develop a new set of relations between the United States and Russia that will enable them to work together to prevent and track undesirable diversions of dual-use products and technologies.
To these ends, case studies would hopefully serve at least three important complementary purposes:
as test beds, for ascertaining the feasibility of, and to work on solving the practical problems that will arise with, control mechanisms such as verification schemes;
to develop models, consolidating the knowledge and experience obtained from simple cases and other experience into prototypes or models for effective vehicles to promote the use of dual-use technologies for civil purposes while controlling military diversion (these models might eventually be explicitly packaged into licensing mechanisms and conditions.);
for confidence building, using a small number of relatively controlled and risk minimizing cases to help build experiences that will be necessary to increase the confidence of both sides in each other and in their prospects for working out longer term and more extensive relations.
These three purposes apply to Russian-American trade and technology transfer and to trade and technology transfer between either and third countries. Clearly, case studies also serve as vehicles for the analysis of problems and the implementation of solutions that arise under many of the other points listed in the December 1991 Protocol; in particular, to the points relating to confidence building (point 3 on openness in research, point 6. on industry reporting, and point 9. on control and verification measures). [l]
If we agree that case studies would prove valuable, then the next step is to decide what to study. Some possibilities that immediately suggest themselves are case studies of one or more of the most important dual-use technology sectors, such as computers, advanced materials, or civil aircraft. A key question that might be examined sectorially or more generally is the extent to which the former Soviet defense industries can effectively convert or spin off civil enterprises that absorb imported dual-use technologies and yet insure against diversion to sister enterprises still in the weapons business. One can study the forms of past diversions, the effectiveness of organizations such as joint ventures to help prevent diversion and provide verification, technological "choke points" , and the technical and economic factors affecting the controllability of products. Some of this has been done before [2, 3, 4], and the prospects of cooperative Russian