agreements, the states which export nuclear materials and technologies have instituted their own domestic measures to control these shipments.
In 1984, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States joined together to form the Australia Group, which aims to limit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. A representative from the European Community also participates in the group's activities. The aforementioned nations have drawn up a list of components which can be used in the production of toxic substances. This list consists of 50 items and is intended to inform firms operating in Australia Group member-countries of the fact that these chemicals can be used to produce both civilian and military products (such as chemical weapons).
Nevertheless, the Australia Group has not created any effective international control mechanism. Our country does not participate in its work on an official basis.
Control of missile proliferation has a very short history. In April 1987, the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy established a committee for the control of missile proliferation and agreed to basic control principles, which were set forth in a document entitled the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This committee was subsequently joined by Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, New Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. A total of 16 nations currently participate in the effort to control missile technologies. Furthermore, the United States also carries on a unilateral control over a broader list of missile technologies than that of the above countries. Our country is not presently among the participants in the international missile control regime.
However, the international and national control systems currently in place have not managed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, primarily because the existing control mechanisms do not cover all issues of vital significance in the area of nonproliferation. For example, the MTCR includes only missiles themselves, essentially ignoring missile technologies used in civilian space programs that might also have broad military applications. It must be noted that practically all missile technologies have civilian and military uses.
The control mechanisms existing in foreign countries are also imperfect. Due to the fact that some agencies charged with export control make export expansion their top