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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 30, 1981

Professor W.R.Franta

Department of Computer Science

University of Minnesota

Minneapolis, MN 55455

Dear Professor Franta;

I have been unable to contact you by phone in recent days. Therefore, I am taking this opportunity to write to you concerning Qi Yulu, a Chinese scholar assigned to your department.

The U.S. government regularly reviews the programs of Chinese exchange visitors in scientific and technical programs to meet export control and national security concerns. Various government technicians have reviewed the program of Qi Yulu.

Because U.S. government policy encourages the training of accomplished Chinese scholars in modern technology and science, our concerns are primarily limited to potential transfer of classified technology or of technology which requires an export license. In cases where there appears to be a potential for some unacceptable technology loss, the Department of State often contacts the academic host for additional details about the program in question. If the concerns remain, the Department of State and the Department of Commerce inform the academic host of the pertinent export control regulations as well as requirements not to give students access to classified materials.

In the case of Qi Yulu, the reviewers’ concern stems largely from concerns about the potential loss of critical U.S. technology in the area of computer software technology. This is an area with military applications. The concerns could be lessened if you could provide additional information on the planned program of study and research. As this area is also subject to export control regulations, you may be contacted by the Department of Commerce in the near future.

In the meantime, it is suggested that Qi be restricted from any access to unpublished or classified government-funded work. It is also suggested that the program emphasize course work with minimal involvement in applied research. There should be no access to the design, construction, or maintenance data relevant to individual items of computer hardware. There should be no access to source codes or their development. His access should be limited to the published software for operating systems subroutines. Within this framework, however, Qi should not be denied as full an academic program as possible.

I would take this opportunity to remind you that this office should be advised prior to any visits to any industrial or research facilities.



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Scientific Communication and National Security DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 September 30, 1981 Professor W.R.Franta Department of Computer Science University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 Dear Professor Franta; I have been unable to contact you by phone in recent days. Therefore, I am taking this opportunity to write to you concerning Qi Yulu, a Chinese scholar assigned to your department. The U.S. government regularly reviews the programs of Chinese exchange visitors in scientific and technical programs to meet export control and national security concerns. Various government technicians have reviewed the program of Qi Yulu. Because U.S. government policy encourages the training of accomplished Chinese scholars in modern technology and science, our concerns are primarily limited to potential transfer of classified technology or of technology which requires an export license. In cases where there appears to be a potential for some unacceptable technology loss, the Department of State often contacts the academic host for additional details about the program in question. If the concerns remain, the Department of State and the Department of Commerce inform the academic host of the pertinent export control regulations as well as requirements not to give students access to classified materials. In the case of Qi Yulu, the reviewers’ concern stems largely from concerns about the potential loss of critical U.S. technology in the area of computer software technology. This is an area with military applications. The concerns could be lessened if you could provide additional information on the planned program of study and research. As this area is also subject to export control regulations, you may be contacted by the Department of Commerce in the near future. In the meantime, it is suggested that Qi be restricted from any access to unpublished or classified government-funded work. It is also suggested that the program emphasize course work with minimal involvement in applied research. There should be no access to the design, construction, or maintenance data relevant to individual items of computer hardware. There should be no access to source codes or their development. His access should be limited to the published software for operating systems subroutines. Within this framework, however, Qi should not be denied as full an academic program as possible. I would take this opportunity to remind you that this office should be advised prior to any visits to any industrial or research facilities.

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Scientific Communication and National Security I would appreciate hearing your reactions to this request and would appreciate your keeping us informed about the program. Do not hesitate to contact this office should you have any questions concerning this matter. Please acknowledge this letter at your earliest convenience. You may call me (202) 632–1322. I hope to hear from you soon. Sincerely Yours, Keith Powell, II Exchanges Officer

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Scientific Communication and National Security UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA Office of the President 202 Morrill Hall 100 Church Street S.E. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 October 16, 1981 Mr. Keith Powell, II Exchanges Officer Department of State 2201 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Mr. Powell: This is in reply to your letter of September 30, 1981, to Professor W.R.Franta of our Department of Computer Science, asking that the University of Minnesota impose certain restrictions on the activities of a visiting scholar from the People’s Republic of China. Since the University of Minnesota currently has extensive involvement with PRC students and scholars, it seemed to me that I should be the person to respond. Enclosed, for your background information, is a copy of the “Secrecy in Research” policy of the Regents of the University of Minnesota. You will note that we do not accept classified research, so PRC scholars will not have access to classified research on our campuses. You should know that at least someone in the State Department must be aware of this policy, since they recently went to some length to send plant samples through a third party to one of our laboratories for testing for mycotoxins. This analysis led to the allegations that the Soviets had used biological weapons in Southeast Asia. Our faculty member was not told that the State Department was the source of the samples, and he was subsequently maligned in the press for conducting secret biological warfare research. His role has now been clarified and vindicated, but I thought you should know that the State Department has aroused considerable sensitivity on this campus. Efforts to impose vaguely defined and rather sweeping restrictions on the activities of any scholars, whether from the PRC or elsewhere, would certainly reopen these sensitivities. I have no way to assess the State Department’s review of the program of the Chinese scholar in question. I do not know who the “various government technicians” were who conducted the review or what procedures and standards they might have used. I am satisfied that the restrictions you have proposed are quite sweeping and subject to almost any interpretation that might be applied now or applied retroactively at some future date.

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Scientific Communication and National Security To cite a few examples, you suggested that he be restricted “from any access to unpublished or classified government-funded work.” I have already pointed out that we do not have classified research; we have all kinds of unpublished government-funded research all over this campus. Your proposal would restrict him from access to all of it. You ask for course work “with minimal involvement in applied research”; I don’t know what you mean by “minimal,” and I have no idea how you define applied research. You ask to be informed “prior to any visits to any industrial or research facilities”; I can only interpret this to give us the choice of confining him to the student union or contacting you several times a day about his campus itinerary. Quite frankly, I find this request ironic, coming from an administration that has vowed to reduce the role of big government and eliminate unnecessary paperwork. Both in principle and in practice, the restrictions proposed in your letter are inappropriate for an American research university. Our mission is teaching, research, and public service, and neither our faculty nor our administrators were hired to implement government security actions. We are host to a large number of Chinese scholars, we have sent several delegations to the PRC, and we have formal cooperative agreements with several educational institutions in the PRC. All these relationships were developed within our traditions of openness and academic freedom, and, to use the popular phrase, the restrictions you propose can only have a chilling effect upon the academic enterprise. I sincerely believe that the State Department should reconsider its efforts to suggest or impose these kinds of restrictions. Cordially, C.Peter Magrath President cc: Professor W.R.Franta Dean Roger Staehle Vice President Kenneth Keller Regent Wenda Moore Senator David Durenberger Senator Rudy Boschwitz Representative Bruce Vento Representative Martin Sabo

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Scientific Communication and National Security October 8, 1971 SECRECY IN RESEARCH Article 1. The University of Minnesota shall not accept support from any source for research under a contract or a grant which would restrain the University from disclosing (1) the existence of the contract or grant; (2) the identity of the sponsor or the grantor and, if a subcontract is involved, the identity of the prime contractor if the results of the research must be reported to the sponsor, grantor, or prime contractor; and (3) the purpose and the scope of the proposed research in sufficient detail: (a) to permit informal discussion concerning the wisdom of such research within the University, and (b) to inform colleagues in immediate and related disciplines of the nature and importance of the potential contribution of the disciplines involved. Article 2. The University of Minnesota shall not accept support from any source for research under a contract or a grant, even though it meets the requirements of Article 1, if the contract or grant limits the full and prompt public dissemination of results or specifically permits retroactive classification, except for reasons found compelling by the University community through the review process outlined in Article 4. Article 3. The above policy shall apply to any research under a contract or grant which does not limit the full and prompt public dissemination of results at the time the research is undertaken by the University but becomes so limited thereafter. As soon as this occurs, the contract or grant, and the disposition of the results of the research obtained under such contract or grant shall be re-evaluated under the provisions of Article 4. Article 4. a. The Director, Research Contract Coordination, or some other designated University official, shall report to the Senate Research Committee every proposed research grant or contract which meets the requirement of Article 1 but limits the full and prompt public dissemination of results. If this officer is not certain whether a particular research proposal requires the Senate Research Committee’s recommendation, he shall submit the proposal to this Committee for its determination. b. The Senate Research Committee shall recommend to the Senate acceptance or rejection of every proposed contract or grant which limits the full and prompt public dissemination of results during fall, winter, and spring quarters, in sufficient detail to permit informal discussion of the recommendation made. In addition, the Committee shall report on any problems encountered in implementing this policy.

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Scientific Communication and National Security In performing its functions hereunder, the Senate Research Committee shall be authorized to seek the advice and assistance of ad hoc subcommittees competent to pass on the particular matters that may be involved. If some other University committee also has jurisdiction in a particular case, nothing in this statement of policy shall deprive it of that jurisdiction. c. The University Senate shall review the recommendations of the Senate Research Committee and forward its own recommendations to the President. All proposals which are to be submitted for Senate evaluation shall be accessible to members of the University community (the faculty and students) in sufficient detail to permit informed evaluation and discussion. Article 5. The University shall not make available any of its facilities for which permission is required to any individual, group, or organization for research which violates this Statement of Policy. Exceptions may be made through the review procedure outlined in Article 4. Article 6. The above policy shall not apply to (1) research by faculty members on leave from the University or serving as consultants, or (2) research which involves (a) the collection of confidential personal opinions and attitudes or other information pertaining to the individual persons or business entities, or (b) the analysis of the characteristics or uses of proprietary devices or substances, provided that the results of such research may be published freely in the aggregate or used to guide the design of broader research activities. The Board of Regents approved Articles 1 and 6 of the Senate Policy on Secrecy in Research on July 10, 1969. The remainder of the policy was approved on October 8, 1971.

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Scientific Communication and National Security DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 November 16, 1981 C.Peter Magrath President University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 Dear Mr. Magrath: Thank you for your letter of October 16. You have misunderstood the content and purpose of my letter of September 30, 1981, which was neither aimed at imposing sweeping restrictions, nor at interfering with academic freedom. It was certainly not my intention to disturb sensitivities at the University of Minnesota. I do still need to hear from Professor Franta to learn additional details concerning the program of study and research for Qi Yulu. My letter to Professor Franta was intended to be neither a definitive statement nor application of U.S. export regulations and travel controls as they apply to exchange visitors from the People’s Republic of China. My intent was to encourage Professor Franta to contact me. As my letter indicated, I had been unable to reach him and hoped to converse with him in order to determine whether export administration regulations regarding the transfer of technical data would be applicable in the case of Qi Yulu. If so, then more precise guidance, tailored to Mr. Qi’s program, would be provided. There are in existence several laws, including the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, that regulate the export of all goods, services, and technology from the United States. These acts include “technical data” as well as hardware. “Export” is defined to include the transmission or release of the relevant material to a foreign national. In general the acts exempt from control information that is already available to the public. The applicability of the regulations varies with regard to the nationality involved. Thus, a student from the People’s Republic of China could come under the purview of these regulations while a student from Canada, involved in the same program, might not. For this reason, the State Department routinely requests information on proposed programs of study for all Chinese scholars. In the vast majority of cases the information provided by the host is, in itself, sufficient to satisfy the Departments of Commerce and/or State that the aforementioned regulations would not apply. In a few cases, when it appears that the regulations would come into force, the academic host is contacted by the State and/or Commerce

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Scientific Communication and National Security Departments. The applicable regulations are explained and suggestions are offered as to how the program could be amended to meet the requirements of law. Within that context, we then encourage the fullest academic program possible. We are always happy to provide guidance and to respond to specific questions regarding the subject areas covered by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations. Finally, with regard to travel controls, my reference was to requirements which Chinese students meet. The responsibility in this regard rests with the students themselves. They are informed of the requirements when they receive their visas in China. The enclosed memo from the International Communications Agency (ICA) explains this point as well as other matters affecting Chinese exchange visitors. This memo was sent to all universities with active exchange programs last June. I hope the foregoing provides a clear insight into the reasons for my communication with Professor Franta. My goal was to advise him of existing laws and regulations and to learn more of Qi Yulu’s program so that there would be no inadvertent violation of the law. I also intended, in the absence of a response from Professor Franta, to provide interim suggestions. I appreciate your frank and direct response, which has led me to restructure the letter format my office has been using so as to avoid misinterpretations and to convey more clearly the nature of our concerns. I do still need appropriate information regarding Mr. Qi’s program. I will again seek to contact Professor Franta in the near future. If you have additional questions or suggestions, please do not hesitate to write to me or call me at (202) 632–1322. Sincerely yours, Keith Powell, II Office of Chinese Affairs Enclosure: ICA Memo cc: Professor W.R.Franta

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Scientific Communication and National Security UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA Office of the President 202 Morrill Hall 100 Church Street S.E. Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 December 7, 1981 Mr. Keith Powell, II Exchanges Officer Department of State 2201 C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Mr. Powell: I appreciate your November 16 letter and the effort it represents to avoid a needless and disruptive controversy. The University of Minnesota, both because of its international educational commitments and because of our understanding of national policy with regard to educational exchange with such significant countries as the People’s Republic of China, has committed a very considerable effort to international education and, especially, the development of productive exchanges with the PRC. Neither institutionally, nor personally, do I wish to have misunderstandings or an abrasive conflict with the Department of State or the federal government on such matters. Unfortunately, as I have reviewed your letter and comments, aided by University legal counsel, I find it impossible to alter the core position stated in my original October 16, 1981, communication. Allow me to explain this by beginning with what appears to be the clearest issue, namely the question of travel notification. Your original letter to Professor Franta states in part, that you simply wish to “…remind [him] that [your] office should be advised prior to any visits to any industrial or research facilities.” There is absolutely no reference to the fact that there is no obligation on Professor Franta or any other University employee to provide this information to your office. Your request for this kind of travel information, we believe, is therefore unjustified. More generally, I hope you can understand our great caution and suspicion with regard to requests for detailed information about a scholar’s course of study and research by general reference to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. Both of these are lengthy, complex, and ambiguous pieces of legislation and are difficult to interpret even by those dealing daily in munitions or exports. What is clear to me as an educator and a public official is my responsibility to protect the privacy of scholars at this institution under the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §1332g, as reinforced and augmented by the Minnesota Government Data Practices

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Scientific Communication and National Security Act, Minn. Stat. §15.1611, et seq. If your legal department can be more specific about any authority granted to your office which supercedes my responsibilities and those of Professor Franta under the law I cite, I am willing to reexamine this position—so long as it is possible to maintain the integrity of academic principles, traditions, and obligations that are the foundation of education in a democratic society. As your own statement indicates, the legislation you present as your authority exempts from control information available to the public. I repeat, it is the clearly stated policy of the Regents of the University of Minnesota that no classified research is to be conducted on the campus. Under all the circumstances, I do not believe that it would be particularly helpful for Professor Franta to be in direct contact with you. Instead I suggest that any request for information on individuals be addressed to him in writing, with a copy to me, so that we can seek appropriate legal advice with regard to the University of Minnesota’s responsibilities in responding. I would very much appreciate your reconsidering and reexamining the bases for requests for information under the applicable laws in view of the considerations I have noted. To repeat, we are not interested in any confrontation or disagreeable dispute with the Department of State, and we are exceedingly anxious to maintain our international exchange activities with the PRC and other countries. But we are insistent that our faculty and our students (regardless of their country of origin) be allowed to operate in their teaching and research functions both in letter and in spirit in ways consistent with our academic traditions and the applicable laws, which we believe are totally on the side of openness and do not make it appropriate for faculty to report on or control the activities of our students. Cordially, C.Peter Magrath President CPM: kb cc: Vice President Kenneth H.Keller, Academic Affairs Professor W.R.Franta, Department of Computer Science

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Scientific Communication and National Security NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418 USA COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Cubic Address: NARECO TWX #: 7108 22 9589 June 1, 1981 MEMORANDUM TO: Dr. Michael Laskowski, Jr. Purdue University, West Lafayette Dr. G.G.Guilbault, University of New Orleans, Louisiana Dr. Sidney W.Fox, University of Miami, Coral Gables Dr. Nevin S.Scrimshaw, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dr. Anthony L.Fink, University of California, Santa Cruz FROM: Diana B.Bieliauskas, Section on U.S.S.R. & Eastern Europe Program Officer, 202/389–6066 SUBJECT: Proposed Scientific Exchange Visit of Dr. Mikhail Yuryevich Gololobov The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (ASUSSR) has proposed to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Dr. Mikhail Y.Gololobov, Research Fellow at the Institute of Elemento-Organic Compounds in Moscow, for a three-month visit in the U.S. within the framework of the interacademy exchange program. A copy of the official agreement governing this program is enclosed for your reference as is biographical data on Dr. Gololobov. He requests a starting date in August. Dr. Gololobov wishes principal placement at Purdue University, to be followed by shorter visits to New Orleans, Miami, M.I.T., and Santa Cruz. As you can see from his biographical information, Dr. Gololbov is hopeful of arranging a longer stay in the U.S. than just three months. Due to budgetary considerations, however, we are not able to offer Dr. Gololobov assurance of a longer stay and will plan his program for three months for the time being. I am writing at this time to determine if you are willing and available to receive Dr. Gololobov in accordance with this schedule. Please indicate in your response which dates you would prefer, as well as those which are impossible for you.

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Scientific Communication and National Security During his stay in the U.S., Dr. Gololobov will be financially self-sufficient. Dr. Gololobov will receive a living allowance to cover food and housing. We do ask prospective hosts to assist the visiting scientists by meeting them upon arrival and locating housing for them. The NAS will pay directly for their travel, medical insurance, and any income taxes. These financial and administrative provisions are described in detail in the accompanying “Handbook for Hosts” and summarized in the “Fact Sheet.” The U.S. Department of Commerce has asked that we provide all prospective U.S. hosts of visiting scientists with information about the Export Control Act of 1949. In this regard, I call your attention to Section 16 of the Handbook. Finally, I should add that all visits by Dr. Gololobov are subject to approval by the U.S. Department of State. Dr. Gololobov’s professional program must focus on fundamental, not applied research. The State Department has informed us that: The subjects may not have access, whether it be visual, documentary, or verbal, to production, research, or activities funded by DOD contracts or grants. Moreover, hosts are asked to limit the programs of visiting scientists to research that has been published in open literature. Questions of interpretation of State Department policy can be directed to Mr. William Brencick (202/632–8956). If there are any local security considerations of which you are aware that might influence your ability to receive Dr. Gololobov, please let me know. I would be glad to discuss the proposed program of vists for Dr. Gololobov in detail with you. Please telephone me at your earliest convenience concerning your willingness to host this visiting scientist or giving suggestions for alternate affiliations. Enclosures: Interacademy Agreement (NAS & ASUSSR) Handbook for Hosts and Fact Sheet Biographical data on Dr. Mikhail Y.Gololobov cc: Mr. William Brencick, Department of State

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Scientific Communication and National Security DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 November 6, 1981 Diana Bieliauskas Program Officer U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe National Academy of Sciences 2101 Constitution Ave. Washington, D.C. 20418 Dear Diana, Here are the cautions and restrictions we have placed on the Soviet candidates approved to date. If you have any concerns please call me. We await the additional material on Rudashevskiy and hope to have a determination on Ilgamov in the near future. 1. GOLOLOBOV, M.Y.—(A) During his visit to M.I.T. he should not be exposed to work there on nutritional research and possible production of food supplements. His hosts at M.I.T should be informed of the U.S. Government’s concerns regarding access to genetic engineering and prevent Gololobov’s access to such work at M.I.T. (B) Gololobov should have no access (visual, documentary or verbal) to production, research or other activities funded by DOD contracts or grants. [Extraneous Material Deleted] Sincerely, James George Jatras Office of Soviet Union Affairs

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Scientific Communication and National Security NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418 USA COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Cubic Address: NARECO TWX #: 7108 22 9589 December 3, 1981 MEMORANDUM TO: Dr. Michael Laskowski, Jr. Purdue University, West Lafayette Dr. G.G.Guilbault, University of New Orleans, Louisiana Dr. Sidney W.Fox, University of Miami, Coral Gables Dr. Nevin S.Scrimshaw, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dr. Anthony L.Fink, University of California, Santa Cruz FROM: Diana B.Bieliauskas, Section on U.S.S.R. & Eastern Europe Program Officer, 202/334–2644, –2652 SUBJECT: Reinstatement of Proposed Scientific Exchange Visit of Dr. Mikhail Yuryevich GOLOLOBOV Early last summer, I advised you that the Soviet Academy of Sciences had nominated Dr. Mikhail Y.Gololobov, Research Fellow at the Institute of Elemento-Organic Compounds in Moscow, for a three-month visit in the U.S. Because of budgetary restrictions, we were unable to accommodate Dr. Gololobov’s visit at the time he wished to start, i.e., August 1981. Please refer to my memorandum of June 1 for further details. Dr. Gololobov has been renominated by the ASUSSR for a three-month visit starting January 12, 1982. He will spend all of that time at Purdue University. The NAS has requested that Dr. Gololobov be nominated for a longer visit in accordance with the wishes of his primary host, Dr. Laskowski. Should Dr. Gololobov be in the U.S. for longer than three months, I will contact you again about a short visit to your institution. This would probably not take place until late spring/early summer. For your information, Dr. Gololobov’s visit in the U.S. has been cleared by the Department of State with the following restrictions:

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Scientific Communication and National Security During his visit to M.I.T. he should not be exposed to work there on nutritional research and possible production of food supplements. His hosts at M.I.T. should be informed of the U.S. Government’s concerns regarding access to genetic engineering and prevent Gololobov’s access to such work at M.I.T. Gololobov should have no access (visual, documentary or verbal) to production, research or other activities funded by DOD contracts or grants. Enclosure: Memorandum of June 1, 1981 cc: Mr. James Jatras, Department of State

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Scientific Communication and National Security MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY International Food and Nutrition Program 20A–201 18 Vassar Street Cambridge, Mass. 02139 U.S.A. December 21, 1981 Francis E.Low Provost M.I.T., 3–208 Cambridge, MA 02139 Dear Francis: The import of the enclosed correspondence is so bad that I believe M.I.T. should enter some kind of formal protest. The idea that scientists from the U.S.S.R. or any other country should visit M.I.T. under the sponsorship of the Commission of International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences on the condition that they “not be exposed to work there on nutritional research and possible production of food supplements” is so outrageous as to be incredible. If you prefer that I write, please let me know. Sincerely, Nevin S.Scrimshaw Institute Professor

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Scientific Communication and National Security MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Office of the Provost Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 January 20, 1982 Dr. Frank Press President National Academy of Sciences 2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418 Dear Frank: As I told you in our conversation yesterday, Professor Nevin Scrimshaw received a memoradum dated Dec. 3, 1981, from your program officer for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, relating to the visit of Dr. Gololobov from the U.S.S.R. The memorandum contained restrictions which we could neither accept nor enforce if accepted. These restrictions required that Dr. Gololobov should not be exposed to work on nutritional research, food supplement production, or any research sponsored by DOD. As I am sure you agree, these conditions are inconsistent with the spirit and practice of a university as an open community of scholars, teachers, and students. I hope that you will be able to persuade the State Department to agree to visits whose terms make university participation possible. The exchange program is valuable, and it is important to preserve it. Yours sincerely, Francis E.Low Provost cc: Dr. N.Scrimshaw FEL: mcs