EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This publication reports the results of a one-year joint program between the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) on dual-use technologies and export control. The program was concerned with the conflicting demands of controlling the spread of proliferation-related technologies, while encouraging the spread of technologies for economic growth and development. It focused particularly on the control of dual-use technologies in and by the Russian Federation, with respect both to internal transfer from civilian to military applications, and to export or re-export to other nations and sub-state actors (including terrorist organizations) seeking to acquire a credible military threat.
During the course of the program, four closely related issues were identified as the principal loci of concern: export administration, defense conversion, brain drain, and the need to sustain Russian science and technology development through additional funding and joint activities.
Consensus on these four issues emerged from three joint meetings over the period December 1991 to December 1992. Each meeting included site visits to dual-use manufacturing facilities in one of the two countries. With the exception of the first meeting, the chairman of the NAS delegations was Dr. Roland Schmitt, President of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The chairman of the RAS delegations throughout the program was Academician Gennadiy Mesyats, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Chairman of its Urals Division.
The first interaction took place in Moscow and Perm, Russia, December 13-21, 1991. It sought to determine whether there was sufficient interest and openness on the Russian side to merit initiation of a full-scale joint program. A small delegation of American experts, led by Major General William Burns, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, met with a group of RAS counterparts. Their discussions addressed a variety of issues concerning dual-use technologies, including their application, transfer, and export control. Visiting formerly closed military institutes and factories in Perm and Moscow, the American participants witnessed first-hand the progress and problems of Russian defense conversion as characterized by Russian defense scientists and managers. The visit concluded with a joint protocol of the American and Russian delegations which outlined a list of topics to be addressed over the course of the program. This protocol is included, along with other relevant information from this exploratory meeting, in Appendix 3 of this publication.
Based on this protocol and the success of the exploratory meeting, the NAS and RAS organized a second interaction in Washington, DC, May 26-29, 1992. Members of both delegations presented papers on such topics as: economic aspects of the development and production of dual-use technologies; technology-related industrial reports; categories of manpower having unique knowledge of weapons systems; Russian export control trends; verification schemes; and case studies on the controlled application
of dual-use technologies. These papers are included in this publication; the agenda and participants are included in Appendix 2.
The third and final meeting in the program took place in Moscow and St. Petersburg, December 12-20, 1992. It focused on the export control issues surrounding three important technologies with applications in both the civilian and military sectors: advanced materials, optoelectronics, high-speed computing. The NAS delegation included experts in export control as well as the specific technologies discussed. The Russian delegation included key representatives of both the Russian military and scientific communities.
In preparation for the meeting, both Academies commissioned case studies in the three technology areas described above. These case studies are included in the text of this publication. In addition, both delegations prepared a joint statement which was released in April 1993 after endorsement by both Academies and is included here. The joint statement makes recommendations to the governments of the respective academies in three broad areas: access to technologies of proliferation concern, national security concerns, and confidence-building measures.
