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INTRODUCTION 34 In Strategy 2, complete oxidation (mineralization) is accomplished without the need for long-term storage of agent, energetics, metal parts, and containers. This strategy meets all goals by oxidation and heat treatment. Agent destruction can be accomplished by a detoxification step, as in Strategy 1, followed by oxidation of the by- products or by direct oxidation as in the baseline technology. Energetics and metal parts are thermally decontaminated. An afterburner would generally be required to ensure complete destruction of all products of incomplete oxidation. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY In response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment, the NRC formed the Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies to study alternatives to the baseline technology for the destruction of unitary chemical agents and munitions. The main required steps in the destruction of this stockpile include (1) transport of weapons from storage to the destruction area, (2) unpacking of weapons, (3) disassembly of weapons, (4) destruction of agent and weapons, and (5) waste stream treatment and management. The focus here is on Steps 4 and 5. In particular, the primary task of the committee is to objectively characterize alternative destruction technologies, assess their state of development, identify their advantages and disadvantages for chemical demilitarization, and identify the research and development (R&D) they would require if they were to be used in demilitarization. The committee's charter does not include selecting or recommending any specific technology to the Army (see Appendix A for the statement of task). Results of this study will be used by the NRC's Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Army Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program to generate specific recommendations on disposal technologies. As mentioned above and discussed in more detail later, many of the technologies reviewed here cannot handle all components of the chemical weapons stockpile that must be destroyed. Hence, in its assessment, the committee considered the possible use of individual alternative technologies to demilitarize parts of the stockpile and combinations of technologies to form alternative demilitarization systems. The committee took a number of steps to identify technologies for review. Initially, an attempt was made to list all possible alternative technologies without concern for development status, cost, time required for implementation, suitability, or any other constraint. During this early study phase, the committee used many sources, including prior Army experience, proposals submitted to the Army since 1984, the NRC report Disposal of
INTRODUCTION 35 Chemical Munitions and Agents (NRC, 1984), a 1991 report on alternative technologies prepared for Greenpeace International (Picardi et el., 1991), a report by the Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA, 1991), the EPA's Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation Program (EPA, 1991), suggestions from outside the committee in response to an announcement of the study, and the committee's own suggestions and experience (see Appendix D for committee members' backgrounds). Using all these sources, the committee identified and collected information on technologies that appear to be developed to a point where an assessment can be made. For many of the processes considered, such limited data were available on their use in chemical weapons destruction that assessments of these processes are necessarily highly judgmental. Where the data were dearly insufficient or there appeared to be great constraints on the use of alternatives, these alternatives were not further evaluated. In particular, the committee did not consider the following as viable alternatives: ⢠open atmospheric dispersion and/or burning; ⢠ocean dumping, including placement in the subducting subsea regions of adjacent plates; ⢠placing chemical agent in extraterrestrial orbit; ⢠destruction by underground nuclear weapons explosions; ⢠burial in volcanoes; ⢠destruction of weapons in existing industrial facilities; and ⢠minor modifications to incineration systems that have already been reviewed, such as different mechanical configurations of the combustion chamber. All but the last of these concepts was automatically eliminated from further consideration because all require extensive transportation of weapons to disposal sites, a method not within the scope of this study. Some of these methods would also violate environmental regulations. In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention excludes dumping in any body of water, land burial, and open-pit burning of chemical weapons. The last item in the list above was eliminated because such systems were reviewed in an earlier report on the choice of an incineration system (NRC, 1984). The committee did not develop a numerical rating system for screening criteria but instead established general considerations and requirements to assess alternative technologies (see Chapter 4). Specific information on many of the technologies was provided to the committee by technology developers (see Appendix E). However, in its assessment the committee focused on general approaches rather than specific technologies of specific companies, although it received information from companies on their technologies. (Proprietary information was not used in this study. Some of the processes are
INTRODUCTION 36 under intensive development and data concerning their operation are changing rapidly.) The committee held a June 1992 workshop for presentations and discussions on the technologies selected for assessment (see Appendix F on committee activities for a list of workshop presentations). Additionally, a worksheet was developed by the committee for obtaining and organizing important information on each technology (see Appendix G). Invited observers were asked to comment on the formal presentations at the workshop. Observers included technology developers; independent scientists and engineers; members of public interest groups, such as Greenpeace International, Concerned Citizens for Maryland's Environment, and the Kentucky Environmental Foundation; and representatives of federal and state organizations. The committee solicited information in writing from developers working on potentially applicable technologies who were unable to attend the workshop. The information collected, the technical literature, and the committee's own expertise and judgment served as resources in formulating this report. The committee has grouped the processes addressed into preprocessing and postprocessing options, such as charcoal beds (see Chapter 5); low-temperature, liquid-phase processes, such as chemical detoxification reactions (see Chapter 6); and processes at higher temperature and pressure, such as wet air and supercritical water oxidation (see Chapter 7). Chapter 8 integrates and summarizes the information: it summarizes the assessment of the various processes, considers strategies for destroying the chemical weapons stockpile, and delineates how the various unit processes might be applied to the Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.