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Scientific Communication and National Security (1982)
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP)

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. "Appendix I: Executive Order on National Security Information." Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1982.

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Scientific Communication and National Security

or be assigned a United States classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information.

(e) Information assigned a level of classification under predecessor orders shall be considered as classified at that level of classification despite the omission of other required markings. Omitted markings may be inserted on a document by the officials specified in Section 3.1(b).

Sec. 1.6 Limitations on Classification.

(a) In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.

(b) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified.

(c) The President or an agency head or official designated under Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(b)(1), or 1.2(c)(1) may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed if it is determined in writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of national security; and (2) the information may reasonably be recovered. These reclassification actions shall be reported promptly to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

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153
Front Matter (R1-R16)
Executive Summary (1-8)
Introduction (9-12)
1 Current Knowledge About Unwanted Technology Transfer and Its Military Significance (13-21)
2 Universities and Scientific Communication (22-26)
3 The Current Control System (27-38)
4 General Conclusions: Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls (39-51)
5 Improving the Current System (52-64)
6 Compilation of Recommendations (65-90)
Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (91-96)
Appendix B: The Historical Context of National Security Concerns About Science and Technology (97-109)
Appendix C: A Study of the Responses of Industry to a Letter of Inquiry from the NAS Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security (110-116)
Appendix D: A Brief Analysis of University Research and Development Efforts Relating to National Security, 1940-1980 (117-119)
Appendix E: Voluntary Restraints on Research with National Security Implications: The Case of Cryptography, 1975-1982 (120-125)
Appendix F: The Role of Foreign Nationals Studying or Working in U.S. Universities and Other Sectors (126-135)
Appendix G: Letter from Five University Presidients (136-139)
Appendix H: Statement of Admiral B.R. Inman for the May 11, 1982, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Technology Transfer (140-142)
Appendix I: Executive Order on National Security Information (143-170)
Appendix J: Correspondence Between the State Department and the University of Minnesota and M.I.T. Restricting Foreign Visitors (171-171)
Working Papers of the Panel (172-188)