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South'', while of all the great powers, Russia, with her clearly weakened military potential, finds herself in the worst situation.

All this gives serious incentives to politicians and Western and Eastern peace-loving establishments to search for new fundamental military-strategic approaches, as well as for nontraditional philosophical and political assessments of how to protect civilization from ill-intentioned or accidentally provoked regional and global catastrophes.

From the complete range of military-strategic problems directly linked to the conversion of "dual-use" technologies, the key problem, in our opinion, is the issue of nonproliferation (containment) of long-range (>300 km) high-precision weapons. However, we should mainly consider questions within the areas of competence and responsibility of our Academies of Science: specifically, how to prevent the results of fundamental and applied research, which could assist in the creation of more powerful high-precision weapons, from falling into the wrong hands during conversion. You can see that while the world community has worked diligently and with some success on curtailing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, just one agreement (in which the former USSR does not participate) is directed toward limiting the proliferation of conventional weaponry manufacturing technologies. It shows that the world community has not yet clearly realized this growing phenomenon of the twenty-first century, which is not less menacing than weapons of mass destruction! Maybe we will turn out to be the first "worded scientists," capable of persuasively informing the world community about this new global danger.

The delivery system is an important component of any type of weapon. Unfortunately, all conventional and possible future delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction can also be used to deliver high-precision munitions, which complicates the problem of identifying and differentiating between high-precision weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, while the existing weapons of mass destruction and their parameters (number of blocs, geographical locations, capabilities of use, et al.) are well-known and defined by agreements between the members of the "nuclear club," there is practically no international quantitative and qualitative curtailing of high-precision weapons. High-precision weapons also are highly mobile, have incomparably wider range of types and nomenclature than weapons of mass destruction, and they can be used both as an aggressive weapon (in the hands of an aggressor) and as a defensive weapon (in the hands of a peaceful nation). And, finally, the high technical complexity of high-precision weapons attracts practically every conceivable scientific endeavor, among which we give the priority to optical electronics, information science, and computer engineering, as well as engineering of new materials and substances.

As mentioned above, the area of responsibility of our National Academies are the forms of collaboration, represented in the first and partially in the second blocks (bottom line), i.e., fundamental and applied research. As we see, there is a great diversity in the types of scientific and technical collaboration, which complicates verification of

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