This work is usefully assessed in Michael J. Mahoney, "Psychology of Scientists: An Evaluative Review," Social Studies of Science 9 (1979), 349-375, esp. pp. 354-356.


Robert K. Merton. "Making It Scientifically," in James D. Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA: Text, Commentaries, Reviews, Original Papers, ed. Gunther S. Stent (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980; orig. publ. 1968), 213-218;John Lear, "Heredity Transactions," ibid., 194-198 (quoting 194-195); see also reviews by Richard C. Lewontin (pp. 185-187, for comparisons with Martin Arrowsmith), Mary Ellman (pp. 187- 191), P.B. Medawar (pp. 218-224): [Watson's book ought to prevent anyone from going] "on believing that The Scientist is some definite kind of person." Some scientist-reviewers, to be sure, found Watson's portrayal of normal scientific practice both wrong and damaging to the reputation of science. At about the same time, Daniel S. Greenberg's The Politics of Pure Science (New York: New American Library, 1967) and his journalism for Science magazine did much to form a public awareness of scientists as entrepreneurs ''on the make." Indeed, Greenberg's semi-fictional "Dr. Grant Swinger" was somewhat more merely human than the average stockbroker.


For reflective study of the public credibility of science and its bases, see, e.g., Brian Wynne, "Public Understanding of Science Research: New Horizons or Hall of Mirrors?" Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992), 37-43; idem, "Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science," ibid., 281-304, esp. p. 298; also Marcel C. LaFollette, Making Science Our Own: Public Images of Science, 1910-1955 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).


Merton, The Sociology of Science, 275-276.


Hardwig, "The Role of Trust in Knowledge," 707; also Shapin, A Social History of Truth, ch. 1.


The sociologist H.M. Collins has studied episodes of "extraordinary science," in which scientists cannot effectively appeal to "the facts of the matter" to settle disputes, since it is those facts which are being contested. In such episodes, scientists may invoke characterizations of participants' basic competence and morality in attempts to achieve resolution: Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).


Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: I: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), esp. chs. 13-14. MacIntyre's views are brought to bear upon the problem of fraud in science by C.J. List, "Scientific Fraud: Social Deviance or the Failure of Virtue?" Science, Technology and Human Values 10, 4 (1985), 27-36, esp. 30-32.

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