That nobody learned a lesson from the bombing of the Torrey Canyon was demonstrated by the fact that they bombed the Amoco Cadiz and turned it into a mess. There wasn't anything else that happened to the Amoco Cadiz anyway, but there was no sense in bombing it. I said that it is an every case condition. By that I mean that when using air to lighten a ship, the salvage master and the salvage engineer want to test each tank individually to see how long it takes to get them down and to ascertain how much buoyancy they are getting out of the tank, how much of a bubble they have got in there.

The salvage officer, the salvage engineer would determine how much buoyancy they needed, how many inches without a draft she is. Those inches would relate to the tons for each immersion, which is a good measure of how much barging capacity you need or how much blowing capacity you need to get the ship up. For 350,000-and 400,000-ton tankers the tons for each inch of immersion is about 550, that order of magnitude. That means you have got to take 500-tons of oil off to change the draft one inch. One inch isn't going to do much good. The only hope you have for salvaging these kinds of ships is to blow them. The name of the game is to know each instrument in the orchestra that the salvage officer is directing, know what the total buoyancy capacity of each tank is that you are blowing and pumping, and orchestrate them all in connection with the tide, the currents, and the weather.

But each time the salvage people blow down a tank, you are going to have a little pollution. What we worry about is inhibiting the normal, everyday, nonheroic, nongigantic nature of the problem, but just in our simple bag of tricks of blowing tanks, you are going to get some bubbles of oil and maybe 2,000 tons, if you have got big tanks, such as on the Amoco Cadiz, and much more on the Exxon Valdez.

That is my vision of the problem. We erred in using the term jettison when we tried to explain this weakness in the bill. Since then, we have talked about jettisoning. If, as the representative from the London Salvage Association said in his paper, the jettison business goes back to Biblical times or before, I submit that jettisoning was done by the ship's force itself. I submit or suggest that the lawyers and the historians look at the history of jettisoning and see if salvors jettison. I question whether salvors jettison. Salvors blow tanks, salvors pump tanks, move weights around and shift cargo. But I don't think we call them cargo operations. I don't think we need to call it jettison. If the law prohibits jettisoning, what we are talking about is simply routine mechanics, routine procedures, that were in our bag of tricks all the time. I have taken the position lately that we ought to be talking about heroic measures, jettisoning—big jettisoning—being one of them. There are other heroic measures. If you use a simile to the emergency room at the hospital on Friday or Saturday night and the motorcycle boys are coming in on stretchers. The emergency room has the authority to give IVs to people. If you need heroic measures, they may have to strip down a vein or perform a tracheotomy. That is what we are talking about here, not the routine, everyday procedure of blowing a tank.

CHAIRMAN PAULSEN: It has been a wonderful day. I thank everyone who participated, people who asked questions, people who answered questions, people who arranged this session. The committee is going to meet and will keep in mind the things that have been discussed here.

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