The Costs and Consequences of Violent Behavior in the United States

Mark A. Cohen, Ted R. Miller and Shelli B. Rossman

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to set forth a comprehensive theoretical framework in which to evaluate the consequences and costs of violent behavior, and second, to review and update existing estimates of the cost of victimization. At first glance, it might seem that enumerating the consequences of violent behavior is a straightforward task. Take the highly publicized murder of Carol Stuart (whose husband, Chuck, was later found to have been the murderer) and her unborn child in Boston.1 The direct consequences are obvious—two deaths and enumerable medical costs associated with the interim treatment of both victims. However, many indirect consequences of this murder are not so obvious.

Carol Stuart's family and friends suffered a loss. More than 800 mourners attended her funeral. Aside from the time spent away from work or other activities, some of the mourners no doubt suffered at least transitory psychological injury. It is possible that a close relative suffered post-traumatic stress disorder,

Mark Cohen is at the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, and Ted Miller is at the National Public Services Research Institute, and Shelli Rossman is at the Urban Institute.



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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control The Costs and Consequences of Violent Behavior in the United States Mark A. Cohen, Ted R. Miller and Shelli B. Rossman INTRODUCTION The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to set forth a comprehensive theoretical framework in which to evaluate the consequences and costs of violent behavior, and second, to review and update existing estimates of the cost of victimization. At first glance, it might seem that enumerating the consequences of violent behavior is a straightforward task. Take the highly publicized murder of Carol Stuart (whose husband, Chuck, was later found to have been the murderer) and her unborn child in Boston.1 The direct consequences are obvious—two deaths and enumerable medical costs associated with the interim treatment of both victims. However, many indirect consequences of this murder are not so obvious. Carol Stuart's family and friends suffered a loss. More than 800 mourners attended her funeral. Aside from the time spent away from work or other activities, some of the mourners no doubt suffered at least transitory psychological injury. It is possible that a close relative suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, Mark Cohen is at the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, and Ted Miller is at the National Public Services Research Institute, and Shelli Rossman is at the Urban Institute.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control resulting in sleepless nights, withdrawal from social activities, psychological counseling, or even long-term therapy. Chuck Stuart collected several hundred thousand dollars in life insurance. The insurance companies incurred administrative expenses associated with paying out this money and ultimately attempting to retrieve it after the full story became known. A massive police investigation followed the murder after Chuck Stuart reported that a black gunman in a jogging suit had attacked their car at a busy intersection. Aside from the cost of employing police officers and other related expenses, it was reported that as many as 150 black men were stopped and frisked every day. Each of those men likely suffered from fear and deprivation of freedom. Other black men who were not stopped by police also suffered from fear under the threat that they too would be detained. Some commuters who normally drove through the area took longer detours or otherwise avoided the neighborhood because of the perceived increase in the risk of victimization. This may have hurt local businesses who otherwise benefited from sales to these commuters. Others who lived in or near the neighborhood might also have taken extra precautions such as staying home at night or buying security systems. Even more subtle and difficult to measure in this particular case is the increased racial tension precipitated by media coverage and apparently illegal police tactics of searching potential suspects. The police ultimately arrested William Bennett, who was identified in a police lineup by Chuck Stuart. Although a formal indictment was never made (because Stuart's brother went to the police with information implicating Chuck Stuart as the murderer), William Bennett also was a victim of this case, as was his family. Had he been tried or falsely convicted of murder, he would have endured additional costs such as loss of freedom. Further, the government would have incurred the cost of incarceration itself. Had Chuck Stuart (who ultimately committed suicide) lived to be charged with the murders, there would have been additional criminal justice-related costs. As difficult as it is, the task of enumerating the consequences of violent behavior is considerably easier than attempting to quantify (and monetize) the magnitude of these consequences. Although some costs (such as direct medical expenses) are relatively easy to estimate, others are virtually impossible (such as deprivation of freedom). In between these two extremes, there is a growing economics literature that attempts to place monetary values on pain, suffering, injuries, and death. This paper brings together

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control many disparate sources of information concerning the magnitude of the costs and the consequences of victimization; it also provides a few new and updated estimates. The empirical side of this paper focuses on the long-term costs and consequences of all personal victimizations in the United States during 1987. Following the definition set forth by the Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior, we include all "threatened, attempted or completed intentional infliction of physical harm by persons against persons." However, our primary focus is on the traditional violent crime categories of homicide, robbery, assault, and rape. For some types of victimizations—notably abuse of children under age 12—and some types of consequences, insufficient data exist to assess the magnitude of either consequences or costs. In such instances, we identify these gaps, and suggest estimation approaches that might be considered in future research. IMPORTANCE OF ESTIMATING COSTS Estimating the cost of intentional injury is more than an academic exercise. This section discusses a few of the most important reasons for being concerned with the cost of intentional injury. It also illustrates some of the uses and pitfalls of using cost estimates for policy analysis. Comparison of Aggregate Crime Costs to Other Social Ills To the extent that we are successful in estimating the aggregate cost of intentional injury, we can compare this total to the cost associated with other social problems. At a minimum, this would allow one to place the problem of intentional injury in perspective vis-à-vis other social ills (e.g., drug abuse, homelessness). Over time, it might also be possible to compare trends in aggregate costs to determine if these problems are getting worse or better. Whether or not one agrees that this is a useful exercise, various advocacy groups do in fact compare "cost of crime" estimates to other costs in an effort to affect policy decisions (e.g., see Irwin and Austin, 1987:16). Because most of the cost estimates cited in the past have been significant underestimates, more accurate estimates would better inform the policy debate (Cohen, 1988a:538). However, one cannot simply compare aggregate cost estimates of intentional injury with estimates of the cost of other social ills

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control to arrive at policy recommendations for future public priorities. Suppose, for example, it was estimated that the cost of intentional injury in the United States exceeded the cost imposed by automobile crashes (see, e.g., Streff et al., 1992). It does not necessarily follow that society should increase expenditures to prevent intentional injuries relative to public spending for preventing such crashes. If one includes the cost of "preventing" intentional injuries and motor vehicle crashes, it might be found (for example) that society is already spending too much on the former and not enough on the latter. Thus, we also need to know the deterrent and incapacitative effect of various sanctions, increased police patrols, etc. More importantly, one needs to know the marginal costs and benefits of various policy options designed to reduce crime (or highway crashes)—not just the aggregate costs of current social ills. If one is really interested in estimating the aggregate cost of intentional injury, the hypothetical question should be posed, "What would life be like without violence?" Not only would there be no victims and no government expenditures on punishing offenders, but "society would be profoundly transformed. Most sorts of organized crime would be eliminated, since it depends on the threat of violence to do business. There would be no more baggage checks in airports. The commercial life of the inner city would be transformed . . . . "2 This paper does not address these aggregate social costs of intentional injury. Instead, its primary focus is on estimating the cost of individual incidents of intentional injury. This approach is most useful for purposes of conducting benefit-cost analyses of policy options (see below). Comparison of Harm by Type of Victimization Without estimates of cost, it is difficult to compare the harm associated with the "average" assault to that of the "average" rape. Although one can tally up the various harms associated with each type of incident (e.g., value of property stolen, frequency of injuries by type of injury, mental health-related injuries), it is difficult to compare these harms objectively without a common metric such as dollars. Until recently, the only accepted approach to comparing harms has been to survey the public on the perceived seriousness of crime (see Wolfgang et al., 1985; Cullen et al., 1982; Rossi et al., 1974). This approach led to the development of a "crime seriousness index" (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964).3 Although surveys are

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control useful as a means of understanding public opinion, they are based on public perceptions concerning the severity of crimes, which may include misperceptions about the frequency of injuries in typical criminal events (see Cohen, 1988b). Moreover, these studies are generally unable to distinguish between the generic harm associated with an injury and the actual consequences of any one victimization. The latter would be particularly important if one were interested in the extent to which the consequences of victimization vary across different segments of the population (e.g., age or sex). Benefit-Cost Analysis of Policy Options Society's ability to control criminal behavior is limited by its ability to pay for police, courts, and corrections. In an effort to reduce crime, the severity of its consequences, and the cost of preventing and controlling crime, society has undertaken many criminal justice experiments. Recent examples in corrections include intensive probation (National Institute of Justice, 1987), electronic monitoring of offenders (National Institute of Justice, 1989a), and shock incarceration programs (National Institute of Justice, 1989b). Other criminal justice policy experiments include preventive police patrols and misdemeanor spouse arrest programs for domestic violence (National Institute of Justice, 1988). One of the advantages of using dollars as a common metric for analyzing criminal victimizations is that we can compare the benefits of reduced victimization to the costs of the proposed policy. If two options have identical crime control effects but differing costs, the choice is simple. Unfortunately, few policy alternatives are so easily compared. In a more realistic case where a new policy reduces crime at some additional expense (or increases crime at a savings), one of the key questions is whether the reduced (increased) crime level is worth its price. Only by monetizing the cost of criminal victimization can one begin to answer that question. There have been a few attempts to conduct benefit-cost analyses of criminal justice programs. For example, Friedman (1977) concluded that the social benefits of the Supported Work experiment in New York exceeded its social cost. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the "costs" of crimes averted by this program were largely underestimated due to the state of knowledge prevailing at the time. More recently, the deterrent and incapacitative effects of longer prison sentences were combined

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control with estimates of the monetary cost of crime and the cost of prison to estimate the benefits and costs of various policy options (Cohen, 1988a:549-552; Rhodes, 1988). Without a full accounting of costs, it is easy to reach erroneous policy conclusions. For example, a study by Austin (1986) found a favorable benefit-cost ratio of an early release program. The savings to the government from releasing prisoners early was determined to exceed costs associated with the slightly higher crime rate caused by recidivists. However, the "cost" of crime in Austin's paper was based solely on direct out-of-pocket victim expenses. In the case of rape, that cost was assumed to be $357, compared to an average auto theft of $2,544 (Austin, 1986:494, Table 37). Cohen (1988a) reestimated the benefit-cost ratios using dollar estimates of the nonmonetary costs of crime (where rape was valued at $51,058) and reached the opposite policy conclusion. We do not claim that policy decisions should be based solely on benefit-cost analyses, because it will never be possible to adequately monetize all costs and benefits. For example, certain policy options might be chosen primarily because they are "fair" or "just." Society clearly values justice, but we have no method of estimating this attribute. In such a case, the benefit-cost analysis can still help policy makers make informed decisions by understanding what it costs society to implement one particular program as opposed to another that might be less fair. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ESTIMATING COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES Violent behavior imposes many types of costs on society. In determining conceptually whether or not to include an element as a cost, the operational criteria used throughout this paper is whether or not society would be better off in its absence. In other words, we adopt the economist's notion of "social costs" as being any "resource-using activity which reduces aggregate well-being" (Gray, 1979:21). These resources need not be expressed in dollar terms; nor do we require that they be easily measurable. The economics of crime literature has traditionally distinguished between three types of costs (Demmert, 1979:2-5): (1) those caused directly by violence (i.e., external costs imposed by the offender); (2) those costs society incurs in its attempt to deter or prevent future incidents (through deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation of offenders as well as preventive measures taken by potential

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control victims); and (3) those costs incurred by the offender (such as the opportunity cost of the offender's time while either engaging in the offense or being punished). To this traditional division of costs, we add (at least conceptually) a fourth—the cost of society's desire to punish socially unacceptable behavior. There is clearly some overlap between this cost and society's desire to deter or prevent future injuries. That is, sending a rapist to jail might simultaneously satisfy the goals of prevention and retribution. Conceptually, one could allocate prison costs (for example) by assuming that ''prevention" costs are those for which the social costs of imprisonment are less than the social benefits of imprisonment through reduced crime. Any expenditures beyond those justified by such a cost-benefit analysis would be allocated to "punishment." Based on the empirical reality that offenders differ in their propensity to commit crimes, Waldfogel (1989) estimated both the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of incarceration. His findings supported the notion that, overall, incarceration "pays for itself" through deterrence or incapacitation. However, at the margin, the results are less clear. It is possible, therefore, that the cost of incarcerating the marginal offender exceeds the benefits of incarceration, which suggest that incarceration may serve a retributive role. Because data limitations make it difficult, if not impossible, to allocate costs between prevention and retribution, all costs of punishment included in this paper are treated as if they were designed for deterrent or preventive purposes. MONETARY VERSUS NONMONETARY COSTS We can distinguish between two types of costs: monetary and nonmonetary. Monetary costs generally consist of out-of-pocket expenditures, such as medical treatment, property damage and loss, and emergency police or ambulance response. They also consist of lost wages and productivity. In addition to these monetary costs, injury victims and their families may endure pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life. Since pain, suffering, and quality of life are not normally exchanged in the marketplace, there is no direct method of observing their monetary value. Indeed, the term "cost" is more difficult to conceptualize for nonmonetary losses because one cannot simply "buy" or "sell" pain and suffering. Suppose for a moment that there were markets for pain and suffering. If person A wants to inflict harm on person B, he must

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control negotiate a mutually acceptable price. For some injuries, person B will be willing to accept this injury in exchange for a high enough price. Alternatively, person B might be willing to pay person A not to inflict that harm. These two amounts will place bounds on the ultimate market price. That is, one can bound the value from above by examining the maximum amount a person is willing to pay to avoid an injury—the "ransom" value. The "price" can also be bound from below by using the minimum amount a person would be willing to accept to voluntarily endure the injury—the "compensation" value (see Cook and Graham, 1977). The ransom value is generally referred to as "willingness to pay" (WTP) because it measures the amount people are willing to pay for avoidance of an injury. The compensation value is generally referred to as "willingness to accept" (WTA) because it examines the amount required to convince a person to accept an injury or death. For marketed goods, WTP and WTA are generally assumed to be equal; otherwise, one could always profit from arbitrage (Merkhofer, 1987:156). Although WTP and WTA are closely linked, the essential difference between the two is the question of who pays—that is, who has the property rights to the commodity in question. For a commodity that consumers dislike (such as pollution or crime), WTP is likely to be lower than WTA for financial,4 and even psychological or ethical reasons.5 The difference is most striking when one considers the prospect of a certain death. In such a case, the WTP is bounded by one's own wealth, whereas few people would be willing to accept a certain death at any price. Which valuation approach should be utilized depends on the policy question being addressed. For example, if one is interested in examining a proposal to reduce the risk of death to a population, a WTP approach might be warranted. However, if one is interested in making a person "whole" as a result of an incident that has already taken place, a WTA approach might be more appropriate. Finally, it should be noted that many earlier cost of injury and cost of crime studies valued deaths solely on the basis of forgone productivity. This "human capital approach" to valuing life ignores the pain, suffering, and lost enjoyment of life. Instead, it counts the monetary costs of death. This method is appropriate if one is interested solely in the effect of deaths on economic activity, as measured by the gross national product, and on household production.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Interdependency of Cost Categories It is important to understand that the many different consequences and costs of victimization are interdependent. That is, increasing one type of cost might either increase or decrease another type of cost. Conceptually, victimization (and hence the cost of victimization) can be thought of as being the equilibrium outcome of a "crime market" (Cook, 1986:2). Potential offenders who "supply" crimes are sensitive to both "demand" and cost factors. The demand for crime is based on the vulnerability and exposure of potential victims, partially determined by precautions taken by potential victims. One of the key costs of supplying crime is the expected penalty—the likelihood and severity of punishment. To illustrate, consider the following simplistic example. Suppose that the violent crime rate in one neighborhood increases. Potential victims will likely take more costly precautionary actions to reduce their exposure to this new increased risk. They might stay at home more often and buy more secure locks—thus raising the cost of prevention. The city might spend money on overtime for police patrols, which will raise the "expected cost" of committing a crime to potential offenders. The net effect of reducing the demand for and increasing the cost of committing a crime might cause some potential criminals to take more costly actions to avoid capture (such as buying sophisticated equipment or hiring accomplices to watch for police). Alternatively, some potential criminals might decide it is not worth the added risk of failure or capture, and might commit fewer crimes. Thus, it is likely that the crime rate will be somewhat higher than before, but not as high as it would have been if the community had not taken these costly actions in response to the increased criminal activity. Offsetting Benefits of Victimization It is possible that intentional injuries will result in offsetting social benefits. For example, suppose a career criminal is robbed at gunpoint and fatally shot. The social cost of this murder might be partially offset by the reduced cost of other future crimes the victim was likely to commit. That is, there might be an "incapacitative" effect of intentional injury (see Cohen, 1983, for a review of the incapacitation literature). Of course, this assumes that no other potential offenders replace the victim's future criminal

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control career by increasing their own violation rate (see Reiss, 1980). Although this might be a reasonable theoretical approach to aggregating social costs of victimization, empirical evidence is too sparse to make any estimates in this paper. Efficient Versus Inefficient Costs For a variety of reasons, society often chooses methods of achieving its goals that are not cost minimizing. To the extent that these costs serve no other socially desirable goals, they may be considered wasted resources. For example, Schmidt and Witte (1984:Chap. 16) have estimated the optimal prison size based on actual cost data and found that substantial savings could accrue by building larger-scale prisons. Whether or not the added cost of inefficient prison sizes should be included in the cost of victimization is unclear. To some extent, it is not the offender's "fault" that society spends more than it has to for prisons. On the other hand, because higher than minimum costs are almost inherent in any bureaucracy, it may be reasonable to include such costs. Moreover, we may be paying for other attributes, such as a more humane treatment of prisoners. In this paper, we have included all known costs, regardless of whether there are less expensive ways to achieve the same goal. Fixed, Average, and Marginal Costs Although this paper attempts to enumerate and, where possible, monetize virtually all conceivable costs and consequences of violent behavior in the United States, the reader must be careful in using any estimates derived here. As mentioned above, there are many reasons why policy makers might be interested in monetary estimates of the cost of violent behavior. These different reasons often require the use of different estimates. If one is simply interested in the magnitude of the "crime" problem, all costs estimated here should be included. On the other hand, if one is interested in analyzing various criminal justice options, only marginal costs and benefits should be considered. For example, suppose policy makers are considering an increase in the average prison sentence for armed robbers by one year. First, one would need to determine the marginal cost of imprisoning one armed robber for a year. The marginal cost of imprisonment does not include the fixed cost of building prisons (unless this new policy requires the use of expanded prison capacity).

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control This amount would be compared to the marginal benefit of one additional imprisonment year for an armed robber, which depends on the number of crimes averted (through incapacitation or deterrence), and the cost of each additional crime averted. The cost of each additional crime depends on both the cost to victims and the criminal justice processing costs for each offense. In some instances, average costs are more readily available than marginal costs. For example, although we might estimate the aggregate cost for private security (and thus derive the average cost of security per crime), we have no evidence on the reduction in private security expenditures that might occur if we reduced the risk of armed robbery. Without such marginal estimates, it would be unrealistic to assume (for example) that a 10 percent reduction in crime rates would result in a 10 percent reduction in prevention expenditures. See Zimring and Hawkins (1988) and Zedlewski (1989) for a discussion of these issues. Although this paper attempts to distinguish among average, fixed, and marginal costs, it should be acknowledged that this distinction is not always clear cut. For example, one might argue that the marginal cost of imprisonment is the cost of maintaining a prisoner (e.g., food, additional guards) plus the annualized cost of a prison bed. However, if new prisoners are double-celled in jails designed for one prisoner, one might argue that the marginal cost is only the cost of subsistence. Real Versus Opportunity Costs Some costs that appear to be fixed are actually marginal opportunity costs. For example, suppose the number of murders in a city is reduced by one. Suppose further that instead of reducing police costs due to less time investigating murders, the effect of this lowered murder rate is to shift police resources into other activities. From an opportunity cost standpoint, these police costs should be counted as part of the cost of a murder. Reducing the need for a police investigation might not reduce police expenditures, but it will certainly free up valuable police resources that will be used for another purpose. Victim Assistance and Other Cost-Reducing Costs Some of the costs associated with violent behavior may actually be designed to reduce the cost of victimization. For example, victim service agencies provide a variety of psychological treatment

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Garofalo, J., and M. McLeod 1988 Improving the use and effectiveness of neighborhood watch programs. Research in Action. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Gray, C.M., ed. 1979 The Costs of Crime. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Harlow, C.W. 1989 Injuries From Crime. Bureau of Justice Statistics special report NCJ-116811. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Hartman, R. 1990 One thousand points of light seeking a number: A case study of CBO's discount rate policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 18(2)53-57. Hartunian, N.S., C.N. Smart, and M. Thompson 1981 The Incidence and Economics of Major Health Impairments: A Comparative Analysis of Cancer, Motor Vehicle Injuries, Coronary Heart Disease, and Strokes. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington/Heath. Harwood, H.J., D.M. Napolitano, P.L. Kristiansen, and J.J. Collins 1984 Economic Costs to Society of Alcohol and Drug Abuse and Mental Illness: 1980. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute. Hellman, D.A., and J.L. Naroff 1979 The impact of crime on urban residential property values. Urban Studies 16:105-112. Hofer, P.J., and B.S. Meierhoefer 1987 Home Confinement: An Evolving Sanction in the Federal Criminal Justice System. Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. Hofler, R.A., and A.D. Witte 1979 Benefit-cost analysis of the sentencing decision: The case of homicide. Pp. 165-186 in C.M. Gray, ed., The Costs of Crime. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Horowitz, M.J 1986 Stress-response syndromes: A review of posttraumatic and adjustment disorders. Hospital and Community Psychiatry 37(3):241-249. Insurance Information Institute 1989 1989-90 Property/Casualty Fact Book. New York: Insurance Information Institute. Irwin, J., and J. Austin 1987 It's About Time: Solving America's Prison Crowding Crisis. San Francisco, Calif.: National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Jamieson, K.M., and T.J. Flanagan, eds. 1989 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1988. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Judicial Conference of the United States 1989 Report on the Actual Costs of Filing Actions in District Courts. Unpublished report to the U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., August 15. Jury Verdict Research, Inc 1989 Injury Valuation: Tables of Verdict Expectancy Values for Sexual Assault, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Solon, Ohio. Kakalik, J.S., and N.M. Pace 1986 Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation. R-3391-ICJ. Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation. Kilpatrick, D.G., B.E. Saunders, L.J. Veronen, C.L. Best, and J.M. Von 1987 Criminal victimization: Lifetime prevalence, reporting to police, and psychological impact. Crime & Delinquency 33(4):479-489. Kilpatrick, D.G., H.S. Resnick, and A. Amick 1989 Family Members of Homicide Victims: Search for Meaning and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Paper presented at the 97th Annual American Psychological Association Convention, New Orleans, August. Kimmich, M.H. 1985 America's Children. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press. Kleiman, M.A.R., K.D. Smith, R.A. Rogers, and D.P. Cavanagh 1989 Imprisonment-to-Offense Ratios. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ-114948. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Laibstain, L.S. 1988 Legal aspects of sex ring crimes against children. Pp. 41-46 in A.W. Burgess and C.A. Grant, eds., Children Traumatized in Sex Rings. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Lehman, D.R., C.B. Wortman, and A.F. Williams 1987 Long term effects of losing a spouse or child in a motor vehicle crash. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52(1):218-231. Luchter, S., B. Faigin, D. Cohen, and L. Lombardo 1989 Status of Costs of Injury Research in the United States. Paper presented at the Experimental Safety Vehicle Conference, Gothenbug, Sweden. Maltz, M.D. 1975 Measures of effectiveness for crime reduction programs. Operations Research 23(3):452-474. Merkhofer, M.W. 1987 Decision Science and Social Risk Management. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company. Miller, T.R. 1989a Willingness to pay comes of age: Will the system survive? Northwestern University Law Review 83:876-907.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control 1989b 65 MPH: Winners and Losers. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. 1990 The plausible range for the value of life—red herrings among the mackerel. Journal of Forensic Economics 3(3):17-40. Miller, T., and S. Luchter 1988 The socioeconomic impacts of injuries resulting from motor vehicle crashes. Pp. 2.513-2.527 in Proceedings XXII FISITA Congress Technical Papers on Society of Automotive Engineers. SAE P-211. Warrendale, Pa.: Society of Automotive Engineers. Miller, T., A. Hoskin, and D. Yalung-Mathews 1987 Procedure for annually estimating wage losses due to accidents in the U.S. Journal of Safety Research 18(3):101-119. Miller, T., P. Brinkman, and S. Luchter 1989a Crash costs and safety investment. Accident Analysis and Prevention 21(4):303-314. Miller, T., C. Calhoun, and W.B. Arthur 1989b Utility-adjusted impairment years: A low-cost approach to morbidity valuation. Estimating and Valuing Morbidity in a Policy Context: Proceedings. AERE Workshop. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Mitchell, R.C., and R.T. Carson 1989 Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. Mohide, E.A., G.W. Torrance, D.L. Streiner, D.M. Pringle, and R. Gilbert 1988 Measuring the wellbeing of family caregivers using the time trade-off technique. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 41(5):475-482. Moore, M.H., and R.C. Trojanowicz 1988 Policing and the Fear of Crime. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Moore, M., and K. Viscusi 1990 Discounting environmental health risks: New evidence and policy implications. Journal of Environment Economics and Management 18(2):551-561. Munoz, E. 1984 Economic costs of trauma, United States, 1982. Journal of Trauma 24:237-244. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 1983 The Economic Cost to Society of Motor Vehicle Accidents. DOT 1987 HS 806-342, January 1983 and 1986 Addendum. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. National Research Council and Institute of Medicine 1985 Injury in America. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 1988 Injury Control: A Review of the Status and Progress of the Injury Control Program at the Centers for Disease Control. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 1987 New dimensions in probation: Georgia's experience with intensive probation supervision. By B.S. Erwin and L.A. Bennett. Research in Brief. January. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 1988 Policy experiments come of age. By J. Garner and C.A. Visher. Research in Action. NIJ Reports No. 211, September/October. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 1989a Electronic monitoring of offenders increases. By A.K. Schmidt. Research in Action. NIJ Reports No. 212, January/February. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 1989b Shock incarceration programs in state correctional jurisdictions—An update. By D.L. MacKenzie and D.B. Ballow. Research in Action. NIJ Reports No. 214, May/June. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 1989c Comparing costs of public and private prisons: A case study. By C.H. Logan and B.W. McGriff. Research in Action. NIJ Reports No. 216, September/October . Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice 1988 Victims of Crime Act of 1984: A Report to Congress by the Attorney General. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Paykel, E.S. 1978 Contribution of life events to causaton of psychiatric illness. Psychological Medicine 8:245-252. Petersilia, J., and S. Turner 1986 Prison Versus Probation in California: Implications for Crime and Offender Recidivism. Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation. Phillips, L., and H.L. Votey, Jr. 1981 The Economics of Crime Control. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Polinsky, A.M., and S. Shavell 1979 The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. American Economic Review 69(5):880-891. Posner, R.A. 1980 Optimal sentences for white-collar criminals. American Criminal Law Review 17:409-418. Psacharopoulos, G. 1981 Return to education: An updated international comparison. Comparative Education 17(3):321-341. Pynoos, R.S., and S. Eth 1985 Children traumatized by witnessing acts of personal violence: Homicide, rape, or suicide behavior. In S. Eth and R.S. Pynoos, eds., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Children. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Reiss, A.J., Jr. 1980 Understanding changes in crime rates. In S. Fienberg and A. Reiss, eds., Indicators of Crime and Criminal Justice: Quantitative Studies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Resick, P.A. 1987 Psychological effects of victimization: Implications for the criminal justice system. Crime and Delinquency 33:468-478. Reuter, P., R. MacCoun, and P. Murphy 1990 Money From Crime: A Study of the Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington, D.C. Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation. Rhodes, W.M. 1988 Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Guideline Criminal History Adjustment. Staff Report. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C. Rice, D. 1966 Estimating the Cost of Illness. Health Economics Series, No. 5, Pub. No. 947-5. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Rice, D., E. MacKenzie, and Associates 1989 Cost of Injury in the United States: A Report to Congress. San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Health and Aging, University of California, and Injury Prevention Center, The Johns Hopkins University. Rizzo, M.J. 1979 The cost of crime to victims: An empirical analysis. Journal of Legal Studies 8:177-205. Rosenbaum, D.P., A.J. Lurigio, and P.J. Lavrakas 1987 Crime Stoppers: A National Evaluation of Program Operations and Effects. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Rossi, P.H., E. Waite, C.E. Boise, and R.E. Berk 1974 The seriousness of crimes: Normative structure and individual differences. American Sociological Review 39:224-237. Schmidt, P., and A.D. Witte 1984 An Economic Analysis of Crime and Justice. Orlando, Fla: Academic Press. Sechrest, L., S. White, and E.D. Brown 1979 The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects . Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. Sellin, T., and M.E. Wolfgang 1964 The Measurement of Delinquency. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Shavell, S. 1985 Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent. Columbia Law Review 85:1233-1262.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Shenk, J.F., and P.A. Klaus 1984 The Economic Cost of Crime to Victims. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Sherman, L.W. 1989 Small merchants' big burdens. Wall Street Journal (October 23):A10. Sherman, L.H., and J. Klein 1984 Major Lawsuits Over Crime and Security: Trends and Patterns, 1958-1982. Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology. College Park: University of Maryland. Singer, S.I. 1981 Homogeneous victim-offender populations: A review and some research implications. In Victims of Crime: A Review of Research Issues and Methods. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. Skogan, W.G. 1986 Fear of crime and neighborhood change. In A.J. Reiss, Jr., and M. Tonry, eds., Communities and Crime. Vol. 8 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Skogan, W.G., and M.G. Maxfield 1981 Coping With Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Smart, C., and C.R. Sanders 1976 The Costs of Motor Vehicle Related Spinal Cord Injuries. Washington, D.C.: The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Smith, S.R., and S. Freinkel 1988 Adjusting the Balance: Federal Policy and Victim Services. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Spangenberg, R.L., and E.R. Walsh 1989 Capital punishment or life imprisonment? Some cost considerations. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 23:45-58. Spangenberg, R.L., B. Lee, M. Battaglia, P. Smith, and A.D. Davis 1986 National Criminal Defense Systems Study: Final Report. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ-94702. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justic. Stigler, G.J. 1970 The optimum enforcement of laws. Journal of Political Economy 78:526-536. Streff, F.M., L.J. Molnar, M.A. Cohen, T.R. Miller, and S.B. Rossman 1992 Estimating costs of traffic crashes and crime tools for informed decision making. Journal of Public Health Policy 13:451-471. Tabak, R.J. 1989 The execution of injustice: A cost and lack-of-benefit analysis of the death penalty . Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 23:59-146.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Thaler, R. 1978 A note on the value of crime control: Evidence from the property market. Journal of Urban Economics 5:137-145. Toborg, M.A. 1981 Pretrial Release: A National Evaluation of Practice and Outcomes . National Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. Department of Justice 1988 Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice. NCJ-105506. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. 1989a Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1987. NCJ-115524. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. 1989b National Crime Surveys: National Sample, 1979-1987 (Revised Questionnaire), 3rd ed. ICPSR 8608. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Viscusi, W.K., W.A. Magat, and J. Huber. 1989 Pricing Environmental Health Risks: Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis. Working Paper, Center for the Study of Business Regulation, Duke University. Waldfogel, J. 1989 Does the Criminal Justice System ''Pay for Itself" Through Deterrence and Incapacitation? Working paper, Stanford University. Waller, J.A., S.R. Payne, and J.M. Skelly 1990 Disability, direct cost, and payment issues in injuries involving woodworking and wood-related construction. Accident Prevention 22(4):351-360. Webster, B. 1988 Victim assistance programs report increased workloads. Research in Action. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Weller, D., and M.K. Block 1979 Estimating the cost of judicial services. Pp. 149-164 in C.M. Gray, ed., The Costs of Crime. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Whitaker, C.J. 1989 The Redesigned National Crime Survey: Selected New Data. Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ-114746. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Wickenden, D. 1985 Good-bye day care: The insurance crisis hits preschool. The New Republic 193(December 9):14-17. Widom, C.S. 1989 Child abuse, neglect, and violent criminal behavior. Criminology 27:251-271.

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Understanding and Preventing Violence: Volume 4 - Consequences and Control Wirtz, P.W., and A.V. Harrell 1987 Assaultive versus nonassaultive victimization: A profile analysis of psychological response. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 2:264-277. Witte, A.D. 1989 Deterrence and Rehabilitation. Paper prepared for the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Seminar Series (January). Witte, A.D., H. Tauchen, and H. Griesinger 1989 Deterrence, Work and Crime: Revisiting the Issues With Birth Cohort. Working Paper #139, Wellesley College. Wolfgang, M.E. 1958 Patterns in Criminal Homicide. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Wolfgang, M.E., R.M. Figlio, P.E. Tracy, and S.I. Singer 1985 The National Survey of Crime Severity. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Zedlewski, E.W. 1985 When have we punished enough? Public Administration Review (November):771-779. 1987 Making confinement decisions. Research in Brief. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. 1989 New mathematics of imprisonment: A reply to Zimring and Hawkins. Crime and Delinquency 35(1):169-175. Zimring, F.E., and G. Hawkins 1988 The new mathematics of imprisonment. Crime and Delinquency 34(4):425-436.