Dual-Use Technologies and Export Control in the Post-Cold War Era (1994)

The Joint Statement of the Delegations of the RAS and NAS on Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration is the final product of more than a year of discussions between the Russian Academy of Sciences (formerly the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) and the National Academy of Sciences on this topic. The report was reviewed and approved by both Academies for public release.

This report, jointly sponsored by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), examines an issue of growing importance and urgency for both countries: the balance between the conflicting demands of controlling the spread of technology for strategically dangerous armaments (SDAs)¹ while encouraging the spread of technology for economic growth and development. Often, it is the same technology that must be both controlled and promoted: the ''dual-use'' technologies that are applicable to both military and civilian (i.e., commercial) uses. The issue is further compounded by the fact that today much advanced technology is often first used in civilian rather than military applications.²

The national security interests of the Russian Federation and the United States are also changing. Previously, the principal concern of the United States and the former Soviet Union were the weapons each possessed in large quantities to use against the other. Today, however, there is growing concern in both the United States and the Russian Federation about the proliferation of SDAs among other nations and sub-state actors (including terrorist organizations) seeking to acquire a credible military threat.

The issues advanced in this report are not confined to the interests of the Russian Federation or the United States alone. Nevertheless, we have chosen to begin with these bilateral discussions, convened by the two Academies, as a first step toward a broader interaction. We believe that if we can find common ground for resolving the many conflicting interests in this complex arena, we will have established a sound basis for these broader discussions in the future.

Thus, we have adopted the following statement of our intended mission:

To define the issues and recommend solutions—including "confidence-building" measures—to reconcile the following goals:

• to increase technology transfer between the United States and the Russian conversion of Russian defense industries to commercial production in a manner beneficial to both countries; and

• to ensure that technology transfer between the United States and the Russian Federation does not increase the military threat to either country, especially from the export and re-export of technology to countries seeking to acquire SDAs.

It is important to solve this problem, and it is clearly dangerous not to. Yet the probability of not solving it is high, because both countries are preoccupied with other, more pressing issues.

The ideal goal is to impose only those constraints on the flow of technology that are necessary for national security, but no more. Economic growth and development are best served by allowing technology to flow freely within the bounds of normal trade, commercial and industrial activities.

Discussions between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences on the problem of dual-use technologies began with an exploratory planning meeting in December 1991, during which discussions were held in Moscow and a series of site visits were made to dual-use manufacturing enterprises in the city of Perm in the Ural Mountains. In May 1992, a delegation from the RAS visited Washington, DC, to continue the dialogue and to participate in discussions at the NAS headquarters. The RAS delegation also received briefings from U.S. government officials on U.S. export administration measures and expectations for the establishment of Russian export administration measures, and made site visits to dual-use manufacturing enterprises in the Washington-Baltimore area. The final meetings of this first phase of the joint activity took place from December 12-20, 1992, with discussions and site visits in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

During the course of the three meetings, four closely related issues were identified as the principal focus of concern with respect to dual-use technology: export administration, defense conversion, "brain drain," and the need to sustain Russian science and technology development through additional funding and joint activities. Outlined

below is an explanation of the basis on which the joint committee discussed each of these issues.

The need for controls on the export between the United States and the Russian Federation of dual-use technologies that are relevant to the development and deployment of SDAs will diminish as relations between the two nations continue to improve and greater levels of trust are established, thereby overcoming the suspicion and threatening actions of the Cold War period. Progress by the Government of the Russian Federation toward the establishment of an adequate export administration system, and its effective enforcement, is therefore vitally important. Ideally, if political and economic relations between the West and the Russian Federation can evolve toward the level of mutual trust and interdependence that now exists between the NATO countries and Japan, it will be possible to bring the Russian Federation fully within the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) framework. (Russia is already a participant in the COCOM Cooperation Forum.) When that point is reached, the major efforts of export administration can be focused exclusively on the problem of non-proliferation and re-export to third countries.

At the same time, the need for controls on the exports of both the United States and the Russian Federation to third countries "of proliferation concern" is likely to increase. If defense conversion in the Russian Federation does not proceed expeditiously and comprehensively, the financial pressure on Russian defense industry to export technology and weapons to whomever will buy them will continue to grow and thus undercut efforts to limit destabilizing transfers of arms and dual-use technologies. This development will make it much more difficult to agree upon or harmonize export administration measures on dual-use technology for the purpose of controlling proliferation. It is urgent, therefore, that the United States and the Russian Federation agree on an appropriate export administration regime and that the United States support Russia's effort to become less dependent on the export of arms, just as it too must seek to limit its dependence on certain types of foreign arms sales.

With the end of the Cold War, the conversion of a significant portion of the defense research and development (R&D) and defense manufacturing capability of both countries to entirely civilian (i.e., commercial) use is now a necessity.³ It is more urgent,

however, in the Russian Federation because of the relatively greater collapse of support of defense (and other) research institutions, as well as the need for stronger commercial R&D if Russia is to become competitive on world markets. Moreover, the radically changing nature of military doctrines in both countries requires a restructuring of the mission, scope, and goals of the remaining defense R&D and manufacturing capabilities of both countries.

The Russian Federation is apparently suffering a loss through emigration, either permanent or temporary, of some of its most talented scientists and engineers. This phenomenon is often referred to as the "brain drain." While the scope of this discussion was not intended to cover the entire range of issues associated with the problem, one aspect does strongly impinge upon the consideration of sensitive dual technology—namely, the brain drain of scientists and engineers possessing expert knowledge on the design, testing, and construction of SDAs who move to countries of proliferation concern. Controlling this highly dangerous type of brain drain, the extent of which is not accurately known, must be a high priority of both countries. It will require a combination of efforts by the Russian government to identify such individuals and provide incentives for them to remain in the country and by the United States government (and other interested governments) to continue to provide additional monetary support for this effort (or to provide these individuals with sufficiently attractive working conditions in the United States and other interested countries to facilitate the control of this emigration process at the international level).

Some—but not all—of the problems associated with technology proliferation and brain drain can be alleviated through foreign and domestic sponsorship of R&D programs in the Russian Federation that productively engage in new areas those who were previously involved in defense R&D. Such foreign support presumably also would encourage greater openness, which would have the additional benefit of increasing confidence that advanced technology was not being used in the secret development of new Russian military systems. Beyond simple sponsorship, the establishment of joint programs involving teams of scientists and engineers from both countries may be even more efficacious. Such activities are highly desirable and should be encouraged. (The design of such activities was not, however, a major focus of this joint NAS-RAS activity.)

It must be understood that, at the present time, it is virtually to think about anything beyond the problem of survival. The impact impossible for Russian institutions, either industrial or academic, of severe budget cuts has been nothing short of devastating, and it is hard to focus on longer term issues, even though they may

eventually be critical for Russian science and Russian industry. Therefore, even if issues such as export administration for limiting proliferation may be extremely important to the security of the Russian Federation in the long run—as we believe they are—the short term pressures could precipitate actions and decisions that prejudice long-term solutions. In our collective judgment, this requires that we propose short-term actions.

Fortunately, several of our recommendations address the short-term issues in a manner entirely compatible with long-term goals. These steps are primarily to offset that part of the technology proliferation and brain drain that might damage the national security interests of both countries. They also include steps to support appropriate Russian R&D, either through direct grants or joint research programs, and possibly to hire directly Russian scientists and engineers on a temporary basis so that they might be encouraged to return to Russia after a few years.

In the remainder of this statement, the four central problems identified above are discussed, first from the standpoint of the United States and then from the standpoint of the Russian Federation. These sections are followed by a set of recommendations that have been extensively discussed by the two sides and which they now endorse unanimously.

In order to make it easier to understand the highly complex and interrelated issues presented in the document, it was agreed that the issues would be presented in a uniform way. Thus, both the presentation of the issues as seen from the perspective of each country and the recommendations which follow are organized under three main rubrics: national security, access to technology of proliferation concern, and confidence-building measures.

Several issues were identified as concerns for the United States (and to most, if not all, of the COCOM countries) regarding the management and control of militarily sensitive dual-use technologies during the transition of the Russian Federation to a stable, democratic society with a normally-functioning market economy. These issues focus both on the residual problem of diversion of dual-use end products and process technology to military applications within the Russian Federation and on the possibility that technology, end products, and/or know-how could be made available to countries of proliferation concern.

The predominant security concern of the United States and its COCOM allies during the past forty-five years was the threat, both nuclear and conventional, posed by the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, that threat has now largely dissipated, although concerns remain about the chaotic political and economic evolution of the FSU and its potential for reversal. In addition, the large number of remaining nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems (far more than necessary either to defend adequately the national territory of the Russian Federation or to deter aggression from other potential threats) and the large numbers of conventional weapons, many of which could be substantially upgraded through access to Western technology, are cause for concern. Indeed, the fundamental NATO doctrine of reliance on "technology force multipliers" (i.e., using advanced technology to overcome numerical inequalities) in order to maintain strategic force parity has created an inherent conservatism with regard to the complete elimination of controls on sensitive dual-use technology.

The reluctance of the United States to agree to the elimination of controls is likely to continue until such time as it is apparent that the economic, political, and social upheavals in the Russian Federation will be resolved peacefully, leaving in place an open society that is integrated with the global market economy. Part of this reluctance is also no doubt an inevitable result of the fact that old ways of reflexive thinking and behavior, born out of more than forty years of the Cold War, take time to change (on both sides). It also takes time to build mutual trust and to bring "normality" to political, economic, and social relationships.

At the same time, the revelations about the proliferation of SDAs resulting from the recent war in the Persian Gulf and from the activities of certain other countries, have resulted in a substantial upgrading of this problem, relative to the old challenges of the Cold War era, as a priority national security concern. There are, however, two key differences between the new security threat posed by SDAs and the old Cold War concerns. One is that there is not the same unanimity of view among the NATO countries and the other advanced industrialized nations in the West regarding either the specific dimensions and implications of the threat (e.g., which specific countries ought to be considered the targets) or how to respond to it. The other is that a coherent and effective response can only succeed if it is fully multilateral, meaning that it must include the Russian Federation and preferably the other states of the Newly Independent States (NIS) possessing SDAs, as well as the People's Republic of China and other potential proliferating countries. These circumstances make the new security threat far more complex and difficult to respond to.

The end of the Cold War, domestic economic and budgetary pressures in the United States, and changes in the global economy (i.e., the U.S. no longer has a monopoly in many technological and industrial sectors) have set in motion other fundamental changes in the United States that also affect national security. The process

of consolidation and reduction of the U.S. defense industry is already well underway, causing painful economic adjustments and labor displacement, and serious consideration is being given to a major reorganization and reduction of the federal laboratory system. In this respect, the United States and the Russian Federation share a common problem. They also share in common the fact that they both confront increasing pressure to accelerate economic growth, in part by relaxing restrictions on sensitive dual-use exports.

During the past twenty years, there has been a significant reversal of the post-World War II model of military development. Since the early 1970s, a growing fraction of the new technology required for the components and subsystems of the next generation of military systems has been derived from or closely related to commercial (i.e., civilian) development efforts, rather than programs strictly and separately supported by the military. Moreover, following the philosophy of "spin on," largely pioneered by the Japanese, companies are actively looking for opportunities to apply commercially-developed technology to military systems, rather than the other way around as had previously been the case. Indeed, it is clear that new commercial technology developments will inevitably find their way into military systems. It is only the rate of such introduction and the degree of openness associated with it that is subject to control.

To maintain excellence in defense technology in the current budget climate, the U.S. Department of Defense must take advantage of the great overlap between key commercial technologies and military critical technologies. It must therefore both exploit the commercial technology base for non-defense unique technologies and focus its development programs on key defense-unique technologies. As a result of this policy, the U.S. approach will be much closer to the coupling of the defense and commercial technology bases.

In Russia, the structure of the technology base is currently quite different from that of the United States, but the end result may be the same. The Russian defense technology and industrial base historically has been clearly dominant, while the commercial base, in many cases an offshoot of the defense base, has not succeeded in producing affordable and quality consumer goods to any significant degree. Russia, however, has stated that it will rely on the conversion of its military enterprises to meet the demand of the consumer market while simultaneously using arms sales as a mechanism to finance this conversion. The country is therefore likely to maintain or even strengthen the close coupling between defense and commercial technology bases.

This tight coupling of the technology bases in both the United States and the Russian Federation, while unavoidable, is exactly the opposite of what we would like to occur as we promote the transfer of dual-use items and technologies to the former Soviet Union. More specifically, end use controls which attempt to isolate a dual-use technology from exploitation by the military will be much less likely to succeed if the

defense and commercial bases are either the same or very similar. Verification, for the same reasons, will also be more difficult.

These changes in the process of military technology development, together with the rapidly growing and wide-spread availability (i.e., commoditization) of many previously-controlled items, such as personal computers and certain types of semiconductor chips, make the continued enforcement of comprehensive restrictions on the export of sensitive dual-use technology extremely difficult. These new circumstances suggest that future efforts to control sensitive technology will require that an assessment be made of its actual "controllability," i.e., whether the item in question is widely available and whether access to it actually can be constrained. They also suggest that it will be necessary to identify, through both national means and bilateral consultation, specific "chokepoints" in the process of technology development and deployment—particularly in terms of its military application—that enhance the possibility of control. In addition to identifying effective choke points, it will be necessary to establish separate measures for the practical marking, tracking, and verification of end uses. Such schemes are nowadays more readily adopted and useful in view of the advances in information base, analysis, and communication technologies.

The United States continues to maintain a number of significant concerns regarding the willingness and actual ability of the Russian Federation, as the largest republic of the former Soviet Union, to control militarily sensitive dual-use technologies. Foremost among these concerns is the prospect for a long-term, stable situation in which a market economy and a politically open democracy can take root and grow. A second critical concern is that the process of conversion of military industries now underway within the Russian Federation may not be irreversible. It is likely that confidence in the permanence of the process can be increased only through a policy of openness, such as making such converted enterprises open to foreign access and involvement. A third major set of concerns relates to the existence of a competent civil authority with the will and capability to enforce the laws, decrees, operating regulations, licensing procedures, and enforcement practices recently adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation. These concerns are deepened particularly by the realization that military research and production centers are under extreme pressure to find foreign financial support to ensure their survival for the near-term future. Given this strong financial incentive to export technology, the vast number of research and production centers and their employees, and the recent general lack of enforceability of Russian laws, the United States undoubtedly will pay close attention to the actions of Russian Federation export administrators. Once again, openness, a process of regular and frequent consultation, and the results of actual experience are the best ways of building trust on these matters between the two nations.

The problem of dual-use technologies is no less important for Russia than for the U.S. or other leading industrial powers of the contemporary world. At the same time, however, the specifics of the internal political and economic situation in Russia and the countries which surround it are such that this problem has some substantial aspects that are particular to Russia.

First, the Russian Federation has an economy and an armed forces that are completely inconsistent with its national interests. Furthermore, it faces new military threats which force it to revise the list of countries to which it should not sell armaments or sensitive dual-use technologies. A special concern is caused by the unstable regimes to the south of Russia.

Second, the dissolution of the strictly controlled old Soviet borders, seizure of weapons arsenals, transfer of governmental power into the hands of extremists in nearby countries, and the proximity of conflicts to Russian industrial centers and other assets (such as dams and nuclear power stations), has produced a situation in which short-range, high-precision conventional weapons present a graver danger than that posed by the nuclear missiles of former "potential enemies." Consequently, the list of restricted technologies should be expanded to include the technologies related to these advanced conventional weapons.

Third, the establishment of sovereignty in the new states of the former USSR is unfortunately being accompanied by the weakening of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, a rise in crime, and the formation of organized crime syndicates which include civil servants. The problem of non-proliferation is also exacerbated by the unification of organized crime structures on an international level.

Fourth, the majority of scientists and engineers in both Russia and other NIS countries do not have a clear understanding of Western legislative norms for research and the use of research results. Past experience in classified research in the USSR had little in common with international law. Consequently, the breaches of international norms dealing with dual-use technologies may sometimes be unintentional. In order to solve this problem it is necessary to create high-quality and understandable legislative guidelines and then make them available to scientists and engineers. This process may be essential for the conduct of research carried out under contract to U.S. Entities.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union with its highly integrated industries, unitary border, and united armed forces has seriously complicated Russian national security concerns. This situation is further complicated by three factors: the current economic crisis; the problems facing the Russian research and development establishment; and a resultant lowering of Russia's sense of national security.

Russia must now find a compromise between prescriptions for economic growth and necessities for economic survival. This process also will be influenced by trade restrictions due to both Western, and primarily American, export administration concerns and the legitimate national security interests of the Russian Federation. Of key importance in this area will be barriers to Western investment that are caused by the non-convertibility of the ruble, absence of contract and property law, differences in business management practices, etc. Also of concern is the need of military industrial complex and related enterprises in the mining and processing industries to obtain income outside of state procurement contracts. This financial pressure creates a strong incentive on these enterprises to sell dangerous technologies both internally to commercial enterprises and externally to foreign customers, and such sales are especially common in "off-shore" and/or "border" trade.

Related to Russia's efforts to stimulate economic growth are concerns about imports of sensitive Western technologies. As previously mentioned in the joint statement, new technologies do find their way into military applications for reasons of national security. There is therefore an urgent need to establish bilateral agreements on the control of technology transfer, the application of such technologies, and the commodities produced with the application of these technologies so that the importing of sensitive Western technologies will not eventually conflict with Western security interests. In particular, these agreements are needed so that Western technologies are not uncontrollably transferred into the Russian military and/or are subject to re-export. Similarly, these agreements are also needed so that technologies which result from Russian defense conversion and are exported to third countries are not independently diverted to military applications or re-exported from those countries.

As previously mentioned in the joint statement, there is currently a massive disinvestment in Russian science. This disinvestment has resulted not only in heavy losses being taken in world renowned Russian scientific schools, but also in financial pressure on military scientific establishments that provide countries of proliferation concern with the means of strengthening their scientific establishment. The loss of government funding of science in Russia has led to a precipitous cut in employment in the Russian Academy of Sciences and in industrial research institutions. In addition, the research conditions for the remaining scientists are very poor. As a result, there is an internal "brain drain" of specialists to Russian commercial entities and an uncontrolled (and probably uncontrollable) external "brain drain" (i.e., emigration) of specialists to foreign countries. In the future, the emigration process will likely predominate. All of

these processes are being exacerbated by the increasingly complete isolation of Russian scientific communities, which is produced by the termination of the delivery of foreign scientific literature and the sharp reduction in Russian participation in scientific exchange possibilities, international scientific events, and even intrastate scientific exchanges.

All of the factors described above have produced a situation in which Russia's confidence in its national security is growing dangerously weak. Considering the historical experience of this century and the legacy of Soviet authoritarianism, these factors may in turn lead to the militarization of Russia. Furthermore, since Russia now controls a substantial number of the dangerous technologies and strategic armaments of the former USSR, the dissolution of the country would unavoidably lead to the completely uncontrollable proliferation of these extremely dangerous technologies and armaments.

While the Soviet military virtually never received any ''spin-on'' technologies from the civilian sector of the economy, new technologies were "spun-off" to civilian industries from military enterprises and a certain percentage of military production was dedicated to civilian goods as stipulated by state order. The RAS delegation therefore believes that it is more important for Russia to look for military technologies that can be spun-off to the civilian sector than to identify civilian technologies to be spun-on to the military sector. This process, as discussed above, may raise several concerns about the proliferation of sensitive dual-use technologies, and the successful and safe transfer of these technologies is largely dependent on two issues: defense conversion and the efficacy of Russian export administration structures.

The conversion of Russian defense industries may have both positive and negative impacts on Russia's economy and national security and the building of trust between Russia and Western partners. When the conversion process is financially and materially supported, it is feasible to restructure the enterprises to produce for new markets while also reserving some minimal capacities for the quick reconversion of some facilities to meet the contingency of a crisis. Successful defense conversion leads to the general rise of a healthy economy, an indirect strengthening of Russian national security, and a direct rise in trust between Russia and other countries.

An unmanaged crash conversion produces exactly the opposite effect. This would result from the state's decision to stop completely the procurement of armaments and to issue directives to defense enterprises for the production of civilian goods (which, as currently produced, are usually worthless). In this case, an excess of armaments would be produced but not purchased by the government, and strategic raw materials, technologies, and know-how would begin to proliferate uncontrollably.

Related to the issues of export administration and defense conversion are Western concerns over reconversion and the foreign funding of Russian defense enterprises and institutes. The concern of the United States and other Western countries related to the reconversion of Russian enterprises seems to the RAS delegation to be unfounded and, to some extent, unilateral. A state of internal instability should not obviate Russia's right to national security and defense against foreign threats and aggression. Under such contingencies, dual-use technologies (including imports) would be used in the interests of the country's defense. In order to alleviate the concern which this fact may raise in the United States, Russia and the United States will probably have to exchange information (on a mutual basis) related to the current places of possible reconversion down to the level of the enterprises identified for reconversion and the specific technologies to be used. We hope that this will lead to some level of enduring trust between the two countries.

Also, as previously mentioned, there is a new proliferation concern rising from the uncontrolled foreign financing of both private and state enterprises. Regarding the uncontrolled application of dual-use technologies, a special concern is caused by the increasing penetration of investment capital from countries to the south of Russia for the financing of Russian firms, including defense enterprises.

Concerning the efficacy of Russian export administration bodies, it is important to note that the creation of the Russian Federation's state structures has been more complicated than the creation of other NIS countries' state structures. This is due to the historical fact that while other republics of the USSR had their own government agencies under Soviet rule, Russia was the site for only all-union bodies which blocked both Russian sovereignty and the creation of Russian national institutions. Thus the formation of new Russian state agencies really began after August 1991, and the formation of export administration bodies started only in the summer of 1992.

Formally, export administration bodies exist in all relevant ministries and institutions of the Russian Federation, and the primary legislative basis for export administration and the activities of its related institutional agencies have been passed. (Note: the Presidential decree on Dual-Use Technologies was passed a few days after the end of the NAS-RAS meeting in December, 1992.) Expert scientific support for Russian export administration activities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, is provided by the RAS council on export control. In addition, a special RAS group on dual-use technologies and related issues, established by the RAS Presidium, is the result of prior Russian-American interacademy meetings.

To accelerate the convergence of Russian export administration policies with international standards in effectiveness and reliability, it is necessary to solve the following problems: 1) creating an adequate legislative and executive basis for the structure as a whole and each of its institutional bodies; 2) overcoming the lack of transparency and openness in the administrative and other non-classified activities of enterprises and scientific institutes; 3) installing an effective licensing system in the

Russian Federation regarding its rights in both the internal and international arenas, including protection for intellectual property rights; 4) overcoming the present ability of Russian enterprises and institutions to conclude contracts with foreign buyers, including contracts for dual-use technologies and armaments, which circumvent national authorities in respect to export authorization, registration, and licensing; 5) instituting customs controls and bringing them up to a sufficient level of effectiveness, particularly at borders with the neighboring states of the former republics of the USSR.

In defining the approaches to building a reliable and long-term atmosphere of mutual confidence, it is necessary to raise and to stress the issue of mutuality. All bilateral talks are being conducted only because the healthy forces of both countries recognize a mutual danger, including the danger to the military strategic potential of Russian Federation, and see a way to diminish this danger through a mutual search for confidence-building measures.

Thus, it is not helpful to restate continuously that Russia, as the inheritor of the USSR, has been defeated in the Cold War. Russia does not consider the political crash of communist ideology in the world and the subsequent economic crisis to be the country's defeat. The sooner this crash is seen as a very hard road to a victory—the victory of common sense, human rights, and united human community—the faster Russia will be able to travel the road to victory together with the rest of the civilized world. The RAS delegation believes that it is important for the Russian Federation to build relationships based on mutual confidence with both the U.S. and Western Europe and to join the various international regimes related to export administration. It also believes that Western countries must be sensitive not to use a double standard against Russia in regard to international weapons and technology sales.

Considering the current economic, political, and military situation in Russia, our country is not in a position to launch any premeditated aggressive moves. Nevertheless, this does not mean either that Russia, under conditions of explosive instability, would be incapable of launching such an attack in the future, or that a threat to Russia cannot exist from other states. Russia must therefore seek allies and work toward relations of complete trust and openness with them. In fact, for many geopolitical, strategic, and historical reasons (originating from the times when the USSR and the U.S. shared the burden of global responsibility), the convergence of Russian interests with other countries, up to and including allied relations with the United States, seems most natural. At the same time, however, Russia must consider the alliance obligations of the United States as well as its own European interests.

The Russian Federation is also interested in the development of political and economic relations with West European countries and in strengthening confidence in all spheres—including strategic cooperation and, particularly, joint efforts on the proliferation

of precision guided munitions technology. Therefore, after constructing a broad relationship based on trust with the United States, Russia should focus on cooperation with the EC in the areas mentioned above. There is also a complete convergence of ecological interests of both Russia and these countries, and Russia's readiness to participate in international measures for the detection and suppression of unauthorized missile launches presents another area for cooperation. In addition, Russia may be the most interested of all European countries in the creation of an international system for the prevention and/or containment of local tensions and conflicts in Europe. In the future, Russia also may be interested in expanding these "zones of confidence" in the fields of dual-use technologies, export control, non-proliferation, and verification with a number of Asian-Pacific countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

The development of these zones and the realization of confidence-building measures in issues as vital as the proliferation of strategically dangerous technologies and armaments are inconceivable in theory, and impossible in practice, without the equal and comprehensive incorporation of the Russian Federation into the system of existing international treaties, agreements, and conventions in the this field. First and foremost are the following international regimes: 1) Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM); 2) Nuclear Suppliers Group; 3) Convention on Biological Weapons; and 4) Missile Technology Control Regime. (More information on the Russian perspective on joining these regimes is presented immediately following this statement.)

As in the sale of certain missile technologies, a number of leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex believe that international restrictions, particularly on armaments trade, often discriminate against Russia. When Russia leaves an international weapons market for either economic reasons or certain political agreements, her "warm shoes" are immediately filled by other countries (including United States), and very often these sales circumvent these countries' laws and obligations. Such a state of affairs is completely unacceptable to Russia from both an economic and a political point of view. It also constitutes an unhealthy factor that impedes confidence-building.

The NAS-RAS committee became well aware that Russian enterprise and institute directors believe that they must either find foreign sources of income or face, in some cases, the fact that their immediate survival may not be viable. While it is clear that Western, and particularly U.S., companies and institutions are the Russians' first choice for partners, the "excessive cautiousness" which the West has displayed in investing in joint projects in the former Soviet Union (as viewed by many Russians) has resulted in the sale of technology in many fields to countries to Russia's south and east by Russian enterprises. Thus, the dire financial status of Russian military research and production enterprises presents: 1) a pressing need to effectively implement export administration

measures in Russia's newly developing market economy; 2) the necessity to have an administrative structure which recognizes the legitimate economic needs and rights of Russia's enterprises; and 3) the need to ensure that Russia's scientists and engineers are successfully and safely converted to civilian pursuits in order to assist economic recovery and to prevent sensitive technology proliferation.

In response to these problems, the NAS and RAS delegations have formulated the following proposals.

1. It is clear that the Russian Federation and the United States will have to work together closely if they hope to control access to key technology related to SDAs. Since both the Russian Federation and the United States developed most of this technology and its applications to SDA weapons systems, the two countries should take the lead in managing access to technology of proliferation concern in consultation with their allies.

2. The NAS-RAS committee believes that it is of foremost importance to implement an effective and fair system of export administration in the Russian Federation and to complete the reexamination of U.S. and Western export administration policies in the wake of recent revelations concerning the capabilities of certain states to develop SDAs. In the Russian Federation, the government must strive to complete the establishment of an export administration legal authority, effective licensing mechanisms, and enforcement capabilities.

3. The United States can take a number of steps beyond its current advising of the Russian Federation on the means to make its governmental export administration bodies, which already exist, more effective in their operation:

   • The United States, along with other Western countries, should work with Russian authorities to attain a convergence of their export administration lists.

   • Russian specialists, in cooperation with scientists and engineers from the United States, should undertake an effort to identify "chokepoints" for the unwanted export and/or internal transfer of technology.

   • The two countries should consider establishing a bilateral laboratory group that would work to identify and agree upon dangerous dual-use technologies. The researchers for this group could be drawn from the U.S.

national laboratories and defense industries and Russian institutes involved in military research and production.⁶

• The presence of American researchers (along with new Russian export laws and possible technical means of verifying technology use) could generally provide assurance that the U.S.-controlled technology exported to Russia was not being diverted to military applications or re-exported. The United States and Russia thus should also implement international joint programs, sited in Russia, which would involve utilizing controlled technology for selected basic research purposes. One example of such a program would be the export of a supercomputer to the Russian Federation from the United States for a joint program in astronomical research. Given the sensitivity of this technology, however, the Russian Federation will need to fully implement existing export administration laws, and demonstrate its ability to enforce those laws, before the U.S. government will permit the export of a supercomputer.

4. One of the important technology access issues facing the United States and Russia is the ability of the countries to verify the use of exported/imported controlled technology and the status of defense conversion at enterprises that have requested and/or received sensitive technology imports. This issue is particularly important in regard to sensitive U.S. technology exports to Russia which are needed for economic and scientific reasons but pose national security risks due to their possible military applications. Since both countries will need to maintain an ability to reconvert some enterprises to military production during times of impending hostility, it would be useful for the two governments to inform each other as to which enterprises have been identified for reconversion in emergency situations.

5. Another step that can be taken to help verify the use of technology in selected cases is the introduction of technical means of verification as previously mentioned. Concerning high performance computers or powerful networks of workstations or PCs exported to the Russian Federation, the United States could, for example, incorporate a software package into the operating system which would record all users that log on to the computer. This information could then be transmitted via satellite to the United States, or to some other location, as a partial means of unobtrusively verifying the end use of the computer. The information in all cases would be considered confidential, and the United States would provide support for the verification software and ensure that this software did not unduly interfere with the computer's operating system.

6. Both the Russian Federation and United States should employ, as appropriate, new verification technologies (e.g., bar-coding and laser scanning) to verify compliance. It is possible that some of these technologies may be useful in addressing the problems associated with unauthorized reverse engineering or clandestine manufacture.

7. The Russian Federation and United States should also consider strengthening the role of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and other multilateral agencies (e.g., the IAEA)

1. The committee also forwards several proposals in regard to the sale of sensitive technologies and the emigration of Russian specialists who have knowledge of strategically dangerous armaments:

   • It would be desirable for the Russian government to establish its own programs to identify and support these scientists and engineers. Such programs might be modeled, for example, on the Mexican National System of Researchers or similar Japanese programs which provide supplementary support to outstanding scientists and engineers.

   • The Russian and United States governments and scientific and technical communities should seek to ensure that the various centers and programs which support Russian scientists are fully and effectively utilized to help prevent the sale of sensitive technology and brain drain. While one program, the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, has been implemented specifically to address these issues, scientists and government officials also should recognize and pursue the support provided by other programs, such as the new International Science Foundation for the former Soviet Union (established by financier George Soros), the U.S. SABIT (Special American Business Intern Program) and CAST (Cooperation in Applied Science and Technology) programs, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development and administered respectively by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Research Council, and other sources of funding. A joint Russian-American group could be established to exchange information about these various programs and assess their effectiveness.

   • Both the Russian and U.S. governments also should investigate the possibility of establishing cooperative research programs in Russia in selected areas of science in order to stem the brain drain of key military scientists and reduce the sale of sensitive military technologies.

• As a last resort only, the Russian government should delay the emigration of individuals possessing knowledge related to SDA proliferation concerns to select countries and use this time to offer alternative incentives to the scientists to keep them in the country.

2. The joint committee endorses the intelligence cooperation which has recently been initiated by agencies of the United States and the Russian Federation. This process should involve, at a minimum, the sharing of intelligence information about violators of export administration and proliferation regimes as well as perceived threats.

The NAS-RAS committee agrees that it is important for the Russian Federation and the United States to adopt a variety of confidence-building measures that would demonstrate each country's trust and ability to abide by mutually agreed export administration rules.

1. The Russian Federation and United States should participate in a series of incrementally sensitive research projects regarding controlled dual-use technologies. Such a series of "gateway" joint programs would demonstrate to each country the other's ability to conduct research utilizing increasingly sensitive technologies without technology diversion.

2. After the point is reached when Russian export administration laws are fully implemented and enforced and as initial experience with sensitive cooperation proves reassuring, the two countries may want to consider eventually conducting audits of each other's export administration reporting, in some instances, in place of on-site inspections. Should inconsistencies in the reporting be evident, either country could then demand a return to intrusive, on-site inspections. In this and other cases, the progress achieved by certain East European countries in establishing viable organizational and procedural arrangements for export administration exemplifies the opportunity presented to Russia for obtaining further liberalization, and the ultimate removal, of the COCOM restrictions.

3. The two countries should establish a joint data bank group which would establish joint lists of restricted technologies and enterprises or "projects of concern" to which certain technologies should not be internally transferred or exported. Alternatively, this activity could be referred to a joint working group as described in the "Access to Technology of Proliferation Concern" section above. Development of methodologies for assessing the degree of risk of dual-use technologies and the means of reducing this risk would be the most important task of such a future joint committee.

4. Both the Russian and U.S. governments should seek to ensure the rapid and unrestricted publication of non-classified, pre-competitive research results to promote openness and transparency in research and to avoid "technological surprise." For the

same reason, the two countries should connect all non-classified research facilities to international electronic networks.

5. The Russian Federation and the United States, as well as other advanced countries, should work to promote openness and reporting to each other about technical assistance to, the training of students and post-doctoral candidates from, and joint programs with countries of proliferation concern.

6. Academic contacts between the two countries should be expanded on perception of threat from cultural, political, economic, technological, and military standpoints. The conclusions reached should be forwarded to the respective governments.

7. The two countries should participate in a variety of international fora, both governmental and non-governmental, that address issues related to dual-use technologies and export administration (e.g., UN, CSCE, SIPRI, IISS, etc.)

8. The two countries should complete work on and implement existing and proposed arms control and other military agreements at the earliest possible time.

The problem of dual-use technologies is no less important for Russia than for the U.S. or other leading industrial powers. Russia, however, must cope with unique aspects of the problem as a result of the specific internal and political problems which it and the countries surrounding it face.

In the new, post-confrontational world created by the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the Russian Federation is a new sovereign power and has become the heir of the USSR. Russia is now faced with an economy and armed forces that are completely inconsistent with its own political interests. Different military dangers and threats are forcing Russia to revise the list of countries to which it is impossible to sell armaments and with which it is necessary to restrict the proliferation of dual-use technologies. The unstable regimes in countries to the south of Russia present a special cause for concern.

The crumbling of the strict border control system of the USSR, the theft of weapons stockpiles and their transfer to extremists, and the proximity of conflicts to Russian industrial centers and other assets (the destruction of which would be ecologically catastrophic) have led to a situation in which shorter range conventional weapons, when used with high precision, have become more dangerous to Russia than the intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles of the previous "potential enemies" of the USSR. Consequently, the list of restricted technologies for limiting proliferation should be expanded to include those technologies which can be used for improving the military-tactical properties of conventional weapons.

Although the dissolution of the USSR left Russia with approximately 80% of the capacity of Soviet defense enterprises and about 90% of its engineering-design and scientific potential, the 20% and 10% of the respective remaining potentials that are located in other former republics do include unique production facilities and laboratories. Consequently, certain states of the CIS, including the Russian Federation, will have to coordinate their lists of restricted dual-use technologies.

The establishment of sovereignty in these new states (the former republics of the USSR) is unfortunately being accompanied by the weakening of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, a rise in crime, and the formation of organized crime groups which include civil servants. Under such conditions, the problem of controlling dual-use technologies—the transfer of which may give substantial advantages to the criminal strata—may be complicated by the unification of organized crime structures on an international level. Control and sanctions against countries, companies, or individuals breaking these regulations therefore becomes at some point a struggle with organized syndicates.

The majority of scientists and engineers in Russia and the other CIS countries lack a clear understanding of Western legislative norms for research and the use of research results. Past experience with classified research in the USSR had little in common with international laws. Consequently, the breaches of international norms dealing with dual-use technologies may be unintentional—they may be the result of ignorance and not of ill will. To solve this problem, it is necessary first of all to have high quality and understandable legislative guidelines, and, secondly, to make them available for study and everyday use by scientists and engineers. This development may be especially essential for the conduct of research contracts carried out under U.S. grants.

These particular aspects of the situation in Russia put into context the RAS delegation's statement of the problems connected with dual-use technologies.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union with its highly integrated industries, common border (with no border controls between republics), and unified strategic defense system has seriously complicated national security issues for the Russian Federation.

Military-technical and techno-economic problems, which have a direct bearing on the national security of Russia, also have appeared in addition to these military-political and administrative-territorial issues.

1. There is a need to find a compromise between economic survival and the requirements of economic growth. With the increasing globalization of economic relations, this process is clearly influenced by both the requirements and the restrictions imposed due to Western, and primarily American, export administration concerns and the legitimate national security interests of the Russian Federation. These contradictions are focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the following issues:

• The crisis in the Russian economy and barriers to Western, including American, investment that are caused by the non-convertibility of the ruble, differences in business management, etc.

• The enterprises of the military industrial complex and related enterprises in the mining and processing industries now must obtain income sources independent of state procurement and budget financing. This process creates a strong incentive for the sale of dangerous technologies (both internally to commercial enterprises and externally to foreign customers) and is especially common in poorly controlled off-shore and/or border trade.

• New technologies, including those already transferred to industry and those still being perfected in research organizations, find their way into

military applications for reasons of national security. To ensure that the transfer of these technologies does not conflict with international trade interests, there is an urgent need to establish a system of bilateral agreements on the control of technology transfer, the application of such technologies, and the commodities produced as a result of their use. The establishment of these agreements is particularly needed so that technologies imported from the West are not uncontrollably transferred into the Russian military industrial complex and, more importantly, are not re-exported. Similarly, these agreements are also needed so that technologies which result from Russian defense conversion are not diverted to military applications and/or re-exported to third countries.

2. The impact of the economic crisis has become extremely severe for Russian science, threatening heavy losses for world-renowned Russian scientific schools and an overall degradation of Russian science. The crisis also presents the possibility of an uncontrolled increase in military-related research in countries of proliferation concern. This statement may be expanded as follows:

   • Cutbacks in government financial support for basic research and for military-applied science have brought about a precipitous cut in employment in both the Russian Academy of Sciences and industrial research institutions. In addition, working conditions for the remaining scientists have badly deteriorated due to a lack of funds for equipment, reagents and salaries.

   • The conditions described above have produced a ''brain drain'' from Russia, encompassing both scientists who have lost their jobs and those who have left their positions due to dissatisfaction with poor research conditions. We have seen not only a departure of specialists to commercial enterprises, but also uncontrolled emigration to foreign countries. Lately, the emigration process has become predominant.

   • All these processes are complicated by the sharp reduction in opportunities for scientific exchanges, participation in international scientific events, and even mutual scientific exchanges within Russia. This process leads to segregation and the formation of closed scientific communities isolated from the mainstream of international scientific developments. The isolation of Russian science is becoming virtually complete due to the high cost of communications, the termination of the delivery of foreign scientific literature, and the reduced publication volume of domestic scientific journals.

3. Viewed in their entirety, the factors described above may give rise to a sense that the state is experiencing an inescapable reduction in national security guarantees below a critical level. Considering the country's historical experience and the continuation of

some consequences of the authoritarian regime, these factors may in turn stimulate antidemocratic processes and ultimately promote the militarization of Russia. The international community should also consider the fact that since Russia has largely managed to absorb the dangerous technologies and strategic armaments of the former USSR, its collapse, which is quite possible given its perception of insufficient national security, would unavoidably lead to the completely uncontrollable proliferation of these extremely dangerous technologies and armaments.

Defense research and industries virtually never received any "spin-on" technologies from the civilian sector of the economy in the former USSR, and it should be noted that Russia has inherited the more or less destroyed Soviet economic structures, which operated neither efficiently nor productively and constantly experienced shortages of resources. New technologies were, however, "spun-off" to civilian industries from the military, and the state's central planning bodies did stipulate that a certain percentage of military production had to be dedicated to civilian goods. Thus, considering the Russian spin-off philosophy and the lack of sufficient economic incentive, it is senseless to speak about new technologies making their way into military industries. Regarding technologies indigenously created in the former USSR and in contemporary Russia, it is much more important to look for ways in which new technologies can be transferred into civilian (commercial) industries. There may be some concern, however, regarding dual-use technologies imported from the West. The following issues are critical in resolving this problem while meeting international obligations and allaying foreign partners' concerns.

1. While the conversion of defense industries has an unquestionably positive impact on the civilian sector, it can also have a negative effect on the economy, national security, and confidence-building measures between Russia and Western partners due to the proliferation of high technology to strategically dangerous Third World countries. In cases where conversion is financially and materially supported, it is possible to restructure enterprises for the manufacture of new products and spare parts while maintaining some minimal capacities for rapid reconversion in the event of a crisis. These developments, along with the incorporation of Russia into the world economy, lead to general economic improvement, an indirect strengthening of Russian national security, and a direct increase in trust between Russia and other countries. Exactly the opposite effect would result from an unmanaged crash conversion in which the state would simply halt its procurement of armaments and issue directives for the production of civilian goods which are largely useless. In this case, an excess of armaments produced but not purchased by the government, as well as strategic raw materials, technologies and "know-how," would begin to proliferate uncontrollably. This would threaten stability in the country itself, in its immediate vicinity, and on a global scale (considering the strategic potential of Russia's military). This situation gives rise to the following questions:

• The concerns of the U.S. and other Western countries regarding the reconversion of Russian industrial enterprises seem to the RAS delegation to be unfounded and, to some extent, unilateral. From a national security standpoint, any country can see the need to maintain its capacity for rapid partial reconversion and slower reconversion of a substantial portion of its industrial base in the event that the international political situation shifts from a danger of war to an imminent threat of war or outright direct aggression. This right is also justifiable for Russia. A state of internal instability should not obviate Russia's right to national security and defense against real external threats and aggression when all dual-use technologies, including those imported, would be used in the interests of the country's defense. Another side of this issue is that, given a certain degree of mutual trust, Russia and the U.S. can, and evidently will have to, exchange information on their current plans for possible reconversion, including details down to the level of specific enterprises and technologies.

• Russian economic reality, as created by the problems inherited from the Soviet Union and the existing crisis, precludes any hope that new dual-use technologies will be developed in the civilian sphere in the near future, with the exception of imported technologies which may have certain military usefulness. Separation of research into defense and civilian spheres occurs during the formulation of the initial outline and technical requirements of R & D. The practice of industrially developed countries regarding the "spin-on" of civilian technology to defense industries when economically advantageous may become economically feasible and consequently desirable for Russia in the longer term.

• In connection to the recent transition to a market economy, there is new concern regarding the possibility of uncontrolled or poorly controlled proliferation of dual-use technologies. The problem stems from the lack of control over new financing sources now being used by both private and, in many cases, state enterprises. In relation to the uncontrolled application of dual-use technologies, special concerns are arising from the increasing penetration of investment capital from countries to the south of Russia for the financing of Russian enterprises, including defense companies.

2. The transition from the disintegrating structures of the former USSR to new Russian state structures has been occurring in circumstances which are much more historically complicated than those in the other republics of the former USSR. This situation exists because the basic principles of Gorbachev's policies, and the Union structures which supported them, involved blocking the development of Russian sovereignty and thwarting the formation of Russian state structures to the greatest extent possible. Thus the formation of these Russian institutions really began only after August 1991, and the creation of an export administration started only in the summer of 1992.

Export administration offices have been established, at least formally, in all relevant ministries and institutions of the Russian Federation, and the primary legislation on export administration and the activities of its related institutional bodies has been passed. [Note: a few days after termination of the NAS-RAS meeting the Presidential Decree on dual-use technologies was passed.] Expert scientific support for Russian export administration activities, especially in the field of dual-use technologies, is provided by the RAS council on export control, augmented as a result of the previous Russian-American interacademy meetings by a special RAS Presidium group on dual-use technologies and related issues. To accelerate the convergence of Russian export administration policies with international standards in effectiveness and reliability, it is necessary to address the following issues:

• Creating an adequate legislative and executive basis for the export administration structure as a whole and for each of its institutional bodies.

• Overcoming the historically-rooted absence of transparency and openness in the administrative-financial and other non-classified activities of industrial enterprises and scientific institutions, with the exception of a certain range of questions involving state and/or military secrets.

• Affirming the domestic and international rights of an administrative licensing system in the Russian Federation with the authority to monitor observance of intellectual property rights.

• Eliminating the ability of Russian enterprises and institutions to conclude contracts with foreign buyers, including contracts for dual-use technologies and military hardware, which circumvent national authorities with regard to export authorization, registration, and licensing.

• Instituting customs controls and bringing them up to the necessary level of effectiveness, particularly with respect to the borders with the former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact nations, in order to eliminate opportunities for the re-export of dual-use technologies and armaments.

In defining approaches to building a reliable and long-term atmosphere of mutual confidence, it is necessary to raise and stress the issue of mutuality. While one may continuously announce that the USSR and Russia as its heir have suffered defeat in the Cold War, these very announcements would represent nothing but the continuation of the cold war. In addition, as the well-known literary hero Khodzha Nasreddin used to say: "You may repeat the word 'halva' as many times as you like, but you won't taste any sweetness." All bilateral talks between the United States and Russia are being conducted only because the healthy forces of both countries still recognize a mutual danger and see a

mutual search for confidence-building measures as one of the most radical ways of reducing this danger. Russia does not view the political fall of militant communist ideology in the world and subsequent economic crisis as a defeat for the country, but rather as a hard road to a victory of common sense, human rights, and unity with the world community on the basis of peace and equality. It is from this standpoint that the Russian Federation has identified the following key issues which must be addressed in order to build trust:

1. Considering the current economic and military-political situation in Russia, any serious politician could hardly anticipate premeditated aggressive moves from our country. Nevertheless, this does not mean either that under conditions of protracted instability Russia would be incapable of becoming a source of an unpremeditated threat, or, on the other hand, that there cannot be a threat to Russia from other states. Overall, the situation compels Russia to seek allies and to work for relations of complete trust and openness with them. For many geopolitical, military-strategic, and historical reasons (originating from the times when the USSR and the United States shared the burden of global responsibility), the convergence of interests with the United States, up to and including the establishment of an alliance, may be most natural. At the same time, Russia must consider the alliance obligations of the United States and its own European interests at a time when a number of states—both former republics of the USSR and former Warsaw Pact members—plan their defense doctrines based on potential confrontation with Russia. The Russian Federation thus has an obvious interest in developing political and economic relations with West European countries and building trust in all spheres, including military-strategic cooperation. This interest is particularly valid in light of the common danger of the proliferation of precision guided weapons technology.

Thus, having achieved sufficient bilateral convergence and confidence-building between Russia and the U.S. over a broad spectrum of problems, the next focus for further Russian expansion of the mutual confidence zone should be the countries of the European Community. Cooperation with the EC can occur in the fields of politics, economics, and, with regard to NATO member countries, in the military-political field. Such an approach is well-founded and in agreement with NATO's stated new priorities for the near future. Here, for example, one observes a complete convergence of bilateral interests regarding ecological problems. Russia has already declared its readiness to participate in international efforts to build a unified anti-missile defense system for the monitoring and destruction of intentionally and/or accidentally launched missile weapons. In addition, Russia may also be even more interested than many other European countries in the creation of an international system for the prevention and/or containment and liquidation of local tensions and armed conflicts in Europe.

In the future, one cannot rule out the interest of the Russian Federation in a further expansion of confidence zones relating to policy coordination in the fields of dual-use technologies, export control, and strategic weapons non-proliferation and verification with a number of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Australia and New Zealand.

2. The development of these zones and the realization of confidence-building measures in such vital matters as the proliferation of strategically dangerous technologies and armaments are inconceivable in theory and impossible in practice without the equal and comprehensive incorporation of the Russian Federation into the system of existing international treaties, agreements, and conventions in this field. First and foremost are the following international regimes:

It is necessary to consider the changed international situation which places the need for a transformation of COCOM on the agenda. The participation of Russia and certain other countries (the former republics of the USSR and former members of the Warsaw Pact), along with the need for a partial change in the perception of regions and countries presenting a danger with regard to the proliferation of dual-use technologies and strategic weapons, necessitates the transformation of COCOM or even the redrafting of the COCOM agreement on the basis of its existing principles.

Here the dissolution of the USSR, a former participant in this group, has turned both the international community and Russia itself into hostages of the ambitions of the leaders of the former USSR republics. These republics were the sites of enterprises of the former Goskomatom, Minsredmash and a number of other agencies responsible for mining, enrichment and processing of raw materials, for applications of fissionable materials for both civilian (nuclear power, medicine, etc.) and military purposes. Unfortunately, the number of these countries exceeds the number of former republics where nuclear weapons of the former USSR were deployed. These weapons are to some extent controlled even now by the staff of the joint armed forces of the CIS and by special units subordinated to the Russian Federation. In general, the enterprises that use nuclear technologies predominantly at the level of raw material processing and enrichment are currently unable to operate efficiently without support from Russia's industrial structures. Nevertheless, there is still a serious danger of proliferation of technologies and processed materials and migration of nuclear specialists. Under such conditions it is necessary first of all to transfer to the Russian Federation the comprehensive and full scale international rights previously held by the USSR and, secondly, to encourage the fuller participation of Russia in the activities of this group, with effective assistance from the other group members.

Agreements signed under the group's auspices will soon be supplemented by a Convention on Chemical Weapons. Russia possesses a significant pool of chemical scientists, including military personnel, engineers, and skilled technicians and workers

with experience in chemical weapons. With adequate investment in applied research and production under the guidelines set by the International Convention, Russia could make a substantial contribution to the elimination of chemical weapons, working openly in cooperation with other nations.

Confidence-building measures in this field have unfortunately been frustrated by industrial and economic barriers. Russian missile manufacturers justifiably believe that the limitations required under this regime on the initiative of the United States are to a considerable extent based on protectionist considerations. As Russia is opposed to the permanent destruction of its missile and space industry, which would substantially worsen the country's already disastrous economic situation, the establishment of trust in this field largely depends on the international community, and primarily on the United States. It depends not on restricting Russian high technologies, but on making them internationally available for peaceful purposes, a process in which Russia is fully prepared to engage.

Furthermore, the best way of achieving mutual trust is joint action. We are currently faced with a challenge which threatens world stability in the twenty-first century—the augmentation of arsenals of weapons of mass destruction by a fourth destabilizing component, i.e., long-range precision guided weapons of secondary ecological destruction. Developing means of controlling these weapons, ensuring their non-proliferation, and preventing or reducing the effectiveness of their use would be an ideal field of joint activity for all responsible states in the world. As a result of such joint work, we might achieve a previously unattainable level of mutual trust among nations.

3. As in the case of missile technologies, a number of leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex express the opinion that international restrictions, particularly those pertaining to the arms trade, often discriminate against Russia. If Russia leaves the international weapons market for economic reasons or in accordance with political agreements, its place will immediately be taken by arms merchants from other countries, including the United States., and often in contravention of the laws of these countries. In the absence of adequate economic compensation, such a situation is economically and politically unacceptable for Russia and constitutes an unhealthy factor hindering the establishment of trust.