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Appendix A
Meetings, Site Visits, and Discussions
COMMITTEE MEETING: DECEMBER 21-22, 1994
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Participants
Committee except Charles Crawford, Atari Epstein, Don Giadrosich, Robert Loewy
(see page iii for a list of committee members); NRC staff (Mike Clarke, Bruce
Braun, John Hughes, and Norm Haller); and briefers (listed with the presentations
below).
Objectives
Complete administrative matters; agree on tasking and study plan; review tentative
report outline; assign persons responsible for various sections of report; begin data
gathering from selected presenters-Air Force, OSD, congressional staff, arid others
as appropriate; decide what additional data are needed; and determine next steps.
Presentations
Threat, Mission, and Operational Requirements for the F-22. Presented by Brig.
Gen. William S. Hinton, Ir., U.S. Air Combat Compared, Requirements.
OSD Views on Waiver. Presented by Dr. Albert Rainis, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Tactical Warfare Program.
Discussion of Waiver of Live Fire Tests. Presented by Lt. Gen. Richard E.
Hawley, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition.
Overview of the F-22 Program. Presented by Maj. Gen. Robert F. Raggio, F-22
System Program Office.
99
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100
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
Congressional Views on Waiver. Presented by Mark Forrnan, Senate Staff.
Discussion of Live Fire Testing Philosophy =d the History Associated with First
Report. Presented by James O'Bryon, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Live Fire Testing.
Air Force Test and Evaluation Pearls for F-22 and Other Applicable Air Force
Aircraft. Presented by Lt. Gen. Howard W. Leaf (Ret.), Air Force Test and
Evaluation, Ralph Mae, Wright Laboratories; and Jon Ogg, F-22 System
Program Office.
Discussion of Testing for Navy Of-. Presented by John Aldridge, Naval Air
Systems Commas.
Discussion of Other Views on Waivers in General. Presented by Louis I.
Morgues, General Accounting Office.
COMMITTEE MEETING AND SITE VISIT: JANUARY 19-20, 1995
F-22 SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE,
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO
Participants
Committee except Charles Crawford, Robert Loewy, and Larry Ullyatt; NRC staff;
and briefers.
Objectives
Complete admiriistrative matters; review updated report outline; continue data
gathering from selected presenters representing OSD, the Anny, the Air Force, and
the Navy; furler refine report storyboards; panel chairs brief report status; decide
what additional data are needed; and determine next steps.
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Meetings and Discussions
101
Presentations
Special Topics. Presented by LTC John Lawless, Joint Technical Coordinating
Group, and Kevin Crosthwaite, Survivability/VuInerability Information
Analysis Center.
Vulnerability Program Overview. Presented by Jon Ogg, F-22 System Program
Office.
Vulnerability Reduction Features. Presented by John Donnelly, Lockheed Corp.,
and Jim Shipman, Pratt and Whitney.
High Power Microwave. Presented by Joe GiorIando, Lockheed Corp.
Ballistic Vulnerability Analysis. Presented by Mark Stewart, Lockheed Corp., and
Jim Shipman, Pratt and Whitney.
Live Fire Test Program. Presented by Hugh Griffis, F-22 System Program
Office.
Joint Live Fire Testing. Presented by Ralph La~z~e, Wright Laboratories.
Cost Benefit Analysis Methodology. Presented by Hugh Griffis, F-22 System
Program Office, and Ralph Mae, Wright Laboratories.
MEETING TO DISCUSS PREVIOUS NRC REPORT: FEBRUARY 8,
199S, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
(SAIC), TYSONS CORNER, VIRGINIA
Participants
Committee member Harry Reed; NRC staff member Mike Clarke; Pete Adolph,
SAIC (formerly with the Of lice of the Secretary of Defense); Albert Ravines, Of lice
of the Secretary of Defense; and Larry Stanford, TRW.
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I02
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
Objective
Discuss responses to various findings in the previous NRC report regarding live
fire testing, Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft.
COMMITTEE MEETING: FEBRUARY 16-17, 1995
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Participants
Committee, NRC staff, briefers, and additional participants listed below.
Objectives
Continue data gathering through (a) briefings, and (b) a rourld-table question-and-
answer session with invited participants.
Presentations
Live Fire Test and Evaluation of He F-22 Aircraft. Presented by Lowell
Tonnessen and Larry Eusanio, Institute for Defense Analyses.
Naw Vulnerability Testing- Results, Methodology & Modeling. Presented by
David Hall, Naval Air Warfare Center.
Army Vulnerability Testing Results Methodology and Modeling. Presented by
Paul H. Deitz, Anny Research Laboratory.
Knowledge-Based Benefit/Cost Methodology for Live Fire Test Evaluation.
Presented by TetTy Klopcic, Almy Research Laboratory.
RouncI-Table Question-and-Answer Session
Survivability and live fire testing issues were discussed by He committee, NRC
staff, and the following participants:
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Meetings an'`! Discussions
103
Chuck Brammeier, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Test and Evaluation
Paul Deitz, Army Research Laboratory
Larry Eusanio, Institute for Defense Analyses
Lee Frame, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Test and Evaluation
Hugh Griffis, F-22 System Program Office
David Hall, Naval Air Warfare Center
LCDR David Hattery, Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft
Survivability
Terry Klopcic, Army Research Laboratory
Ralph dazzle, Wright Laboratories
LTC John Lawless, Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability
km O'Bryon, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Live Fire Testing
Al Rabbis, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Arthur Stein, Institute for Defense Analyses
Jetty Wallick, Logistics Management Institute
SITE VISIT: FEBRUARY 2l, 1995
NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA
Participants
Committee members Dale Atkinson, Charles Crawford, Alan Epstein, Donald
Giadrosich, Robert Hillyer, and Milton Margolis; NRC staff members Mike Clarke
and John Hughes; and representatives from the Air Force, the Institute for Defense
Analyses, and the ITCG/AS.
Objective
To gather data regarding existing live fire test programs.
Presentations
Uses and Limits of Vulnerability Models. Presented by Dave Hall, Naval Air
Warfare Center.
The Test Data Integration Process arid Results. Presented by John Mansion,
Naval Air Warfare Center.
F/A-~8E/F and V-22 Live Fire Test Program. Presented by I. Hardy Tyson and
Tim Wise, Naval Air Warfare Center
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104
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
COMMITTEE MEETING: MARCH 21-22, 1995
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Participants
Committee except Cynthia Volkert and NRC staff.
Objective
Writing meeting held in executive session.
COMMITTEE MEETING: APRIL 27-2S, 1995
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Participants
Committee except Laity Ullaytt; arid NRC staff.
Objective
Writing meeting held in executive session.
PANEL MEETING: MARCH 3, 1995
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
Participants
Committee panel members John Bode, Delores Etter, Don Giadrosich, and Milton
Margolis.
Objective
Writing meeting.
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Appendix B
Live Fire Test Law
U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 2366, 1994
2366. Major systems and munitions programs: survivability testing and
lethality testing required before fi~-scale production
(a) Requirements - ~) The Secretary of Defense shall provide that
(A) a covered system may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until
realistic survivability testing of the system is completed in accordance with this
section and the report required by subsection (~) with respect to that testing is
submitted in accordance with that subsection; and
(B) a major munition program or a missile program may not proceed beyond
low-rate initial production until realistic lethality testing of the program is
completed in accordance with this section and the report required by subsection
(~) with respect to that testing is submitted in accordance with that subsection.
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall provide that a covered product
improvement program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production
until-
(A) in the case of a product unprovement to a covered system, realistic
survivability testing is completed in accordance with this section; and
(B) in the case of a product improvement to a major munitions program or a
missile program, realistic lethality testing is completed in accordance with this
section.
(b) Test guidelines - ~) Survivability and lethality tests required ureter
subsection (a) shall be carried out sufficiently early in the development phase
of the system or program (including a covered product improvement program)
to allow any design deficiency demonstrated by the testing to be corrected in
the design of the system, munition, or missile (or in the product modification or
upgrade to the system, munition, or missile) before proceeding beyond low-rate
initial production.
105
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106
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
(2) The costs of all tests required under that subsection shall be paid from
funds available for the system being tested.
(c) Waiver authority (~) The Secretary of Defense may waive the application
of the survivability and lethality tests of this section to a covered system,
munitions program, missile program, or covered product improvement program
if the Secretary, before the system or program enters engineering and
manufacturing development, certifies to Congress that live-fire testing of such
system or program would be unreasonably expensive and impractical.
(2) In the case of a covered system (or covered product improvement program
for a covered system), the Secretary may waive the application of the
survivability and lethality tests of this section to such system or program and
instead allow testing of the system or program in combat by firing munitions
likely to be encountered in combat at components, subsystems, and
subassemblies, together with performing design analyses, modeling and
simulation, and analysis of combat data. Such alternative testing may not be
carried out in the case of any covered system (or covered product improvement
program for a covered system) urdess the Secretary certifies to Congress, before
the system or program enters engineering and manufacturing development, that
the survivability and lethality testing of such system or program otherwise
required by this section would be unreasonably expensive and impracticable.
(3) The Secretary shall include with any certification under paragraph (~) or (2)
a report explaining how the Secretary plans to evaluate the survivability or the
lethality of the system or program and assessing possible alternatives to realistic
survivability testing of the system or program.
(4) In time of war or mobilization, Me President may suspend the operation of
any provision of this section.
(~) Reporting to Congress At the conclusion of survivability or lethality
testing under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report on
the testing to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the
Senate and House of Representatives. Each such report shall describe the
results of the survivability or lethality testing and shall give the Secretary's
overall assessment of the testing.
(e) Definitions In this section:
(~) The tenn "covered system" means a vehicle, weapon platform, or
conventional weapon system
(A) that includes features designed to provide some degree of protection to
users in combat; and
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Live
Test Law
107
.
(B) that is a major system within the meaning of that term in section 2302(5)
of this title.
(2) The term "major munitions program" means
(A) a munition program for which more than 1,000,000 rounds are planned to
be acquired; or
(B) a conventional munitions program that is a major system within the
meaning of that term in section 2302(5) of this title.
(3) The term "realistic survivability testing" means, in the case of a covered
system (or a covered product improvement program for a covered system),
testing for vulnerability of the system in combat by firing munitions likely to
be encountered in combat (or murutions with a capability similar to such
munitions) at the system configured for combat, with the primary emphasis on
testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties and taking into
equal consideration the susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the
system.
(4) The term "realistic lethality testing" means, in the case of a major munitions
program or a missile program (or a covered product improvement program for
such a program), testing for lethality by firing the munition or missile
concerned at appropriate targets configured for combat.
(~) The term "configured for combat," with respect to a weapon system,
platform, or vehicle, means loaded or equipped with all dangerous materials
(including all flammables and explosives) that would normally be on board in
combat.
(6) The term "covered product improvement program" means a program under
which
(A) a modification or upgrade will be made to a covered system which (as
determined by the Secretary of Defense) is likely to affect significantly the
survivability of such system; or
(B) a modification or upgrade watt be made to a major munitions program or a
missile program which (as detennined by the Secretary of Defense) is likely to
affect significantly the lethality of the munition or missile produced under the
program.
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Appendix C
Department of Defense F-22 Waiver Request
This appendix reproduces verbatim the letter submitted by the Department
of Defense to Congress (Letterhead of the General Coarse! of the Department of
Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301-1600, dated October 8, 1993) requesting a
waiver of live fire testing for the F-22. Included are attachments (a) Draft
Legislation; (b) Plan for Alternative Assessment; and (c) Section by Section
Analysis.
108
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Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request 109
The Honorable Al Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. President:
Enclosed is draft legislation, "To authorize a retroactive waiver of the survivability and
lethality testing procedures that apply to the F-22 program."
This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d
Congress and the Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the
Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the
consideration of Congress.
Purpose of the Legislation
Section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, requires realistic survivability and lethality
testing of covered systems and munitions programs prior to fill-rate production. The requirement
is that the covered system must be tested for vulnerability in combat by firing munitions, likely
to be encountered in combat, at the system configured for combat.
Section 2366 of title 10 allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the requirement if, before
the system enters fill-scale engineering development, the Secretary certifies to Congress that live
fire testing, of the system would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. Because of the cost
of an F-22 aircraft, such testing is both unreasonably expensive and impractical. Since the F-22 has
already entered fill-scale engineering development, legislation is needed to allow the Secretary of
Defense to grant a waiver.
In order for the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the survivability of the F-22 aircraft, the
Air Force developed the revised live fire test program that is summarized In an enclosure to this
letter. This plan includes detailed analyses, review of historical test data, and incremental build-up
testing that includes material characterization tests and live fire testing of selected components and
subassemblies. Information from the results of these tests will be taken into account in the F-22's
design. In this way, we plan to achieve Filly the objective of section 2366 in as realistic a manner
as is consistent with cost effectiveness and practicality.
The proposed legislation will authorize the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver to the
survivability testing requirements in section 2366 as they apply to the F-22 system.
Cost and Budget Data
The enactment of this legislative proposal shall not cause any increase in appropriated
Finding for the Department of Defense or have any budgetary impact.
Sincerely,
{Signed Jamie S. Gorelick]
Jamie S. Gorelick
Enclosures: Draft Legislation
Plan for Altemative Assessment
Section by Section Analysis
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Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request
115
engineers have attended meetings with Wricht LaboratorY test engineers leading
_ _ _ ~ ~ O
the test planning effort, so this series of tests can be performed in a manner which
will provide information useful to the F-22 program. Test results which can be
applied to the F-22 will be factored into the F-~. vl~lnt?r~h~litv rearm
A_ ~ · , ~e
~ ^ ~^ -d r~ ~ ^ ~^-
Depending on the review of the generic test results, some F-22 specific testing
may be required to confirm the vulnerability analysis.
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR!. In conjunction with subassembly
ballistic testing, ABDR procedures and techniques wait be developed, validated,
and verified. The Air Force ABDR Program Office from Sacramento Air Logistics
Center wall participate in this activity. The above ballistic test articles wail be
made available for ABDR activities.
High Power Microwave (HPM) Test. HEM tests will include coupling energy
into wires and connectors as well as conducted and radiated antenna tests.
Laser Tests. Laser testing wall be conducted on applicable components based
upon vulnerability reduction requirements.
Chemical Testing. The F-22 weapon system is being hardened to withstand
chemical weapons. The effects of chemical agents on the F-22 materials is being
tested using coupons (small panels) of the materials in question. Based upon this
coupon testing, materials and coatings will be selected. Selection of chemical
resistant materials and coatings will improve the F-22's ability to operate in a
chemical environment.
Hardening a fighter aircraft to chemical weapons has never been attempted.
Hence, the F-22 program has requested and received support from the Human
Systems Center (HSC) at Brooks Air Force Base and U.S. Army Dugway Proving
Grounds (DPG). HSC and DPG plan to perform a series of system level "proof-of-
concept" decontamination tests on a surrogate fighter aircraft. Availability of this
test data will allow F-22 designers to make timely and informed design decisions.
Late in EMD, the F-22 air vehicle will be exposed to a chemical agent simulant
and then be decontaminated to demonstrate the F-22 decontamination capability.
MODEL ENHANCEMENTS
As stated earlier, some of the ballistic tests selected were based upon the fact
that existing models are not adequate for all situations of interest. For example,
they are not adequate for predicting penetration of new materials, for predicting
sustained fires, arid for predicting damage when there are synergistic effects.
Ballistic test results will be used to reduce the uncertainties. Enhanced models will
in turn provide increased fidelity and confidence in the vulnerability analyses. The
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116
Live Fire Testinc of the F-22
F-22 SPO has initiated vulnerability model code enhancements. Additionally, the
F-22 SPO has requested and received Joint Technical Coordinating Group (JTCG)
support in accomplishing additional improvements.
CREW CASUALTIES
Crew casualty reduction is one of the critical factors identified in the Live
Fire Test legislation. A number of the tests described above wait yield information
which will be used to minimize crew casualties. In keeping with the spirit of the
legislation, an effort has been made to design the aircraft for reduced casualties
from all sources (e.g., ballistic impact, fire, smoke) and to facilitate Me safe escape
of the crew in the event the aircraft is lost.
SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS [ENCLOSURE C;
LIVE-FIRE SURVIVABILITY TESTING OF F-22 AIRCRAFT
This amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report
explaining how the Secretary plans to evaluate the survivability of the F-22 system
and assessing various alternatives to realistic survivability testing. The provision
also would require the Secretary to ensure that major components and subsystems
that could significantly affect the survivability of the F-22 be made available for
live-fire testing.
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
fire testing
Appendix D
VuInerabili~cy Assessment Process
The body of this appendix reproduces pages 1 1 to 18 (numbered here as pages D-1 to D-8) of
the National Research CounciT's 1993 report Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft. Citations called out
within the text are included in a reference section from the original report, at the end of the text.
What Are the ~aS to Military Aircraft?
When the military began to use aid ~ Woo, ~ oppos-
mg forces began mug weapons ~ an ~ ~ destroy
them. In the ~ half of Me twentic~ century, guns were
the primary weapons used against assail These gum were
either s~ce-based or Ted by enemy ~ They
ranged from the small alms weapons, such as the 0.3/0.303-
mch (7.62~7.7-minimc=) and 050
118
Live Fire Testing: of the F-22
tile airman to avoid (being damaged by) the man-made
hostile en~arnent and is mcasumd by Pa, the probability
Me airway is bit by a wan while on its minion. the
aid atrnbac known as ~rulnerabili~ refers to the inabilitr
of We abesaft to wind Idle damage causal by the) hostile
env~ment and is meal by P-~ the City the
aid Is killed giveD Eat it is hit Ihc pso~r tbc
his killcdby ap~arwcapon while onthc~on
is PA which is equal to PH.P - . The probability the ahoy
sunrives the encounter wide the weapon is Ps, which is equal
to 1-Pa, which is Be sync as 1-POP - . Thus, Cog
an aimeft's sub (PH) add w1~ (do) to the
weapons likely to be expound in Cal increases its
s~vi~ity. An aimaR's susceptibility c" be sit be,
desu-D - g the enemy ad detessc dana=, by reducing Be
t~s signatures (st~hh), by Oblong outboard and
off-board ~ w=Dmg Cons "d eclectic comeamca-
su~es, and by the ~ 0,plc~yst. An simah's wIn~-
I~ - ~g~
nam, bar locating ads to mint; the "ssibilhy
and Cal of damage, by dig al to cam
or m~ the effem of ~e, by Cog so em
newt to suppress Tic damask by shielding comb and
by removing mlnelablc co~xmcms Tom the ~cigm A tray
imps aspect of vu~abiligr Induction is do my
design flanks arc effects ages a namer of diffe~em
don weapons. For cxa~lc, locating abundant flit con-
mol hydraulic Cubs on opposite sides of the aircraft
and inking the fill ionic pulses will pm~dc pi
ham both gun projectiles and pro~y-fuzed missiles in
most simations. Thus, ~ Boy siphons it is not necessary
to consider aII of die individual Is when designing the
abaft.
Cr~ComponentsandEsscr~lFun~ons. E=hcom-
ponent in the Allah has a level, die. or amok of
Salability to the Dane ~i~ genmated
by tic Cat weapon; ~ - cut h cc~o~t's ~1
contributes ~ some mat ~ do vu~abilit,,r of die Cot
~e wow lcill IS used bees m ~ ~1 ~ 1~ vul~
mad cot uses HI defied of~lcill. TO _olldI1 he
the ambim 1511 ant Be ~ abon AIL 1~ ~ ~1 levels of
An bed upon ~ ~ ~ ~m ~ - ~ Fat ~
~ Kit rcl ~ IciII Us did as ~ ~ m ~ Me ad ~11s om
of coal ~ 30 ~ after tie ha, and We A Icon is deft-d as
which me ad fills om of coda ~ 5 ~ Par the ~
'Dam, I, ~ en, ~ai~ ac tie Ott-of die the-Ward
~ Cager ~ ~ do ~CafL The Apes of Amp ~ ~-
and ~ pastor "d ~v agleam am _ hag-
~smd~LD~Fp~s~
of ~cd~ _ tubed-dies_- Ibex
pew ~ ash ~ deaf ~ ~ here ~ bend
~ ~ ~ ED (m me form of ~ fin or e - - an),
hyd~nlie or hy~c saw "d bled bet
airman The critical components on an aircraft are Bose
componeDss whose kill result in Me loss of an essential
fimcdo~L Esscadal functions are those fimcuons mogul to
prevent an aid 1511. The essential functions that prevent
an antilog kin am ii*, dam and control of Bight, "d the
ability to land safely. Na~ga*on and wee ons delivery am
two possible ~ fusions for a Con am lcilL AD
epic of a critical con~onent for the anion Icil1 is the
~ingac pilot who controls the digllt of the aid If the
pilot ~ killed tic., helshe is unable to persona the Unseal
f~on of control of tic ahead) the d is go killed
An exile of a apical component ~ an ~ al
for the Con abort kill ~ tic weapons ddiYe~y cony.
~ Tic computer is Kim, the weapons canon be Leased at
the cost time; I, the pilot will rc~ to base
"or to Con co~letion.
Cw~ems that do not co~ibu~ to any of the essa~al
from Axle ethical When they response to a ha tie.,
Weir kill mode) cmses Be kill of another colons that
is critical ~ it colltributes to an essential fimctiom For
aulmple, Wader the by Gamed on-bo~d an ark
~ ~hc bombs do not contribute to the ~ f~c-
dons for flight of lift, ~ and control However, if one
of the bombs explodes why hit by a flagmen or bullet.
Id the e~l~on kills t}lC pilot or any over critical cat
Ned on the aid the bombs arc critical components
bounce their ~11 mode (explosion) e~rcn~lly le" to a ~1
of the airman The propagation of damage In tic hit
cw~ to other u~mpona~s is known as ~;ng dam-
age. Pyrotechnic hems, such as inhaled flame, are also ~-
cal comports when Bed Revlon to a hit Lads to a fi=
and Be eternal loss of the airman
The cndcal components can be nonred~m~, su:h as
Be single pilot and single Cole on a single-pilo~ sm~e-
et~ =aft, 0~ reduced such as the nvo end on
a two~giDed ail When Be cnuca1 components are
redundant, a ~ of more In one of Be redo compo
nab is ~ for a 1~11 of the aid In get, the
c~iacal component on a particular aircraft depend only Won
the sd~ 1511 Argosy (and leveL if alias) Ed the
assumed kill maws), and not upon the dead wend
The probe used to die all of the no
and Imp ~ compounds on ~ Ada* is lcoown
At the cubical component Crisis. Two direct types of
;~lyscs c" be used, ~ Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FLEA) and Be Fault Tree Analysis - -A). ~ the FMEA,
all possible failure, damage, or kill modes of a component
or subsystem me identified and the consequence of each
by Marc cad mum wines mug ·~ ~nu~-
met ~ to the Em. ~iy for ~ grids
in ~ Sb~ nip concern is Id In tic ~ opt
2 - d4.
Graft to follow 3 for several exiles of 1~ dots
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft
~9
_
TABLE l-1 List of Some Subsystem Damage Caused Failure (Kill) Modes [BalL 1985]
Fuel Subsystem
Fuel supply depletion
In tank S=/e~10s~on
Void spa" fi~/e~losion
Summed c~or
Hydraulic ram
Power TrainlRotor
BladclPropc~lor Subsystem
Loss of lubrication
Mech~ical/~al damage
Etec~ical Subsystem
Scv~g or grolmd~g
Mechanical failure
0~8
Propulsion Subsystem
Fuel mignon
_ . . . . .
Foragn object mScsDon
Inlet flow di~rnon
ricanon station
Compressor case p~f~=
Combustor case pofo~on
T - inc section fable
F~h~l'~ dun few
Eng~c c=~ol/acc~oncs
flub
Crew Subsystem
Icy, incapaci~o~ or Ash
Aunt Subsystem
F=Jc - 106ioc
Flight Control Subsystem
Disruption of corm al path
Loss of control power
Loss of airy motion data
Damage to control surfaces
Hydraulic fluid fire
Seal Subsystem
SO removal
EN of - cad
Normal wig
Pa~oD
AYiO~ Subsystem
PeDamor~t damage
F-c~los~o~o~ cat
component failure/dam~ge~ll mode upon each of the essen-
hal functions Is de~amincd.' Id He FTA, those component
or subsystem kill modes Red to cause the loss of Tic
essential fi,ncuons a" deter
Kill Modes. For many yew the aimah vulnerability com-
muni~ has observed He results of live fire testing of compo
nests, subsystems, and aircraft and has examined the combat
data on damaged and killed ai~af' ~ order to define
~ of He kill modes associate with each of He airman
subsystems. For example, Mete are Eve ~11 modes ass~
wad He feel subsystem. When a fuel milk is holed by a
pene~or or fragment, a catastrophic explosion or major
fi= may occur inside He lank or foci may leak from He
hole ~ the tank into an adjacent void space or dry bay and
catch 0, or hy~ic ram Arm to die fuel tank wall
may cause a major special failure of He tank or allow
fuel to dump into engine in ok:e dents, causing an engime
kill A list of some of Tic possible kill mom far each of
the major subsystems on an alphas been compiled based
Ron these observations and studies. Figs List is presented
In Table 1-1.
"lbe kill modes listed in Table 1-l describe different types
of Ron the: components or subsystems in He aimah
exhibit when the aircraft is hit. In some of the kill modes,
the component hit is Tic only component lulled whereas in
others, the component hit Is ~ the hit in a mode that
Abbe rcladon between a co~o~ or swam flails mode and comb - -
causet damage or kill mocks ~ developed m the Damage Mode and Effects
Ad.
kills other components. An example of the former is the
loss of flight control due to a hit ~ a hydraulic power actuator
But causes a jam of the actuator and a loss of control of the
con-1 surface. An example of the lam is a foci ingestion
kill of an endue due to a hit on a fuel tank adjacent to the
am inlet. Reducing the v~erabili~ of an airman to the
Heat weapons and Heir damage mechanisms involves rc-
ducing Tic likelihood the kill modes given ~ Table 1-1 will
occur when He airman is hit.
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA'. As an
example of the FMEA process, consider a s~gle~ngine
airman with only two fuel tang, one ~ each Hog. The
tam are partially full, and there He fuel vapors in the 'alleges
of Tie Am. The possible kill modes for Tic fuel subsystem
am given ~ Table 1-1. One fuel tank kill mode is an comply
soon ids the tank. If the consequence of the internal e~lo-
sion in either wing tank is Tic destruction of the wing con-
~g ~ mnlc which then ~ a kill of the airman disc
to loss of lift, both Hug *eel tanks are no~undane Critical
components for the amition kill for He Renal explosion
kin mode. On the other hand, suppose the kill mode of the
tanks is a loss of fuel storage c~abiliy due to one or more
holes in the bonom of the tang If this ~11 mode occurs
only one tank, this Bill not lead to a loss of Rust due to
fuel supply depletion when the Damaged tank can provide
fuel to the engine. However, if both tanlcs are holed and
lose their suffrage capability, then a fuel supply depletion
*{be allege is the volume of we Tic above the fuel lc~cL Fun ~5
arc m the ullage.
120
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
kill will occur, the ~ will lose Bush and an aurinon
kill win result Thus, for this kill mode, the fuel tonics am
It cnU~ ~.
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In He FTA process, the
sell kill category (and possibly level) is dewed as tic
to~level undes~le evem, and the component Icm
to carted the Imdes~le erred "c died. Tic compo
mat kill that cult ~ the Impel Chew are links togt~ber
~ the fault Ned by Dig logical AND and OR gales. Fir
example, consider an away with components A, B. C, and
D. An undesirable kiI1 will occur if em colonel A OR
B is killed, or it may occur if both component C AND D
~ killed. Thus, c~ponc~ts A and B are non~du~
mdcal combs, Hi components C and D arc Tunic
conical colons. Id using FTA for tic feel mnlc expels
glares above, one undac~le eared leading to ~ anon
kill is loss of lift. If loss of lift occurs due to an e~l~oa
inside the left wmg fuel ~ a campone~ A kid OR if it
occurs due to am c~plmio~ mode the light wmg Em, a
componem B Ici8, bow wing foci tanks me n
cndcal component forge explosion kill motile Oar the of
hand a loss of ~ will occur if Bog tanks A AND B
are killed Our die fuel sway depledon ~11 mode). Thus,
the ~ arc ~m~ conical components for this ~11
modic. As another example of FTA, Add a two~gmcd
ahaafL The ~ even' of loss of Bust, which leads
go ~ attrition kin, will of when die led engine AND He
right come ale km~ Thus, dress two comes are
ndant cnucal components. A list of tic ~yEncal Local
component on a siDgl~piloted, tweed helicopter is
gi~rcn in Table 1-2.
The Kill Tree. A view Ivan of all of the conical
components and their redundancies is provided by the kill
~ee,9 such as the one shown in Ogre 1-1 for an anon
kill of a Nero engined, two-piloted helicopter. A complete
honzontal or diagonal cut Lough the tree tnmk any~erc
along tic trunk ~1 ~a't~ a kilt For example, a ~11 of die
pilot and either die copilot or He copilot's consuls iNiI1
cause a kin, as will a kill of the drive main or alar of die
He cyclic Its. If the Em mode of the left- and ngb~-
band fuel tails is fuel supply depletion' bob tam must be
killed to Cause a ~11 of do aims On Be other he- if
Be kill mode is a fuel fin: or Close then a kill of cipher
omk will Ici]1 Be Cafe Once Be mucal component have
be" imbibed and amaged in the 1611 ~e, a vulnmabiliy
assessment can be pet med.
Wbat Id a V - embed ~n~t?
A vu~aa~ibr ~meSl' is brolly defined hoe
die sync demon, delineation, test and e~ral~ion,
analysis, orq~ificanon of the vuloasbility of the ind~id-
ual critical component and of die total aid When as
al is hit by one or more damage mechanisms Ed
by Be dam weapon, the outcome of those hits is not deter-
minishc; it Is random or s~a~c.'° For ex~lc, when 15
hagmcn~ from ~ pro~ty-fuzed high~~losi~c ~rarhcad
pme~e Tic upper wall of an Aft's Bog fuel Ala the
Epic veer inside die tank may explode, des~ymg
the wmg and killing Tic ad or the orator may not
by ~ sac is also reared to as the few ~c.
HA d~icplocess has ar~blc outcome that c~bc~dic~d
with Icy if all of Tic if pars "d govem~g he's sac
~ R~or~cp~es he~re~plc ore,
any or of whim may os may Dot oar: on my ogle ~aL
TABLE 1-2 List of Typical Nomedundant and Redundant Cridcal Components on a
S=gle-Piloted. TwmE~i Helicopter (Bali, 1985)
Norman Crime Condones
R~a Conical Components
1
Flight Control Subsystan Co~onasu
Red I, pitch ~ Splay
hy~ic ac~S co~ec~rc Icver, asked
cordon pahls
Rotor Blade and Power Tray Consonants
Blades, disc sham, moor heads, ~
_om "d gc~xes
Fud Subsystem Consonants
Fun cells, sump, lid, "d valves
Sure Subsystem Con~ponen~
Tail boom
Propulsion Subsystem Componam
1~5 and "gme mousers
Hydraulic Subsystem Components
Hydraulic reservoirs, lines, and co~o~ts
S~c~al Subsystem Components
Redundant Cal clemc~ts
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment o f Aircraft
,~,
~ PtL0T >(COtilDT ~
.
'I ~
( COIITROLS' ) ( COIITI DLS, )
L . I
l
Us,
.
~-~
( HID~UUC ( H'OReWLC )
~#
Cal
~ bib
r FUEL SU,P~
I DEPL£ItO!
1~
, . FEEL FIRES
C ~t ~ElPLOS101
FIGURE 1-1 TO amidon l~l~cf~atw~piloted, two~gined helicoper(BaLt, 198S). C~ght ~ ALAA 1985 - Jsed m~ pamisnom
explode, and Me annular sunrives We 15 hits. The Iilcel~ood
of an explosion inside Tic rank depends upon mmy random
variables, such as Me amount of fuel vapor, Me oxygen
conception in the Enemy of the Sagmcats, and the tan-
pera~e of me fragments.
How 16; Vulnerability Meas~?
As a consequence of the random nature of vulnerability,
the metric most often ~ to q~n~ Me vulnerability of
an airways conical componen~c is Pall,, the probability the
component is killed Even a random hit on the component
by a tow weapon or damage m~hanism.~' The value of
P.,,. depends upon Me Away ofthe~ effects parame-
t~ ass~iamd with the damage minim such as mass
and impact velocity on the component for pene~s and
fragments. The set of come PA values for different
masses and impea velocities is known ~ He Pa,, from
A Pond metric used to q~r a component's vulnerabil-
i~ is As, the vulnerable area of the componcDt Component
vulnerable area is defined ~ c presented Ma of He compo
nent that, if hit, would cause a kill of die component and is
equal to He product of the components Rented area Ap
in the Mat approach Lion and its P'`h, i.e., As = A, Up,,
ItOther my somber used for component ~b~ ~ Pa
the pr~bili~ a compC is ~ ~ a hit, arcs ~cmov~, eden
y, and buss
l
1
Ihc metrics used to quantify me vulnerability of tic
airman to a single random hit by a penetmor or a~-
fi'~1 warhead include Ply. the probability the away is
killed given a random hit on the aid and An, the aims
single hit vulne~lc archly The metric Ad to quantify the
vuln~abilin~r of an ahead to tile proximity- and dme-fuzed
B warheads on AAA projectiles and Sidled missiles is Plus,
the probability the ad is killed given ~ external detona-
lion by a high+XPIOSiVe Warh-C1 The PI S a function
Of the 10CaiiOn Of the detODaDOn point USA respect to the
aircraft.
What Are me Two Methodologies Used to Assess
Vulnerability?
ID gee . there are two methodologies Used to assess
affray VUI~eiaBiii~Y. One method is the a Ron Pads On
Of aid VUIneraBiiitY by usmg analyses Or modeling. AS
mC`hOd iS nearly always SUPPOr~d by prior live fire test
data on component Pith values for He venous kill modes.
However, the Ads have open been obtained on older equips
mend The odor method is tile a postenon observation and
~-
:~rcrmsc ~ 0= to a compa~ asd uppamsc ~5
Oft to Tic Dow Thus. P" is me By a c_ is killed ~
a random hit on the comport I'M is Me prob~ili~ a composer is Pact
given a ~ hit on the airway and P,UH is the probability the Emit
is wed gum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
122
possible measllrEment of airman ~nerabili~r by using em-
pincal dam obtained mom either actual combat, aberaR ~-
dlents, or controlled live fire ~g,13 This method is nearly
always suppmed by a pnon predictions of vulnerability
psiorto testing to dome me test conditions Id by apos~non
analyses or evaluation of He ~ A brief renew of the
stste-of-thc-an of vulnerability analysis/modeling "d vol-
nelabiligr tog is Men below.
An~sis/ModeZ~g~ Ibep~ediction of ~ ai~'s vulner-
ability to the balls projectiles and gaidlcd Similes likely
to be cocounen:d ~ combat can be accompanist by mug
stand~di~d computer pi One set of prams is
applicable to ~ Ogle hit by im~cHng pcueualor or ftag-
me~ Compulsion of V~nasble Area and Repair r~mc
(COVART) is the Joim Tecimical C~ Group on
A0mft Stability (]TCGlAS) sods Pogrom for com-
pu~g the critical component vul~adble areas Al and tic
a~'s truly-le area ^' far a single random hit by a
penes or Foment (lTCG/ME, 1984). Anodler set of
Logjams comma; ~ ~rulne~iliy to con~ct-fi=ed
HE warheads that dHonatc on the space or within the
at High Explosive Vulnerable Area and Reps r~mc
(HEVAR13 (BRL, 1978 and HEI Vulaasbiligr Assessment
Modd1 0=VAM) ~ In:., 1979) are exiles of this
type of ~gram. A did set, Mown as endgame programs,
computes the probabBi~ an aid ~ killed due to an ex~r-
na1 but of ~ HE wash - ~1 SCAN (Damon U~ersit~r Ohio
Research minter 1976) is tbe current ITCGlAS endgame
model for computing ~ aids PAD. Modally Endg~
Computer Asses~em (MECA), Jowt Sennces Endgamc
Model Asset. SESTEM ~ (ASD/WPAFB. 1981), and
SHAZAM (Air Force AlmamcIlt LAb.lE0in AFB, 1983) are
four over widely used endgame programs.
All of these vuln~abiligr assessment programs require
as Out a ~e~mens~1 data base Cat defines the geo
medic model of the aid Me geometric modal may be
combed within the Addability assessmaa program, ~
in SCAN, or it may be developed in a Mate program'
such as MAGIC, Balliaic Research Many Compaer-
Aidled Design (BRL CAD) package, or PASTGEN m'
which are '`~ as prowesses for COVART. Ibis model
should contain all of the airways components, equipment,
and supplies, induding such items as fun, hy~ic fluids
'A and awn ~ are cry Music ~ "~ ~ tic
od~cr~hg~ but Hey arc limited m scope, limited m Be infon~
on do ~c of the Crew and cot always mi~blc for dada ~
'~be shim T~l ~ng Gap on AT Sw~ has
chablis a Lucy of compute ohms for assessing die Ability.
vuh~abil~r, ~ Viva of I. Be Libra is-~ "d
Opined by ~ Sub - /V_y Afoot ~ A - Us Can
tcr (St'RWAC) at the WE A_l hobo - ~
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
and ordnance. However, because of He limitations on pros
gram size, av~lahle time, and manpower, many small non-
cniical components that are not expect to influence the
results are oft omi.tted.~5 Another sub-mm that has oven
been omit in vulnerability ~nemS ~ the on-board
Penance in the fog of bombs, missile warheads and propel-
lants, and Audubon Mums. On most aircraft, bombs and
similes a" ~cd cxtanally. Id this position, play may
shield other compote Cam proje~es and f = s, or
they may mat ~riol~ndy to a ballistic impala (e.g., die)
and destroy the away The new scald at cony ord
Dance intanaBy m order to reduce signatures. Adverse rcac-
tions of any in~a11y canted ordnance, such as a dedagra-
tion or a lion have ~ even greeter probibili~ of
desb~o~g the Mafia Me omission of on-board "dnancc
mom He as~sCatad is ~c~ in more detail ~ Oapters
2 and 4.
Anod~r if reqli~sement for the assessment is the kill
tam (or logical kill expressions for the smiled kill category
(and level if ap~iatc). As tam defines the r~mdaI't
Ad n~ond~ components that if lulled India tally The
single engine on a sm~e~cogmed ~ah) or in ~bina~ion
(bosh engmeson a two engmedaimah~willcauscaDai~
kin. Assumed with em critical componcm on the Sac is
a ~ base that contains He PA or Av value for the component
that is based upon He selected it weapon or die
mech~m and He possible ~angc of impact eclectics on
Tie insured component, for tie kill modes cons~dacd
Tic conical componem analysis.
Vulnerability to a Single Hit by a Penetrator or Frag-
ment. All of the vulnerability assessment programs contain
an assumption ~ to how the itemize mechanic; as~iamd
wad the weapon proceed through the Cam The COVART
methodology resumes that the penetrator or fragment from
any selected diamond is equally likely to impact He aiIcraR
at any lion and that it propagates along a sage lme,
lmown as a shoddy, Hugh the abaft slo~gdown and
possibly Hang up tic itpene~s the venous camponems.
l~c amount of Tent or penet~tor slowdown is dd=-
mined by tic peDe~:ion equations that are a part of He
built-m data ~c. Ricochet of the Cement or for is
not cousin An additional assumption often made is that
only the components that arc intersected by one shotline can
be lulled by the hit along Hat shodine. This assamphon
rules out He possibility of caching damage away from the
shodine." ~ the analysis, me presented area of the airman
Gibe COVART model f" ~ F-= ~ =13 ~= of
which ~iy hi arc AL
'A dew Any sd~ i - ~ ~ six ~ ~5
~ lop, Aim Ic£t side. and next 5idc' and may include me
45~ee angles bin these six ~news.
'7It '5 possible to ~ He idled componeDt's PI to
At l~c of adjacent COlDpO~
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment o f Aircraft 123
. ~
FIGURE 1-2 Example of a grid and it showed ~ FASIGEN for COVART (BalL 1985). Ccpyri~ ~ ALLA 1985 - Jsod
with pamissiom
mom He smelted &-eaion is coved by a usifo~ ~d'
and one sbodine is Icy local wow etch call An
example of tile Tom shotlincs within the cells for apanic-
ular away is show ~ Algae I-2.
The user has the option of sag We Miff cell size.
Typical cell sew range Hem 12 inches to 1 inch on a side,
win 2 Inches being typical A ~ssorprogram~ known
as a shone generator program, such as MAGIC. BRL-
CAD, or FASTGEN m, i~ifies all of the cndcal compo
nents ink by each shodine. This infammion is Out
"a for COVART. COVART composes Me vulnerable area
of each Critical component and the aberaft's single hit ~
neable area, as well as the probability We aid is killed
by a random hit For componem vu~emble areas, each Ad
cell containing a sho~ne that Insets a component has a
vulnerable area equal to the product of Be presented area
of the cell Andre P`,,, fought shore Rough the component
The total vul~eshle area of the component is the sum of
the vulnerable areas of those cans wide shotlines ~ int=-
sect Me component For the aberah vulnerable arm An, ~
Ed cell shown in Fanfare 1-2 contributes a ~rulne~abk area
equal to the Product of the preset area of He cell and
the probability the aircraft is killed by a hit along Arc shotline
in Cat ccll.l' Lee total al vulnerable area is equal
to the stun of the vu~asble areas of each of Arc cells.
Consequently, r~dant compose-, if sepma~ that bow
are not ink by one shoreline' do not contnbum to the
aids single hit vulnerable area for that shodinc.'9 Ihc
P'c,ff for the airman is equal to the A., of the airman divided by
As, He aiders presented area from die sclec~d di~om
armed. mom ~ one DQ~ on, c_ is ill
by a sew die p~bili~ the ~ is lulled is equal to the cam of
the ~ ~bifides of IcilL
'Ws s the result of He qrdon Cat only He compoDam ~-
sa:~1 by Be show can be ~ A moddi~on of the PA value for
a component can be Inane to Flow a hit on oac component to cause a ~11
offs
Vulnerability to a Co~t-Fuzed High-~xploswe War-
h~ fly dot sync cat l~dUD IS foBo~
for con~-fuzed high~c~pl~vc warheads. A tic
model ofthea~aft: ekill~c, "d the cndcal condone
PA or At ~ are I A Ed is Unposed on the
aircrew and a shodine is randomly local wok each cclL
lbe differ - oc between this analysis for the cod-*
HE warhead and the analysis for He single pene~or or
knew is He fast that componems in the Unity of the
shodinc can be lulled by the blast and Intents from tie
demotion of the HE warhead Thus, Indent Focal com-
poncnn that arc Maturely close together can be hilled by a
single bit, causing a 1611 of the Adam Flgme 1-3 shows
die Ed cell and randomly located shodines for this type of
analysis. Note ~ ~ this fight the HE warhead detonation
~ cause a kill of bod1 the foci tank and the en~c even
though neither component was hit dinky by the whom
Vulnerability to an E=ernally Detonanng High-Explosive
Warhead. The analysis for the exumally detonating HE
washed, shown in Alga 1 - , follows the same McClure
used for the single pene~or or fragment, except that the
fragment shodines fig mom He c~temal dc~adon
are radial Car then parallel, "d He aid can suffer
mu~plc fragment impels over its surface rather ~ a
single hit Id addidon, the blast from the detonation can ~11
do aid Me ~ssmcut of the hill of the aid by
external blast is usually made independently from the fiag-
ment assessment Three~mensional blast contours around
the aircraft am Mined as a function of HE weight
Within a p~cular blast kill contour for particular explosive
choke weight, a detonanon of a warhead with that charge
weigh or larger fill kill He a~af.L
Resultsirom the Analyses. The results or islformmon ok
~cd from an analyncal assessment of aid ~Inerabili~
BURST POINTS
PK.IHb
1
. _
~ . ~
Ha. -
. ~\ ~ _ ~ _
. ~ At&
Ab
Live Fire Testing of the F-22
~:
FIGURE 1-3 Grid cats ant ~ for the -fizzed high arplo5Nc weapon (BalL 1985) Colt 6:} AIDE 198~Jset With
. .
~om
_
~ VQO ~>
~C
~,_,
FRAG~TS~
a' "a - ~
FIGURE 1 4 ~ ~ - ~ ~ By fig ~ ~ ~^ 1985). C~= ~ ~ 198~U~ m~ ~i~
for the single hit bar a pme~amr or Anew Epically con-
s~ts of predictions of the values of vulne~lc area At for
all of the Micas comports - , the aimoft vul~ablc Ma
A:,' Me probability the Ada* is killed Ben a bit wow
each and cell and the probabiligr the aimaff is killed gnrcn
a random hit P - . The assessment results for the single hit
by the con~-fi:zed high~xplosi~re warhead colt of the
aid vulnerable Sea A, Ad Tic probability of ~ gird
a random hit on the aircraft PA- Ins results of an agent
for the cx~nally dog warhead consist of the probabil-
iffy of kill of do critical components inte~l by the hag-
ment shotlines Tom He warhead detonation, Tic prob~li~
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft
125
of aircraft kill due to blast, and Me probability of aircraft
kill given a detonation PIUD
References
Aerlmaunca1 Systems Dixon (ASD), 1981. l~pacm of Engine
Vul~aabili~r Unca~es on AS Sumvabilincs, Wnght
Pa~ Air Force Base, Ohio, AD N~ber:C037839.
Air Form A_ Tory, 1983. User Manual for sac
Aim - Air Mime Tam SHAZAM, Eglin AD Fox BE
Fla' AD N~B1049S9.
· Balk RE. 198S. Tic Fu~aaals of AT S~`raWity
Analysis and Desigm African TO of Aamautics "d
As~cs. 1^ New Yam
· Ballistic Research I_y (BRL), 19?8. "=VART-An Id-
~ Sit on PA forthc lion of HEI Vulnes~-
blc AS Ed R - ir Ramsey Abe P"~g G==d' ME
AD Numbe~30817L
· ~ ldc., 1979. High-Exploa~rc incendiary Vuinasbiligr
Model VAMP, Volume 1, Us" May, For' Walton Bc~
Fly, AD Number.B107811L
· Dayton Uni~raspy Ohio Reseezch Impinge, 1976. SCAN-A
Conquer Program for Stability Analysis, Volume 1, User
Manual, AD N~:8068149L.
· Dcim P.~, a al * 1990. Cur Sun~*on Methods in Military
Systems Vulnerability Assessment, Ballistic Research l~bora-
tory, Ab~n proving Gm~md* ML. BRL-MR-3880.
· Joint Typical C - Indicating Gmop for Mentions Efic~vcDcss
(]TCGJME), COVART II -A Simulation Program for Computa-
tion of Vul~c~sblc Areas end Repair Lyrics -Users Manual. 1984.
Government Rc~t Number:61 ~TCG/ME 84 3.
· National Research Council (NRC), 1989. Am~ored Combat
Vehicle VuL~c~ili~r to An~i-annor Weapons, A Review of the
Amy's Assessmcat Methodology, Committee on a Review of
Army VuLdc~ability Ass~nent Methods. Board on Anny
Science and Technology, Colon on En~een~g and
Tecimical Systems, Washington, D.C: National A~ny
PI .
O'BIYOn, James F.. 1991. Presen~On made IO the Committee
On WaN>0nS Effects On A~nC S~mS. JUIY 24.
U.S. C0ngieSS, 1986 1989. SUnri~Fabili~ and LC!halitY Testing
Of Major Systems, DoD AUthOnZa~iOn ACE, FY86~Sec. 123,
PY87~ec. 910 Sa:. 910, FY88 89 See. 80~
· U.S. COQgrCSS, 1988. FY88~9 DoD Authon~on Act Contcr-
encc Report Li~c-F'rc Testing (Sec. 802~.
· U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 1987. Live Fire Tcs'-
ing, Evaluating DOD's Programs, GAO/PEMD-87-17, Wash-
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