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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 but instead has assessed generic approaches to chemical weapons destruction. The committee did not have access to proprietary information in this study. REQUIREMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS Destruction of the chemical stockpile is a complex undertaking. Determining the appropriate technologies to perform this task must include cognizance of a number of requirements and considerations. ⢠A number of process streams must be treated. Destruction technologies must be able to treat liquid nerve and mustard agents and the products of their aging, such as gels and reaction products. Because agent is stored both in bulk in metal containers and in weapons containing explosives and propellants, destruction technologies must also be able to manage solids contaminated with agent, both with and without explosives and propellants. The committee focused on these process streams, recognizing that dunnage, ventilation air, and spent decontamination fluids must also be treated and disposed of. ⢠An integrated system of unit processes will be required. As the name of this committee suggests, the word ''technology'' is usually applied to processes that are or might be used to destroy the chemical stockpile, such as baseline technology or plasma arc technology. However, many unit processes are entailed in any technology. The baseline technology, for example, encompasses transport and dismantling of weapons, separation of agent from explosives, agent combustion, combustion of by-products in an afterburner, and cleanup of waste gas streams. Alternative approaches to these processes may be useful, but alone they are often unable to demilitarize the chemical stockpile. For example, chemical hydrolysis might be used to detoxify the chemical agent drained from munitions. The products of this process might then be oxidized by a biological process, a wet air oxidation, or a supercritical water oxidation to further destroy organic materials. The effluents of this step might require yet further treatment, for example, in a catalytic oxidizer, before release to the environment. Such a sequence of processes might be viewed as one technology for the destruction of a given agent. Other processes would still be required to destroy or detoxify agent on metal parts, dunnage, and energetics. These system considerations must be taken into account when assessing the likely potential value of alternative technologies and unit processes. ⢠International treaty deadlines should be met. The international treaty on chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (signed by the United States and a number of other nations January 13-15, 1993), specifies that chemical agents should be converted essentially irreversibly (to
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 a form unsuitable for the production of chemical weapons) and that munitions and other devices should be rendered unusable as such. The convention, when ratified, will require destruction of all chemical weapons within a 10-year period, with provision for a one-time extension. For the deadline to be met, technologies must be developed and demonstrated in a timely fashion, and they must be able to process weapons at an acceptable rate. Hence, the development stage of a technology and the time likely required to demonstrate its effectiveness become important considerations. Although treaty deadlines may change, there also remains the risk of agent release from any continued storage of weapons, which should be balanced against the risks of demilitarization. ⢠Waste streams must meet environmental standards. All technologies used to destroy chemical weapons will produce liquid, solid, and gas waste streams in proportions depending on the technology. All systems, including the baseline technology, must meet regulatory standards for effluents. This requirement implies that liquid wastes, such as salt solutions, spent decontamination fluid, and contaminated water, must be converted to dry solids and water and that the water be treated to allow recycling. Solid wastes consist mainly of salts and decontaminated metal parts. For solid wastes, the Army has developed a classification of degrees of decontamination achieved. Level 3X, established primarily for worker safety, applies to once-contaminated or potentially contaminated material that has since been decontaminated to show zero residual contamination as indicated by air monitoring above the material. Worker contact is allowed with such materials, but they cannot be released to the public. A level 5X rating is applied to a fully decontaminated solid that can be released to the public for uncontrolled use; this level is achieved by a thermal treatment of at least 1000°F for at least 15 minutes. To achieve 5X solids decontamination with technologies that do not operate at such temperatures would require treatment equivalent to this thermal treatment. ⢠Agent release must be avoided. For gas waste streams, the highly toxic nature of chemical warfare agents requires that any demilitarization system encompass safety systems to prevent agent release to the environment. In addition, discharge of other toxic materials in air generated by the destruction process must be below regulatory requirements for both design operation and operation in the case of equipment or operational failure. Alternative demilitarization technologies must be able to meet these criteria. ⢠Time for development must be weighed. All alternative technologies will require some time for development dependent on their stage of development. Although there is a treaty deadline, the committee did not eliminate from consideration any technology because of the development time it would require; development time is one factor that must be weighed by the
