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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTROLLABILITY OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES: OPTOELECTRONIC DEVICES

Joint Paper of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Russian Academy of Sciences Working Groups on Optoelectronic Devices

Alan G. Chynoweth

Vice President Applied Research and Chief Scientist (Retired)

Bellcore

Yuriy E. Nesterikhin

Kurchatov Institute

Academician, Russian Academy of Sciences

Lev N. Pyatnitsky

Department Head, Institute for High Temperatures

Russian Academy of Sciences

A. Sobolev

Russian Academy of Sciences

INTRODUCTION

Previous joint meetings between the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Science have led to agreement regarding the general framework within which to address the question of the controllability of dual-use technologies, i.e., technologies that have both civilian and military applications. In particular, the questions concern control over the flow of imported technologies to the military (diversion) and to other countries that are not members of COCOM (proliferation).

The earliest joint meetings selected three areas of dual-use technologies for further joint study. This paper addresses one of these—optoelectronic devices.

A constant undercurrent to the discussions that took place was that controllability could not be cleanly separated from cooperation in research and technology between the two countries. While the U.S. participants focused on controllability first and cooperation second, the Russian participants repeatedly stressed (in view of present Russian economic conditions) that cooperation was their immediate priority. It is clear that both controllability and cooperation have to be addressed simultaneously.



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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTROLLABILITY OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES: OPTOELECTRONIC DEVICES Joint Paper of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and Russian Academy of Sciences Working Groups on Optoelectronic Devices Alan G. Chynoweth Vice President Applied Research and Chief Scientist (Retired) Bellcore Yuriy E. Nesterikhin Kurchatov Institute Academician, Russian Academy of Sciences Lev N. Pyatnitsky Department Head, Institute for High Temperatures Russian Academy of Sciences A. Sobolev Russian Academy of Sciences INTRODUCTION Previous joint meetings between the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Science have led to agreement regarding the general framework within which to address the question of the controllability of dual-use technologies, i.e., technologies that have both civilian and military applications. In particular, the questions concern control over the flow of imported technologies to the military (diversion) and to other countries that are not members of COCOM (proliferation). The earliest joint meetings selected three areas of dual-use technologies for further joint study. This paper addresses one of these—optoelectronic devices. A constant undercurrent to the discussions that took place was that controllability could not be cleanly separated from cooperation in research and technology between the two countries. While the U.S. participants focused on controllability first and cooperation second, the Russian participants repeatedly stressed (in view of present Russian economic conditions) that cooperation was their immediate priority. It is clear that both controllability and cooperation have to be addressed simultaneously.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences A significant argument for taking this position is the concern of both parties over the "brain drain" of Russian scientists and engineers to potentially hostile countries, a phenomenon that is largely driven by present economic circumstances. Thus, throughout this paper, the two threads of controllability and cooperation as they apply to optoelectronic devices are repeatedly interwoven. OPTOELECTRONIC DEVICES AND TECHNOLOGIES Optoelectronic devices cover a wide range of components and technologies that can be used in both civilian and military applications. The components include, but are not limited to: lasers (semiconductor; glass; gas; chemical); light emitting diodes; photodetectors; optical fibers; optical amplifiers; optical circuit switches; optical scanners and imaging devices; non-linear optical devices; liquid crystal filters; acousto-optic wavelength switches; displays; holographic optical storage; optical signal processors and computers; and others. In order to explore which fundamental principles might affect the achievement or otherwise of controllability, this paper will address only the components based on compound semiconductors or glass fiber technologies. Furthermore, high power devices will not be covered. For the semiconductor devices in particular there are number of key technologies. These include: material purification; bulk crystal growth; epitaxial growth (including liquid phase, metal-organo chemical vapor deposition; and molecular beam; lithography; patterning; and packaging.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences In addition, there is usually a need for testing equipment. Increasingly sophisticated processing technologies are enabling the fabrication of optoelectronic integrated circuits (OEICs), which are components that combine optical and electronic technologies in a single monolithic structure to achieve specific functions (such as transmitters, receivers, regenerators, and switches, scanners and memories). The degree of functionality achievable in OEICs will undoubtedly advance with state-of-the-art technology. Optical fiber technologies have matured considerably over the last decade. The principal fiber components are: passive optical waveguides; optical fiber amplifiers; and optical fiber lasers. Relevant materials technologies include: glass compositions and preform fabrication; glass fiber pulling; glass fiber coating and encapsulation; and cabling and splicing. Applications Most, if not all, of the above devices and the technologies needed for fabricating them are relevant to both civilian and military applications. Civilian applications for optoelectronic devices include: optical telecommunications; local area networks; computer interconnection; optical storage (such as compact disc players); medical equipment; sensors; imaging devices; surveying; security (surveillance) systems; and simulation and virtual reality systems. Military applications include: sensors;

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences missile guidance systems, especially including precision weapons, with conventional explosives; optical radar systems; range finders; surveillance; communications systems, especially in airplanes and ships; and simulation systems. Especially for the military sector, as the ability to combine optical and electronic technologies with software advances, one can anticipate increasingly ''intelligent'' weaponry with on-board real-time decision-making technologies such as neural networks. Ultimately, military capability becomes measured mainly by the sophistication of the software, and the ruggedized hardware becomes essentially a commodity. Starting from the COCOM background, the U.S. participant tended to focus initially on controlling the flow of imported technology to the Russian military. While this issue continues to be important, the discussions brought out much more starkly the concern over the re-export of technology to hostile, or potentially hostile, third countries or militant organizations. Such countries must now include at least some of the break-away republics of the former Soviet Union and perhaps additional regions as well. In addition, the potential dangers, threats, and even blackmail that could result from, for example, a few precision guided weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or fanatically hostile governments can be readily imagined. Optoelectronic devices can or could play key roles in the sensing and guiding mechanisms in such precision weapons, underscoring the urgent need to establish effective control mechanisms, particularly to guard against undesired proliferation. The conundrum that has to be tackled is that dual-use technologies cannot, by definition, be automatically compartmentalized from the outset into civilian and military categories—it would be a contradiction in terms. The two sets of applications spring from the same source of fundamental science and technology. But though they have a common source, there must be some points at which the two streams or innovation paths begin to diverge. The question is whether these divergence points for optoelectronic technologies can be usefully delineated. But even if such delineation is possible, it seems rather naive to assume that the military can be prevented from acquiring any technology they are interested in. Thus, a more realistic approach may be to limit the ability of the military or the export industry to take advantage of new technology through production on a significant scale rather than by trying to achieve absolute denial of the technology. Any unauthorized production on a significant scale should generally be discoverable. Thus, the innovation paths by which optoelectronics technologies proceed from the research laboratory to commercial or military applications have to be examined to determine which controls may be introduced.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences INNOVATION PATHS There are two familiar, interrelated sequences by means of which ideas and discoveries in the research laboratories get transformed into commercially or militarily useful products: the technical and the managerial sequences. The ideas or discoveries are sometimes the result of "pure" research, particularly in the universities and research institutes, but more often they are stimulated by a perceived or anticipated need, opportunity, or application in the marketplace or in the military sphere. Vertical, Technical Sequence The complete vertical, technical sequence or hierarchy that may be followed is described below: At most, if not all, stages along the innovation paths, technology can be transferred in various forms as products. The product associated with one stage in the sequence is often regarded as a necessary technology for the next stage. Optoelectronic devices are basically hardware products though they may incorporate software. Processes are the means by which products are made or assembled. Processes may involve specialized machines, such as molecular beam epitaxy machines or electron beam synchrotrons. Also, know-how is generally crucial but often abstract. It resides in the minds and skills of individuals.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences Hardware products and specialized machines lend themselves to various control procedures, especially if they are fairly large and/or relatively few in number. The know-how that individuals possess underscores the importance of alleviating constraints, financial, environmental, etc., that could otherwise incline valuable individuals with sensitive knowledge to emigrate to non-COCOM countries. Horizontal, Managerial Sequence There is also a horizontal or managerial sequence (pictured below) that can be followed for each step in the above sequence: In our discussions, the point was repeatedly made that the managerial sequence offers a number of possible control or "choke" points, particularly at interfaces between various organizations or institutions. There are also a variety of control techniques that can be considered at various points along the innovation path, including techniques that are becoming increasingly familiar in the commercial world for such tasks as inventory tracking. In assessing the controllability that can be exercised over optoelectronic devices, these two sequences—the technical and the managerial—should be kept in mind. CONTROLLABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPTOELECTRONICS Fundamental Science Phase The way the world-wide research community operates and communicates effectively keeps researchers all over the world very much informed about significant discoveries, ideas, and results. Lead-times enjoyed by the originators are seldom more than a year, often very much less. The spirit of open communication between researchers has deep roots. Many times even a rumor over the "grapevine" that another scientist has achieved a certain result serves to stimulate other scientists to come up with an equivalent

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences result using their own ideas and ingenuity. And nowadays, the operation of the grapevine has been greatly enhanced by the evolution of worldwide networking of researchers over Internet. For commercial purposes, critical inventions can be patented, thereby giving the inventors certain commercial rights and advantages if all parties and countries are playing by the same rules. It is critically important, therefore, for Russia rapidly to establish intellectual property laws that are in line with those operating in the COCOM countries. Bureaucratic control over intellectual property in itself is not likely to completely prevent unauthorized military or other applications, but it is an important element in Russia's strategy for developing mutual trust. CONCLUSION Both Russia and the United States can learn from each other but it is unrealistic to assume that either Russia or the United States possesses an overall intellectual advantage at the fundamental science level because of the long-established modus operandi of the world-wide research community. Indeed, the open cooperation between Russian and American scientists at this level should be encouraged as a means by which Russia will become better integrated into the world economy. Furthermore, such cooperation tends to counteract the brain drain problem. Cooperation already embraces such mechanisms as: scientific exchanges; direct support of science centers in Russia; support for participation by Russian scientists in American conferences; and, perhaps most importantly, well-managed collaborations between peer groups with well-defined goals in important areas of fundamental science. It is important to recognize that in addition to financial support; Russia particularly needs support in the acquisition of managerial practices appropriate for applying science to a civilian economy. Joint projects provide opportunities for Russia to acquire more of such expertise. Optoelectronic Device Fabrication Phase RESEARCH PHASE To transform fundamental physical and device concepts into actual demonstrations, working models, etc. often requires special skills, materials and equipment. For research demonstrations, Russia's long-standing capability in materials and compositions is generally sufficient, only a few people need to have the skills, and only a small amount of equipment (maybe one of a kind) will often suffice. Russia can nearly always provide such levels of support. Relative lack of equipment resources can stimulate extraordinary ingenuity in order to achieve the desired result. Russia ingenuity under adversity is outstanding. And when domestic resources cannot meet the need for

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences some advanced fabrication equipment, such as, perhaps, for fine line lithography, it has to be assumed that Russia can acquire an example from the West. CONCLUSION Russia has, or can acquire, the small amounts of technology it needs in order to perform research demonstrations. The only exception at present for optoelectronic devices might be in the area of sub-micron lithography of compound semiconductors, especially for the fabrication of advanced OEICs. Thus, except in very few, highly specialized cases, it would seem almost impossible for COCOM to deny Russia any access to state-of-the-art optoelectronics technology at this research phase. It should be noted, however, that individual commercial enterprises will decide for themselves which of their proprietary technologies they will make available to Russia and which they will continue to hold proprietary for perceived commercial advantage. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND SCALE-UP PHASE In this phase, technology transfer from the research demonstration to a production design and to manufacture occurs. Though America's abilities in this regard are not perfect by any means, this is probably the area to which Russia has to devote most attention at present if it is to become an effective participant in the world economy. These transfer steps also offer various opportunities for exercising control over where dual-use technologies are applied. Russia has long had an impressive indigenous military capability. While in areas of new technology it has generally lagged behind the United States, the lag has been a matter of only a few years. Clearly, where commercial metrics do not matter, Russia has been able to transfer technology out of the research laboratory or institute and into production facilities for the military. While the U.S. author has no knowledge of Russia's military uses of optoelectronics, it would seem safe to assume that Russia is able to mount adequate development and production to meet military needs. It is likely, however, that the present productivity of these military production facilities is significantly below the levels achieved in the United States and other Western countries. Conversion to commercial production, as well as meeting the worldwide marketplace's criteria for costs, timeliness, reliability, performance, and customer appeal, are likely to require considerable assistance from the West, especially as regards organization, management, and marketing practices as well as with modem production equipment. Russia recognizes this need, as evidenced by the high level of activity in Russia of Western management consulting firms. Special equipment needed for the production of optoelectronics devices may offer effective opportunities for exercising control, either by denial or by monitoring its use.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences The above remarks apply particularly to the fabrication of optoelectronic chips and their packaging to make components. It can be expected that production capability in Russia will catch up fairly quickly to the West in discrete components but will tend to lag behind the West when it comes to OEICs. It should be pointed out, however, that OEICs are still largely in the research phase even in the United States, underscoring the complexity of the technology and perhaps also reflecting on questions as to how the technology will be best used or made competitive with simpler, hybrid technologies. Thus, OEICs could well afford Russia the opportunity to catch up substantially with the United States by the time they become commercially important. CONCLUSION The military in Russia will get the technology it needs whether or not the West provides technical assistance. But the West, in helping Russia towards a market-based economy, will inevitably make it easier for the military to get what it wants, and more quickly. The challenge to the West, as in any competitive enterprise, will be how to keep always a few steps ahead of Russia's technology, particularly as regards applications of the technology. Control by denial of advanced optoelectronic technology to the extent it can be exercised, is most likely to be in the few special fabrication, packaging, and testing technologies, if any, where the United States has a distinct competitive edge and can therefore maintain a lead time. The challenge to both Russia and the West is to ensure that Western state-of-the-art optoelectronics technology acquired by Russia through the course of research collaborations does not make its unauthorized way into the hands of the military or, even more important, the hands of potentially hostile nations, regions, or organizations. Russia's scientists are well aware of their responsibilities as regards the prevention of unauthorized diversion or proliferation of technology, as was repeatedly made clear in the discussions. They are aware that breaches of agreements regarding technology transfer could seriously jeopardize, even destroy, the international cooperation that is so important to Russia. Russia's scientists in the Academy institutes believe they can exercise considerable control over what optoelectronics technology transfers take place between their institutes and industry- or defense-oriented institutes. However, this ability to control needs to be demonstrated. One of the best ways of doing so is for American scientists to work with Russian scientists on joint projects in their research institutes. Such close cooperation helps achieve multiple objectives: the transfer of American technology and know-how to Russia and vice versa; increased knowledge or awareness of the uses of technologies under development in Russia; and, thereby, building an atmosphere of mutual trust.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences However, even if the scientists in the research institutes can exercise effective control over the initial transfers of technology out of their institutes, their ability to control subsequent transfers between other organizations is likely to be considerably less. Russia clearly recognizes this concern, as evidenced by its current approach to establishing two export control (or restriction) lists—one for science or research and the other for applications or products, the latter applying to industry and defense institutes. Clearly, Russia's scientists are involved, along with representatives of industry and the military, in generating these lists. Likewise, they can be influential in recommending any other control mechanisms and government structures for establishing necessary controls and monitoring procedures. Incorporation of Optoelectronic Devices in Equipment In the foregoing, optoelectronic devices and the technologies for fabricating them have been regarded as essentially generic in nature, equally applicable to both civilian and military applications (dual-use). But at this point, differentiation between various types of applications may begin. While there may still be a lot of commonality between, for example, optical communications equipment needed for public telecommunications networks on the one hand and for military local area networks on the other, the particular special requirements posed by the two sets of applications begin to be more evident. While the military applications will typically emphasize performance and reliability of the equipment, civilian applications will also place more emphasis on customer appeal, competitive cost, and timing (to hit the market "window"). Different sets of equipment therefore begin to emerge, although based on a common optoelectronic technology. However, having identified optoelectronics devices as a generic, dual-use technology, care has to be exercised to ensure that not ALL optoelectronic devices are mistakenly and automatically lumped under the heading of dual-use. There may be some devices which, by virtue of their unusual performance parameters or their ability to work in extremely hostile environments, are relevant to military applications but otherwise have no practical relevance for commercial applications. Such devices, and any special materials and processes needed to make them, would clearly belong on the control or restriction lists currently being compiled or updated and should not be regarded strictly as dual-use. Two possible sources of the generic optoelectronic components have to be recognized: direct purchase from the West (paid for, for example with hard currencies earned from export of oil or other natural resources); and domestic production, with or without the help of the West. Likewise, at the equipment level, sources can be foreign or domestic. Production facilities can be established and/or operated in Russia with or without Western help, though the latter's expertise would undoubtedly expedite the process.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences CONCLUSION In view of the multiple potential sources of optoelectronic components and technologies, control at this level by denial would be very difficult if not impossible for the West to achieve. (Vast quantities of optoelectronic components can easily be carried in a briefcase.) It would be a little easier at the optoelectronic equipment level, and with specialized production and testing equipment, because of the greater visibility and smaller number of these products. On the other hand, equipment is generally quite readily reverse-engineered. Control by denial therefore would be at most a delaying tactic and at the same time would deny market opportunities to the United States. Inventory Tracking and End-Use Verification As the foregoing discussion has brought out, except in very few instances, control by product denial is generally not feasible, whether at the technology, component, or equipment level, and furthermore, often runs counter to the larger objectives of assisting Russia towards a market economy. Another, and in many ways more attractive, approach towards achieving a degree of national security (and international stability) may be keeping track of products through some form of automated inventory information base system. Such systems, such as those based on bar codes and bar code readers (using optoelectronic devices) are now widespread in business and commerce. They lend themselves to a variety of information analysis and intelligence deriving techniques. Inventory tracking at the chip level would require some internationally agreed-upon method of marking the chips, e.g., by including a bar code, trademark, or other indicator in the lithography step. Whether such an approach would be feasible or effective must be assessed separately. Inventory tracking at the board and equipment levels is certainly feasible—it is already widely practiced in industry. Again, international agreement needs to be reached on how to mark boards and equipment, including production equipment as well as finished products, but bar code marking appears to offer many advantages. CONCLUSION With the advances being made in data base management and analysis, such marking techniques have several attractions. They would allow verification of the origins of products and, if well implemented, identification of illicit products or end-uses and unauthorized copies. They could perhaps reveal anomalous production levels, inconsistent with the verified end-uses and suggestive of diversion to military uses or illegal fostering of exports to other countries (i.e., proliferation). On the other hand, ways

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences in which such a control scheme could be circumvented by unfriendly parties should be thoroughly addressed. Implicit in a universal, internationally agreed marking scheme is the creation of an international center for implementing and managing the information base and for deriving intelligence from it. Such a center might be under the auspices of the United Nations or, at a minimum, under the auspices of the COCOM-signatory countries. OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS Probably the most urgent civilian application in Russia for optoelectronic devices is in optical telecommunications. The United States and most other technologically advanced countries have deployed long distance systems widely and are now addressing the deployment of optical systems in local distribution and cable TV systems. Thus, these countries are establishing ubiquitous, broadband public networks. These networks are regarded as vital for a modem economy and industrial competitiveness. These broadband networks are also of strategic value to the military. In the United States, because of the enormous investment required and the rapidly advancing sophistication of civilian technology, the military increasingly relies on standard civilian technology to meet its needs. This is a reversal of earlier policies which tended to stress, whenever possible, spin-off of advanced technologies from the military to the civilian sector. Thus, broadband telecommunications networks in the United States are becoming a dual-use systems, or supersystem, technology. Virtually every civilian application of the optical technology has a military counterpart, as seen in the following hierarchy from largest to smallest: Civilian Technology Military Use Submarine cables Underwater surveillance, detection Long distance terrestrial systems networks Strategic, global or regional networks Local feeder Tactical area networks, military base complexes   Information processing, shipboard and aircraft systems Local area networks and data links High-performance computers ("board level")   Special performance ("chip level") Optical interconnection Missile guidance, night vision OEICs   Devices (LEDs, lasers, photodetectors)  

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences In addition, while free space optical communications have relatively specialized applications, such as in police radar and building security systems, they are fundamental to many tactical or battlefield uses by the military. Some of the items in the above list especially optical interconnects and OEICs—are still largely in the research or exploratory development phase and have not yet made their way into standard civilian systems. The first item, submarine cables, is a thriving worldwide business at present, but it seems likely that Russia has very little domestic need for such systems. First generation long distance and local feeder systems are by now very much a commodity. They are based on discrete (not integrated) optoelectronic devices and single-mode fibers based on well-established technology. Understandably, Russia does not wish to invest in less than state-of-the-art networks, but these first generation networks are what the United States and other countries are investing in for their public networks. Later generation networks may be based on optical solitons (under serious consideration for submarine cable and perhaps long haul), coherent optics, or multiple wavelengths. The latter in particular are being actively pursued for high volume information traffic handling. But all of these systems and their components are still very much in the research or exploratory development phase and are not yet ready for widespread commercial use. Eventually they are likely to lead to higher performance, higher capacity optical communications systems but they are not relevant to Russia's current need to upgrade substantially its telecommunications infrastructure. Contemporary civilian technology is increasingly based on the internationally accepted SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) or SONET (Synchronous Optical Network) standards. Equipment operating up to 632 Megabits/sec is becoming commonplace. As the performance of individual components is raised, the speed of the networks gets to be several Gigabits/sec, with systems operating at 10 Gb/s now a well-established objective. But if pressed, a user such as the military does not have to wait for faster components to be developed; multiple slower channels (e.g., 632 Mb/s channels) can simply be bundled or multiplexed together, albeit at lower efficiency and greater cost. The need for such ultra-high performance systems is not likely to be felt by the civilian economy in Russia for quite a long time. Putting in supersystems only makes economic sense if there are enough workstations, supercomputers, and video and multimedia services requiring them. The traffic justifications for such systems take a relatively long time to build up even in the United States.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences High performance hardware is only a first step towards a modem high performance optical communications network, whether for civilian use or for military C3I applications. As a first step, optical fiber is simply substituting for a lot of copper in order to achieve bandwidth. But key to the performance, flexibility, adaptability, and robustness of future networks is the overall network architecture (so-called intelligent networks) and the software systems for operating and supporting these networks. Such architectures for public networks are, perforce, public knowledge, but the equipment and the software systems contain much that is proprietary. For C3I applications in times of combat, theater operations will require massive information transmission and processing capabilities calling for the very highest performance workstations, microprocessors, computers, and information storage and retrieval systems. Optical signaling processing is expected to play an important part, eventually, in handling and analyzing, in real time, massive amounts of information and providing guidance to equipment and/or personnel. But such demands seem at present to be well beyond the needs, actual or anticipated, of basic, high quality civilian telecommunications networks. CONCLUSION Optical telecommunication systems based on discrete components are state-of-the-art and are currently being deployed commercially world-wide. Performance at hundreds of Mb/sec is now standard and some commercial systems performing up to several Gb/sec are imminent. Fiber optical amplifiers are also about to enter the commercial marketplace. Soliton, coherent optics, and wavelength switching systems are currently in the research or exploratory development phase. Systems for which Russia may not have significant civilian need at present but which have considerable relevance to the military include submarine cables and high power laser-based systems, particularly free-space systems. At the component level, the most sensitive areas from America's perspective would be integrated components providing enhanced functionality, especially ''intelligent'' components for information processing, specially hardened or ruggedized component structures and packages, and individual devices that can be used in telemetering, sensing, and image processing systems for precision guidance and delivery of missiles and other munitions. Sensitive areas at the systems level include the so-called intelligent systems based on sophisticated combinations of software and hardware architectures, but so far optoelectronics has not had a major impact in this area. With respect to all of the above technologies, components and systems, as well as other optoelectronic devices and the means for producing them, the present COCOM lists need to be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated. Particular attention should be paid

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences to where performance parameters may be used to distinguish between civilian and military applications, such as wavelength ranges and upper limits to speed, bit rates, and power. (It should be noted that the fact that an item is on the COCOM list does not necessarily mean that its export will be denied. Export may indeed be approved provided there are safeguards in place to ensure that the items do indeed end up in the agreed civilian applications.) OVERALL CONCLUSIONS While the emphasis in this paper has been almost entirely on the flow of American technology to Russia, there are many situations where the flow is in the reverse direction. It is also accepted that America's interests and the cause of world peace are served for the foreseeable future by Russia's progress towards a market economy. The implication of this policy is that its success will be apparent when Russia is regarded as a fully-fledged, capable competitor in the global marketplace. In turn, this implies that Western technological and managerial expertise, particularly for scaling up to commercially viable and timely production levels, will infuse Russia in much the same way as it has spread among the Western and Pacific Rim countries. This phenomenon is itself a manifestation of international commercial competition and it is in America's interest to be prominent in the spread of expertise into Russia just as it has been among other countries. American corporations are extending themselves into Russia in various ways. At present, this cooperation is mainly at the research level but it can be expected to expand into the design, development, and manufacturing phases, as well through such approaches as specific contracts and joint ventures. These activities will be focused at first on upgrading Russia's economy and standard of living, particularly through the build up of its internal markets. An essential feature of an upgraded economy for Russia will be a modern telecommunications infrastructure. Optoelectronics technology can be expected to play a major role. Russia will not be able to purchase all of its optical telecommunications equipment from abroad, although it will certainly purchase some early systems in order to get started. But Russia will need to establish its own world class telecommunications equipment production facilities to help meet the country's enormous needs. Western expertise, among which the United States must be counted, is urgently needed to establish commercially viable equipment development and manufacturing facilities, particularly through the conversion of industries previously focused on supplying the military forces. Furthermore, as a practical matter, very little in the way of optoelectronics technology or managerial or operational expertise will or can be withheld or denied by the West. Russia already has the essential intellectual and basic research capabilities. With improved facilities, Russia will be able to strengthen the coupling of its research to

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences development and production. Control from the West of these internal operations will not be feasible let alone desirable. Likewise, with the inevitable infusion of Western market research, marketing, sales, and services capabilities, Russia will eventually be able to manage the total innovation chain, from basic research to the commercial marketplace, and vice versa. The concern for the West for the near-to-medium term future is how to ensure that diversion of Western technology to military purposes or, perhaps more seriously, to "unfriendly" countries and organizations does not occur. The best, though by no means foolproof, managerial mechanisms for keeping informed as to how state-of-the-art technology initially is used will be derived from close, day-to-day cooperation and collaboration between Russian and Western scientists and engineers on research programs of common interest. Such collaborations, starting in the least sensitive areas, can steadily build mutual trust and allow incremental progression into collaboration in increasingly more sensitive areas. The best technical mechanisms for minimizing diversion and/or proliferation appear to be based on marking techniques, such as bar codes and data bases for keeping track of optoelectronic equipment, including production equipment imported from the West or constructed using Western expertise. Records kept in this way would have to be verified from time to time, such as by customs inspectors and by unannounced inspections of facilities and production and shipping records. (It is unlikely that any significant production or distribution to users can occur without records.) Going beyond joint bilateral cooperation would suggest the establishment of a multi-nation inspection activity, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations, focused on international trade in particular items of military technology. The world may not yet be quite ready for this step, but it might be logical to begin discussion of such an international inspectorate. Since Russia seeks the benefit of Western technology and managerial know-how, it will be careful to operate within the rules mutually agreed to. Trust is essential. Any violations revealed by the operation of the inventory tracking information base could damage this trust, leading to subsequent denial of further assistance. Likewise, it will be in American's interest not to violate the mutually agreed rules where the United States acquires technology and technical know-how from Russia. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The foregoing essay obviously assumes a considerable amount of international cooperation among Western and "fully-cooperating" countries on one hand, and between

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences this group and Russia on the other. Cooperation would at a minimum have to address the following topics (though these are by no means unique to optoelectronics): Russia is already working expeditiously on establishing a framework of laws, regulations, and penalties with respect to rights and obligations regarding intellectual properties, patents, and licensing procedures. International acceptance of this framework needs to be reached. Russia, under its newly formed Export Council, is already developing restriction lists for both science and products for use in controlling exports (proliferation). These restriction lists and the existing COCOM lists need to be made as much the same as possible. It is also appropriate for the COCOM list to be reviewed and, where appropriate, updated. It is recognized that there is urgent need to provide Russia's scientists with support and expertise appropriate for transition to a civilian economy, not least of all to discourage or even eliminate emigration of scientists to potentially unfriendly countries. Mechanisms for such support and the obligations of all parties with regard to research collaborations must be widely understood and accepted. Collaborations on joint projects are felt to be particularly effective for developing mutual trust—by increasing understanding of each party's needs and obligations, and by increasing sensitivity to, and awareness of, ways in which new technology is being, or may be used. In particular, research collaborations may offer opportunities for monitoring, even controlling as "choke points," the transfer of technology out of research institutes into industry or military establishments. Research collaborations and joint projects should start in least sensitive areas and incrementally progress to more sensitive areas, as appropriate, as mutual trust builds with experience. The effectiveness of export and re-export controls can be greatly facilitated by a practical marking scheme for components, products, systems, and key production and testing equipment. The well-established bar code system for inventory tracking might well be adopted to fulfill this role. It may even be possible to use it at the individual device or chip level. Its successful implementation, however, requires international agreements on standard bar codes and monitoring procedures. An international organization or center needs to be established to gather information on technology flows and to verify end users. This center should be equipped with state-of-the-art information monitoring and analysis techniques designed to detect unauthorized or undesirable transfers or exports of technology and other possible violations of international agreements. Customs and other law enforcement agencies must be trained to detect attempts at illicit transfers of technology.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences In short, as has been proposed by others, an approach to controlling sensitive technologies consists of three steps: Establish Agreements; Governments must first reach agreement with each other as to what needs to be done; Build Trust; Particularly by working closely together to jointly implement the agreements; But Verify; As in any responsible business enterprise, audits must be regularly performed to ensure that the system is working and that agreements are being kept.

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Dual-Use Technologies and Export Administration in the Post-Cold War Era: Documents from a Joint Program of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences ENDNOTE-SOME EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS IN OPTOELECTRONICS While the discussions focused primarily on general principles relating to the preventing the diversion or proliferation of militarily sensitive technology, a number of examples were suggested by the Russian authors of opportunities for research collaborations between Russian and Western scientists. The following list gives these examples, but it clearly is not exhaustive, nor probably even representative. However, it should serve as a stimulus to Western scientists and research organizations to be more proactive in assessing the mutual benefits that might result from increased attention to these opportunities for international research collaborations. It should be noted that there are already two collaborative programs in operation in optoelectronics between AT&T Bell Labs and Russian institutes on optical fiber technology (General Physics Institute) and semiconductor lasers (Ioffe Institute). Other opportunities for collaboration suggested by Russian participants in the discussions included: laser disc memories; magneto-optical information storage; semiconductor laser structures; 'table-top' laser systems; electronic image converters; plasma accelerators (high-power lasers); optical image simulation technologies; use of electron synchrotrons for fine line lithography; nanotechnology; information networking and multi-media services over optical networks; and optical computing elements using laser and optical amplifier arrays.

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