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Scientific Communication and National Security (1982)
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP)

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. "Appendix E: Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975-1982." Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1982.

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Scientific Communication and National Security

WIDER APPLICABILITY OF THE CRYPTOGRAPHY MODEL

The question of whether PCSG’s solution for cryptographic research might be applied to research papers in other fields is beyond the scope of this paper. However, since cryptography has a number of characteristics that are unique, these characteristics would have to be taken into account in determining how the solution could be applied elsewhere.

First, the field of cryptography involves only a few dozen researchers—most of whom are working colleagues—and the publication of less than 100 papers per year. Second, the agency with the principal interest in cryptography, the NSA, is both technically competent and mission-oriented. In other words, it is engaged in the direct use of cryptography. Third, the frequency of problem papers—i.e., papers that would interfere with NSA’s mission—is small. These characteristics do not prevail in other areas of science and technology. Hence, it is far more difficult for the government to evaluate the potential impact on national security of any single research paper in other areas of science and technology.

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125
Front Matter (R1-R16)
Executive Summary (1-8)
Introduction (9-12)
1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance (13-21)
2 Universities and Scientific Communication (22-26)
3 The Current Control System (27-38)
4 General Conclusions: Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls (39-51)
5 Improving the Current System (52-64)
6 Compilation of Recommendations (65-90)
Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (91-96)
Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology (97-109)
Appendix C: A Study of the Responses of Industry to a Letter of Inquiry from the NAS Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (110-116)
Appendix D: A Brief Analysis of University Research and Development Efforts Relating to National Security, 1940-1980 (117-119)
Appendix E: Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975-1982 (120-125)
Appendix F: The Role of Foreign Nationals Studying or Working in U.S. Universities and Other Sectors (126-135)
Appendix G: Letter from Five University Presidients (136-139)
Appendix H: Statement of Admiral B.R. Inman for the May 11, 1982, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Technology Transfer (140-142)
Appendix I: Executive Order on National Security Information (143-170)
Appendix J: Correspondence Between the State Department and the University of Minnesota and M.I.T. Restricting Foreign Visitors (171-171)
Working Papers of the Panel (172-188)