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with experience in chemical weapons. With adequate investment in applied research and production under the guidelines set by the International Convention, Russia could make a substantial contribution to the elimination of chemical weapons, working openly in cooperation with other nations.


Confidence-building measures in this field have unfortunately been frustrated by industrial and economic barriers. Russian missile manufacturers justifiably believe that the limitations required under this regime on the initiative of the United States are to a considerable extent based on protectionist considerations. As Russia is opposed to the permanent destruction of its missile and space industry, which would substantially worsen the country's already disastrous economic situation, the establishment of trust in this field largely depends on the international community, and primarily on the United States. It depends not on restricting Russian high technologies, but on making them internationally available for peaceful purposes, a process in which Russia is fully prepared to engage.

Furthermore, the best way of achieving mutual trust is joint action. We are currently faced with a challenge which threatens world stability in the twenty-first century—the augmentation of arsenals of weapons of mass destruction by a fourth destabilizing component, i.e., long-range precision guided weapons of secondary ecological destruction. Developing means of controlling these weapons, ensuring their non-proliferation, and preventing or reducing the effectiveness of their use would be an ideal field of joint activity for all responsible states in the world. As a result of such joint work, we might achieve a previously unattainable level of mutual trust among nations.

3. As in the case of missile technologies, a number of leaders of the Russian military-industrial complex express the opinion that international restrictions, particularly those pertaining to the arms trade, often discriminate against Russia. If Russia leaves the international weapons market for economic reasons or in accordance with political agreements, its place will immediately be taken by arms merchants from other countries, including the United States., and often in contravention of the laws of these countries. In the absence of adequate economic compensation, such a situation is economically and politically unacceptable for Russia and constitutes an unhealthy factor hindering the establishment of trust.

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