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INTRODUCTION 29 alternative to storage and certification, could be extended to include gas streams leaving the destruction equipment. ALTERNATIVE DEMILITARIZATION SYSTEMS Recent studies of different approaches to the destruction of the Army's unitary chemical weapons stockpile have used the term "alternative technologies," a term reflected in the name of the committee preparing this report. However, most technologies reviewed here or by other investigators are actually unit processes: they represent only part of a system of processes required to demilitarize the U.S. stockpile. For example, separation of agent from munitions and explosives, chemical neutralization of agent, oxidation of the neutralization products, and oxidation of remaining agent on the metal parts are all unit processes, which together might represent an alternative demilitarization system. Alternative demilitarization processes might partly or wholly replace or be used in addition to the current baseline system to handle agent, explosives, propellants, metal parts, dunnage, or any other waste streams potentially contaminated with agent. Chemical weapons demilitarization has been studied and practiced for decades. A National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study in 1969 assessed the hazards of different disposal methods for several types of obsolete and defective chemical warfare stocks: Air Force M34 bomblet clusters containing GB, bulk containers of mustard, M55 rockets containing GB, contaminated and water-filled bulk containers, and drums containing cans of a riot control agent called CS (NAS, 1969). This study advised against then-current plans for ocean dumping, recommending instead that the M34 clusters be disassembled, the withdrawn GB be chemically destroyed by acid or alkaline hydrolysis, and the mustard be burned in government establishments where storage was safe and local air pollution from SO2 and HCl would not be a problem. The report also suggested that a systematic study be undertaken regarding disposal of the chemical weapons and munitions on military installations without hazard to the general population or pollution of the environment. In the early 1980s, alternative approaches to destroy the U.S. stockpile were considered and evaluated by the NRC Committee on Demilitarizing Chemical Munitions and Agents (NRC, 1984). The major alternatives evaluated in this study were placement in the deep ocean, thermal destruction processes such as pyrolysis and combustion, chemical processes, nuclear explosions, and a number of novel methods including in-shell combustion, steam pyrolysis, drain-in-furnace, underground combustion or caustic hydrolysis, and high- temperature pyrolysis. After considering the advantages and disadvantages of each method, the committee concluded that thermal destruction would be preferred for disposal of the U.S. stockpile. Again, this
INTRODUCTION 30 conclusion supported the Army's selection of combustion as the most appropriate method. (For a brief review of actual U.S. and foreign experience with chemical demilitarization, see Chapter 3.) As the time to transfer the baseline technology from JACADS to mainland sites has come closer, several national and local organizations and many individuals have voiced opposition to the use of incineration as part of the Army's chemical weapons destruction program (Ember, 1992; OTA, 1992). Discussions with representatives of Kentucky citizens groups concerned about proposed activities at the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot led the Office of Technology Assessment to identify the following issues as those generating opposition: concern over possible health risks associated with incinerator effluents, the possibility that the facilities will be used for other types of waste disposal once the stockpile is destroyed, the proximity of destruction facilities to major population centers, and the risk to citizens in communities near chemical weapons storage sites during munitions transport from storage igloos to the on-site incinerator facility (OTA, 1992). The Office of Technology Assessment also briefly addressed some possible alternative technologies, namely, chemical neutralization, supercritical water oxidation, steam gasification (or steam reforming), and plasma arc technology, all of which are also reviewed here. In addressing these and other unit processes that might be applied to stockpile destruction, the committee considered the concerns raised by local communities. As mentioned above, special attention is given here to storage and certification of gas waste streams. In this regard, note that all possible alternative technologies will produce some set of wastes (gas, liquid, and solid) that must be appropriately managed within governing regulatory requirements. In particular, the heteroatoms contained in chemical agents (fluorine [F], chlorine [Cl], sulfur [S], and phosphorus [P]) contribute to the formation of salt wastes that may need disposal in hazardous waste landfills. Opponents of the baseline incineration technology have also claimed that it poses significant risks of exposure to surrounding populations and to the environment, risks that could be reduced by alternative technologies. Greenpeace has sponsored a report reviewing alternatives to incineration for destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile, including biological, chemical, photochemical, electrochemical, and thermal processes (Picardi et al., 1991). These processes would have to be combined to manage the various components of the stockpile. Many of these processes are also addressed here. Finally, Congress has taken a serious interest in the technologies to be used to destroy the U.S. stockpile and is looking to the mandated evaluation of potential alternatives that the Army will submit to Congress by December 31, 1993 (National Defense Authorization Act of 1993). This Army report is required to include an analysis of the present report. Until the Army's report is submitted, the Army may not prepare sites or construct a disposal facility
