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2 Public Concerns There exists a long and extensive legacy of disputes over the siting of facilities, both public and private (Popper 1981, Seley 1983). Various public groups have objected to gas stations, airports, highways, group homes (com- munity residences for the mentally retarded), recombinant DNA laboratories, and, of course, nuclear power plants. During the past decade, the list of controversial facil- ities appears to have expanded. It is evident that a waste repository will engender strong reaction from local public groups, independent of the reactions, both in support and opposition, of official government entities In siting some types of facilities, a low-profile or Machiavellian approach has worked in the past. Particu- larly notable is the group home, which was rarely opposed when first introduced but is now subject to predictable controversy. Estimates range from a 30 percent to a 75 percent rate of rejection for proposed group homes, despite little evidence of any real harm to host com- munities (Seley 1983). Power plants, too, underwent a cycle of acceptance prior to the Three Mile Island accident and subsequent public response. In the few instances involving commer- cial high-level radioactive waste, efforts to search for sites have been subject to controversy. It is apparent that any effort to find a site for a repository (or repositories) will engender a range of concerns that must be addressed if siting is to proceed without undue delay and social disruption. This is a conclusion based on both historical evidence and the demands of societal equanimity. This chapter has four objectives: (1) to assess the trends and characteristics of public concerns about the management of radioactive wastes, (2) to evaluate the 15
16 adequacy of current scientific understanding of these public concerns, (3) to examine critically the hypotheses that have been put forth to explain patterns of public concerns, and (4) to note the major limitations of the data base and methodology for current understanding and inferences. THE DATA BASE This section examines the various subsets of the data base available for assessing the attitudes of the general public and some of the major characteristics of public response. Later in the chapter we address the limitations to both the data and the methods for making inferences from them. Inasmuch as the problem of isolating radio- active wastes has been a matter of public concern for less than a decade, it is not surprising that social science research on public response to the problem is also of recent vintage. Government agencies have funded extensive research on the technical issues of waste isolation, but far less funding has supported investiga- Lions of the social issues raised by nuclear power. Hence, the data base for assessing the attitudes of the general public has a number of deficiencies. Neverthe- less, there exists a sizable amount of past work that, if tapped judiciously, can suggest major characteristics of public response. Several collections of relevant public opinion polls have appeared in Public Opinion Quarterly (Erskine 1963, de Boer 1977). In 1978 the Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers published a comprehensive overview of more than 100 national, state, and areawide polls and surveys dealing with public attitudes on nuclear power (Melber et al. 1977). This overview was subsequently updated by the Battelle group to include polls and surveys taken from 1977 through the summer of 1979 (Melber et al. 1979). For the past decade, national polling agencies such as Cambridge Reports, Opinion Research Corporation, Louis Harris and Associates, and, more recently, the Gallup Poll, have regularly sampled opinion on nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Finally, Robert Cameron Mitchell of Resources for the Future has carefully appraised the various surveys of nuclear power (Mitchell 1978, 1980). A second body of data consists of psychometric studies conducted by Decision Research Inc., by the International
17 Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and by the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research. Decision Research Inc. has asked people to make judgments about risky technologies and activities, to rate their risks and benefits on as many as 18 different risk attributes (e.g., newness, severity of consequence), and to state their preferences for risk reduction (or "acceptable" risk). Nuclear power has been included in the studies, along with some 29 (recently broadened to 93) other technologies and activities. Three groups of subjects--college students, a local chapter of the League of Women Voters, and a local businessmen's organization--have given answers so far. Decision Research has also asked college students to write scenarios of the maximum credible nuclear power disaster that might occur during their lifetimes. The work of Vlek and Stallen (in press) and of Stallen and Thomas (1981) is similar to that of Decision Research but has involved a representative sample of the population of the greater Rotterdam area. Scholars at IIASA have utilized an attitude formation model to inquire into public beliefs about nuclear power, obtaining the views of energy experts, a heterogeneous sample of the Austrian population, and participants in a nuclear energy refer- endum in the United States (Otway et al. 1978). A third collection of studies has used clinical methods to explore personal fears and emotional responses to nuclear energy. Prominent among these are the works of Robert Jay Lifton, which include Death in Life (1968) and The Broken Connection (1979), based on interviews of the survivors of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Psycho- logical analysis has also been conducted by Pahner (1976), who reviewed behavioral literature, press reports, inter- views, and public demonstrations at reactor facilities to identify the conscious and unconscious fears that influ- ence public attitudes to nuclear power. Robert L. DuPont (The Media Institute 1980) has analyzed the news media handling of nuclear power issues, while others have examined the attitudes of media representatives (Rothman and Lichter 1982). Recent studies of psychological stress in the people who live near the Three Mile Island nuclear plant have provided additional empirical data on public fear and anxiety (U.S. President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island 1979, Bromet 1980, Houts et al. 1980). There have also been a number of public votes on nuclear power issues. In 1976 there were unsuccessful
18 referenda in California and six other states aimed at restricting nuclear power. The California referendum, defeated by a 2-1 margin, has been the subject of several detailed analyses tGroth and Schutz 1976, Hensler and Hensler 1979). Questions involving nuclear power appeared on 1980 ballots in an additional six states, and nuclear waste was a primary issue in all but one. Voters approved three and rejected three of these initiatives. Organized political activity on nuclear energy has been examined as part of the broader study of political interest groups. Energy and environmental groups differ markedly from interest groups whose principal motive is economic interest in government decisions (McFarland 1976, Berry 1977). Both staff and member-supporters place high value on influencing public policy per se rather than mea- suring success in immediately tangible economic terms. These "public interest" groups have organized success- fully around both promotion of and opposition to nuclear power. Antinuclear groups have used a variety of means, including ballot initiatives and protest and civil disobedience (Nelkin 1981a, 1981b). How these means are selected through the internal decision processes of these and other protest groups is not well understood (Lipsky 1968), although Berry (1977) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) agree that the internal structure and dynamics of voluntary groups shape their public positions signifi- cantly (see also Wilson 1973, Chaps. 13 and 14). . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attentlon has also been pale to pUbllC attitudes to nuclear power in a number of other societies. Poll data comparable with those in the United States are available for a number of other countries (see, for example, Greer- Wooten and Mitson 1976, Renn 1981). Nelkin (1977), Nelkin and Pollock (1981), Zinberg (1982), and Paige and asso- ciates (1980) have provided comparative overviews of the nuclear controversy, public information campaigns, and public reaction in European countries. The data base, nonetheless, is uneven, as discussed below. THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC CONCERNS Public attitudes to civilian uses of nuclear power were generally positive until the last decade. Generally, there was little concern prior to the late 1950s about the risks posed by the few reactors in operation. There
19 was, to be sure, considerable concern over the develop- ment of nuclear weapons and substantial public support for efforts to limit them (Erskine 1963). There was also concern over the dangers of atmospheric fallout of radio- activity from the testing of nuclear weapons (Kraus et al. 1963, Kopp 1979). As the debate over the dangers of fallout continued, the press began to report incidents that raised questions about the safety of nuclear power (Figure 2.1): an acci- dent at Sylvania Electrical Products in New York, control problems at the Argonne National Laboratory reactor, an accident at an experimental military reactor in Idaho, and the Windscale accident in Great Britain. In 1957 the AEC published its first major report (WASH-740) on safety, citing the potentially catastrophic consequences of a major reactor accident unless strict protective measures were engineered, and Congress debated federal insurance for nuclear power plants. This attention to nuclear power plant safety coincided with the intense debate over fallout, suggesting that media attention to nuclear safety was related to the widespread anxiety over fallout (Mazur 1975). An early test of public sentiment toward nuclear waste occurred in a 1960 survey of attitudes on the siting of the Indian Point reactor, which revealed that 57 percent of respondents felt confident that waste isolation was safe and only 13 percent had some questions (Rankin and Nealey 1978, p. 112). A national survey by the Sind- linger Company in the same year found that none of the respondents who opposed nuclear power gave waste manage- ment problems as a reason (Rankin and Nealey 1978, p. 112). Nuclear power was not a major political issue during most of the 1960s. However, there were protests over the construction of some individual nuclear power plants, and in 1968 the environmental movement revived dormant public concerns over nuclear power and elicited new ones as well. At first the focus was largely on possible adverse environmental impacts, particularly thermal pollution. During the 1970s, however, public attention shifted from environmental to safety issues, prompted by such incidents as the leaking of radioactive wastes from storage tanks at the Hanford Reservation in Washington State in 1973. In 1974, a survey by Opinion Research Corporation found that 52 percent of the respondents believed that waste management was a serious problem. That was more than the combined percentages of respondents who cited radiation, nuclear accidents, and thermal pollution as concerns.
20 550 500 450 400 ce o 350 2 me Z 300 cr 6 cam 6 250 J - ~ 200 o UJ m ~150 At 100 50 Three Mile Island Environmental Impact Study WindsCale AEC Safety Rept. Accident (Wash. 740) Enrico Fermi \/{ Price Anderson Act Plant Accident / \ Bodega Head 8< `,J \ Ravenswood `~\ t__ Idaho Accident Chalk River Ace ident ~1 G.E. Managers Resign Browns Ferry F i re |~\ ECCS Hearings I,/ \ Rasmussen Report Am/ (Wash 1 40n} 1 BY " ~ O . , , 1 1945 1950 1955 1960 1 965 1970 1975 1980 YEAR 1 1 FIGURE 2.1 Media concern as indicated by attention in The New York Times. Source: updated from R. A. Kasper son. 1980. The dark side of the radioactive waste problem. P. 159 in Progess in Resource Management and Environmental Planning, T. O'Riordan and K. Turner, eds. New York: Wiley, 1980), Chap. 6, p. 159.
21 Waste issues continued to rank at or near the top of public concerns over nuclear power during the latter half of the 1970s, and state and local governments began to pass laws restricting the use of their areas for disposal. Meanwhile, public support for nuclear power waned tde Boer 1977). The long-term impacts of the accident at Three Mile Island (Figure 2.2) are not yet apparent but are likely to include some loss of enthusiasm among sup- porters of nuclear power and the movement of more people into opposition (Mitchell 1980, pp. 18-19). Since 1978, Harris polls have found respondents opposed by nearly 2-1 majorities to nuclear plants being built within 5 miles of their homes. A 1980 Harris poll also found that a majority of the public continued to support nuclear power, but more than 8 of every 10 respondents believed that fundamental changes in regulation were needed to keep the risks of nuclear power Within tolerable limits" (Marsh and McLennan 1980, p. 39). Moreover, a Resources for the Future survey in 1980 found that nuclear power stood at the bottom of the public's list of preferred energy sources. Thus, if the high level of concern about radio- active wastes persists public acceptance will be a difficult goal to achieve for any large-scale waste management program. DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF PUBLIC CONCERN Public opinion about nuclear power varies according to certain characteristics. The most noteworthy difference is that between men and women. Polls and surveys have revealed a consistent tendency for women to be more uncer- tain about or opposed to nuclear energy than men are. The 1977 Battelle review, for example, found that among men the mean support for nuclear power was 65 percent, as compared with 46 percent among women. Polls conducted after the accident at Three Mile Island suggest that it may have further widened these sex differences. The Cambridge Reports opinion polls indicate that these sex differences also extend to opinions on nuclear waste, with women significantly less confident than men that the problem can be solved (Rankin and Nealey 1978, p. 116). A Rand Corporation study of the California nuclear referendum revealed sex to be one of the few demographic factors that correlated significantly with nuclear attitude (Hensler and Hensler 1979). Another study, which involved reinterviews with respondents to obtain
22 , l r T l l r 0 00 f-°~m =~- ~. \ ¢~/S I \ ~1 -i _ jo -1 _ e _1 -jo ~_ !~- C~ o Z o Q a) ~n 6 , ._ LL r' o oo ,_ n u) _ C) oo o LL toIt CD /r · I Il / \ J\ ,/~5, V 1 im !o, I ~o ~ Z !- 1 1 1 1 1 O O O O O Q O O O O 0 a) oo ~ca LO ~_ 1N30U 3d z ~ cn 1 ._ CD _ ~ ~ <: ~ 1~m ·e O ~5 ~ o U] n ~ U] H · ~ tQ · - * a, ~s ~ ~ ~ o 3 ~ tn o U] U] ~ U] ~ ~ · - a, t) ~ 3 u' ~ O .,1 o Q c: ~ Q ~r1 C,) ·- n ~ a Q ~, ~ C~ ·~ O ~ o .,, · - · - .o ,c Q ~ P. tQ U] · - o . Q, ~ O :r: 0 o · `4 O a; ~ s C~ : H O G h ~ :~: a, ~ Q ~ · - ~5 O ~ ~ O .., .., ~ ~: s E~ U] o .,, ~: ~ .,, s o ~q o~ ~a ~ s u] ~ c o H C) .,. C o ~q a,' ,0 W S~ C 3 · - ~4 a) ~ C o s C o U] U] a 1n o U] ~q aJ · - U] ~ ~n cn H .,' ~: S E~ JJ tQ o
23 their views about a nuclear waste facility in New York State, found that exposure to the controversy that surrounded it increased negative attitudes among women but not among men (Mazur and Conant 1978). Studies of the Three Mile Island accident also indicate higher levels of continuing psychological stress in mothers of young children (Bromet 1980). The contrast between the sexes is all the more striking given that it appears to be independent of other socioeconomic factors and that recent polls have shown few differences between the sexes in their attitudes to environmental issues (U.S. Council on Environmental Quality 1980, p. 29). A prime ingredient in this differential response is concern over the catastrophic releases of radioactivity from nuclear plants. All recent polls reveal that women are significantly more concerned (and uncertain) about nuclear power than are men. Even the stated uncertainty may mask latent concern; the woman who is "not sure" may actually be signifying dissent (Duncan 1978). The common but erroneous belief that nuclear plants can explode like nuclear weapons may also play a role, for it is known that women across a variety of cultures are less prone to violence and more concerned about loss of life than men are (Setlow and Steinem 1973, Steinem 1972). One study, using free-association questions, found women signifi- cantly more fearful than men that nuclear plants might "explode n and more concerned about the long-term effects of radiation (Kasperson et al. 1980). A survey of 1,004 Massachusetts residents found that women were opposed to nuclear power not because they were less knowledgeable or because they harbored antitechnological values but rather because they felt more concern about safety and moral questions rather than about economic growth (Reed and Wilkes 1980a). One analysis of women's magazines and the feminist press has concluded that the genetic effects of radiation on women and, hence, on future generations particularly influence the concerns of women (Nelkin 1981a). While considerable evidence exists of a differ- ential response between the sexes, however, a searching and authoritative explanation has not yet been forthcoming. Other demographic correlates of concern about nuclear power and nuclear wastes are less well understood. Younger persons (those under 30) are more likely to oppose nuclear power than are older persons. Correla- tions with education and income tend to be ambivalent or inconsistent. Some survey results indicate that more
24 highly educated and higher income groups support nuclear power, whereas others provide contrary results or show no significant association. In their review of polls on nuclear wastes, Rankin and Nealey found few differences related to education and income on the question of whether such wastes "are too dangerous" to produce, although they did find a greater tendency for low income and less educated respondents to be unsure. Despite the polarization over nuclear power in the scientific community and the extensive media coverage of nuclear issues, the public has largely refused to join either side. A national survey In 'H78, in fact, revealed that only 2 percent of the respondents were active Dar - ticipants in the controversy over nuclear energy, with another 27 percent sympathetic and 21 percent unsympa- thetic to the antinuclear movement (Mitchell 1978, p. 5). The remaining 44 percent of those polled defined them- selves as neutral. This division contrasts with the larger active public participation in and support for the environmental movement as a whole (Figure 2.3). Mass public support for environmental activism does not imply similar support for antinuclear activism (Mitchell 1980). The Three Mile Island accident appears to have had only a marginal impact on public sentiment, increasing the active segment from 2 to 4 Percent and the svmn~th-t i from 27 to 29 percent . These changes, however, are balanced by an increase in the unsympathetic from 21 to 26 percent (Mitchell 1980), and attitudes m~v Nat van have stabilized. ~ - ~ r ~ _ I,, ~,~ a_ ~ = it_ Thus' while several small minorities are active in supporting or opposing nuclear power/ the broad middle of the public, while certainly wary of nuclear power and more positive toward other energy sources, thus far remains uncommitted. Finally, an apparent difference of opinion exists between technical experts on the one hand and the lay public and public officials on the other. Technical experts tend to see high-level waste management as a more solvable problem than do members of the public. This difference in attitude has been demonstrated by research at Battelle (Maynard et al. 1976) and is also apparent in the different responses of the business and regulatory communities in the 1980 Marsh and McClennan national poll on risk (Table 2.1). These results suggest that technical experts may underestimate the degree and misperceive the reasons for public concerns.
25 Z~ lo O I_ Z ~ UJ LU ~ To r- .,: .o ~4, ~ Z Q _ C O ._ ~ 6 J Z ' Z Z ~ I o 1~ ~ o 1 ~ 1 to C" ._ ~- ._ ~ C) 4_ ._ ~ . ~ A _ ~In . _ 6 ~ a, ° Z ~4- Q ' ~O O ~ ·,1 o A 10 ~ 3 hi ~ ·. O Sit U) . - at at U) V O ~ Q ,. U] v ~ . - - l ~ s 3 V ,' £ O ~ ~ O O U] tr; P C' H O ~ CQ 00 a, SJ ~ o z 1 S" Q ~n - o ~D o z ~n V o U] a) ~;
26 TABLE 2.1 Attitudes toward Nuclear Power Issues Top Corporate Investors/ Federal Executives Lenders Congress Regulators Public (Number of respondents) (402) (103) (47) (47) (1,488) ~% % Fundamental regulatory changes are necessary if the r isks of nuclear energy are to be kept w i th in tolerable 1 irnits Agree 47 57 81 72 84 Disagree 46 35 17 19 9 Not sure 7 8 . 2 9 7 The disposal of nuclear waste is a problem that can be solved in an acceptable way Agree Disagree Not sure Nuclear power is too dangerous to permit its cant inued expans ion 90 85 2 8 1 66 66 62 21 11 26 14 11 23 12 Agree 2 - 30 17 3 4 Disagree 98 98 70 72 59 Not sure - 2 - 11 7 SOURCE: Marsh and McClennan, Risk in a Complex Society, a Marsh and McClennan Public Opinion Survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 1980), p. 39. THE CAUSES OF PUBLIC CONCERN: ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES Speculation abounds as to the reasons for the evident public concern over nuclear power. Some see concern as the result of technical ignorance of the public and its inability to see nuclear power and waste issues in the context of other natural and technological risks. Some attribute the concern to a connection that people make between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Others point to a broad and growing public intolerance of technology. Still others believe that there are significant technical risks that have not been recognized by the proponents of nuclear power. Note that the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: more than one may be valid, and the effects may interact synergistically. In this section the various hypotheses that have been put forward to explain public concerns are examined in the light of existing data and analyses.
27 Public Ignorance Public concern over nuclear power, it has been argued (Firebaugh 1981), is largely a product of unfounded fears and misinformation. The recent report of the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Sources calls attention to this problem: The foremost of these [political and institutional] barriers is misunderstanding by the public of the nature of the problem. As evidenced by local hostility in many places to investigation of sites, it appears that the public is under the misappre- hension that waste management poses local, high- intensity risks, rather than (at worst) widespread, low-intensity risks (National Research Council 1979, p. 316). If public ignorance does indeed lie at the base of public concern, the democratic answer is surely that stated by a former Energy Research and Development Administration assistant administrator for nuclear energy: .. . . the best answer to the problem of public perception, public attitudes, is information . . . the more people understand about nuclear power, the more they tend to favor it. (Roberts 1975). It is clear that the general public has limited knowl- edge of nuclear power and radioactive wastes. Various surveys of public attitudes prior to the Three Mile Island accident revealed that most people possessed little factual knowledge of nuclear power (Melber et al. 1977). A 1978 survey of Washington state residents, for example, found that most respondents had little knowledge of the origins and forms of waste or of their decay over time (Nealey and Rankin 1978). In a Massachusetts study, out of five relatively simple multiple-choice questions on nuclear power, 51 percent of the respondents answered no more than one of the questions correctly (Reed and Wilkes 1980b). Limited knowledge also characterizes other technical and social policy issues on which the public historically has had a role in the decision-making process. Recent research has questioned the view that greater knowledge produces a more favorable attitude to nuclear energy. An Oak Ridge study found no relationship between knowledge and support or opposition, but the test con- cerned specific factual data about a particular plant
28 rather than the technology itself (Sundstrom et al. 1977, pp. 39-40). A study of college student opinions about breeder reactors also found no relationship between knowledge and attitudes (Clelland and Bremseth 1977, pp. 31-32). On the other hand, while a detailed ~tudv (Nealey and Rankin 1978) in Washington state found no s~gn~r~cant a~terence in knowledge between opponents and supporters of nuclear power, it did show that strong supporters of nuclear power were the most knowledgeable group. The Rand Corporation study of the 1976 California referendum found that whereas knowledge was low, it was largely independent of attitudes to nuclear power (Hensler and Hensler 1979). Overall, the results to date, though not conclusive, suggest that knowledge serves primarily to confirm rather than to shape attitudes, that indi- viduals selectively "fit" new information to pre-existing positions. This is consistent with a national survey (U.S. Council on Environmental Quality 1980, p. 35), which found that levels of knowledge did not correspond with views about environmental protection or the environ- mental movement. Added confirmation of these results has been provided by a number of informational campaigns and consensus- building efforts on nuclear power and other technical issues in various European countries. One comparison of three such efforts, in Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, concluded that n . . . there is little evidence that efforts to improve public knowledge about uncertain technical issues have actually reduced conflict. n Indeed, the Swedish study indicated that access to more informa- tion may in fact increase confusion and conflict, for many people are reluctant to accept and evaluate the uncertainties inherent in many technical areas (Nelkin 1977, pp. 96-97). The panel's appraisal of this body of work is that sufficient evidence does not exist to allow a searching test of the relation between knowledge and attitude, for studies to date have largely assessed the possession of general information rather than technical understanding. The direction of research results, however, does not support the inference that public concern is the product of inadequate information or lack of education. Fear The H. G. Wells novel The World Set Free (1914) portrays a cataclysmic world war during the 1950s that leaves
29 cities uninhabitable through the use of induced- radioactivity bombs the size of a handbag. John Hersey's' widely read factual account, Hiroshima, describes in detail the death and destruction caused by an atomic bomb. In 1959 the film based on Nevil Shute's novel On the Beach portrayed the end of humanity as a result of worldwide nuclear war. These films and novels have received added credence from events since World War II. Civil defense drills were commonplace during the 1950s, and school children were taught to fall to the floor and cover their heads. A series of polls taken between 1954 and 1963 revealed that about two thirds of the public consistently expressed the view that hydrogen bombs would be used against the United States in the event of another world war (Erskine 1963). The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made the prospect of global nuclear war even more vivid, and 15 years later a national poll found 4 of 5 Americans convinced that if too many countries acquired a nuclear capability, "some irresponsible country is bound to set off a bomb that could blow up the earth in World War III" (de Boer 1977, pp. 407-408). These strong fears of nuclear weapons have likely contributed to anxiety over the civilian uses of nuclear energy. Pahner (1976) argues, for example, that a sub- stantial part of the public concern over nuclear power plants represents anxiety "displaced from the fear of nuclear weapons. Public concern over nuclear risks, according to Pahner, stems from (a) pre-existing images of the horror of nuclear war, (b) conscious or unconscious fears related to the invisibility of radiation and the uncertainty of exposure, and (c) conscious and unconscious fears of the immediate and long-term effects of radiation on genetic processes. Since nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants both present danger of exposure to radiation and death, people tend to see them as similarly threaten- ing, even though they may not be fully aware of what upsets them, may not have a fully conceptualized knowl- edge of the threat, and may be unable to articulate their concerns (Pahner 1976, p. 11). Lifton (1967, 1976) has explored also the unconscious fears raised by nuclear energy. The development of nuclear weapons, he argues, has evoked a powerful new image--man's extermination of himself as a species with his own technology. The widespread belief, attested to by various polls, that nuclear weapons may be used again during the course of one's life evokes the idea of total
30 biological destruction, of the possible interruption of all human continuity. In his discussions with young American adults, Lifton found three characteristic psychological themes: "The equation of death with annihilation--early childhood exposure to the prospect of the nuclear holocaust leads to a psychic deformation in which one's own death becomes merged with total death, and thus more terrifying, "the unmanageability of life--the sense that any attempt to order existence is countered by the possibility of its absolute interruption, The perception of craziness--the idea that human beings would make nuclear weapons and the pre- scription for responding (ducking under a desk, going down to the cellar) both seem strange and unreal" (Lifton 1979, pp. 365-366). The public, in short, extends its fears of nuclear weapons to nuclear power plants, which evoke similar primal fears about the integrity of the human body. Lifton argues that these fears cannot be eliminated by rational-probabilistic assessments of risk, such as that of the Reactor Safety Study (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1975), because it may be the mode rather than the number of deaths that is critical. The Most impor- tant human feelings are precisely those least susceptible to mathematical equations (Lifton 1976). Sufficient evidence to confirm the various psychologi- cal mechanisms through which fear of nuclear weapons interacts with fear of nuclear power plants does not exist, but some evidence is available to support the widely held view that such a connection is real. Polls in recent years have consistently revealed that about half of the public harbors the belief that explosions or the possibility of explosions in nuclear plants are a major found ' problem (Mitchell 1980, Table 3), and a 1980 survey anal ~z percent of respondents believed that nuclear plants could explode and "cause a mushroom-shaped like the one at Hiroshima (U.S. Council on Environ Quality 1980). When visitors at three reactor were asked to complete simple sentences* about power cloud mental sites *"When I think of nuclear power plants, I n
31 their feelings, more than half cited anxiety (30 percent), war (19 percent), or disease (7 percent) (Kasperson et al. 1980). The authors of the Rand study, by contrast, while finding that about one fifth of the respondents used doomsday imagery in free-association responses to nuclear energy, did not believe this to be a significant factor in attitudes to nuclear power (Hensler and Hensler 1979, Vol. I, p. 4). Safety has been the dominant theme in the public's expressions of reservations about nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Concern consistently focuses on the release of radioactivity, potential catastrophic acci- dents, and waste management problems. In 1980, Marsh and McLennan found that 73 percent of those polled agreed with the suggestion that there was no guarantee against catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant, and 84 percent agreed that fundamental changes were necessary if the risks of nuclear energy were to be kept within tolerable limits (Marsh and McLennan 1980, p. 39). THE NATURE OF HAZARD Although many experts hold that the risks posed by nuclear wastes and nuclear power plants are no greater than, and perhaps substantially less than, the risks posed by other generally accepted technologies (National Research Council 1979), public concern over safety per- sists. One hypothesis for this is that nuclear power, as compared with other technologies, elicits extraordinary concern because of the characteristics, rather than the gross amount, of its risks. Psychologists at Decision Research have investigated this hypothesis. Three groups of respondents--college students, members of the League of Women Voters (LOWV), and businessmen--were asked to judge the risks and benefits of nuclear power and 29 other technologies or activities on 9 characteristics--voluntariness of risk, immediacy of effect, knowledge about risk, control over risk, newness, whether known to exposed, and chronic- catastrophic, common-dread, and severity of consequences. Nuclear power had the dubious distinction of scoring at or near the high-risk end on most of the characteristics. This profile of risk is shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, which contrast the response to nuclear power with the response to nonnuclear electric power and x rays. Furthermore, nuclear power was "dreaded" far more than any of the other hazards (Slovic 1979, p. 38).
32 Vl x o .Q C o ~' o C 6 z 5 4 z UJ 3 2 1 ' 1 1 Nuclear Power --1--T' ~ Eleciric Power ~ \ / \ / __ - _ . 11 ~ ,c y a, _ _ ~ ~ z 8 __, CJ . U. o C D _ ~ 0 = C O Y _ _ C ~ Z ~O . ~ . _ _ 1 / _ _ . _ _ _ _ 1 %~__, _ l c ° E t ~o .m c D 3 ' ° t1` E ~o to c 3 - 3 o z Y Y 7 2 1 FIGURE 2.4 Comparison between nuclear power and nonnuclear electric power on 9 risk characteristics ( from Fischhoff et al., 1978). z s cc z UJ 1 O c x ~ C ~ C ~ D C (_~ C} ~ Z ~ Z ~O _ :~ 6 4 3 2 FIGURE 2.5 Comparison between nuclear power and x rays on 9 risk characteristics (from Fischhoff et al., 1978)
33 Respondents were later asked to estimate the frequency of death to be expected from the 30 activities and tech- nologies. As a guideline it was pointed out that the total number of deaths each year in the United States averages about 2 million. The respondents were also asked to indicate how many times more deaths than the average would occur if next year were "particularly disastrous" for the technology or activity, thus pro- viding a measure of opinion about the technology's or the activity's potential for catastrophe (Table 2.2). Inter- estingly, the expected number of fatalities from nuclear power in an average year was smaller than for any other activity or technology. But for the worst year nuclear power was unique in terms of respondents' judgments about fatality multipliers. In fact, more than 40 percent of the respondents presented multipliers for nuclear power that were greater than 1,000. The respondents, in short, expected nuclear power to lead to disasters of immense proportions. The researchers also asked a new group of 28 students to write scenarios of the maximum credible disaster that might be produced during the respondent's lifetimes by a nuclear power plant or by commercial airplane flights. One third of the scenarios postulated an explosion within the reactor, and the expected number of fatalities tended to be several orders of magnitude greater than the worst case estimated in the Reactor Safety Study (3,300 prompt and 45,000 latent fatalities, with a probability of 5 x 10-9 per reactor year). Three respondents wrote scenarios postulating worldwide radioactive contamination and death. These results are indicative of the degree of public con- cern. Researchers generally have found that members of the lay public have been modestly successful in ordering other risks according to their probabilities and consequences. These results are directly relevant to radioactive waste management because the public apparently links it (despite differences in the nature of the hazards) with nuclear power issues more generally. In fact, as noted above, concern over nuclear wastes ranks at or near the top of all concerns over nuclear power. VALUE CONFLICT It has been argued that nuclear power is a victim of its time and that the political polarization over its survival
34 TABLE 2.2 Fatality Estimates and Disaster Multipliers for 30 Activities and Technologies Geometric Mean Fatality Estimates Average Year Geometric Mean Multiplier Disastrous Year Activity or Technology LOWVa Students LOWVa Students 1. Alcoholic beverages12,0002,6001.9 1.4 2. Bicycles9104201.8 1.4 3. Commercial aviation2806503.0 1.8 4. Contraceptives1801202.1 1.4 5. Electric power6605001.9 2.4 6. Fire fighting2203902.3 2.2 7. Food colouring38333.5 1.4 8. Food preservatives61633.9 1.7 9. General aviation5506502.8 2.0 10. Handguns3,0001,9002.6 2.0 11. High school and college football39401.9 1.4 12. Home appliances2002401.6 1.3 13. Hunting3804101.8 1.7 14. Large construction4003702.1 1.4 15. Motorcycles1,6001,6001.8 1.6 16. Motor vehicles28,00010,5001.6 1.8 17. Mountain climbing50701.9 1.4 18. Nuclear power2027107.1 87.6 19. Pesticides140849.3 2.4 20. Power mowers40331.6 1.3 21. Police work4603902.1 1.9 22. Prescription antibiotics1602902.3 1.6 23. Railroads1902103.2 1.6 24. Skiing55721.9 1.6 25. Smoking6,9002,4001.9 2.0 26. Spray cans56383.7 2.4 27. Surgery2,5009001.5 1.6 28. Swimming9303701.6 1.7 29. Vaccinations65522.1 1.6 30. X rays90402.7 1.6 SOURCE: P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, and B. Fischhoff. 1979. Images of disaster: perception and acceptance of risks from nuclear power. In Energy Risk Management, pp. 223-245. G. Goodman and W. Rowe, ed. London: Academic Press. league of Women voters symbolizes a more basic struggle between contending value systems. It is apparent that value questions have been prominent in the nuclear debate. There have been internal debates and positions taken by religious groups such as the World Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches, with the latter more critical of nuclear power (National Council of Churches 1979). Perhaps it was inevitable that a technology first used in weapons would be the subject of debates involving values from the very beginning.
35 President Eisenhower's inauguration of the Atoms for Peace program in 1956 was praised as a clear demonstra- tion of the willingness of the United States to share the anticipated benefits of nuclear technology with the nations of the world that did not possess it. On the other hand, Commoner (1969) has emphasized the possible burdens or nuclear wastes ror rucure generations, an issue subsequently taken up by the Sierra Club but given its most compelling expression in Weinberg's "Faustian bargain" metaphor (Weinberg 1972). Issues of democratic process and political accountability have also received considerable attention over the past decade (Green 1975, Ebbin and Kasper 1974). Congressional hearings in 1973-1974 on nuclear power safety showed that the controversy embraced a host of social, political, moral, and other issues about the regulation and use of technology in a democratic society (del Sesto 1980). Pro nuclear advocates stressed the benefits that would accrue to human welfare through improving the standard of living, increasing the rate of economic growth, and achieving energy self-sufficiency. Nuclear opponents stressed the inequity to future genera- tions, the dangers to civil liberties and the democratic process, and the global threat of proliferation. The evidence so far suggests that there is substantial concern of an ethical nature among activist opponents of nuclear power, although the studies are, in the panel's judgment, too few and too limited to provide definitive conclusions on this hypothesis (see also Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Hence, the resolution of the issues posed by nuclear power will require attention to broad social goals as well as to the narrower questions of safety and technology. INSTITUTIONAL CREDIBILITY AND DISTRUST Public concern over radioactive wastes, it has been hypothesized, reflects a distrust of the institutions that manage them (Office of Technology Assessment 1982). This distrust, it may argued, is part of a general decline in public trust of most social institutions, ranging from the family to the federal government (Figure 2.6). Evidence for this hypothesis is forthcoming. Various public opinion polls have shown a long-term decline in the confidence people have in governmental institutions, public officials, and the press. A 1976 poll revealed
36 al 0 C~. 0 0 C 0 ._ _ u, w ,~ _ W - V 0 w 3' o c ~ ._ (D ~D ~ ._ _ tt _ ~S tD _ c ~ ~D O ~ O ~ E · ~ o W U. ^.> ~ -v - 111 ~ o 3 0 _ ·. ~ _ ~ V ~ o E ~ W - ~E ~ o C~ C~ . o ~ o ~ ~ ~ 0 0 - .~-2 CO C ~ C 43) {V) C- O C ~ <D' ~ ~ o o ~ o.C- ~ E ° D ~r o a ° ~ ~ n _ ~ 0 C O _ ~ ~ ~G _ (o ~ _ ~ ·' C 2g ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ E .. o C (D C o ~ fD ~ so - ~ "c _ ~ ~ ~ z C. iL z o IL o 0 O ~c
37 1 ' ' ' ' ' 1 0 ._ - - o - ._ 0 x ~ ~/ o ~n - J ~ .// e{_ _r 1 1 1 1, ~8V ~ ~ ~ 2 j\ c~ 1ii o ~ ~ ~- _ _ ~ o ~ ~ 8 ,- ~ ~ _ . == 0 - . ~ 0 0 ,C tD 0 0 0 8 ., ~ _ c'. ~ ~ c .c ~ ~ ~ ~ --"' ~ E ~ 10 0 tD o ~ 0 e~',O=.0 O c ~ ~ c, E a a ° ~ ~ 8 I 0) 0) co o, ~z ~ ~ 0 c 0 a, ie _ e ~ 41' _ ~ ~o a) - e _ 0 _ _ ~ r~ _ _ 17 0 ~ z o, _ 0 c~ u ~c~ N N · - ~ ~ ~N r ~ N ~a: 0, N CO _ _ ~ r ~r~ o N O <0 N _ - N 0) C~ C~ 40 ~ O UD U' ~ cn O C o CO.O ~ E ~ CD (V ·- co c cn ~ C .' ~: (n ._ c CO Q . E o o ·Ct E ~ .° g ~ ae ~ ~ ~ ~ ' .,,~~,~-.~-o~ _ 0 =c ~= =~_ :. 4' E ~ c 0 ~ a' ~ O ~ ~D .. o ~ 0 E C. ~ ~ o o ~ o o, o .,' O O ~n Ll O · - ~ I_~ -~ a) 54 O . z ~Q U] · - U] 3 a C ., a V C t. C O · - .,' C .,, O V o . - V .V~ ~ _I Q Q P., ° a,' U] U] o UO O · .~1 · - r ~ · -
38 that only scientists commanded "a great deal" of con- fidence on nuclear power issues (58 percent), with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (39 percent), the President of the United States (24 percent), the heads of electric power companies (19 percent), and the companies that produce equipment for nuclear power plants (12 percent) lagging far behind (Harris & Associates, 1976, p. 29). A 1980 survey of Wisconsin residents revealed that most of them did not believe that the government was moving fast enough to solve the problem or was interested in what local citizens thought about having a waste repository in their community. These respondents ranked the federal government behind the news media, university scientists, and environmental groups, and just ahead of friends and acquaintances, as the most reliable source of information about nuclear wastes (Kelly 1980). The Office of Tech- nology Assessment (1982, p. 31) also recently concluded that "the greatest single obstacle that a successful waste management program must overcome is the severe erosion of public confidence in the Federal Government, citing policy instability, the capacity of the federal government to implement policy, and perceptions of trustworthiness (pp. 31-34). As inheritor of the Atomic Energy Commission's difficulties in waste management, the Department of Energy bears the burden of an unfortunate legacy. It is not surprising that the Keystone Group, composed of leading industry, environmental, and university repre- sentatives, could quickly agree that DOE's lack of credibility was a major obstacle to an effective waste management program (Keystone Group 1978), or that a 1979 General Accounting Office report suggested creation of an overall planning institution outside of DOE as a means of fostering public acceptance (General Accounting Office 1979, p. 11). In this respect, current institutional changes may provide some opportunities, an issue the panel addresses in Chapter 6. METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA-BASE LIMITATIONS Despite this social research on public concerns about nuclear energy, the body of knowledge developed thus far is limited in two important ways in its utility to administrative policymakers. First, in a democracy the government's authority to control or shape public behavior is subject to constitutional constraints. Even
39 if it were possible to predict political behavior accu- rately and to change it at will, there would be legal and political limits on the government's ability to bring about those changes. Second, much social research is limited by small sample size, often atypical sample pop- ulations, and complexity of behavior. Research relevant to public policy is only rarely amenable to controlled experimentation, and the "natural experiments" provided by governmental actions are rarely documented or con- trolled well enough to permit clean inferences. Risk psychology investigations have chosen to focus on small, atypical sample populations in an effort to examine the complex cognitive and affective processes at work. While such studies have contributed to a richer scientific understanding of how beliefs develop, their emphasis on individuals' motivations do not yet allow unambiguous analyses of organized social behavior, including reaction to waste repository site selection. Studies of political opposition to nuclear energy in other nations face a problem of a different kind. Behavior is affected by social and cultural setting, so that patterns observed in one nation may not apply in another. In addition, comparative studies face the methodological difficulties of social research in general. The emergence of the Green Party in the Federal Republic of Germany as a significant electoral force, accordingly, does not presage antinuclear candidacies in other elec- toral systems--much less the success of such political campaigns. These limitations do not, of course invalidate com- parative studies. Awareness of the relationship between governmental structure (e.g., a parliamentary system in the FRG) and political behavior (the possiblity of successful single-issue parties) bears on the design of decision processes. Moreover, both radioactive waste management and antinuclear activism are international activities, in which transfer of information across national boundaries plays a significant role. Thus, comparative studies are valuable as a form of intelligence in the short run and as a source of basic understanding for institutional design in the long term. Studies of political action and polls estimating poten- tial electoral response are based on relevant samples: political action involves the self-selected fraction of the population that chooses to participate, and opinion polls rest on solid statistical foundations. This con- siderable strength is tempered, however, by problems in
40 the reliability of the data and the legitimacy of policy inferences based on the data. The history of opposition to nuclear energy itself demonstrates the fluidity of the public agenda; the concept that the attention span of mass societies is limited has been developed in some detail by political scientists (Downs 1972, Cobb and Elder 1976, Berry 1977). Ballot initiatives in several states have shown considerable (if declining) support for nuclear power, but more detailed inferences are harder to establish. The wording of referenda varies from place to place, as do margins of victory, voter turnout, and the collateral effects of other items on the ballot. Demonstrations and civil disobedience exhibit even larger variations. All are energized by particular facilities, and their organizers seek to take advantage of favorable circumstances such as weather or the opening of the school year (a time when students can be more easily recruited). Yet these regularities serve to underscore the irregular nature of these events, and thus the unpredictability of their occurrence. Finally, their unpredictability as events is a major element of their power as a medium of social expression. The threat of violence, in particular, commands media attention. Opinion polls, perhaps the most highly validated of these measures, also face significant problems of method. Re-interviewing the same persons over a period of time (panel studies) demonstrates that opinion-poll responses change substantially over time, for reasons that are poorly explained. In part, instability of opinion esti mates is caused by differences in the wording of poll questions and variation in respondents' understanding of the wording. Mitchell finds that changes of up to 40 percentage points result from changes in the wording of questions about nuclear power plants and their safety (Mitchell 1980, p. 12). These questions about the quality of political data are compounded by problems of interpretation. The repub- lican framework of American government accords funda- mental legitimacy to voters and those whom the voters elect as representatives. The repeated affirmations of support for nuclear power, in Congress and the Executive Branch and in state referenda, have therefore set the directions of public policy. The rise of controversy has nonetheless led to major adaptations of public policy--a measure of the responsiveness of the American political - process.
41 Despite the clear power of the majority, the history and current texture of American government is replete with instances in which well-organized minorities with intensely held beliefs have influenced the public agenda and the action of government. Studies of antinuclear groups and their activities provide measures of the inten- sity of opposition. The prominence of the nuclear con- troversy is due in part to the success of this minority in raising its concerns among the wider public and within the institutions of government. Moreover, the trend of opposition and its success within government may be lead- ing indicators of the challenges to be faced in reposi- tory siting. It remains difficult, however, to convert these general observations into specific qualitative inferences, much less make quantitative estimates. Political action is Eve` fill ", ~ "1~ a =~, c; 1nnovaclOn and competition matter (Hirschman 1970). The competition ranges over many dif- ferent dimensions, and there is no simple measure of effectiveness or figure of merit with which to keep score. Indeed, the emergence of quality of life and the ever- lower expectations of acceptable risk reflect innovation in the dimensions along which competition takes place. Because they are widely used in electoral strategy, opinion polls illustrate the problems of interpretation and legitimacy with special clarity. Social scientists have debated the significance of opinion polls for sev- eral decades (Roll et al. 1972, Bennett 1977). The portrait of the American voter remains controversial in ways that bear directly on complex policy matters such as radioactive waste: how stable are attitudes? How well informed are they? How are they affected by social set- ting? While there is a rough consensus among political scientists and sociologists on these questions, it has been a difficult one to win and sustain in the face of new findings. In the judgment of the panel, extending the conclusions of this body of research to policy applications in repository siting is of doubtful merit. More pragmatically, survey data seem to be in a state of flux, with evidence that the molar; Pv ~,nnnrh for ^~] ^~' energy is eroding. These imperfections in quality of social scientific data, the scientific interpretation of them, and the use of social science in governance all limit the policy applicability of studies of public concerns. The panel is mindful, however, of the risk that these caveats may lead to the conclusion that social research is useless in repository siting. The reverse is true. W~ ~ ~ _ _ _ ~ ~J ~ _ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
/ 42 The diversity of research methods that has been applied to analyzing public concerns leads to qualitative findings that are robust and that merit careful attention in the siting of nuclear waste repositories FINDINGS . 1. While electoral, legislative, and administrative behavior in the United States have historically demon- strated substantial support for the economic benefits of nuclear power, over the past 15 years (and particularly since 1979) this support has weakened significantly at all three levels. In the same period, an articulate organized opposition has emerged, one with support among a significant minority of the population. 2. There is widespread perception that nuclear energy entails risks to health and safety. This perception is exacerbated by the fact that most public groups do not distinguish clearly between the risks of nuclear weaponry and nuclear power plants. The extent to which fear over nuclear weapons enters into attitudes on nuclear wastes is difficult to pinpoint, but it is undoubtedly an element in the formation of public opinion. Concern over cata- strophic accidents in nuclear power plants adds to these fears of technology. 3. The level of knowledge about nuclear power and radioactive wastes remains low among the general public. This limited knowledge, however, does not explain the high level of concern. It is uncertain whether greater amounts of information would reduce or increase public concern, but improved public understanding of waste management problems is a central need for developing an informed public policy and a socially acceptable manage- ment program. 4. Public concern and the perception of threat are exacerbated by mistrust of government in general and by the appearance of secrecy or desire to exclude the public from governmental decisions about radioactive waste and repository siting. REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2 Bennett, W. L. 1977. The growth of knowledge in mass belief studies: an epistemological critique. American Journal of Political Science 21:465-500.
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