JOINT CONCEPT OF U.S. AND RUSSIAN PROVISIONS FOR THE ENSURANCE OF GLOBAL STABILITY UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER
General Oleg K. Rogozin (retired)
Principal Research Scientist, RAS Elorma Program
Former Deputy Chief of Procurement, Soviet Ministry of Defense
Professor Valery N. Spector
Vice President, RAS Elorma Corporation
PREAMBLE
A New Megatrend of the 1990s: Transition from the Arms Race to Defense Sufficiency
Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s, by J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene, lacks a vital aspect which makes predictability for what is coming less than doubtful. We feel justified to say that one of the major megatrends now is a transition from a rigid armed counterpose of superpowers to a state of defense sufficiency, when the primary task of armed forces becomes a guaranty of national survival.
Bipolar Strategic Arrangement Preservation as a Geopolitical Imperative
Strategic nuclear forces of two great powers—the United States of America and the Soviet Union—have evidently become a decisive factor for the almost half century of calm on the world level, as their mutual deployment would have brought the world to a total catastrophe without victors or losers. The strategic nuclear forces, the ban on deployment of which has not yet become an absolute political and military imperative, have mainly caused limitation or, to be more precise, impossibility of the traditional wars between nuclear states, as nobody could have given reasonable guarantees for non-deployment of a tactical, or in later stages, strategic nuclear weapon by a losing party, if it were on the brink of a national catastrophe.
Expansion of the "Nuclear Club"
The dominant strategic balance of nuclear forces of the United States and USSR after World War II helped to maintain a time-tested international bipolar geostrategic stability, which prevented large-scale regional and world wars. However, the principle accepted in the U.S. and USSR of "the fewer fingers on the nuclear triggers, the better" was soon violated. The dialectics of universal development are such that more and more countries are joining or trying to join the "nuclear club." Great Britain, France, and China have been members of this "club'' for a long time; later Israel, South Africa, India and Pakistan also developed nuclear weapons. Iraq, Argentina, Brazil and North Korea may soon also have nuclear weapons. The fact that many countries which are trying to reach their own nuclear triggers did not sign the non-proliferation treaty of March 5, 1970, is troublesome.
The main attributes of nuclear weapons are their carriers (ballistic and aeroballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery shells, and others). The rapid development of such carriers is noticeable in many developing countries. In 1989, about 20 countries had ballistic missiles, which are the least vulnerable in flight (among all types of carriers). In recent years Egypt, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia developed such missiles. Twelve countries are currently actively developing such missiles. This process is aided by the ill-advised policy of the developed countries, including the U.S. and the former USSR, of increasing the number of types and sizes of carrier rockets, granting licenses for their production, providing scientific-technical consultations and support. A chain reaction is going on in the world and things have even gone so far that several Third World countries (Argentina, Brazil, and others) themselves became exporters of carrier rockets.
Multipolar Geostrategic Set Up - A Way to Apocalypse
Under the conditions of a perilously rapid development of missile and nuclear technologies by the Third World countries and the disintegration of the USSR, the world's bipolar geostrategic stability is starting to erode, which may cause serious and unpredictable military and political consequences, especially in the Islamic world (including the territories of the former USSR), and in the Asia-Pacific region.
Creation of a multipolar geostrategic nuclear world system is a direct path to an apocalypse, since several Third World states with newly developed or almost developed nuclear weapons experience a much higher temptation to resolve territorial, religious-ethnic and other problems by military means. Kuwait's annexation by pre-nuclear Iraq and continuous military conflicts between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region are just two examples.
Are Nukes the First Strategic Priority for Technologically Advanced States?
The struggle for the strategic stability of the world community (or more precisely, for its physical survival) cannot be limited just to nuclear weapons, since modern conventional high-precision long-range weapons are also formidable strategic means of war and international terrorism.
This is caused by the huge power, chemical, and radioactive potential accumulated in the economically developed countries (nuclear power plants, chemical and oil processing industries, water-engineering systems, etc.). Their deliberate or provocative destruction by high-precision conventional weapons may cause catastrophic consequences on the regional and global levels. Because of this, under these perilous conditions of changing strategic stability, the world community should decisively move from a multitude of declarations on universal disarmament and endless cuts of nuclear and conventional weapons to strict legal measures under the aegis of the United Nations and forceful measures of self-defense. The two superpowers—the United States and Russia—should become leaders of this process.
THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF SECURING THE WORLD'S STRATEGIC STABILITY BY THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
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Exerting highest influence from the United States and Russia to secure the world's strategic stability, and maintenance by these two superpowers of the time-tested world order that prevented conventional large-scale and world wars.
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Strengthening of mutual trust between the United States and Russia in the military-political and strategic areas, joint development and adoption of agreed decisions on problems of international and national security, openness and mutual assistance in the areas of military-technical construction, which will eliminate mutual pseudo-threats and prevent a needless arms race between the superpowers.
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Adoption—under the aegis of the United Nations, by the world's most advanced nations, and under the leadership of the United States and Russia—of effective measures designed to block the build up of strategically dangerous nuclear and conventional weapons in the third world countries, especially in countries with non-democratic authoritarian regimes; banning the development in any country of new, even more inhumane weapons of mass destruction; and reduction by treaties or under compulsion of stockpiled strategic weapons by involving all countries in this process.
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Establishing under the aegis of the United Nations systems of international control, monitoring, communications and data transfer, including the following:
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a missile attack warning system, capable of providing timely warning to the world community about an accidental or deliberate launch of missiles, and able to determine the coordinates of the launch and detonation sites, and the details about the flight path of the weapon units;
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a system of monitoring outer space, capable of warning countries about military changes in outer space, and also able to monitor compliance with international treaties on space use;
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monitoring of testing of strategic nuclear and conventional weapons in various physical environments;
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an automated command point of the United Nations for receiving, processing and transmitting data used in the total assessment of the strategic situation in the world.
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Creating a global system of anti-missile defense for intercepting deliberate and accidental launches of single or small groups of ballistic missiles.
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Setting up a joint U.S.-Russian center for verification of non-proliferation of strategically dangerous technologies.
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Creating supervisory bodies accountable to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring the development of new nuclear weapons systems in Third World countries.
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Organizing international endowments for social and professional support of scientists and leading specialists in the fields of nuclear weapons and space technology.
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Internationalization of basic research in the areas of material properties, physics, chemistry, and biology, including the following:
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initially joint Russian-American scientific projects, related primarily to the indicated fields;
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adding to these programs scientists from other countries through retraining and reorientation to basic and advanced research aimed at creating a foundation of collective development and collective security;
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widening the scope of projects to include applied research aimed primarily at the development and international unification of waste-free and resource-saving technologies, creation of systems of regional and global ecological monitoring, systems of recultivation and recuperation of the biosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, systems of repressive control of the technospheres.
MAIN TYPES OF STRATEGICALLY DANGEROUS ARMAMENTS
The following types may be, from our point of view, referred as a priority among the most strategically dangerous armaments:
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All nuclear strategic, operational-strategic, operational-tactical and tactical warheads and means of their delivery (ballistic, aeroballistic, and aerodynamic missiles launched from the ground, sea, aircraft or outer space with flight distance over 500 kilometers, and strategic aircraft);
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missile-carrying ships with missile range over 700 kilometers, operational-strategic ''stealth" aircraft with an operational radius of action over 500 kilometers, striking (offensive) space and aerospace crafts, equipped with laser, particle beam, nuclear, and other air-to-surface weapons, also other types of mass destruction weapons (chemical, bacteriological, radio-frequency, ultrasound, etc.) and means of their delivery regardless of their range.
THE MOST IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGIES TO BE RESTRICTED FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER COUNTRIES
Technologies and scientific-technical documentation that should not be transferred to other countries include the results of basic, applied, and design research in the area of developing new, and improving existing, types of following weapons:
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nuclear weapons and weapons based on new physical principles;
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radar, television, infrared, laser, correlation (by area relief and target "portrait"), radiometric, and combined self-guided warheads for guiding high-precision strike weapons;
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thermovision systems and control (guidance) devices for all-weather and around-the-clock missiles, and guided bombs;
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low visibility aircraft (airplanes, missiles, etc.), primarily stealth aircraft;
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low specific density and corrosion resistant structural and composite materials for aerospace and missile technologies;
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optical and optoelectronic devices for control and guidance of strike (offensive) weapons;
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systems for processing signals of various physical origins;*
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high-precision laser gyroscopes;
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microelectronics and miniature thrusters;*
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supermini and onboard computers;*
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cryogenic engineering and fuel for rocket engines;*
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hydroacoustic systems for surface ships and submarines.*
BASIC MEASURES TO PREVENT UNCONTROLLED "BRAIN DRAIN" FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
To prevent the employment of scientists and specialists from the former Soviet Union (primarily scientists from Russia) for the accelerated development of strategically dangerous weapons in a number of Third World countries, it is necessary to design a balanced and coordinated system of measures, which could include the following activities:
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a directed social and economic support of primarily Russian scientists and specialists during the period of transition from centralized to market economies taking place in the states of the former Soviet Union;
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reorientation of scientists and specialists who used to work for the military-industrial complex into other research work that would be similar in form and content, and their guaranteed employment, mainly in their own country;
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establishment of controlled contractual migration to developed countries and contractual assignments through the United Nations to developing countries for conducting civil research aimed at reconstruction and development;
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use of their knowledge and experience by involving them in solving ecological problems, primarily related to the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station and other industrial accidents, and disposal of weapons and munitions according to the conversion plans and reductions in armaments and armed forces;
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use of these specialists in international projects, primarily joint projects with the United States, designed to create and develop technical systems of global security;
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participation in joint projects with the United States and other developed countries aimed at reconstruction and development by conducting theoretical and applied research of a peaceful nature;
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development of international exchange systems concerning science and technology, including retraining of scientists and specialists, on the job training, support of scientist participation (primarily Russian), in international and regional scientific functions (congresses, symposiums, conferences, seminars, expositions, and science schools).