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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES Committee on the Safety of Marine Pipelines Marine Board Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems National Research Council National Academy Press Washington, D.C. 1994
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the panel responsible for the report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for appropriate balance. This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Robert M. White is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. Robert M. White are chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. The program described in this report is supported by Cooperative Agreement No. 14-35-0001-30475 between the Minerals Management Service of the U.S. Department of Interior and the National Academy of Sciences. Limited number of copies are available from: Marine Board, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, DC 20418 Additional copies aviailable for sale from: National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Box 285, Washington, D.C. 20055800-624-6242 or 202-334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 94-66887 International Standard Book Number 0-309-05047-2 Copyright 1994 by the National Academy of Sciences. B-324 Printed in the United States of America
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES MARK Y. BERMAN, Chairman, Amoco Production Company, Houston, Texas SALVATORE J. BELLASSAI, Consultant, Missouri City, Texas ROBERT J. BROWN, R. J. Brown, Inc., Houston, Texas JOHN M. CAMPBELL, John M. Campbell & Company, Norman, Oklahoma JOHN E. FLIPSE, NAE, Texas A&M University (retired), Georgetown, South Carolina NORMAN HACKERMAN, NAS, Rice University, Houston, Texas G. PAUL KEMP, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, Baton Rouge M. ELISABETH PATÉ-CORNELL, Stanford University, Stanford, California KENNETH H. STOKOE II, University of Texas at Austin GARY L. ZIMMERMAN, Shell Pipe Line Corporation, Houston, Texas Liaison Representatives E. P. (BUD) DANENBERGER, Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Herndon, Virginia CESAR DeLEON, Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. FRANK PARKER, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C. Staff DONALD W. PERKINS, Project Officer DUNCAN M. BROWN, Editorial Consultant CARLA D. MOORE, Administrative Assistant
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES MARINE BOARD JERRY R. SCHUBEL, Chairman, State University of New York at Stony Brook JERRY A. ASPLAND, Arco Marine, Inc., Long Beach, California ANNE D. AYLWARD, National Commission on Intermodal Transportation, Alexandria, Virginia ROBERT G. BEA, NAE, University of California at Berkeley MARK Y. BERMAN, Amoco Production Company, Houston, Texas JOHN W. BOYLSTON, Argent Marine Operations, Inc., Solomons, Maryland JAMES M. COLEMAN, NAE, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge WILLIAM M. EICHBAUM, World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C. EDWARD D. GOLDBERG, NAS, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla California MARTHA GRABOWSKI, Lemoyne College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Cazenovia, New York ROBERT W. KNECHT, University of Delaware, Newark HENRY S. MARCUS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge ASHISH J. MEHTA, University of Florida, Gainesville J. BRADFORD MOONEY, NAE, Consultant to Ocean Engineering and Research Management, Fort Pierce, Florida STEPHEN F. SCHMIDT, American President Lines, Ltd., Oakland, California STEPHANIE R. THORNTON, Coastal Resources Center, San Francisco, California JUDITH S. WEIS, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey ALAN G. YOUNG, Fugro-McClelland BV, Houston, Texas Staff CHARLES A. BOOKMAN, Director DONALD W. PERKINS, Associate Director DORIS C. HOLMES, Staff Associate
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES Preface The safety of the United States' undersea pipeline systems, in terms of both human safety and potential for environmental damage, is a major national concern. These systems, in federal and state waters in the Gulf of Mexico and off Southern California and Alaska, extend more than 20,000 miles, carrying almost one-fourth of the nation's natural gas production and more than one-ninth of its crude oil. Several accidents in the late 1980s, which claimed more than a dozen lives, raised public and congressional concern about the safety of the subsea pipeline system. That system must coexist with some of the world's busiest ports and most productive fisheries. Its structural integrity and maintenance are also subject to question, for much of it was installed in the 1940s and 1950s. Both maritime accidents and pipeline structural failures could result in pollution of fishing areas and coastal lands. In discussions with the Marine Board, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) of the U.S. Department of Transportation requested an interdisciplinary review and assessment of the many issues—technical, regulatory, and jurisdictional—that affect the safety of marine pipelines in U.S. offshore waters, including state waters. The National Research Council appointed the Committee on the Safety of Marine Pipelines, under the auspices of the Marine Board. The committee was charged with the following tasks: Review and analyze the historical causes of pipeline failures; Assess the state-of-practice and the potential for pipeline failures —whether caused by external, man-induced forces, seabed geotechnical conditions, or hydrodynamic ocean forces from currents and wave actions —and the means of mitigating them; Review and assess means for conducting right-of-way surveys and pipeline inspections; Assess the operation of pipeline safety systems and devices, and the maintenance and rehabilitation procedures for detecting and mitigating hazards and leaks; Assess periodic inspection, data collection, and analyses needed to evaluate the integrity of the pipeline systems;
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES Identify alternatives for improvements in the regulatory framework and guidance for rule-making that may enhance pipeline system safety and environmental protection. 1 In undertaking these tasks, the committee excluded from consideration pipelines in harbors and inland waterways and those related to refinery and storage facility interconnections. Pipelines in Alaskan state waters were also excluded (except for statistical information), in view of the special climate conditions and technical issues, such as ice protection, that are unique to operations off the North Slope and in Cook Inlet. The committee, seeking to address the most salient issues of pipeline safety, did not attempt a general survey of pipeline repair and rehabilitation techniques, and focused on measures to improve pipeline safety. In its review of pipeline survey techniques, the committee placed primary emphasis on pipeline inspection rather than right-of-way surveys, which have a more indirect influence on operational safety. With regard to the geographical coverage of this report, the greatest emphasis by far has been placed on the systems in the federal and state waters of the Gulf of Mexico, where about 99 percent of the marine pipeline mileage is located. The pipeline safety issues applicable to California are often significantly different, including the relatively few miles (about 300) of marine pipeline there, and the risk of seismic action. The Committee on the Safety of Marine Pipelines is composed of experts in offshore oil and gas development, research in systems safety improvements, ocean engineering, development of deep water pipelines and offshore structures, risk analysis and environmental management, pipeline safety regulations, corporate safety management, chemistry and corrosion, geotechnical engineering, petroleum economics, and environmental policy from a state and local viewpoint. The committee met five times from the beginning of its activity in April 1992. During these meetings, the committee received briefings from the MMS, OPS, and U.S. Coast Guard on these agencies' responsibilities in executing regulations, and their operational issues and problems. The committee reviewed the concerns of persons and organizations affected by offshore pipelines and their regulation through briefings by pipeline operators and representatives of the fishing industry. It also received presentations on the dynamics of shoreline change and its influence on pipelines, on the location and reporting of navigational obstructions, and on charting. The problems of safety data bases were explored. Through reports and data from federal and state agencies and industry, the committee reviewed technical topics such as pipeline operations and inspection, corrosion control, and leak detection. Finally, individual committee members visited state agencies in Louisiana and Texas, as well as industry sites, to obtain first-hand views of particular issues. In preparing its report, the committee was aided by representatives of the two sponsoring agencies and their staffs. The Minerals Management Service representative to the committee was Mr. E. P. (Bud) Danenberger, Chief, Engineering and Technology Division. Alexander P. Alvarado, Supervisor, Pipeline Unit, MMS Gulf of Mexico Region, and Melinda S. Mayes, Geologist, MMS Pacific OCS Region, were particularly helpful in providing regional data. Cesar DeLeon, Director, Regulatory Programs, Office of Pipeline Safety, and William Bertges of the OPS Southwest Region provided pipeline data and correspondence related to marine navigation safety concerns. George P. Vance, Manager, Subsea Marine Section, Mobil Research and Development Corporation, served as the Marine Board's liaison to the committee. Albert H. Mousselli of Applied Offshore Technology, Houston, generously guided the committee through the geotechnical problems of pipeline installation in the Gulf of Mexico. 1 The term “regulatory framework” is understood to mean the complex of laws, regulations, scientific and engineering knowledge, and formal and informal relationships that shapes regulation and determines the roles of regulators and regulated entities.
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES The committee extends its thanks to the many persons who provided briefings and correspondence to inform committee and staff members of current measures to ensure safe operations and of problems that have yet to be resolved; these persons are listed in Appendix F.
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 1 INTRODUCTION 12 Divided Regulatory Responsibilities, 13 Safety Concerns, 15 Scope of the Study, 17 Inadequate Safety Data, 17 Findings, 18 References, 19 2 SAFETY EXPERIENCE 20 Data Sources, 21 Limitations of the Safety Data, 22 Minerals Management Service, 22 Office of Pipeline Safety, 23 U.S. Coast Guard, National Response Center, 23 State Agencies, 24 Previous Studies, 24 The Woodson Data Base, 24 Other Studies, 25 Causes of Failure, 25 Consequences of Pipeline Failures, 26 Deaths and Serious Injuries, 27 Pollution, 28 Economic Costs, 30 Findings, 30 References, 31
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES 3 RISK ANALYSIS: HAZARDS AND ZONATION 33 Developing a Prototype Model: Decision Variables and Criteria, 36 Decisions, 36 Decision Criteria and Relevant Outcomes, 37 Structure of the Risk Analysis Model: Zonation, 37 Choosing the Model's Complexity, 39 Modeling Change Over Time, 40 Data Sets and Biases, 40 Establishing Safety Goals, 41 Findings, 43 References, 44 4 MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MARINE PIPELINE NETWORK 45 Corrosion Control, 46 External Corrosion Protection, 46 Internal Corrosion Protection, 48 Maintenance and Inspection, 49 External Inspection, 50 Internal Inspection, 50 Inspection Requirements of Regulatory Agencies, 54 Detecting and Limiting Leaks, 55 Routine Operations, 55 Responding to Leaks and Other Emergencies, 60 Identifying and Notifying the Responsible Operator, 63 Findings, 64 References, 64 5 AVOIDING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WITH PIPELINES 66 Coexisting Activities, 67 Oil and Gas Field Activities, 67 Fishing, 67 Cargo and Other Traffic, 68 Nearshore and Coastal Dynamics of the Gulf of Mexico, 68 Texas Barrier Island System, 69 Strandplain-Chenier Plain System, 69 Mississippi Delta System, 72 North-Central Gulf Coast System, 73 Pipeline Avoidance Techniques for Vessels, 73 The Role of Technology in Pipeline Avoidance, 73 Pipeline Location Data, 75 Standards for Vessel Inspection, Licensing, and Training: Implications for Improving Pipeline Avoidance, 76 Pipeline Burial, 77 Regulatory Requirements for Depth of Cover, 77 Engineering Considerations in Installation, 78 Periodic Depth-of-Cover Inspections, 80 Abandoned and Inactive Pipelines, 82 Findings, 83 References, 84
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES 6 REGULATORY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT 86 Federal Jurisdiction, 87 Division of Federal Jurisdiction, 87 New Authority for MMS Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 88 State Jurisdiction, 89 State Regulation of Intrastate Production Pipelines, 89 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 90 Coastal Zone Management Plans, 90 Agency Roles, 91 Resolving Differences Between Federal Enforcement Approaches, 91 Findings, 93 References, 93 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94 APPENDICES: A. BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 100 B. MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE SERIOUS ACCIDENT REPORTING FORM 103 C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT REPORT, HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINES 110 D. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT REPORT, GAS TRANSMISSION AND GATHERING SYSTEMS 113 E. A RISK ANALYSIS APPROACH 116 F. SOURCES OF BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 140
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES FIGURES AND TABLES Figure 1-1. Offshore crude oil and gas condensate production in federal waters, 1954–1991. Figure 1-2. Offshore natural gas production in federal waters, 1954–1991. Figure 1-3. Pipeline safety regulatory jurisdictions in federal outer continental shelf waters. Figure 1-4. Offshore production areas in the Gulf of Mexico, showing active and proposed federal leases. Figure 2-1. Pipeline failures, by reported cause. Figure 2-2. Average pollution amount per incident, by reported cause of failure. Figure 2-3. Size distribution of pipeline spills, 1967–1987. Figure 3-1. Partition of a hypothetical area according to water depth, pipeline density, and boat traffic density. Figure 4-1. Schematic drawing comparing the advantages of different leak detection methods as functions of installation costs and relative stability of pressures and flows. Figure 4-2. Schematic drawing comparing the advantages of different leak detection methods as functions of sizes of leaks and detection times. Figure 5-1. Map of the Gulf of Mexico shoreline, showing rates of shoreline erosion and accretion. Figure 5-2. Decision process for burial and stability evaluation of a marine pipeline. Figure E-1. Hypothetical map of pipeline density. Figure E-2. Hypothetical map of vessel traffic density. Figure E-3. Hypothetical map of water depth. Figure E-4. Partition of a hypothetical area according to water depth, pipeline density, and vessel traffic density. Figure E-5. Influence diagram for assessment of the risks involved in vessel/pipeline collisions. Figure E-6. Influence diagram (for assessment of the risk to pipelines due to dropped and dragged anchors (or impacts of other objects). Figure E-7. Influence diagram for assessment of the risk due to pipeline corrosion.
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IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF MARINE PIPELINES Figure E-8. Influence diagram for assessment of the risk to pipelines due to severe storms. Figure E-9. Influence diagram for assessment of the risk due to accidents and incidents at the interface between pipelines and platforms. Table 2-1. Marine pipeline incidents, by reported cause. Table 2-2. Reported failure causes, by product carried. Table 2-3. Deaths and injuries associated with pipeline failures, by source, 1967–1990. Table 2-4. Pollution from marine pipelines, by reported cause of failure, 1967 –1990. Table 4-1. Leak detection methods compared. Table 4-2. Applications of leak detection methods in different types of operations. Table 5-1. Shoreline and seabed dynamics affecting pipeline depth-of-cover inspection requirements. Table 5-2. Depth-of-cover inspection requirements for different shoreline and seabed regimes. Table 6-1. State agencies with jurisdiction over pipeline safety.
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