New York: Columbia University Press.

Albrecht, S.L. 1978. Sociocultural factors and energy resource development in rural areas in the west. J. Environ. Mgmt. 7:73-90.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Bates, E.V. 1978. The impact of energy boom-town growth on rural areas. Social Casework 59:73-82.

Bateson, G. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballentine.

Brabant, S. 1991. From Boom to Bust: Community Response to Basic Human Needs. Presented at the annual meeting of the Sociological Practice Association, Costa Mesa, Calif.

Brabant, S., and R. Gramling. 1985. Academic versus street definitions of poverty: Implications for policy formulations. Appl. Sociol. 2:33-42.

Brantly, J.E. 1971. History of Oil Well Drilling. Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Co.

Bunker, S.G. 1984. Modes of extraction, unequal exchange, and the progressive underdevelopment of an extreme periphery: The Brazilian Amazon, 1600-1980. Am. J. Sociol. 89:1017-1064.

Bush, G.H.W. 1990. Statement by the President [Press release related to decision to extend moratoria on OCS activities in Florida, California and several other contentious sites], Washington, D.C., June 26.


Carter, L.J. 1978. Virginia refinery battle: Another dilemma in energy facility siting. Science 195:668-671.

Catton W.R., and R.E. Dunlap. 1980. A new ecological paradigm for post-exuberant sociology. Am. Behav. Scientist 24:15-47.

Centaur Associates, Inc., Dames and Moore, Harry Shatto, Consulting Engineer, and VTN, Inc. 1984a. Mitigation of Sea Floor Conflicts Between Oil and Gas Pipelines and Commercial Trawl Fisheries on the California Outer Continental Shelf. A final report to the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Pacific OCS Region, Los Angeles, Calif., under Contract No. 14-12-0001-30050.

Centaur Associates, Inc. 1984b. Cumulative Socioeconomic Impacts of Oil and Gas Development in the Santa Barbara Channel Region: A Case Study, 2 vols. A final report for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Pacific OCS Region, Los Angeles, Calif., under Contract No. 14-12-0001-30026. Available as NTIS 851135978.

Cicin-Sain, B. 1986. Offshore Oil Development in California: Challenges to Governments and to the Public Interest. Public Affairs Report, Vol. 27, Feb.-Apr. Bulletin of the Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, Berkeley.

Cicin-Sain, B., and R.W. Knecht. 1987. Federalism under stress: The case of offshore oil and California. Pp. 149-176 in Perspectives on Federalism, H.N. Scheiber, ed. Berkeley: Institution of Governmental Studies, University of California.

Cicin-Sain, B., and A. Tiddens. 1989. Private and public approaches to resolving conflicts between the fishing and oil industries offshore California. Ocean and Shoreline Mgmt. 12:223-251.

Cicin-Sain, B., and C. Lee. 1990. Blue Water-Black Gold. Santa Barbara's Response to Offshore Oil Development. Video production. University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif.

Cicin-Sain, B., M.J. Hershman, R. Hildreth, and J. Isaacs. 1990. Improving Ocean Management Capacity in the Pacific Coast Region: State and regional Perspectives. NCRI No. W-91-004. National Coastal Resources Institute, Newport, Oregon.

Cicin-Sain, B., R.W. Knecht, and J.H. Archer. In preparation. Public Policy and the Oceans. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Comeaux, M.L. 1972. Atchafalaya Swamp Life: Settlement and Folk Occupations. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate. 1975. An Analysis of the Department of the Interior's Proposed Acceleration of Development of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. March.

Cook, L.W. 1985. Estimates of Undiscovered, Economically-Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources. MMS 85-0012. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Dolan, J. 1987. Environmentalists Opposed to ANWR Provided Rebuttal Before Seante Energy and Natural Resources Committee. State New Service, June 11.

Darmstadter, J., and H.H. Landsberg. 1976. The Economic Background. Pp. 15-37 in The Oil Crisis, R. Vernon, ed. New York: Norton Press.


Eichenberg, T., and J. Archer. 1987. The federal consistency doctrine: Coastal zone management and the "New Federalism". Ecology Law Quarterly. 14:7-68.


Freudenburg, W.R., and R. Gramling. 1992. Community Impacts of Technological Change: Toward A Longitudinal Perspective. Social Forces 70:937-957.


Goldstein, J., ed. 1982. The Politics of Offshore Oil. New York: Praeger.

Good, J.W., R.G. Hildreth, R.E. Rose, and G. Skillman. 1987. Oregon Territorial Sea Management Stuidy. Final report to the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development . Oregon Sea Grant College Program, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oreg. June.

Governors' Letters. 1989. Letters from Governors Neil Goldschmidt (Oregon) and Booth Bardner (Washington) to Secretary of the Interior Lujan. January.

Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting (Florida). 1987. Draft Report: Scientific Review of Environmental Studies Conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior in Consideration of Oil and Gas Drilling off Southwest Florida. Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting, Tallahassee, Fla.

Gramling, R. 1980. The economic history of East St. Mary Parish. Pp. 4-16 in East St. Mary Parish: Economic Growth and Stabilization Strategies, R. Gramling, ed. Department of Natural Resources, Baton Rouge, La.

Gramling, R. 1983. A Social History of Lafayette Parish. Pp. 8-52 in Energy and Economic Growth in Lafayette, La.: 1965-1980, D.P. Manuel, ed. The University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La.

Gramling, R. 1989. Concentrated work scheduling: Enabling and constraining aspects. Sociol. Perspect. 32:47-64.

Gramling, R., and E. Joubert. 1977. The Impact of Outer Continental Shelf Petroleum Activity on Social and Cultural Characteristics of Morgan City, Louisiana. Pp. 106-143 in Outer Continental Shelf Impacts, Morgan City, Louisiana, E.F. Stallings, ed. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, Baton Rouge, La.

Gramling, R., and T.F. Reilly. 1980. Education in East St. Mary Parish. Pp. 109-116 in East St. Mary Parish: Economic Growth and Stabilization Strategies, R. Gramling, ed. Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Baton Rouge, La.

Gramling, R., and S. Brabant, eds. 1984. The Role of Outer Continental Shelf Activities in the Growth and Modification of Louisiana's Coastal Zone. U.S. Department of Commerce/Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La.

Gramling, R., and S. Brabant. 1986. Boom towns and offshore energy impact assessment: The development of a comprehensive model. Sociol. Perspect. 29:177-201.

Gramling, R., and W.R. Freudenburg. 1990. A closer look at "local control": Communities, commodities, and the collapse of the coast. Rural Sociol. 55:541-58.


Hershman, M.J., D.L. Fluharty, S.L. Powell, D. Robison, S. Robison, and C. Weisman. 1988. State and Local Influence Over Offshore Oil Decision. Washington Sea Grant Program. Seattle: University of Washington.


Jones, G.K. 1984. Major issues in developing Alaska's OCS oil and gas resources. 1 Alaska Law Review 209.


Kahoe, M.A. 1987. States' Role in OCS Development: The California Model. Coastal Zone '87,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Proceedings 2:1914-1928.

Kallman, R.E., and E.D. Wheeler. 1984. Coastal Crude in a Sea of Conflict. San Luis Obispo, Calif.: Blake Printery and Publishing Co.

Kerr, R.A. 1979. Petroleum exploration: Discouragement about the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf deepens. Science 204:1069-1072.

Lankford, R.L. 1971. Marine drilling. Pp. 1358-1444 in History of Oil Well Drilling, J.E. Brantly, ed. Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Co.


Magnuson, W.G., and E.F. Hollings. 1975. An Analysis of the Department of the Interior's Proposed Acceleration of Development of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Mangone, G.J. 1977. Marine Policy in America: The United States at Sea. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Manuel, D.P. 1983. Energy and Economic Growth in Lafayette, Louisiana, 1965-1980. Lafayette, La.: University of Southwestern Louisiana.

Manuel, D.P. 1984. Trends in Louisiana OCS Activities. Pp. 27-40 in The Role of Outer Continental Shelf Activities in the Growth and Modification of Louisiana's Coastal Zone, R. Gramling and S. Brabant, eds. U.S. Department of Commerce/Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La.

Mead, W., A. Moseidjord, D. Mauraoka, and P. Sorensen. 1985. Offshore Lands: Oil and Gas Leasing and Conservation on the Outer Continental Shelf. Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research.

Miller, D. 1984. Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Offshore Oil and Gas Development. 11 Ecology Law Quarterly 401-450.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1986. Proposed Program: 5-Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program for January 1987-December 1991: Detailed Decision Documents. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Washington, D.C. February.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1987. Proposed 5-Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, Mid-1987 To Mid-1992: Final Environmental Impact Statement, 3 vols. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1988. OCS Oil and Gas Program: Cumulative Effects. MMS 88-0005. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va. September.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1989. OCS National Compendium: Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Information through September 1988 . U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va. June.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1990. Pacific Update: August 1987-November 1989. MMS 90-0013. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1991a. OCS National Compendium. MMS 91-0032. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Herndon, Va.

MMS (Minerals Management Service) 1991b. Outer Continental Shelf Natural Gas and Oil Resource Management: Comprehensive Program 1991-1997, Summary and Decision. Proposal, July 1991. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Washington, D.C.

MMS (Minerals Management Service). 1992. Comprehensive Program: 1992-1997. Proposed final report. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service.

Morgan City Historical Society, The. 1960. A History of Morgan City, Louisiana. Morgan City Historical Society, Morgan City, La.

Mumphrey, A.J., R.E. Thyer, J.K. Wildgen, F.W. Wagner, A.H. Young, J.S. Brooks, G.D. Carlucci, C.B. Fromherz, M.J. Landry, J.C. Miller, and T.F. Whaler. 1977. OCS

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Development in Coastal Louisiana: A Socioeconomic Impact Assessment. Louisiana Department of Transportation, Baton Rouge, La.

Nash, A.E.K., D.E. Mann, and P.G. Olsen. 1972. Oil Pollution and the Public Interest: A Study of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California.

NRC (National Research Council). 1989. The Adequacy of Environmental Information for Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Decisions: Florida and California. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 86 pp.

NRC (National Research Council). 1990. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program. I. Physical Oceanography. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 143 pp.


Oil and Gas Journal. 1988. Databook. Tulsa, Okla.: Pennwell Books.

OCS Leasing and Development Task Force. 1990. A Final Report to the President on Lease Sales 91, 95, and 116, Part II. Prepared by Task Force Representatives from the Department of the Interior, Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget.

OCSLA (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Acts Amendments). 1953. Public Law 83-212. 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356.

OCSLAA (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Acts Amendments). 1978. Public Law 95-372. 43 U.S.C. 1801-1866.


Rappaport, R.A. 1977. Maladaptation in social systems. In Evolution in Social Systems, J. Friedman and M. Rowlands, eds. London: Duckworth.

Rappaport, R. 1979. Ecology, Meaning, and Religion. Richmond, Calif.: North Atlantic Books.


Slobodkin, L., and A. Rapoport. 1974. An Optimal Strategy of Evolution. Q. Rev. Biol. 49:181-200.

Stallings, E.F. 1984. Development of OCSNRC Techniques. Pp. 1-26 in The Role of Outer Continental Shelf Activities in the Growth and Modification of Louisiana's Coastal Zone, R. Gramling and S. Brabant, eds. U.S. Department of Commerce/Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, La.

Stallings, E.F., T.F. Reilly, R.B. Gramling, and D.P. Manuel, eds. 1977. Outer Continental Shelf Impacts: Morgan City, Louisiana. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, Baton Rouge, La.


Townsend, R., and B. Heneman. 1989. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Management Analysis. Center for Marine Conservation, Washington, D.C. September.

TR 85. Kruse, J.A., M. Baring-Gould, W. Schneider, J. Gross, G. Knapp, and G. Sherrod. 1983. A Description of the Socioeconomics of the North Slope Borough. A final report by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Alaska OCS Office, Anchorage, AK, under Contract No. 14-12-0001-29071.

TR 89. Little, R.L., and L.A. Robbins. 1984. Effects of Renewable Resource Harvest Disruptions on Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Systems: St. Lawrence Island. A final report by the John Muir Institute, Napa, Calif., for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Office, Anchorage, AK under Contract No. 14-12-0001-29024. Available as NTIS PB87-190278. June.

TR 120. Knapp, G., S. Colt, and T. Henley. 1986. Economic and Demographic Systems of the North Slope Borough: Beaufort Sea Lease Sale 97 and Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 109, Vol. 1, Description and Projections, Vol. 2, Data Appendices. OCS/MMS 86-0019. A final report by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska, Institute of Social and

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×

Economic Research for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Alaska OCS Office under Contract No. 14-12-0001-30139. June.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1940. 1940 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980. 1980 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. 1977. Report by the Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf together with Additional, Supplemental, Dissenting, Minority, and Additional Minority Views (Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. August.

U.S. Department of Commerce. 1978. U.S. Ocean Policy in the 1970s. Status and Issues. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. October.

University of New Hampshire. 1974. The Impacts of an Oil Refinery Located in Southeastern New Hampshire--A Preliminary Study. University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.

Urban Pathfinders, Inc. 1975a. Northampton Background Study. Urban Pathfinders, Inc., Baltimore, Md. January.

Urban Pathfinders, Inc. 1975b. Brown & root Impact Study. Urban Pathfinders, Inc., Baltimore, Md. February.


Weise, J.D. 1986. Atlantic Summary/Index. January 1985-June 1986. OCS Information Report, MMS 86-0071. U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Vienna, Va.

Williams, B. 1984. Drilling Flurries in the Channel and San Pedro Bay. Oil and Gas Journal 82:64-68. January 9.

Wilson, E. 1982. MAGCRD: A Classic Model for State/Federal Communication and Cooperation. Pp. 72-90 in The Politics of Offshore Oil, J. Goldstein, ed. New York: Praeger.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 107
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 108
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 109
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 110
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 111
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 112
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 113
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 114
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 115
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 116
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 117
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 118
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 119
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 120
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 121
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 122
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 123
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 124
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 125
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 126
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 127
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 128
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 129
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 130
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 131
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 132
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 133
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 134
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 135
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 136
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 137
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 138
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 139
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 140
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 141
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C: The Evolution of the Federal OCS Program: National and Regional Perspectives." National Research Council. 1992. Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2062.
×
Page 142
Next: Appendix D: Social and Economic Studies Technical Reports, Alaska OCS Region, MMS »
Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $40.00 Buy Ebook | $31.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

This is the third of four volumes from the Committee to Review the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Environmental Studies Program (ESP). The first two dealt with physical, oceanographic, and ecological aspects of the program.

This book presents the findings of the panel's investigation of the social and economic relevance of OCS oil and gas activities and the social and economic aspects of the ESP.

It describes the potential effects of OCS activities on the human environment, presents an ideal socioeconomic studies program, and comments on the current program in the Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and Alaska regions.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    Switch between the Original Pages, where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  9. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!