The following HTML text is provided to enhance online
readability. Many aspects of typography translate only awkwardly to HTML.
Please use the page image
as the authoritative form to ensure accuracy.
Product Liability and Innovation: Managing Risk in an Uncertain Environment
in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State New York: Free Press, 1992, Chapter 8, pp. 118–131.
1.
See W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, "Rationalizing the Relationship between Product Liability and Innovation," and Robert Litan, "The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities," both in Peter Schuck, ed. Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, N.Y.: Norton, 1991, pp. 105-150. W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, 101:161-184 (1993).
2.
Patricia Danzon found that roughly one in 126 patients admitted to California hospitals in 1974 suffered an injury due to negligent medical care. Of these no more than one in 10 filed a claim and only 40 percent of these claims resulted in payment to the patient. Patricia Danzon, "Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener?" in Peter Schuck, eds. Tort Law and the Public Interest: Competition, Innovation, and the Consumer Welfare, N.Y.: Norton, 1991, pp. 176-204 at 183.
3.
W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, 101:161-184 (1993).
4.
Eleven three-digit SIC industries were in the high liability group. One of them was the composition goods industry which includes asbestos manufacturers. Another was miscellaneous chemicals, a group including manufacturers of battery acid, fireworks, jet fuel igniters, and pyrotechnic ammunition. Id. at 181.
5.
Id. at p. 167.
6.
The discussion in this section is derived from Steven Shavell, "Liability versus Other Approaches to the Control of Risk," in Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 277-290.
7.
In contrast, Wood v. General Motors Corp. (865 F.2d 395, 402 [1st Cir. 1988]) held that common law actions seeking to hold manufacturers liable for failing to install airbags were not permitted. Airbags are a special case because the agency expressly permitted automotive firms to select an alternative to airbags.
8.
A study of compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Act standards by the custom woodworking industry found high levels of compliance despite weak agency enforcement. The author speculates that one reason may be the fear that violation of an OSHA standard would leave the employer open to higher liabilities from tort judgments, workers compensation premiums, or insurance ratings. David Weil, "If OSHA Is So Bad, Why Is Compliance So Good?", draft manuscript, Boston University, Boston, Mass., 1993, pp. 31-32.
9.
For a fuller discussion, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State, New York: Free Press, 1992, Chapter 8, p. 127.
10.
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 2999 (1993).
11.
985 F.2d 516 at 517.
12.
985 F.2d 736 at 739-741.
13.
Under the CERCLA, private individuals can sue generators of hazardous wastes for cleanup costs (but not for personal injuries) even if the government has taken no action against the waste generator.
Items in cart [0]
