SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Ensuringthe Best Presidential Appointments
A White Paper from the
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
December 1992
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The new administration has emphasized the promise of science and technology (S&T) in helping to meet the social and economic challenges facing the Nation. To help deliver on this promise, it will be necessary to recruit approximately 78 outstanding and technically qualified individuals to top S&T positions in the federal government. Although they constitute only about twelve percent of presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions, their successful recruitment will be critical to effective policymaking and management in key areas of government, including national security, energy, and health, to name only a few. To enhance the capacity of the executive branch to identify and recruit the very best people for these positions, the following measures should be undertaken:
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The President's Science Advisor should be appointed early, and one of his or her major tasks should be recruitment of outstanding scientists and engineers for key positions.
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The presidential personnel office should have specialized and experienced staff to work cooperatively with the Science Advisor and the department and agency heads in identifying and recruiting qualified appointees for S&T positions.
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Unnecessary barriers to hiring the best talent should be addressed early. Conflict-of-interest laws, especially those governing postgovernment employment, have become so complex and restrictive that they deter honest, public-minded scientists and engineers from serving. It is possible to have and administer conflict-of-interest laws in ways that protect the integrity of government and also meet the public's interest in having highly qualified and motivated scientists and engineers from industry and academia in the public service. Where necessary, existing provisions to exempt critically needed scientific and technological experts should be used.
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Recruitment for positions that are primarily technical will be much easier if they are not unduly politicized but are insulated from daily partisan pressures. Some S&T positions have term appointments in recognition that they are usually held by individuals appointed for the technical qualifications and judgment and that continuity of leadership in long-term S&T positions is desirable. Incumbents normally should be allowed to serve their full terms, unless their performance was below par or they have politicized their positions in a manner contrary to the administration's policy positions, and appointees in other primarily technical positions should be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than removed automatically.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LEADERSHIP IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Ensuringthe Best Presidential Appointments
A White Paper from the
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
December 1992
THE PROBLEM
There are approximately 78 top federal positions with important functional responsibilities in S&T policymaking and program management (see attached list). Although they constitute only about twelve percent of presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions, the key S&T positions have an importance beyond their numbers on the Nation's ability to use science and technology to improve national security, public health, quality of life, and economic well-being.
In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to fill such positions in a timely manner. This problem is most acute at the beginning of an administration, when many politically appointed positions must be filled in a very short period. The average time it takes to fill presidentially appointed positions has increased threefold since 1960. The average time from inauguration day to confirmation of PAS subcabinet positions was 2.4 months in the Kennedy administration, 5.3 months in the Reagan administration, and more than 8 months in the Bush administration. Some key positions took a year or more to fill—for example, the Director of the Office of Energy Research (22 months), the Director of the National Institutes of Health (18 months), and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (12 months). If the situation continues, the government's ability to make key decisions in the face of rapid scientific and technological change—and to design, carry out, and evaluate effective and responsive programs—will be seriously affected.
Recently the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, with the support of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, have studied the problems of recruitment and retention of science and engineering policy officials and have recommended steps to alleviate these problems. The study was conducted by a knowledgeable and experienced bipartisan group.1
CAUSAL FACTORS
Not only is it taking longer to fill key positions, especially at the beginning of new administrations, but it is also becoming harder to recruit top candidates. It has become less common to succeed in recruiting one of the top two or three candidates, and there have been cases where it was necessary to go to the tenth, twentieth, or even the thirtieth name on the list of desirable candidates. High turnover is also a concern. The Council for Excellence in Government found that the average tenure in top S&T positions is 2.5 years. These trends are disturbing because excellence and continuity are especially needed in S&T programs.
The factors making it harder to recruit highly qualified scientists, engineers, and medical experts for top government leadership include:
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More stringent and confusing postgovernment employment restrictions;
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The longer, more burdensome, and more intrusive nomination and Senate confirmation process;
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Stricter and more costly conflict-of-interest provisions;
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More detailed requirements for public financial disclosure;
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Pay that is not competitive with comparable positions in the private and nonprofit sectors;
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The high costs of moving to and living in Washington;
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Increased public scrutiny of one's personal life;
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Decreased capacity of government to carry out effective programs; and
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Lower public esteem for and prestige of public service.
AMELIORATING ACTIONS
There are three areas for action that can enable the government to attract the talent it needs for top science and engineering positions:
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improve the outreach to the science and engineering community and use more effective techniques for recruiting leading scientists and engineers.
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reduce the hurdles of the appointment process and the disincentives to government service.
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restructure certain positions to make them more attractive to scientists and engineers.
Improve Recruitment
The President's Science and Technology Advisor as Recruiter
Early designation of the President's Science Advisor will enablehis or her active involvement in the effort to identify and recruitoutstanding scientists and engineers for presidential appointments .
One of the key roles of the science advisor should be to assist the President in recruiting the best scientific and engineering talent in the country for top positions in the S&T-intensive agencies. In recent decades, however, presidential science advisors have been chosen too late to participate in the all-important initial recruitment effort of new administrations, and they have too seldom played a strong role in recruitment once they were on board. The importance of presidential leadership in attracting the best scientists and engineers for leadership positions in the executive branch cannot be overemphasized, and the selection and role of the President's Science Advisor is crucial to this perception. If the President's Science Advisor is of high stature in the research community and participates personally in presidential recruiting, the acceptance rate of the most qualified scientists and engineers would be increased.
Involvement of Departments and Agencies
A new administration not only must conduct the search and negotiation process required to fill 78 or so presidentially appointed S&T positions but also the other 470 full-time PAS jobs, nearly 2,350 additional full-time positions and several thousand part-time appointments to boards and commissions. Without giving up their exclusive right tomake executive appointments, presidents should place greater relianceon cabinet secretaries and agency heads for active identificationand recruitment of candidates for subcabinet positions involvingS&T expertise. The White House and President's Science and Technology Advisor can concentrate on the highest priority positions while working cooperatively with the departments and agencies on the rest, scrutinizing the qualifications of those candidates put forth by Cabinet officers and agency heads.
The White House cannot hope directly to fill the thousands of PAS and other political positions that must be filled at the beginning of an administration in a timely fashion or thoroughly supervise them thereafter. In any case, most appointed S&T positions are level IV or V, are primarily specialized in nature, and work primarily with department leadership, not the White House. The White House office of presidential appointments is likely to be under intense pressure to fill positions for political reasons, while department and agency heads have a large stake in filling S&T positions with people of high expertise. They are also better able to match the person with the job, and they are more likely than the White House presidential appointments office to be connected to the networks in which technical experts operate professionally.
A Special S&T Unit in the White House Personnel Office
Because some of the best scientists and engineers do not think of seeking a presidentially appointed position and have to be actively recruited, the White House office of presidential appointments shouldhave a special unit charged with assisting in the recruiting of outstandingscientists and engineers, and it should be given sufficient resourcesto ensure a high level of professionalism in recruitment.
The most qualified scientists and engineers are probably not looking for appointed positions in the government. They are less likely to be living in the Washington area already or to be involved in partisan politics than are capable individuals outside the S&T community. It is essential to reach out actively to this special, limited pool of potential appointees. Also, in some recent cases, initial contacts with prestigious scientists and engineers have not been well handled, leading potential candidates to believe that inappropriate criteria were being used or that political criteria, while appropriate to some degree, were being overemphasized relative to technical qualifications.
It is necessary and appropriate for the presidential appointments office in the White House to manage the overall confirmation process. A specialized and experienced staff unit, working in conjunction with the President's Science Advisor and concerned department and agency heads, would help the departments and agencies better perform the recruitment function.
Reduce Hurdles and Disincentives
The hurdles and disincentives in the presidential appointment process have become an ordeal that fewer and fewer of the most highly qualified scientists and engineers are willing to undergo. Some of the most important hurdles are conflict-of-interest laws that have proliferated. The integrity of government and public trust in government must be maintained, but, as a Nation, we also pay a high cost if top leadership positions are not filled by the most qualified and experienced experts.
Adopt Reasonable Conflict-of-Interest and Postgovernment Employment Restrictions
The unintended costs of broader conflict-of-interest restrictions—particularly those dealing with postgovernment employment of technical people—have reached the point where they substantially outweigh their benefits. It is possible to have fair and effective conflict-of-interest laws that are compatible with and would promote public service by highly qualified and motivated individuals from industry, academia, and other sectors.
Federal officials must not have conflicts of interest arising from financial or other personal interests in matters relating to their official duties or activities of their agencies. Federal officials are expected to serve the public interest, and they should not abuse their positions to enrich themselves, their families, or any organization in which they have a financial or personal interest.
Since the 1978 Ethics in Government Act set up the current procedures and established the Office of Government Ethics, cases where it has been impossible to resolve conflicts have been
rare. Over time, however, there has been a natural tendency to resort to the most stringent ''cure''—for example, divestiture and recusal.
In applying the conflict-of-interest laws, divestiture of assetsshould not be considered the primary remedy and therefore requiredroutinely. Recusal, coupled with full public financial disclosure,should be considered by the Senate, the Office of Government Ethics,and designated agency ethics officials as the primary remedy in mostcases. In many cases, recusal alone should be a sufficient remedy. If divestiture is necessary, it should not be coupled with recusal (unless the appointee retains some interest, such as pension rights). The public interest is better served if the least drastic—and least costly—remedy is used in each case, because it would improve recruitment of needed personnel.
Recent efforts to create a scandal-proof government have gone so far that, on balance, they may be doing more harm than good by deterring talented and experienced scientific and engineering personnel from taking senior government positions. Where laws afford little additional ethical protection at very high cost, they are a bad bargain for the government and the public. Postemployment restrictions shouldbe revised to balance the public's interest in ensuring the integrityof government operations with its interest in attracting the besttalent to government service. At the same time, federal ethics laws,including postemployment restrictions, should be streamlined andclarified, and they should be contained in a single comprehensivesection of the U.S. Code. To accomplish this, appropriate legislationshould be submitted as soon as possible.
In the meantime, since the new administration must conduct its initial and most important recruitment under existing laws, which are overlapping, conflicting, confusing, and in some respects overly broad, it should make full use of current provisions for waivers and exemptions fromthe postemployment laws that apply to critically needed scientificand technological experts to the fullest extent needed. In certaincases, this will require personal approval of the President.
Reduce the Disincentives to Government Service
The executive pay situation has eased considerably but will deteriorate again unless there are regular cost-of-living adjustments. The costs of entering the government service and staying there for an effective period of time, say four years, should be reasonable. This does not mean that the pay of appointees need be comparable to the private sector, but appointees should be able to meet their living costs. This principle may be more important for midcareer scientists and engineers than for other professionals, because they are not as likely to have accumulated much wealth and their government service will probably not boost their salaries as much after they leave government. The President and Congress should ensure that there are regular salaryreviews and pay increases, when justified by cost-of-living data,to avoid the large lapse in adequacy of executive pay that developedin the mid-1980s.
Also, the pay-related flexibilities authorized by the Federal EmployeesPay Comparability Act of 1990 should be used selectively where necessaryto recruit and keep top candidates for key positions. These flexibilities include recruitment bonuses and retention allowances, special pay categories, and reimbursement for moving expenses.
Streamline Administrative Actions
The appointment process itself has become too elaborate and lengthy. This unnecessarily deters some potential candidates and hinders effective leadership. The sheer length and paperwork burden of the appointment process itself should be reduced. For example, background investigations of prospective nominees by the FBI add weeks and even months to the appointment process. To eliminate this source of significant delay, the President could direct the FBI only to conduct background investigationssince the last such investigation, where one exists.
Nominees for PAS positions must fill out a series of separate, complicated, and incompatible financial disclosure and personal data forms for the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Government Ethics, the FBI, and the White House and for the relevant Senate committee. This slows the process, imposes unnecessary legal and accounting costs on candidates, and multiplies the chance of error. The administrationshould work with the relevant Senate committees to simplify and standardizeforms and coordinate procedures used in the confirmation process.
Make Jobs More Attractive
The positions can be made more attractive to top scientists and engineers, chiefly by ensuring that incumbents, once appointed, can see that their expert knowledge and judgment are heard and coupled effectively with S&T policymaking and management decisionmaking.
Unfortunately, there has been a growing belief in the scientific and engineering communities that the PAS jobs are becoming more difficult to do well. This belief stems in part from a perception that technical expertise and judgment are not given their due weight in making policy—or, sometimes, in making the appointments themselves. There have been many reports in recent decades (especially those associated with ideological or "litmus test" rejections of qualified potential nominees) that send a message that an incumbent's technical integrity may be compromised. There is also a perception that some positions have been pushed down too many layers in the decisionmaking structure to be effective.
Politics cannot and should not be removed from the top S&T jobs. S&T appointees, like all presidential appointees, should be willing and able to support the President's policy positions. But the President is served if the best technical judgment on difficult public policy issues is heard, considered, and balanced with other considerations by decisionmakers. The basic function of presidentially appointed S&T leaders is to bring technical knowledge and informed judgment to the policy arena and to foster policies that are defensible on both political and technical grounds. It follows that other considerations should not be permitted to prevail—in reality or perception—without the scientific and technical considerations being carefully considered.
There are ways to help ensure that technical expertise is heard and appropriately considered at top decisionmaking levels, and this would help to improve the attractiveness of S&T positions. For example, some positions have fixed terms and normally carry over from one administration to the next. These include the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Chief Medical Director of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Fixed terms also promote continuity in policy and program management, which is often appropriate for S&T programs because they are typically long-term. For these reasons, incumbents of such positionswho were chosen primarily for their technical qualifications shouldbe allowed to serve their full terms, unless their performance wasbelow par or they have politicized their positions in a manner contraryto the President's policy positions.
The political status, responsibilities and authorities, and reportingrelationships of the government's top S&T positions should be reviewedperiodically—and restructured as necessary—to ensure that the unbiasedscientific and engineering judgment of incumbents is preserved andis directly introduced into the policy process. Such a process would help maintain the effectiveness and relevance of these important positions, which in turn would ensure that highly qualified and capable individuals would want to serve in them. The reviews should be a responsibility of the President's Science Advisor, with staff assistance from the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Independent reviews should also be conducted periodically by a private organization or set of organizations concerned with the government's effectiveness in carrying out its scientific and engineering missions.
Certain positions could be elevated in level and status to reduce "layering" and make them more effective in carrying out their responsibilities and thus more attractive to outstanding candidates. Some positions would be more attractive to highly qualified scientists and engineers if they were not subject to the presidential appointment process at all, but were filled through merit procedures. This was done successfully in the case of the assistant directors of the National Science Foundation, because political recruitment was taking too much time of the director and promising candidates were put off by the ordeal of the confirmation process in order to fill what they considered to be a professional position.
Finally, working with the Congress, the President should carry outan overall reduction in political appointees (especially in ScheduleC and noncareer Senior Executive Service jobs, but also in PAS positions),as recommended by the National Commission on the Public Service andother bipartisan and nonpartisan groups.
The proliferation of political appointees is part of the problem in effective governance. Political layering and excessive interference from Schedule C and political SES appointees who work for higher level officials constitute important disincentives for highly competent individuals to serve. This is especially a problem in the S&T policy and administration area, because too much layering of authority affects the input of technical considerations in decisionmaking.
PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED SCIENCE-AND TECHNOLOGY-RELATED POSITIONS |
|
Unit |
|
Position Title |
Executive Pay Level |
Executive Office of the President |
|
Office of Science and Technology Policy |
|
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology |
II |
Associate Director for Policy and International Affairs |
III |
Associate Director for Life Sciences |
III |
Associate Director for Physical Sciences and Engineering |
III |
Associate Director for Industrial Technology |
III |
Council of Economic Advisors |
|
Chairman |
II |
Council on Environmental Quality |
|
Chairman |
IV |
Departments |
|
Agriculture |
|
Assistant Secretary for Science and Education |
IV |
Commerce |
|
Under Secretary, Technology |
III |
Assistant Secretary, Technology Policy |
IV |
Director, Census Bureau |
IV |
Assistant Secretary/Administrator, National Telecommunications and Information Administration |
IV |
Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology |
IV |
Under Secretary/Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) |
III |
Assistant Secretary, Oceans and Atmosphere |
IV |
Chief Scientist, NOAA |
V |
Defense |
|
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation |
IV |
Under Secretary for Acquisition |
II |
Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition |
III |
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) |
V |
Director of Defense Research and Engineering |
IV |
Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) |
IV |
Assistant Secretary (Health Affairs) |
IV |
Air Force |
|
Assistant Secretary (Acquisition) |
IV |
Army |
|
Assistant Secretary (Research, Development and Acquisition) |
IV |
Navy |
|
Assistant Secretary (Research, Development and Acquisition) |
IV |
Education |
|
Assistant Secretary for Educational Research and Improvement |
IV |
Energy |
|
Director, Civilian Radioactive Waste Management |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy |
IV |
Director, Office of Alcohol Fuels |
IV |
Director, Office of Energy Research |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy |
IV |
Administrator, Energy Information Service |
IV |
Health and Human Services |
|
Assistant Secretary for Health |
IV |
Surgeon General, Public Health Service |
PHS |
Administrator, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration |
IV |
Director, National Institutes of Health |
IV |
Director, National Cancer Institute |
PA |
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration |
IV |
Housing and Urban Development |
|
Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research |
IV |
Interior |
|
Assistant Secretary—Fish and Wildlife, and Parks |
IV |
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service |
V |
Assistant Secretary for Water and Science |
IV |
Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation |
V |
Director, Bureau of Mines |
V |
Director, U.S. Geological Survey |
V |
Justice |
|
Director, Bureau of Justice Statistics |
IV |
Labor |
|
Commissioner of Labor Statistics |
V |
Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health |
IV |
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health |
IV |
State |
|
Under Secretary for International Security Affairs |
III |
Assistant Secretary, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs |
IV |
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs |
III |
Transportation |
|
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration |
II |
Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration |
IV |
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration |
III |
Veterans Affairs |
|
Chief Medical Director |
III |