Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994)

Professor Yuriy N. Vershinin

Vice Chairman

Urals Division, Russian Academy of Sciences

First and foremost, it is pertinent to emphasize the major difference that has existed in position and status between the scientific workers of Russia and their counterparts in market economy countries. In terms of the planned-administrative economy that previously existed in Russia, the difference stems from the weak receptivity of civilian industrial sectors to scientific proposals, especially those which would lead to substantial changes in technology, let alone the creation of new technologies. The natural dissatisfaction of researchers with the existing state of affairs led to their striving to focus on theoretical and fundamental aspects of the technological problems involved. This is what accounts for the gap between the high level of basic research and the low level of the incorporation of these technologies in civilian industrial sectors.

A different situation emerged in the weapons-related industries. Global competition in the area of military production led the military industries to respond readily to achievements of science. A special system was even set up to search for scientific achievements to be used for military purposes. As a result, the highly educated scientific workers of universities and academic institutes readily tackled problems associated with sophisticated military equipment and weapons-related work or left their establishments to join scientific organizations of the military industrial complex. Other factors conducive to this process included better provision of such work with material and technical resources and scientific equipment, as well as a higher salary.

These circumstances need to be taken into account in analyzing the ways and means of converting science in the former Soviet Union to civil applications and in discussing the undesirable aspects of the "brain drain" problem.

One of the tasks crucial to conversion and to the promotion of mutual trust is the need to preclude the possibility of utilizing basic research results for the development of qualitatively novel military equipment and weapons. The experience of past decades has led to nuclear and chemical weapons receiving the most attention in this respect. The danger that these types of arms present when combined with modem delivery systems cannot be understated. At the same time, one cannot rule out the contingency that, in the depths of the various fields of fundamental science, arms can be devised that are based on

new physical principles and on achievements of genetic engineering and biochemistry, and that meteorological and other types of weapons can be developed.

In this context, it is hardly possible to define the list of specialties of Russian and U.S. scientists and, accordingly, of research directions that could lead to results which would be dangerous to world stability. A more effective means to exclude such possibilities is to create a system of measures conducive to a greater openness and transparency of the research conducted by scientific communities and individual scientists in both the United States and Russia.

Reorienting (converting) a relevant part of the country's scientific potential to civilian applications thus calls for arranging a number of conditions that render this process most attractive to Russian scientists. These conditions include a number of possibilities for scientists:

• quickly implementing the scientists proposals and development projects in civilian industrial sectors and thereby improving their financial position,

• publication of papers and books in prestigious journals and by prestigious publishing companies to allow Russian scientists to gain international recognition;

• use of modem experimental research equipment;

• receiving a higher salary compared to that which scientists had when working for the military-industrial complex.

These opportunities should be realized in two stages:

• the first stage, a tactical one, calls for immediate solutions and comparatively limited material and financial resources;

• the second stage, a strategic one, is associated with large investments.

In either case, definite efforts are needed on the part of the legislative, governmental, and scientific structures of Russia and the United States.

Of fundamental importance here is to create mutual trust in governmental, industrial, commercial, and scientific structures and to overcome the stereotypes and styles that prevailed in the relations of our countries for many decades.

This applies primarily to dual-use technologies. To start with, it is imperative to define and to register legally the list of dual-use technologies that can be the subject of commercial operations between the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United States. In the countries of the CIS, such a list is also needed

in order to facilitate the procedure of transferring these achievements to civilian industrial sectors. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that the effective use of relevant ''American'' technologies in the CIS is directly related to the necessity of exporting the corresponding technological equipment that is currently on COCOM's list. Thus, creating a list of dual-use technologies allowed for transfer to countries of the CIS is connected with an adequate reduction of the COCOM's list of equipment which assists the development of these technologies.

There is no doubt that such measures would help create an atmosphere of mutual trust in the industrial and governmental circles of our countries. It stands to reason that all this should be embraced by a monitoring system that precludes such technologies from being utilized for the creation and improvement of weapons.

Confidence-building measures and means of converting Russia's scientific potential coincide in many ways. All these measures are united by the need for openness and transparency of research programs and results to the world scientific community. The major method is by creating collaborative research programs and, accordingly, establishing joint groups of participants in research with the right to carry out individual stages of these programs, or the programs in their entirety, at scientific institutions in both Russia and the United States. This work would result in joint publications.

In our view, it is highly important that the corresponding foundations of both the U.S. and Russia be organized and used with due account to the features peculiar to the organization of science in Russia.

Members of the RAS are eminent scientists who work in the military industrial complex and in the universities of Russia. These structures possess the most complete and objective information about the scientific potential of both scientific teams and individual scientists. Also, they are least liable to bureaucratic diseases.

A Central Foundation Council should be established and its regional divisions should include representatives of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and commercial organizations (as entrusted by the foundations). The main volume of work associated with the selection of proposals concerning collaborative activities or the choice of Russian partners for American scientific or commercial organizations should be effected in the regional branches and submitted to the Central Foundation Council for final approval. As experience is gained in work with Russian scientific, industrial, and commercial circles, these regional structures should become major centers of collaborative scientific and commercial initiatives.

The Central Foundation Council should comprise representatives of regional foundation divisions. Such an arrangement would help the council identify an objective solution and use the Foundation's means most effectively. Special treatment should be given to the problem of salary. This problem should be considered in accordance with Russian legislation. The following arrangements could be implemented: when Russian

scientists carry out work on the territory of Russia, their work should be paid for in rubles and dollars (the dollar to ruble ratio is a separate issue). If that work is continued in the territory of the United States, salary should be in dollars. It should be borne in mind that the continuation of work in the United States may be connected with the necessity of confirming previously-obtained results on equipment that has the necessary assurances regarding calibration as specified in U.S. legislation.

To conclude, some brief comments must be made on the report "Reorientation of the Research Capability of the Former Soviet Union" presented by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences.

There is every reason to believe that the conclusions and recommendations of the workshop on this problem will receive support on the part of scientists working in various different institutes of Russia, including those in the military industrial complex. The major problem will consist in bringing these conclusions and recommendations to the attention of the governmental and legislative circles of both the Russian Federation and the republics and regions that are members of the Federation.

In doing so, one must to take into account the specific character of the distribution and organization of the scientific potential in Russia. A version that takes account of these peculiarities has been outlined above. The version proposed allows for the fact that proposals regarding scientific and commercial collaboration should be collected on regional levels, where Russian scientific and commercial potential is concentrated. This arrangement will be welcomed by local authorities and, in turn, can largely facilitate and considerably expedite the implementation of the proposals concerned. In this context, it is expedient to issue joint recommendations of Russian and U.S. scientists in Russian and in English and to submit them for publication to the central and regional governments of Russia.

The main point is that Russian scientists do not need a specific kind of humanitarian or financial assistance from the United States or other market economy countries. They are interested in realizing their scientific potential and technological results in carrying out collaborative scientific programs and fulfilling orders of firms. The problem resides in creating an efficient mechanism by which such programs and orders can be formed and implemented.