over individual installations in the destination country. Simultaneously, the Soviet government took very similar measures to prevent advanced technologies from being obtained by the U.S. and its allies. Reliance on mutual cooperation was minimal.
In recent years, remarkable progress has been made in recasting diplomatically the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia from one that has been fundamentally confrontational to one that is more mutually beneficial. The cooperation of Russians can be a powerful factor in the export control equation. If the Russians can demonstrate their ability and willingness to work with Western governments, vendors, and users in keeping sophisticated technologies from being diverted to military uses or restricted destination countries, it is possible that the iron-clad controls of the past can be eased to the benefit of commerce, scientific progress, and the Russian transition to a viable market economy.
In any relationship, including that between countries, the reduction of confrontation does not lead immediately to an establishment of trust. The latter can be accomplished only through the multilateral establishment of procedures and mechanisms to achieve the goals of non-diversion and non-proliferation, and a series of small and incremental steps taken over time in which both parties demonstrate trust, trustworthiness, and a willingness to work together in mutually beneficial ways. These will necessarily involve an element of risk, since measures which give one party complete control over the actions of the other give the latter no opportunity to demonstrate independent good faith and cooperation. Russians must be given the opportunity to demonstrate they are both willing and able—in both theory and practice.—to respect the national security concerns of the United States and to cooperate in preventing the diversion and proliferation of sophisticated technologies, provided the United States does the same.
In the past, the Soviet Union's willingness to control diversion and proliferation was questioned, but its ability to do so was not. Strong, centralized political and military institutions effectively regulated sensitive technologies. Today, there is reason to suspect that although Russia's willingness to control proliferation has increased, its ability to do so has decreased. Partly as a result, concerns about North-South proliferation of technologies to such countries as Iraq and Iran have grown. It is largely incumbent on the Russians to demonstrate to the Western community that effective, civilian control regimes can be established in spite of widespread fragmentation and decentralization of lines of authority.
This paper examines the preset nature and inherent controllability of high performance structural materials (HPSM) and their enabling technologies. It addresses means of control in the context of broader efforts to create an environment in which the need for control is reduced.