Below are the first 10 and last 10 pages of uncorrected machine-read text (when available) of this chapter, followed by the top 30 algorithmically extracted key phrases from the chapter as a whole.
Intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text on the opening pages of each chapter.
Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
Do not use for reproduction, copying, pasting, or reading; exclusively for search engines.
OCR for page 15
2
Public Concerns
There exists a long and extensive legacy of disputes over
the siting of facilities, both public and private (Popper
1981, Seley 1983). Various public groups have objected
to gas stations, airports, highways, group homes (com-
munity residences for the mentally retarded), recombinant
DNA laboratories, and, of course, nuclear power plants.
During the past decade, the list of controversial facil-
ities appears to have expanded. It is evident that a
waste repository will engender strong reaction from local
public groups, independent of the reactions, both in
support and opposition, of official government entities
In siting some types of facilities, a low-profile or
Machiavellian approach has worked in the past. Particu-
larly notable is the group home, which was rarely opposed
when first introduced but is now subject to predictable
controversy. Estimates range from a 30 percent to a 75
percent rate of rejection for proposed group homes,
despite little evidence of any real harm to host com-
munities (Seley 1983).
Power plants, too, underwent a cycle of acceptance
prior to the Three Mile Island accident and subsequent
public response. In the few instances involving commer-
cial high-level radioactive waste, efforts to search for
sites have been subject to controversy. It is apparent
that any effort to find a site for a repository (or
repositories) will engender a range of concerns that must
be addressed if siting is to proceed without undue delay
and social disruption. This is a conclusion based on
both historical evidence and the demands of societal
equanimity.
This chapter has four objectives: (1) to assess the
trends and characteristics of public concerns about the
management of radioactive wastes, (2) to evaluate the
15
OCR for page 16
16
adequacy of current scientific understanding of these
public concerns, (3) to examine critically the hypotheses
that have been put forth to explain patterns of public
concerns, and (4) to note the major limitations of the
data base and methodology for current understanding and
inferences.
THE DATA BASE
This section examines the various subsets of the data
base available for assessing the attitudes of the general
public and some of the major characteristics of public
response. Later in the chapter we address the limitations
to both the data and the methods for making inferences
from them. Inasmuch as the problem of isolating radio-
active wastes has been a matter of public concern for
less than a decade, it is not surprising that social
science research on public response to the problem is
also of recent vintage. Government agencies have funded
extensive research on the technical issues of waste
isolation, but far less funding has supported investiga-
Lions of the social issues raised by nuclear power.
Hence, the data base for assessing the attitudes of the
general public has a number of deficiencies. Neverthe-
less, there exists a sizable amount of past work that, if
tapped judiciously, can suggest major characteristics of
public response.
Several collections of relevant public opinion polls
have appeared in Public Opinion Quarterly (Erskine 1963,
de Boer 1977).
In 1978 the Battelle Human Affairs
Research Centers published a comprehensive overview of
more than 100 national, state, and areawide polls and
surveys dealing with public attitudes on nuclear power
(Melber et al. 1977). This overview was subsequently
updated by the Battelle group to include polls and
surveys taken from 1977 through the summer of 1979
(Melber et al. 1979). For the past decade, national
polling agencies such as Cambridge Reports, Opinion
Research Corporation, Louis Harris and Associates, and,
more recently, the Gallup Poll, have regularly sampled
opinion on nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Finally,
Robert Cameron Mitchell of Resources for the Future has
carefully appraised the various surveys of nuclear power
(Mitchell 1978, 1980).
A second body of data consists of psychometric studies
conducted by Decision Research Inc., by the International
OCR for page 17
17
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and by
the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific
Research. Decision Research Inc. has asked people to
make judgments about risky technologies and activities,
to rate their risks and benefits on as many as 18
different risk attributes (e.g., newness, severity of
consequence), and to state their preferences for risk
reduction (or "acceptable" risk). Nuclear power has been
included in the studies, along with some 29 (recently
broadened to 93) other technologies and activities.
Three groups of subjects--college students, a local
chapter of the League of Women Voters, and a local
businessmen's organization--have given answers so far.
Decision Research has also asked college students to
write scenarios of the maximum credible nuclear power
disaster that might occur during their lifetimes. The
work of Vlek and Stallen (in press) and of Stallen and
Thomas (1981) is similar to that of Decision Research but
has involved a representative sample of the population of
the greater Rotterdam area. Scholars at IIASA have
utilized an attitude formation model to inquire into
public beliefs about nuclear power, obtaining the views
of energy experts, a heterogeneous sample of the Austrian
population, and participants in a nuclear energy refer-
endum in the United States (Otway et al. 1978).
A third collection of studies has used clinical
methods to explore personal fears and emotional responses
to nuclear energy. Prominent among these are the works
of Robert Jay Lifton, which include Death in Life (1968)
and The Broken Connection (1979), based on interviews of
the survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Psycho-
logical analysis has also been conducted by Pahner (1976),
who reviewed behavioral literature, press reports, inter-
views, and public demonstrations at reactor facilities to
identify the conscious and unconscious fears that influ-
ence public attitudes to nuclear power. Robert L. DuPont
(The Media Institute 1980) has analyzed the news media
handling of nuclear power issues, while others have
examined the attitudes of media representatives (Rothman
and Lichter 1982). Recent studies of psychological
stress in the people who live near the Three Mile Island
nuclear plant have provided additional empirical data on
public fear and anxiety (U.S. President's Commission on
the Accident at Three Mile Island 1979, Bromet 1980,
Houts et al. 1980).
There have also been a number of public votes on
nuclear power issues. In 1976 there were unsuccessful
OCR for page 18
18
referenda in California and six other states aimed at
restricting nuclear power. The California referendum,
defeated by a 2-1 margin, has been the subject of several
detailed analyses tGroth and Schutz 1976, Hensler and
Hensler 1979). Questions involving nuclear power appeared
on 1980 ballots in an additional six states, and nuclear
waste was a primary issue in all but one. Voters approved
three and rejected three of these initiatives.
Organized political activity on nuclear energy has
been examined as part of the broader study of political
interest groups. Energy and environmental groups differ
markedly from interest groups whose principal motive is
economic interest in government decisions (McFarland 1976,
Berry 1977). Both staff and member-supporters place high
value on influencing public policy per se rather than mea-
suring success in immediately tangible economic terms.
These "public interest" groups have organized success-
fully around both promotion of and opposition to nuclear
power.
Antinuclear groups have used a variety of means,
including ballot initiatives and protest and civil
disobedience (Nelkin 1981a, 1981b). How these means are
selected through the internal decision processes of these
and other protest groups is not well understood (Lipsky
1968), although Berry (1977) and Douglas and Wildavsky
(1982) agree that the internal structure and dynamics of
voluntary groups shape their public positions signifi-
cantly (see also Wilson 1973, Chaps. 13 and 14).
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attentlon has also been pale to pUbllC attitudes to
nuclear power in a number of other societies. Poll data
comparable with those in the United States are available
for a number of other countries (see, for example, Greer-
Wooten and Mitson 1976, Renn 1981). Nelkin (1977), Nelkin
and Pollock (1981), Zinberg (1982), and Paige and asso-
ciates (1980) have provided comparative overviews of the
nuclear controversy, public information campaigns, and
public reaction in European countries.
The data base, nonetheless, is uneven, as discussed
below.
THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC CONCERNS
Public attitudes to civilian uses of nuclear power were
generally positive until the last decade. Generally,
there was little concern prior to the late 1950s about
the risks posed by the few reactors in operation. There
OCR for page 19
19
was, to be sure, considerable concern over the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and substantial public support
for efforts to limit them (Erskine 1963). There was also
concern over the dangers of atmospheric fallout of radio-
activity from the testing of nuclear weapons (Kraus et
al. 1963, Kopp 1979).
As the debate over the dangers of fallout continued,
the press began to report incidents that raised questions
about the safety of nuclear power (Figure 2.1): an acci-
dent at Sylvania Electrical Products in New York, control
problems at the Argonne National Laboratory reactor, an
accident at an experimental military reactor in Idaho,
and the Windscale accident in Great Britain. In 1957 the
AEC published its first major report (WASH-740) on safety,
citing the potentially catastrophic consequences of a
major reactor accident unless strict protective measures
were engineered, and Congress debated federal insurance
for nuclear power plants. This attention to nuclear
power plant safety coincided with the intense debate over
fallout, suggesting that media attention to nuclear
safety was related to the widespread anxiety over fallout
(Mazur 1975).
An early test of public sentiment toward nuclear waste
occurred in a 1960 survey of attitudes on the siting of
the Indian Point reactor, which revealed that 57 percent
of respondents felt confident that waste isolation was
safe and only 13 percent had some questions (Rankin and
Nealey 1978, p. 112). A national survey by the Sind-
linger Company in the same year found that none of the
respondents who opposed nuclear power gave waste manage-
ment problems as a reason (Rankin and Nealey 1978, p.
112).
Nuclear power was not a major political issue during
most of the 1960s. However, there were protests over the
construction of some individual nuclear power plants, and
in 1968 the environmental movement revived dormant public
concerns over nuclear power and elicited new ones as
well. At first the focus was largely on possible adverse
environmental impacts, particularly thermal pollution.
During the 1970s, however, public attention shifted from
environmental to safety issues, prompted by such incidents
as the leaking of radioactive wastes from storage tanks
at the Hanford Reservation in Washington State in 1973.
In 1974, a survey by Opinion Research Corporation found
that 52 percent of the respondents believed that waste
management was a serious problem. That was more than the
combined percentages of respondents who cited radiation,
nuclear accidents, and thermal pollution as concerns.
OCR for page 20
20
550
500
450
400
ce
o
350
2
me
Z 300
cr
6
cam
6 250
J
-
~ 200
o
UJ
m
~150
At
100
50
Three Mile Island
Environmental Impact
Study
WindsCale AEC Safety Rept.
Accident (Wash. 740)
Enrico Fermi \/{ Price Anderson Act
Plant Accident / \ Bodega Head 8<
`,J \ Ravenswood
`~\ t__ Idaho
Accident
Chalk River
Ace ident
~1
G.E. Managers Resign
Browns Ferry F i re |~\
ECCS Hearings I,/ \
Rasmussen Report Am/
(Wash 1 40n} 1
BY " ~
O . , , 1
1945 1950 1955 1960 1 965 1970 1975 1980
YEAR
1 1
FIGURE 2.1 Media concern as indicated by attention in
The New York Times. Source: updated from R. A. Kasper son.
1980. The dark side of the radioactive waste problem.
P. 159 in Progess in Resource Management and Environmental
Planning, T. O'Riordan and K. Turner, eds. New York:
Wiley, 1980), Chap. 6, p. 159.
OCR for page 21
21
Waste issues continued to rank at or near the top of
public concerns over nuclear power during the latter half
of the 1970s, and state and local governments began to
pass laws restricting the use of their areas for disposal.
Meanwhile, public support for nuclear power waned tde
Boer 1977). The long-term impacts of the accident at
Three Mile Island (Figure 2.2) are not yet apparent but
are likely to include some loss of enthusiasm among sup-
porters of nuclear power and the movement of more people
into opposition (Mitchell 1980, pp. 18-19). Since 1978,
Harris polls have found respondents opposed by nearly 2-1
majorities to nuclear plants being built within 5 miles
of their homes. A 1980 Harris poll also found that a
majority of the public continued to support nuclear power,
but more than 8 of every 10 respondents believed that
fundamental changes in regulation were needed to keep the
risks of nuclear power Within tolerable limits" (Marsh
and McLennan 1980, p. 39). Moreover, a Resources for the
Future survey in 1980 found that nuclear power stood at
the bottom of the public's list of preferred energy
sources. Thus, if the high level of concern about radio-
active wastes persists public acceptance will be a
difficult goal to achieve for any large-scale waste
management program.
DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF PUBLIC CONCERN
Public opinion about nuclear power varies according to
certain characteristics. The most noteworthy difference
is that between men and women. Polls and surveys have
revealed a consistent tendency for women to be more uncer-
tain about or opposed to nuclear energy than men are.
The 1977 Battelle review, for example, found that among
men the mean support for nuclear power was 65 percent, as
compared with 46 percent among women. Polls conducted
after the accident at Three Mile Island suggest that it
may have further widened these sex differences. The
Cambridge Reports opinion polls indicate that these sex
differences also extend to opinions on nuclear waste,
with women significantly less confident than men that the
problem can be solved (Rankin and Nealey 1978, p. 116).
A Rand Corporation study of the California nuclear
referendum revealed sex to be one of the few demographic
factors that correlated significantly with nuclear
attitude (Hensler and Hensler 1979). Another study,
which involved reinterviews with respondents to obtain
OCR for page 22
22
,
l r T
l l r
0 00
f-°~m
=~-
~. \
¢~/S I
\
~1
-i
_ jo
-1
_ e
_1
-jo
~_
!~-
C~
o
Z
o
Q
a)
~n
6
,
._
LL
r'
o
oo
,_
n
u)
_ C) oo
o
LL
toIt
CD /r
· I
Il
/
\
J\
,/~5,
V
1
im
!o,
I ~o
~ Z
!-
1 1 1 1 1
O O O O O Q O O O O
0 a) oo ~ca LO ~_
1N30U 3d
z
~ cn
1
._ CD
_ ~ ~
<: ~
1~m
·e
O
~5 ~
o
U]
n
~ U]
H
· ~
tQ · -
*
a,
~s ~
~ ~ o
3 ~ tn
o U]
U] ~
U]
~ ~ · -
a,
t) ~
3 u'
~ O .,1
o Q
c: ~ Q
~r1 C,)
·- n
~ a
Q ~, ~
C~ ·~
O
~ o
.,,
· -
· -
.o
,c
Q ~
P.
tQ U]
· - o
.
Q,
~ O
:r: 0
o
· `4
O
a; ~ s
C~ :
H O G
h ~ :~:
a,
~ Q
~ · -
~5
O ~
~ O
.., ..,
~ ~:
s
E~
U]
o
.,,
~: ~
.,,
s
o
~q
o~
~a
~ s
u] ~
c o
H
C)
.,.
C
o
~q
a,'
,0
W
S~
C
3
· -
~4
a) ~
C
o
s
C
o
U]
U]
a
1n
o
U]
~q
aJ
· -
U]
~
~n
cn
H
.,'
~:
S
E~
JJ
tQ
o
OCR for page 23
23
their views about a nuclear waste facility in New York
State, found that exposure to the controversy that
surrounded it increased negative attitudes among women
but not among men (Mazur and Conant 1978). Studies of
the Three Mile Island accident also indicate higher levels
of continuing psychological stress in mothers of young
children (Bromet 1980). The contrast between the sexes
is all the more striking given that it appears to be
independent of other socioeconomic factors and that recent
polls have shown few differences between the sexes in
their attitudes to environmental issues (U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality 1980, p. 29).
A prime ingredient in this differential response is
concern over the catastrophic releases of radioactivity
from nuclear plants. All recent polls reveal that women
are significantly more concerned (and uncertain) about
nuclear power than are men. Even the stated uncertainty
may mask latent concern; the woman who is "not sure" may
actually be signifying dissent (Duncan 1978). The common
but erroneous belief that nuclear plants can explode like
nuclear weapons may also play a role, for it is known
that women across a variety of cultures are less prone to
violence and more concerned about loss of life than men
are (Setlow and Steinem 1973, Steinem 1972). One study,
using free-association questions, found women signifi-
cantly more fearful than men that nuclear plants might
"explode n and more concerned about the long-term effects
of radiation (Kasperson et al. 1980). A survey of 1,004
Massachusetts residents found that women were opposed to
nuclear power not because they were less knowledgeable or
because they harbored antitechnological values but rather
because they felt more concern about safety and moral
questions rather than about economic growth (Reed and
Wilkes 1980a). One analysis of women's magazines and the
feminist press has concluded that the genetic effects of
radiation on women and, hence, on future generations
particularly influence the concerns of women (Nelkin
1981a). While considerable evidence exists of a differ-
ential response between the sexes, however, a searching
and authoritative explanation has not yet been
forthcoming.
Other demographic correlates of concern about nuclear
power and nuclear wastes are less well understood.
Younger persons (those under 30) are more likely to
oppose nuclear power than are older persons. Correla-
tions with education and income tend to be ambivalent or
inconsistent. Some survey results indicate that more
OCR for page 24
24
highly educated and higher income groups support nuclear
power, whereas others provide contrary results or show no
significant association. In their review of polls on
nuclear wastes, Rankin and Nealey found few differences
related to education and income on the question of whether
such wastes "are too dangerous" to produce, although they
did find a greater tendency for low income and less
educated respondents to be unsure.
Despite the polarization over nuclear power in the
scientific community and the extensive media coverage of
nuclear issues, the public has largely refused to join
either side. A national survey In 'H78, in fact, revealed
that only 2 percent of the respondents were active Dar
-
ticipants in the controversy over nuclear energy, with
another 27 percent sympathetic and 21 percent unsympa-
thetic to the antinuclear movement (Mitchell 1978, p. 5).
The remaining 44 percent of those polled defined them-
selves as neutral. This division contrasts with the
larger active public participation in and support for the
environmental movement as a whole (Figure 2.3). Mass
public support for environmental activism does not imply
similar support for antinuclear activism (Mitchell 1980).
The Three Mile Island accident appears to have had
only a marginal impact on public sentiment, increasing
the active segment from 2 to 4 Percent and the svmn~th-t i
from 27 to 29 percent
.
These changes, however, are
balanced by an increase in the unsympathetic from 21 to
26 percent (Mitchell 1980), and attitudes m~v Nat van
have stabilized.
~ - ~ r ~ _ I,, ~,~ a_ ~ = it_
Thus' while several small minorities
are active in supporting or opposing nuclear power/ the
broad middle of the public, while certainly wary of
nuclear power and more positive toward other energy
sources, thus far remains uncommitted.
Finally, an apparent difference of opinion exists
between technical experts on the one hand and the lay
public and public officials on the other. Technical
experts tend to see high-level waste management as a more
solvable problem than do members of the public. This
difference in attitude has been demonstrated by research
at Battelle (Maynard et al. 1976) and is also apparent in
the different responses of the business and regulatory
communities in the 1980 Marsh and McClennan national poll
on risk (Table 2.1). These results suggest that technical
experts may underestimate the degree and misperceive the
reasons for public concerns.
OCR for page 25
25
Z~
lo
O I_
Z ~
UJ LU
~ To
r-
.,:
.o ~4, ~
Z Q _
C O
._ ~
6
J
Z
' Z
Z ~
I o
1~ ~
o
1 ~
1 to
C" ._
~-
._ ~
C) 4_
._ ~
. ~
A _
~In
. _
6
~ a, °
Z ~4-
Q '
~O
O ~
·,1 o
A
10 ~
3
hi
~ ·.
O
Sit
U)
. -
at at
U)
V
O ~
Q
,.
U]
v ~
. - - l
~ s
3 V
,'
£
O ~
~ O
O
U]
tr;
P
C'
H O
~ CQ
00
a,
SJ
~
o
z
1
S"
Q
~n
-
o
~D
o
z
~n
V
o
U]
a)
~;
OCR for page 37
37
1 ' ' ' ' ' 1
0
._
-
-
o
-
._
0
x
~ ~/
o
~n
-
J
~ .//
e{_ _r 1 1 1 1,
~8V ~ ~ ~ 2
j\ c~
1ii
o ~ ~ ~-
_ _ ~ o
~ ~ 8 ,- ~
~ _ .
== 0 - .
~ 0 0
,C tD 0 0
0 8 ., ~ _
c'. ~ ~ c .c
~ ~ ~ ~
--"' ~ E ~
10 0 tD
o ~ 0
e~',O=.0
O c ~ ~ c, E
a a ° ~ ~ 8
I
0)
0)
co
o,
~z ~
~ 0
c
0
a, ie
_
e
~ 41'
_
~ ~o
a)
- e
_ 0
_ _ ~
r~
_ _
17
0 ~
z o,
_
0
c~
u ~c~
N N
· - ~
~ ~N
r ~
N
~a:
0, N
CO
_
_ ~
r ~r~
o
N
O <0
N _
-
N
0)
C~
C~
40 ~
O UD
U'
~ cn
O C
o CO.O
~ E ~
CD (V ·-
co c cn
~ C .'
~:
(n
._
c
CO
Q
. E
o o
·Ct
E ~ .° g ~ ae ~ ~ ~ ~ '
.,,~~,~-.~-o~
_ 0 =c ~= =~_
:. 4' E ~ c 0 ~ a' ~ O ~ ~D ..
o ~ 0 E C. ~ ~ o o ~ o o, o
.,'
O
O
~n
Ll
O
· -
~
I_~ -~
a) 54
O .
z
~Q
U]
· -
U]
3
a
C
.,
a
V
C t.
C
O
· - .,'
C .,,
O
V o
. - V .V~
~ _I
Q Q
P.,
° a,'
U]
U]
o
UO
O
· .~1
· -
r
~ · -
OCR for page 38
38
that only scientists commanded "a great deal" of con-
fidence on nuclear power issues (58 percent), with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (39 percent), the President
of the United States (24 percent), the heads of electric
power companies (19 percent), and the companies that
produce equipment for nuclear power plants (12 percent)
lagging far behind (Harris & Associates, 1976, p. 29). A
1980 survey of Wisconsin residents revealed that most of
them did not believe that the government was moving fast
enough to solve the problem or was interested in what
local citizens thought about having a waste repository in
their community. These respondents ranked the federal
government behind the news media, university scientists,
and environmental groups, and just ahead of friends and
acquaintances, as the most reliable source of information
about nuclear wastes (Kelly 1980). The Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (1982, p. 31) also recently concluded
that "the greatest single obstacle that a successful
waste management program must overcome is the severe
erosion of public confidence in the Federal Government,
citing policy instability, the capacity of the federal
government to implement policy, and perceptions of
trustworthiness (pp. 31-34).
As inheritor of the Atomic Energy Commission's
difficulties in waste management, the Department of
Energy bears the burden of an unfortunate legacy. It is
not surprising that the Keystone Group, composed of
leading industry, environmental, and university repre-
sentatives, could quickly agree that DOE's lack of
credibility was a major obstacle to an effective waste
management program (Keystone Group 1978), or that a 1979
General Accounting Office report suggested creation of an
overall planning institution outside of DOE as a means of
fostering public acceptance (General Accounting Office
1979, p. 11). In this respect, current institutional
changes may provide some opportunities, an issue the
panel addresses in Chapter 6.
METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA-BASE LIMITATIONS
Despite this social research on public concerns about
nuclear energy, the body of knowledge developed thus far
is limited in two important ways in its utility to
administrative policymakers. First, in a democracy the
government's authority to control or shape public
behavior is subject to constitutional constraints. Even
OCR for page 39
39
if it were possible to predict political behavior accu-
rately and to change it at will, there would be legal and
political limits on the government's ability to bring
about those changes. Second, much social research is
limited by small sample size, often atypical sample pop-
ulations, and complexity of behavior. Research relevant
to public policy is only rarely amenable to controlled
experimentation, and the "natural experiments" provided
by governmental actions are rarely documented or con-
trolled well enough to permit clean inferences.
Risk psychology investigations have chosen to focus on
small, atypical sample populations in an effort to examine
the complex cognitive and affective processes at work.
While such studies have contributed to a richer scientific
understanding of how beliefs develop, their emphasis on
individuals' motivations do not yet allow unambiguous
analyses of organized social behavior, including reaction
to waste repository site selection.
Studies of political opposition to nuclear energy in
other nations face a problem of a different kind.
Behavior is affected by social and cultural setting, so
that patterns observed in one nation may not apply in
another. In addition, comparative studies face the
methodological difficulties of social research in general.
The emergence of the Green Party in the Federal Republic
of Germany as a significant electoral force, accordingly,
does not presage antinuclear candidacies in other elec-
toral systems--much less the success of such political
campaigns.
These limitations do not, of course invalidate com-
parative studies. Awareness of the relationship between
governmental structure (e.g., a parliamentary system in
the FRG) and political behavior (the possiblity of
successful single-issue parties) bears on the design of
decision processes. Moreover, both radioactive waste
management and antinuclear activism are international
activities, in which transfer of information across
national boundaries plays a significant role. Thus,
comparative studies are valuable as a form of intelligence
in the short run and as a source of basic understanding
for institutional design in the long term.
Studies of political action and polls estimating poten-
tial electoral response are based on relevant samples:
political action involves the self-selected fraction of
the population that chooses to participate, and opinion
polls rest on solid statistical foundations. This con-
siderable strength is tempered, however, by problems in
OCR for page 40
40
the reliability of the data and the legitimacy of policy
inferences based on the data.
The history of opposition to nuclear energy itself
demonstrates the fluidity of the public agenda; the
concept that the attention span of mass societies is
limited has been developed in some detail by political
scientists (Downs 1972, Cobb and Elder 1976, Berry
1977). Ballot initiatives in several states have shown
considerable (if declining) support for nuclear power,
but more detailed inferences are harder to establish.
The wording of referenda varies from place to place, as
do margins of victory, voter turnout, and the collateral
effects of other items on the ballot.
Demonstrations and civil disobedience exhibit even
larger variations. All are energized by particular
facilities, and their organizers seek to take advantage
of favorable circumstances such as weather or the opening
of the school year (a time when students can be more
easily recruited). Yet these regularities serve to
underscore the irregular nature of these events, and thus
the unpredictability of their occurrence. Finally, their
unpredictability as events is a major element of their
power as a medium of social expression. The threat of
violence, in particular, commands media attention.
Opinion polls, perhaps the most highly validated of
these measures, also face significant problems of method.
Re-interviewing the same persons over a period of time
(panel studies) demonstrates that opinion-poll responses
change substantially over time, for reasons that are
poorly explained. In part, instability of opinion esti
mates is caused by differences in the wording of poll
questions and variation in respondents' understanding of
the wording. Mitchell finds that changes of up to 40
percentage points result from changes in the wording of
questions about nuclear power plants and their safety
(Mitchell 1980, p. 12).
These questions about the quality of political data
are compounded by problems of interpretation. The repub-
lican framework of American government accords funda-
mental legitimacy to voters and those whom the voters
elect as representatives. The repeated affirmations of
support for nuclear power, in Congress and the Executive
Branch and in state referenda, have therefore set the
directions of public policy. The rise of controversy has
nonetheless led to major adaptations of public policy--a
measure of the responsiveness of the American political
-
process.
OCR for page 41
41
Despite the clear power of the majority, the history
and current texture of American government is replete
with instances in which well-organized minorities with
intensely held beliefs have influenced the public agenda
and the action of government. Studies of antinuclear
groups and their activities provide measures of the inten-
sity of opposition. The prominence of the nuclear con-
troversy is due in part to the success of this minority
in raising its concerns among the wider public and within
the institutions of government. Moreover, the trend of
opposition and its success within government may be lead-
ing indicators of the challenges to be faced in reposi-
tory siting.
It remains difficult, however, to convert these general
observations into specific qualitative inferences, much
less make quantitative estimates. Political action is
Eve` fill ", ~ "1~ a =~, c; 1nnovaclOn and competition matter
(Hirschman 1970). The competition ranges over many dif-
ferent dimensions, and there is no simple measure of
effectiveness or figure of merit with which to keep score.
Indeed, the emergence of quality of life and the ever-
lower expectations of acceptable risk reflect innovation
in the dimensions along which competition takes place.
Because they are widely used in electoral strategy,
opinion polls illustrate the problems of interpretation
and legitimacy with special clarity. Social scientists
have debated the significance of opinion polls for sev-
eral decades (Roll et al. 1972, Bennett 1977). The
portrait of the American voter remains controversial in
ways that bear directly on complex policy matters such as
radioactive waste: how stable are attitudes? How well
informed are they? How are they affected by social set-
ting? While there is a rough consensus among political
scientists and sociologists on these questions, it has
been a difficult one to win and sustain in the face of
new findings. In the judgment of the panel, extending
the conclusions of this body of research to policy
applications in repository siting is of doubtful merit.
More pragmatically, survey data seem to be in a state of
flux, with evidence that the molar; Pv ~,nnnrh for ^~] ^~'
energy is eroding.
These imperfections in quality of social scientific
data, the scientific interpretation of them, and the use
of social science in governance all limit the policy
applicability of studies of public concerns. The panel
is mindful, however, of the risk that these caveats may
lead to the conclusion that social research is useless in
repository siting. The reverse is true.
W~ ~ ~ _ _ _ ~
~J ~ _ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
OCR for page 42
/
42
The diversity of research methods that has been applied
to analyzing public concerns leads to qualitative findings
that are robust and that merit careful attention in the
siting of nuclear waste repositories
FINDINGS
.
1. While electoral, legislative, and administrative
behavior in the United States have historically demon-
strated substantial support for the economic benefits of
nuclear power, over the past 15 years (and particularly
since 1979) this support has weakened significantly at
all three levels. In the same period, an articulate
organized opposition has emerged, one with support among
a significant minority of the population.
2. There is widespread perception that nuclear energy
entails risks to health and safety. This perception is
exacerbated by the fact that most public groups do not
distinguish clearly between the risks of nuclear weaponry
and nuclear power plants. The extent to which fear over
nuclear weapons enters into attitudes on nuclear wastes
is difficult to pinpoint, but it is undoubtedly an element
in the formation of public opinion. Concern over cata-
strophic accidents in nuclear power plants adds to these
fears of technology.
3. The level of knowledge about nuclear power and
radioactive wastes remains low among the general public.
This limited knowledge, however, does not explain the
high level of concern. It is uncertain whether greater
amounts of information would reduce or increase public
concern, but improved public understanding of waste
management problems is a central need for developing an
informed public policy and a socially acceptable manage-
ment program.
4. Public concern and the perception of threat are
exacerbated by mistrust of government in general and by
the appearance of secrecy or desire to exclude the public
from governmental decisions about radioactive waste and
repository siting.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2
Bennett, W. L. 1977. The growth of knowledge in mass
belief studies: an epistemological critique. American
Journal of Political Science 21:465-500.
OCR for page 43
43
Berry, J. 1977. Lobbying for the People. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Bromet, E. 1980. Three Mile Island: Mental Health
Findings Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, School
of Medicine.
Clelland, D., and M. Bremseth. 1977. Student reactions
to breeder reactors. Paper presented at the Annual
Meetings, American Sociological Association, Chicago,
September.
Cobb, R., and C. Elder. 1976. Participation in American
Politics.
Press.
Commoner, B.
Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
1969. The myth of omnipotence: the hidden
costs or nuclear power. Environment 11:8-13, 26-28.
de Boer, C. 1977. The polls: nuclear energy. Public
Opinion Quarterly 41:402-411.
del Sesto, S. 1980. Conflicting ideologies of nuclear
power: congressional testimony on nuclear reactor
safety. Public Policy 28:39-70.
Douglas, M., and A. Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Downs, A. 1972. Up and down with ecology: the
issue-attention cycle. Public Interest 28:38-50,
Summer.
Duncan, O.
nuclear
Ebbin, S., and R. Rasper. 1974. Citizen Groups and the
Nuclear Power Controversy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
Erskine, H. G. 1963. The polls: atomic weapons and
nuclear energy. Public Opinion Quarterly 27:155-190.
Firebaugh, M. W. 1981. Public attitudes and information
on the nuclear option. Nuclear Safety 22:147-156.
Fischhoff, B., P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read, and
B. Combs. 1978. How safe is safe enough? A
psychometric study of attitudes toward technological
risks and benefits. Policy Sciences 8:127-152.
General Accounting Office. 1979. The Nation's Nuclear
Waste--Proposals for Organization and Siting.
EMD-79-77. Washington, D.C.
Green, H. 1975. The risk benefit calculus in safety
determinations. George Washington Law Review
43:791-804.
Greer-Wooten, B., and L. Mitson. 1976. Nuclear Power
and the Canadian Public. Institute for Behavioral
Research, York University, Toronto.
D. 1978. Sociologists should
energy. Social Forces 57:1-22.
reconsider
OCR for page 44
44
Groth, A. J., and H. G. Schutz. 1976. Voter Attitudes
on the 1976 Nuclear Initiative in California.
Environmental Quality Series, No. 25. Institute of
Governmental Studies, University of California, Davis,
December.
Harris, Louis, & Associates. 1976. A Second Survey of
Public and Leadership Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power
Development in the United States. Summary, N.Y.:
Ebasco Services.
Hensler, D. R., and C. P. Hensler. 1979. Evaluating
Nuclear Power: Other Choice on the California Nuclear
Energy Initiative. R-2341. Santa Monica, Calif.:
Rand Corporation.
Hirschman, A. O. 1970.
Exit, Voice and Loyalty.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Houts, P., R. Miller, G. Tokuhata, and K. Ham. 1980.
Health-Related Behavioral Impact of the Three Mile
Island Nuclear Incident. Report submitted to the TMI
Advisory Panel on Health Research Studies of the
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Department of Health.
Kasper son, R., G. Berk, D. Pijawka, A. B. Sharaf, and J.
Wood. 1980. Public opposition to nuclear energy:
retrospect and prospect. Science, Technology, and
Human Values 5:11-23.
Kelly, J. E. 1980. Testimony on Behalf of the State of
Wisconsin Regarding the Statement of Position of the
United States Department of Energy in the Matter of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Storage and Disposal of
Nuclear Waste, Docket No. PR 50-51. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Keystone Group. 1978. Letter to Frank Press, September
19.
Kopp, C. 1979. The origins of the American scientific
debate over fallout hazards. Social Studies of
Science 9:403-422.
Kraus, S., R. Mehlina. and E. El-Assal. 1963. Mass
Public Opinion
media and the fallout controversy.
Quarterly 27: 191-205.
Lifton, R. J. 1967. Death in Life: Survivors of
Hiroshima. New York: Random House.
Lifton, R. J. 1976. Nuclear energy and the wisdom of
the body. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 32:16-20.
Lifton, R. J. 1979. The Broken Connection: On Death and
the Continuity of Life. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Lipsky, M. J. 1968. Protest as a political resource.
The American Political Science Review 62:1144-1158.
OCR for page 45
45
Marsh and McClennan. 1980. Risk in a Complex Society.
A Marsh McClennan Public Opinion Survey Conducted by
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. Summary, N.Y.:
Ebasco Services.
Maynard, W. S., S. M. Nealey, J. A. Hibert, and M. K.
Lindell. 1976. Public Values Associated with Nuclear
Waste Disposal. Seattle, Wash.: Battelle Memorial
Institute, Human Affairs Research Centers.
Mazur, A. 1975. Opposition to technological
innovation. Minerva 13:58-81.
Mazur, A., and B. Conant. 1978. Controversy over a
local nuclear waste repository. Social Studies of
Science 8:235-243.
McFarland, A. 1976. Public-Interest Lobbies: Decision
Making on Energy. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute.
The Media Institute. 1980. Nuclear Phobia--Phobic
Thinking about Nuclear Power: A Discussion with Robert
L. DuPont, M.D. Washington, D.C.: The Institute.
Melber, B. D., S. M. Nealey, J. Hammersla, and W. L.
Rankin. 1977. Nuclear Power and the Public: Analysis
of Collected Survey Research. U.S. DOE Report
PN2-2430. Seattle, Wash.: Battelle Memorial
Institute, Human Affairs Research Centers.
Melber, B. D., S. M. Nealey, A. Weiss, and W. L. Rankin.
1979. Nuclear Power and the Public: Update of
Collected Survey Research. Draft. Seattle, Wash.:
Battelle Memorial Institute, Human Affairs Research
Centers.
Mitchell, R. C. 1978. The public speaks again: a new
environmental survey. Resources 60,
September-November.
Mitchell, R. C. 1980. Polling on nuclear power: a
critique of the polls after three mile island. Pp.
66-98 in Polling on the Issues, A. H. Cantris, ed.
Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press.
National Council of Churches. 1979. Energy and Ethics.
New York.
National Research Council. 1979. Energy in Transition,
1985-2010. Committee on Nuclear and Alternative
Energy Sources. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of
Sciences.
Nealey, S. M., and W. L. Rankin. 1978. Nuclear
Knowledge and Nuclear Attitudes: Is Ignorance Bliss?
Seattle, Wash.: Battelle Memorial Institute, Human
Affairs Research Centers.
OCR for page 46
46
Nelkin, D. 1977. Technological Decisions and Democracy:
European Experiments in Public Participation. Beverly
Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Nelkin, D. 1981a. Nuclear power as a feminist issue.
Environment 23:14-20, 38-39.
Nelkin, D. 1981b. Anti-nuclear connections: power and
weapons. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37:36-40.
Nelkin, D., and M. Pollack. 1981. The Atom Beseiged:
Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Office of Technology Assessment. 1982. Managing
Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste.
Washington, D.C.
Otway, H., D. Maurer, and K. Thomas. 1978.
power: the question of public acceptance.
10:109-118.
Pahner, P. D. 1976. A Psychological Perspective of the
Nuclear Energy Controversy. RM-76-67. Laxenburg,
Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis.
Paige, H., D. S. Lipman, and J. E. Owens. 1980.
Assessment of National Systems for Obtaining Local
Acceptance of Waste Management Siting and Routing
Activities. International Energy Associates Limited,
Washington, D.C.
Popper, F. J. 1981. Siting LULU's. Planning 47:12-15,
April.
Rankin, W. L., and S. M. Nealey.
public about nuclear wastes. Nuclear News 21:112-117.
Reed, J. H., and J. M. Wilkes. 1980a. Sex and attitudes
toward nuclear power. Paper delivered to the Annual
Meetings, American Sociological Association, August.
Reed, J. H., and J. M. Wilkes. 1980b. Nuclear knowledge
and nuclear attitudes: an examination of informed
opinion (unpublished paper).
Renn, O. 1981. Man. Technology and Risk: A Study on
.
Summary.
Nuclear
Futures
1978. Attitudes of the
Intuitive Risk Assessment and Attitudes towards
Nuclear Energy. Julich, West Germany:
Kernforschungsanl~ge Julich.
Roberts, R. 1975. Public acceptance of nuclear
energy--the government's role. Speech to the Atomic
Industrial Forum, San Francisco, 29 November.
Roll, Jr., C. W., and A. H. Cantril. 1972. Polls: Their
Use and Misuse in Politics. New York: Basic Books.
Rothman, S., and S. R. Lichter. 1982. The nuclear
energy debate: scientists, the media and the public.
Public Opinion 5:47-52, August/September.
OCR for page 47
47
Seley, J. E. 1983. The Politics of Public Facility
Planning. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co.
Setlow, L., and G. Steinem. 1973. Why women voted for
Richard Nixon? Ms Magazine 2:66-67, 109-110.
Slovic, P., S. Lichtenstein, and B. Fischhoff. 1979.
Images of disaster: perception and acceptance of risks
from nuclear power. In Energy Risk Management, G.
Goodman and W. Rowe, eds. London: Academic Press.
Stallen, P. J. M., and A. Thomas. 1981. Psychological
Aspects of Risk: The Assessment of Threat and
Control. Paper prepared for the International School
of Technological Risk Assessment, Erice-Sicily, 20-31
May.
Steinem, G. 1972. Women voters can't be trusted. Ms
Magazine 1:47-51, 131.
Sundstrom, E. P., E. J. Costimiris, D. A. DeVault, D. A.
Powell, J. W. Lounsbury, T .J. Mattingly, Jr., E. M.
Passino, and E. Peelle. 1977. Citizens' Views About
the Proposed Hartsville Nuclear Power Plant: A Survey
of Residents' Perceptions in August, 1975. Oak Ridge,
Tenn.: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. 1980. Public
Opinion on Environmental Issues: Results of a National
Opinion Survey. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1975. Reactor
Safety Study--An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. Wash-1400,
NUREG-75/014. Washington, D.C.
U.S. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile
Island. 1979. The Need for Change: The Legacy of
TMI. Washington, D.C.
Vlek, C. A. J., and P. J. M. Stallen. In press. Risk
perception in the small and in the large.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance.
Weinberg, A. 1972. Social institutions and nuclear
energy. Science. 177:27-34.
Wilson, J. Q. 1973. Political Organizations. New York:
Basic Books.
Zinberg, D. S. 1982. Public participation: U.S. and
european perspectives. Pp. 160-187 in The Politics of
Nuclear Waste, E. Colglazier, ed. New York: Pergamon
Press.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
public concerns
