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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994)

Chapter: Main Goals of the Proposed Commissions of the Cabinet of Russian Ministers on the Containment of Potentially Strategically Dangerous Technologies and Weapons

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Suggested Citation:"Main Goals of the Proposed Commissions of the Cabinet of Russian Ministers on the Containment of Potentially Strategically Dangerous Technologies and Weapons." National Research Council. 1994. Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2270.
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MAIN GOALS OF THE PROPOSED COMMISSIONS OF THE CABINET OF RUSSIAN MINISTERS ON THE CONTAINMENT OF POTENTIALLY STRATEGICALLY DANGEROUS TECHNOLOGIES AND WEAPONS

Professor Valery N. Spector

Vice President of the RAS Elorma Corporation

  1. Development of recommendations for adapting a system of government decisions by Russian leadership regarding the creation and use of strategically dangerous technology, based on the analysis of current and stable tendencies in the geopolitical and military-strategic situation in the world.

  2. Development of recommendations and conclusions in accordance with the drafts of international agreements regarding the sorting of technologies according to the level of their potential strategic danger, which would depend on the dynamics of the geostrategic situation.

  3. Development of recommendations and conclusions in accordance with the drafts of international agreements regarding control of migrating scientists and specialists who carry information on potential strategically dangerous technologies.

  4. Development of recommendations and conclusions, in accordance with the drafts of international agreements, on the following: the agreed upon policy in the area of dual-use technologies; technological indications which define the impossibility of military application (for dual-use technologies); the mechanism for international notification about the creation of new, potential strategically dangerous and destabilizing technologies; and the significance of military production, relative to the general levels of production manufactured through the use of dual-use technologies.

  5. Development of recommendations and conclusions in accordance with the drafts of international agreements, regarding restrictive lists in international trade, the participation in the COCOM agreement, and the latter's reorientation toward mutual export restrictions.

  6. Development of recommendations on the selection of optimal decisions that would guarantee a strategic balance and national security in Russia, and which would be within the bounds of the concept of "unacceptable damage to the potential aggressor."

  7. Preparation of proposals, conducting talks and reaching conclusions on behalf of the Russian government regarding the refinancing of Third World countries' debts, with an agreed upon discount, for supplies of weapons, and military equipment and the

Suggested Citation:"Main Goals of the Proposed Commissions of the Cabinet of Russian Ministers on the Containment of Potentially Strategically Dangerous Technologies and Weapons." National Research Council. 1994. Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2270.
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transfer of strategic technologies. This will provide for expenses incurred as a result of socioeconomic, military, technical, and structural problems, resulting from the reorganization of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union into a professional Russian Army.

  1. Development of recommendations and conclusions in accordance with the drafts of agreements (within the bounds of the Commonwealth of Independent States), regarding Russian relationships and policy in the area of transfer of potential strategically dangerous technologies to other states within the Commonwealth.

  2. Development of recommendations regarding the optimal selection of strategic technologies for equipping the professional Russian Army.

  3. Development of recommendations and conclusions regarding the conception of nuclear disarmament, which would comprehensively include questions about nuclear arms and the means of their delivery, as well as the different types of weapons of mass destruction and high-precision weapons.

  4. Analysis of ecological consequences that would result from the destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and a development of recommendations for conducting these activities.

  5. Preparation of recommendations for reporting on the utilization and neutralization problems which arise during strategic and conventional weapons negotiation processes as a result of freeing up of military-technical resources.

  6. Development of suggestions regarding the means of assuring global strategic security and stability at a scientific, technical, economic and legal level, as well as the means of blocking the creation, use, and distribution of potential globally dangerous technologies and actions.

  7. Participation in international meetings, conferences and activities of international organizations and movements which control the distribution of potential strategically dangerous technologies and ecologically dangerous dual-use technologies, and which deal with questions of conversion and its consequences.

  8. Implementation of current analytical conclusions which are assigned by the Russian government.

Suggested Citation:"Main Goals of the Proposed Commissions of the Cabinet of Russian Ministers on the Containment of Potentially Strategically Dangerous Technologies and Weapons." National Research Council. 1994. Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2270.
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Page 161
Suggested Citation:"Main Goals of the Proposed Commissions of the Cabinet of Russian Ministers on the Containment of Potentially Strategically Dangerous Technologies and Weapons." National Research Council. 1994. Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2270.
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Page 162
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This book arises from a joint NAS-Russian Academy of Sciences program to explore possible new approaches to the control of sensitive dual-use technologies, with respect to expanded trade between Western advanced industrialized countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union as well as to the export trade of the Russian and other CIS republics with countries of proliferation concern.

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