both nations' available plutonium stocks would remain comparable. After long-term disposition, neither nation's excess plutonium should be greatly more accessible for use in weapons than the other's.
U.S. consideration of the risks associated with the various options for management and disposition of its own plutonium must be informed by an awareness of the potential linkages between U.S. choices and the choices that may be made in the former Soviet Union. U.S. policy could affect the management and disposition of excess WPu in the former Soviet Union in a variety of ways—including financial assistance, negotiated agreements to pursue particular approaches, outright purchase of former Soviet WPu, or merely setting an example. What is done with excess WPu in the United States and the former Soviet Union, moreover, could affect the fate of the substantially larger (and still growing) quantities of separated and unseparated plutonium discharged from civilian nuclear power reactors worldwide. This study, therefore, will consider disposition of both U.S. and Russian excess WPu, although necessarily with more detailed attention to the U.S. case.
NAS 1994: National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994.