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OCR for page 16
2
Origin of Testing Requirements
This chapter discusses the legal requirements for live fire testing, the
interpretations of those requirements within the Department of Defense (DoD), and
the circumstances that led to the request for a retroactive waiver for the F-22. The
chapter also addresses F-22 design requirements related to vulnerability. Finally,
the committee offers some observations about the disposition of reco~runendations
made by the previous National Research Council (NRC) committee that studied
vulnerability assessment of aircraft (NRC, 19931.
FRAMEWORK
The ultimate objective of any combat system is to destroy or disable the
enemy before being destroyed or disabled by that enemy. In meeting that
objective, one consideration is for Me combat system to have some level of
inherent battle damage tolerance. Thus, aircraft designers must give serious
attention to reducing vulnerability as part of the overall aircraft design.
Once a system enters the formal acquisition process, company designers
receive contractual specifications from the system program of lice of the designated
service. The system program office (the developer) bases its specifications on
system requirements defined by the user.
In establishing F-22 survivability requirements, the system Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) was Me operative source (TAF, 1991) . The F-22
ORD reflects the Systems Threat Assessment Report (STAR) (FASTC, 1992),
which defines the threat the F-22 is expected to face based on its planned mission.
The user's emphasis in the ORD was on susceptibility rather Man vulnerability.
Experience in the 1980s with Me Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle led marry
to conclude that survivability of equipment and personnel had not been adequately
considered and tested. As a consequence, in fiscal year 1987 Congress amended
Title 10 of the U.S. Code by adding the original live fire test (LFT) law (10
U.S.C. 2366, 1986), which mandated certain procedures in vulnerability testing.
Authority that permits the Secretary of Defense to waive the application of the
tests under certain defined circumstances was included in the law. (The current
version of the EFT law is provided in Appendix B.)
16
OCR for page 17
Origin of Testing Requirements
1
17
An overview of the guidelines, opinions, and amendments pertinent to the
original law appears below. This overview sets He context for considering the
F-22 waiver currently requested by the DoD.
F-22 LIVE FIRE TESTING REQUIREMENTS
This section addresses the many documents that influence the F-22 live fire
test program. Because the early documents were reviewed in detail by the previous
NRC committee (NRC, ~ 993), much of the information below is taken from that
committee's report.
The Live Fire Test Law Requirements and Historical Interpretations
The following historical information addresses the law's intent:
The intent of the EFT law is to determine the inherent strengths and
weaknesses of adversary, U.S., and allied weapon systems sufficientiv
~. . ~ ~
~ ¢ --- A J
early in one program to allow any design deficiency to be corrected.
According to the FYI988-1989 DoD Authorization Act Conference
Report, Congress intended that the Secretary of Defense implement the
EFT law "in a mariner which encourages the conduct of fi~-up
vulnerability and lethality tests trader realistic combat conditions, first
at the sub-scale level as they are developed, arid later at the full-scale
level mandated in the legislation" (U.S. Congress, 19881.
(NRC, 1993)
For purposes of this report, the present committee adopts the previous NRC
committee's definitions of full-up and full-scare tests:
.
.
law:
A full-up test is defined as "a test conducted on a complete system or
a partial system, with the full complement of fuel, ammunition, and
hydraulic fluid carried by the system into combat."
A full-scale or complete system test is defined as "a test conducted on
the complete or total system, with or without the filll complement of
fuel, ammunition, arid hydraulic fluid carried into combat."
The previous committee left no doubt about the requirements of the EFT
OCR for page 18
18
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
Based upon the evidence gathered by the committee and its study of
the law, the committee is unanimous in the opinion that the EFT law
requires a full-scale, full-up aircraft to be tested, regardless of the
outcome of the sub-scale tests, unless a waiver is granted.
This committee agrees with the above opinion. In retrospect, it would appear
that the EFT law should have been clear to everyone with little chance for
misinterpretation. However, in the discussion that follows, it becomes obvious that
serious misinterpretations alias occur, which were not fully corrected until
approximately 1993.
Without going into Me nuances of past interpretations and misinterpretations
of the law resulting from guidance issued by the DoD, it is instructive to review
the prior NRC committee's statements:
tThe committee] believes that the definitions in the 1988 Guidelines
and the guidance given in the 1989 Planning Guide are not sufficiently
clear as to the law's requirement that full-scale, Let-up testing must be
conducted. As a consequence of this misunderstanding, the Services
have proceeded with sub-scale Live Fire Test programs on several
weapon systems without making a provision for testing a complete
system and without asking for a waiver because of the belief that no
filll-scale, full-up testing was required if early tests on sub-scale targets
showed no design weaknesses.
The F-22 EFT program, among others, was covered in briefings to the prior
NRC committee. Live fire testing of a ~-up, full-scale F-22 was not planned
(NRC, 19931.
The F-22 passed Milestone I] in mid-1991 and entered engineering and
manufacturing development. No waiver from the law's requirements was granted
by the Secretary of Defense before the F-22 entered this phase. Yet there is
evidence to suggest that some in the Air Force knew, in 1991, that a waiver was
required.
In October 1991, Brigadier General James A. Fain, who was then Director
of the F-22 System Program Office (SPO), sent a memorandum to the Office of
the Secretary of the Air Force outlining F-22 live fire test alternatives. With
respect to full-up testing of the system configured for combat, General Fain
recommended "requesting a waiver to this requirement" (Fain, 1991; see below).
In August 1992, James O'Bryon, the Deputy Director of Test arid Evaluation
for Live Fire Testing in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sent a
memorandum to the Air Force Director of Test and Evaluation. With respect to
the planned F-22 Live Fire Test and Evaluation Vulnerability Program, Mr.
O'Bryon stated:
OCR for page 19
Origin of Testing Requirements
Although in many respects [the ballistic] part of the proposed plan
appears to be comprehensive and well thought out, in one respect at
least it falls seriously short of the requirements of the law. . . . In June
of last year, ~ held a series of meetings with then BG Fain, Director
of the F-22 SPO. ~ left those meetings with the clear understanding
that full-up testing would be included in the Live Fire Test
Program . . . . ~ am concerned that, after more than a year, this most
important inadequacy, the lack of full-up testing, has not been
addressed.
(O'Bryon, 1992)
19
The committee notes that Fain's memorandum to the Of lice of the Secretary
of the Air Force preceded O'Bryon's memorandum by nearly a year, indicating
that O'Bryon was unaware of Fain's waiver reco~runendation. The SPO's position
is discussed further in a later section of this chapter.
With respect to waivers, the previous NRC committee (NRC, ~ 993)
recommended that:
the Director, Test and Evaluation, formalize the waiver process by
developing a r~sk-benefit assessment methodology that can be used
uniformly to determine whether a full-scale, full-up test program for
any particular aircraft is "unreasonably expensive and impractical." The
methodology must also be applicable to the evaluation of the alternate
Live Fire Test program for the sub-scale targets.
the Secretary of Defense take measures to ensure (a) that the
EFT&E tLive Fire Test & Evaluation] Guidelines are properly
enforced by requiring either that covered systems be subjected to full-
scale, fi~-up testing or that a waiver be obtained; (b) that any waiver
be fully justified, (c) that the waiver process be uniformly applied, and
(~) that no stigma be attached to the use of the waiver process.
Recent Live Fire Test Guidelines and Interpretations
A new set of DoD guidelines, issued January 27, 1994, superseded all
previous editions. Revised definitions of full-up test and fi~-up system-level test
are presented in those guidelines, as follows (Longuemare, 19941:
Full-up Test. A vulnerability test conducted on a complete or partial
system loaded or equipped with all dangerous materials (including
flammables and explosives) that would normally be on board in
OCR for page 20
20
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
combat (configured for combat). All critical subsystems which could
contribute to the test outcome must be operating (e.g., hydraulic and
electrical power) under realistic conditions. . . . This testing alone may
not satisfy 10 USC, Section 2366.
FuR-up, System-Leve! Test. A EFT&E Strategy for a covered system,
major munition program, or missile program, or covered product
improvement program will include Full-up, System-level tests. The
term "Full-up, System-leve! Test" is that testing that fully satisfies the
statutory requirement for "realistic survivability testing" or "realistic
lethality testing" as defined in Section 2366, Title 10, USC.
On July 25, 1994, the Air Force published Instruction 99-105 to provide
"guidance and procedures for the live fire test and evaluation of Air Force
systems" (USAF, 1994~. The document states that it is "in compliance with
EFT&E legislation." It also states:
EFT&E is a sub-set of developmental test and evaluation (DT&E), the
Air Force accomplishes it through a balanced program of test and
analysis. Analysis must be an integral part of Me I,FT&E process
because it is unreasonably expensive and impractical to test all possible
combinations of threats, aircraft configurations, and environments. The
Air Force must initiate the EFT&E program sufficiently early to allow
the results to impact system design prior to fulI-rate production or
major modification. The primary emphasis is on testing and analysis
to identify and correct potential design flaws. The EFT&E program
should provide an assessment of a system's vulnerability or lethality
characteristics relative to the expected spectrum of battlefield threats.
Regarding LFT&E waivers, the instruction states:
The Secretary of Defense may waive EFT&E legislation requirements
for covered systems, major munitions programs, and product
improvements (that significantly affect vulnerability or lethality) to
covered systems and major munitions programs where EFT&E would
be unreasonably expensive and impractical. Request, process, and have
a granted waiver before Milestone Il. The Air Force cannot grant
EFT&E waivers after Milestone Il. except through legislative relief.
An approved EFT&E waiver exempts a system, program, or product
improvement from full-up, system-level testing (full scale, complete
system configured for combat, equipped with all fluids, materials, and
OCR for page 21
Origin of Testing Requirements
explosives). However, you must have an alternate plan to evaluate
system vulnerability or lethality (such as combinations of analysis,
component, sub-system, or sub-assembly testing, etc.) to fillfill the
intent of the EFT&E legislation.
21
The committee believes that, with the exception of the requirement for
full-up, full-scale testing, the requirements for waived EFT&E programs are no
less stringent than for nonwaived programs.
Recent Amendment to Waiver Provision of the Live Fire Test Law
The waiver provision of the EFT law was amended in 1994 by addition of
the following (10 U.S.C. 2366; see Appendix B for full text of the waiver
· -
provision :
[T]he Secretary may waive the application of the survivability and
lethality tests of this section to such a system or program and instead
allow testing of the system or program in combat by firing munitions
likely to be encountered in combat at components, subsystems, and
subassemblies, together with performing design analyses, modeling and
simulation, and analysis of combat data.
In making this change, Me congressional conference committee stated that
the amendment (Congressional Record, 1994~:
would make it clear that the certification which must be provided
to (~nn~re~ millet he ~libmitt^A heifer" the Or ^ - tore cuff;_
- _' _~^ _v~ · ~ · ^~ - in_ v~ V - EVA ~ ma_ ~] OL - ~l wAlL - l ~ ~11~1-
peering and manufacturing development. The effect would be to
maintain realistic survivability and lethality testing through testing of
components, subsystems, and subassemblies in cases where the
Secretary waives requirements for fills up testing .
REQUEST FOR A RETROACTIVE F-22 TEST WAIVER
The committee's third formal task (see Preface for Statement of Task) was
to discuss what happened after Milestone I] to cause the F-22 program manager
to request a waiver. The short answer is an improved understanding within DoD
of Me legal requirement.
Milestone I] for Me F-22 program occurred in June 1991 (Raggio, 19941; the
provision of the law that permits a waiver dates to 1987; and a waiver for the
OCR for page 22
22
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
F-22 program was requested in 1993. The waiver request is discussed below,
followed by the committee's assessment of what happened.
The DoD General Counsel submitted draft legislation to Congress on
October 8, 1993, "[too authorize a retroactive waiver of the survivability and
lethality testing procedures that apply to the F-22 program" (Gorelick, 1993a,
~ 993b). The draft legislation was accompanied by a plan for alternative assessment
of the vulnerability of the F-22 aircraft. The General Counsel's letter (as addressed
to the President of the Senate) and its attachments are reproduced in Appendix C
of this report. Briefly, DoD justifies its proposal as follows (Gorelick, 1993a,
1993b):
Because of the cost of an F-22 aircraft, such [live fire] testing is both
unreasonably expensive and impractical. Since the F-22 has already
entered full-scale engineering development, legislation is needed to
allow the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver. . . . tT]he Air Force
developed the revised live fire test program that . . . includes detailed
analyses, review of historical test data, and incremental build-up testing
that includes material characterization tests and live fire testing of
selected components and subassemblies. Information from the results
of these tests will be taken into account in the F-22's design.
The SPO identified two areas for potential aircraft loss: (~) fire/explosion
within the dry bay and/or filet tank ullage (i.e., the volume of the tank above the
finely areas, and (2) hydraulic-ram-induced structural failure of the fuel cells (see
Chapter 4~. The Air Force cites the conduct of limited ballistic tests, directed
energy tests, and vulnerability mode! enhancements as demonstrating its efforts in
vulnerability reduction methods.
There has been no technical change in the program to account for the change
in the Air Force's position. The history of what happened is best understood in
terms of four points:
the Air Force position on vulnerability;
the Air Force position on filll-up, filll-scale live fire testing,
confusion over the interpretation of the law; and
hope within DoD and the Air Force that the previous NRC committee
would help mitigate the requirements of the law.
Each of these points is discussed below.
OCR for page 23
Origin of Testing Requirements
23
Position on Vulnerability
Air Force briefings to this committee expressed the view that F-22 design
emphasis should be placed on reducing susceptibility as opposed to reducing
vulnerability (Hinton, 1994; Leaf et al., 1994~. Briefers also expressed the opinion
that system weight was of overriding importance and should not be Increased
significantly to achieve vulnerability reductions.
The Air Force position, at least that voiced to the committee, is that (a) F-22
qualities like speed, maneuverability, and ability to kill the enemy first are more
important to survivability than vulnerability (Hinton, ~ 994), and (b) further major
improvements in vulnerability reduction would likely be won only by more serious
losses in these other qualities (Ogg, 1995~.
Position on Full-Up, Full-Scale Testing
To the committee's knowledge, the Air Force has never planned to conduct
full-up, full-scale tests of the F-22, believing that they would be too expensive and
result in the loss of aircraft needed for other test purposes. The Air Force
estimates that full-up, full-scale live fire testing of the F-22 would cost
approximately $250 million, an amount that has not been budgeted (Raggio, ~ 994~.
Chapter 3 discusses this matter in more detail.
Confusion Over Interpretation of the Law
Confusion over DoD interpretations of the law has already been discussed.
During the previous NRC committee's deliberations in 1991 and 1992, various
service representatives and contractors expressed their understanding that then
current guidelines indicated that fil11-up, full-scale, live fire testing was not really
required (NRC, 19931. However, someone in the legal office of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) had other ideas, since the SPO (i.e., General Fain, see
above) wrote to the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in October 1991
(Fain, 19911:
We have been informed that OSD's legal council tsic] determined that
full-up "system configured for combat" testing . . . is required to meet
the intent of Chapter 139 of Title 10, United States Code, Section
2366, major systems and munitions programs: survivability and
lethality testing; operational testing. We recommend requesting a
waiver to this requirement.
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24
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
The events surrounding this correspondence from General Fain pose
something of a puzzle:
.
.
According to James O'Bryon (O'Bryon, 1992), he and General Fain
met in June ~ 991, near the time of Milestone Il. Mr. O'Bryon then had
the clear understanding that fi~-up testing would be included in the
F-22 live fire test program.
According to Charles "Pete" Adolph, General Fain never mentioned
live fire testing when he briefed the Defense Acquisition Board for
Milestone I} in June 1991.~
General Faiths correspondence seems to indicate a clear appreciation
by the SPO in October 1991 of the requirements of the law.
Finally, while General Fain's correspondence in October of 1991 was
prepared after Milestone IT in June 1991, a long time elapsed between
that recommendation to request a waiver and the waiver activity in
1993.
At least part of the explanation for this sequence of events seems related to
expectations of help from the previous NRC committee.
Help From the Previous Committee
Between mid-1991 and early 1993, when the previous NRC committee was
conducting its study, the Air Force and some DoD people apparently hoped that
the previous committee would help mitigate the requirements of the law by
recommending to Congress that the requirement for full-up, fi~-scale, live fire
testing be reduced (Hawley, 19941.2 Publication of the NRC's January 1993
report, which upheld the need for a waiver, was a critical turning point.
Several Air Force briefings to this committee referred to the
recornrnendations of the previous NRC committee arid the subsequent DoD
guidelines (Hawley, 1994; Ogg, 1995; arid Raggio, 19941. Others, who were OSD
officials in 1991, expressed disappointment that the previous NRC committee did
not take issue with the need for filll-up, full-scare, live fire testing of aircraft
(Reed, 19951:
~ As indicated in a conversation on February 8, 1995, among Mike Clarke and Harry Reed
of the Committee on the Study of Live Fire Survivability Testing for the F-22 Aircraft and Charles
"Pete" Adolph, Larry Stanford, and Al Rainis, all of whom were OSD officials involved in test and
evaluation at the time of Milestone II.
2 The February 8, 1995, conversation with Mr. Adolph substantiated this point. See note 1.
OCR for page 25
Origin of Testing Requirements
They [Adolph, Stanford, and Rainis] were of the general opinion that
the legislation is not appropriate for most of the Air Force's aircraft,
which are not expected to be highly able to survive close encounters
with bullets and warheads. Although they all felt that the legislation
had added some value to the design process for aircraft, they expressed
disappointment that the NRC EFT Committee had not challenged
portions of the law Mat bear on the amount of knowledge acquired
versus the cost of full-up testing as opposed to what was learned
through the component and sub-assembly testing.
A Lingering Question
25
In spite of all of these circumstances, there is the lingering question of why
the SPO did not request a waiver before Milestone I} (when the Secretary of
Defense could have granted it) to be on the safe side. The answer to this question
may lie in the services' reluctance to submit waiver requests, which the previous
NRC committee detected, leading it to recommend "that no stigma be attached to
the use of the waiver process" (NRC, 1993~.
F-22 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR VULNERABILITY
Design requirements that relate to F-22 vulnerability are based on its
counter-air missions principally, the conduct of offensive courter-air operations
(see Chapter I). The offensive counter-air mission placed a premium on achieving
high survivability through reduced aircraft susceptibility. Reduction of
vulnerability, although important, was deemed less sign~ficar~t.
There is, however, an explicit statement in the 1994 Test and Evaluation
Master Plan that indicates one air-to-surface mission has already been added.3
Even with this mission, the F-22 is to use internal carriage of weapons arid fly at
3 The plan (TEMP, 1994) states:
The F-22 SPO has been directed to integrate the 1000 pound Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM) on the aircraft in support of the F-22's Air to Ground capability.
The F-22 SPO is currently working with ACC [Air Combat Command] and the F-22
contractor team in further defining the actual program plan. When this planning is
complete and placed on contract, program plans which will include test planning
requirements will be available and incorporated into filture releases of the TEMP
[Test and Evaluation Master Plan]. Therefore, the January 1994 TEMP includes no
reference to the JDAM integration.
OCR for page 26
26
Live fire Testing of the F-22
a relatively high altitude. Nonetheless, the EFT law requires weapon systems with
major modifications to undergo appropriate live fire testing or request a waiver.
Presumably, a significant change in the F-22's mission (e.g., to an air-to-surface
mission, which could increase the aircraft's exposure to surface-to-air defenses)
would be considered a major modification that would necessitate additional
vulnerability assessments.
The ORD (Operational Requirements Document) identifies two general
vulnerability requirements (TAF, 19911. The first is that flame-retardant hydraulic
fluid and fuel-tart/c inerting be employed. The second is that avionics oower. and
hv~raulics be redundant. fault tolerant and damage tolerant
7 ~ __~_ In addition,
quantitative design requirements with respect to vulnerability are specified in the
contract for the F-22. These contract specifications are needed to optimize aircraft
design by addressing various tradeoffs and to assess contractor performance
(Stewart and Shipman, 1995~.
The F-22 SPO did art engineering assessment of the state-of-the-art of
vulnerability reduction technology and the desired attributes of the aircraft. The
SPO then specified vulnerability design requirements in two ways. First, general
design requirements (e.g., minimize filet dumping into the engine inlet ducts) were
specified. Second, the SPO specified that the total vulnerable area of the F-22
should not exceed certain levels, expressed in square feet, against various threats.4
The resulting wInerable areas were based on analyses of the F-22 design and were
accepted since they compared favorably to the vulnerable areas of the F- ~ 5 against
the same threats (Stewart and Shipmate, 1995~. These vulnerable areas were
coordinated with and accepted by the user and established as the contractual design
values.
The values in these specifications do not include the effects of on-board
ordnance. This assumption is addressed again in Chapter 4.
Specifications for vulnerability to high-energy microwave devices (stated in
frequencies and maximum power levels) are also included in the F-22 contract
(GiorIando, 1995~. There are no specifications for protection against laser devices
other than for the F-22's missile systems and the pilot's vision. The SPO considers
that pilot safety is satisfied by the current visor.
In summary, Me user chose to put more emphasis on reducing susceptibility,
the probability of being hit in the first place, than on reducing vulnerability, the
probability of being killed if hit. The users' choices were reflected in the
specifications developed by the SPO. For future F-22 missions (e.g., air-to-
surface), the Air Force should reexamine the balance of requirements among
susceptibility, vulnerability, arid related performance parameters.
~.
Vulnerable areas are defined as the product of the probability of kill given a random hit
(by a fragment or a bullet) and the presented area of the target aircraft (NRC' 1993).
OCR for page 27
Origin of Testing Requirements
DISPOSITION OF PRIOR COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS
27
The recommendations of the previous NRC committee fall within three
categories (NRC, 1993~: (~) clarifying and enforcing the waiver process,
(2) improving the vulnerability data base and methodology, to include the
development of cost-benefit analyses; and (3) orgaruzational arid administrative
changes in the way OSD approaches the L`FT&E program and vulnerability
assessment in general.
This committee is pleased that OSD has in fact clarified the waiver process.
The committee regrets that a cost-benefit analysis process has not been developed,
although the Air Force is making some progress in this regard (Griffis, ~ 9951. The
committee also strongly advocates that several areas of vulnerability technology
receive considerably more emphasis: the development of an empirical data base,
development of models, and experimental validation of these models. Finally, the
committee does not wish to take up the organizational and administrative
issues-partly because that would take the committee far from its stated mission
and partly because some of the reorganizations within OSD would make the
recommendations moot.
SUMMARY
Requirements Background
The events that led to the late (post-Milestone IT) request for a waiver of the
F-22 from full-up, fi~-scale live fire tests are complex. The original EFT law was
passed in fiscal year 1987, since then there has been inconsistent interpretation of
what live fire testing included. The most stringent interpretation was that a fully
configured (with armament, fuel, etc.) combat system must be used. A less strict
interpretation was that various sub-scale tests and models could be used to
simulate the full-up, full-scale test and thereby provide information on system
vulnerability. This committee (in agreement with the previous NRC committee)
believes that the most stringent interpretation of the law is correct.
The currently accepted interpretation, as contained in the ~ 994 DoD
guidelines, is quite clear on the requirements for full-up, filll-scale, live fire testing
or for a waiver from such testing prior to Milestone Il. These requirements were
subsequently reflected clearly in Air Force Instruction 99-105. If a waiver is
granted, the law instead permits live fire testing of components, subsystems, and
subassemblies to maintain realistic survivability testing.
OCR for page 28
28
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
What Changed to Cause Request for Waiver
Nothing specific to the aircraft program appears to have changed since
Milestone I] in 1991 that would have prompted the Air Force to request a waiver.
However, there appears to be a changed view of what is required to fulfill the
intent of the EFT law as it is interpreted within the DoD. The committee's
interpretation of the events is as follows.
To the committee's knowledge, the Air Force never planned to conduct
full-up, full-scare, live fire testing on the F-22. Prior to the NRC report in 1993,
the Air Force believed that the component and subassembly testing protocol met
the intent of the law. The Air Force initially based its belief on the DoD
guidelines and then apparently hoped that the previous NRC committee would help
mitigate the full-up, full-scale requirement (allowing instead the component and
subassembly test methodology). Although there was some consideration of a
request for a waiver in 1991, it was not until after the NRC report in 1993 that the
Air Force appeared to accept fully the fact that a waiver was necessary. By then
Milestone I] had Tong since passed (in mid-1991) for the F-22.
F-22 Design Requirements for Vulnerability
The F-22 was engineered principally on the basis of its offensive counter-air
mission, which emphasized reduced susceptibility over vulnerability reductions.
The user did not specify quantitative vulnerability requirements. Instead, contract
specifications for vulnerability were established by the SPO and accepted by the
user.
.
The existing vulnerability specifications arid the live fire test program do not
address fixture missions (e.g., air-to-surface) Mat the F-22 might be required to
perform. For fixture F-22 missions, the Air Force should reexamine the balance of
requirements
parameters.
among susceptibility, vulnerability, and related performance
Disposition of Previous Recommendations
The committee is pleased that the waiver process has been clarified but
regrets the lack of more progress in developing a cost-benefit methodology.
Vulnerability technology still needs considerably more emphasis on the
development of data bases and the development arid validation of models.
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Origin of Testing Requirements
REFERENCES
Congressional Record. 1994. 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140~1201: H8932.
29
Fain, I.A. 1991. Correspondence to Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
Acquisition, October 21. F-22 System Program Office.
FASTC (Foreign Aerospace Science and Technology Center1. 1992. F-22 Svstem
Threat Assessment Report (STAR), November 23. (S).
GiorIando, I. 1995. High Power Microwave. Presentation to the Committee on the
Study of Live Fire Survivability Testing of the F-22 Aircraft, F-22 System
Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January 19.
Gorelick, I.S. 1993a. Letter to the Honorable Thomas Foley, Speaker of the House
of Representatives, October 8. Washington, D.C.: Office of the General
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense.
Gorelick, ].S. 1993b. Letter to the Honorable Al Gore, President of the Senate,
October 8. Washington, D.C.: Office of the General Counsel of the U.S.
Department of Defense.
Griffis, H. ~ 995. Cost Benefit Analysis Methodology. Presentation to the
Committee on the Study of Live Fire Survivability Testing of the F-22
Aircraft, Dayton, Ohio, January 20.
Hawley, R.E. 1994. Discussion of Waiver of Live Fire Tests. Presentation to the
Committee on the Study of Live Fire Survivability Testing of the F-22
Aircraft, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., December 21.
Hinton, W.S. 1994. Threat, Mission, and Operational Requirements for the F-22.
Presentation to the Committee on the Study of Live Fire Survivability
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
fire testing
