is, of course, to identify and promote specific confidence-building measures that will permit technology transfer and capital investment with greater certainty that the new capabilities enabled will not in fact find their way into military systems or be incorporated into items for export to countries of proliferation concern.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that change, if it is to come and if it is to be meaningful, will require new modes of behavior and intellectual approaches on the part of all parties. To be frank, there continue to be residual concerns in the U.S. and NATO military establishments that near-complete elimination of controls on technology exports to the FSU could look reckless and foolhardy, in retrospect, if there were to be serious political reversals in the Russian Federation and a resulting change of leadership and foreign policy. By the same token, the question must be asked whether the Russian national security establishment has yet fully accepted the idea that on-site verification of converted military-industrial enterprises—similar to the kind of verification agreed to in the terms of the INF, START I and START II agreements—will be necessary to promote greater confidence in the West. It is also unclear whether the Russian military is fully engaged in the process of formulating Russian controls on indigenously produced technologies and end products.
Moreover, in recent site visits in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Perm, it was indicated that some military-industrial enterprises that are in the process of converting are being required to retain their military manufacturing production capacity, or at least the capacity to reconvert to military production on a rapid basis in the event of an external threat. While every sovereign state must obviously have the capacity to mobilize its manufacturing resources in defense of the nation, it must be recognized that, for the next few years at least, any such reconversion involving dual-use technology acquired in the West would appear threatening to the COCOM countries.
There are, at the same time, a number of hopeful signs that the situation is improving. Among the most important of these developments is the recent decree by President Boris Yeltsin that formally established an export control policy for sensitive dual-use technology. A second is the creation of an Export Control Council in conjunction with the Russian government, with major participation by representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences. There also has been a series of potentially important proposals discussed within the context of the new COCOM Cooperation Forum in Paris.
Before describing and commenting upon what has been proposed there, let me note that the licensing of sensitive dual-use exports to the FSU in the United States has already improved substantially. Just prior to coming to Moscow, I obtained from the U.S. Commerce Department the latest data on licensing case submissions to COCOM for the period from January 1991 through October 1992. As you may know, only the most sensitive cases must be referred to COCOM in Paris for multilateral review; the remainder are decided by national authorities on the basis of "national discretion."