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OCR for page 1
Executive Summary
The U.S. Army is currently pursuing its modernization
vision, which recognizes that information and its effective
use will be key to tomorrow's military victories. Future
battlefields are slated to become large digital networks
carrying vast amounts of information for real-time use by
commanders and soldiers. The goal is to provide the right
data, at the right place, at the right time. This study
addresses the multimedia technologies that exist or are
emerging in the civilian sector and could help the Army
achieve its goal.
BACKGROUND AND APPROACH
Recognizing the potential of commercial multimedia
technologies for Army use, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Research and Technology asked the
National Research Council to examine the applicability
of such technologies to Army command, control, com-
munications, and intelligence needs. The Committee on
Future Technologies for Army Multimedia Communica-
tions was tasked to (1) review the Army's needs for
echelons at the corps level and lower, (2) review relevant
commercial multimedia technologies, (3) recommend
technical approaches for meeting Army needs with com-
mercial technologies, (4) describe the battlefield potential
that might result from the application of multimedia
technologies, and (5) recommend a technology manage-
ment strategy by which the Army can use commercial
multimedia technologies.
The committee focused initially on requirements as
seen by the "customer"in this case, the Army. It next
reviewed relevant commercial technologies, from the
perspective of status and trends. Each of these building
block technologies and the Army's requirements were
then brought together in a way that highlighted, for each
technology, whether the Army should (a) adopt it off-
the-shelf, (b) adapt it, or (c) pursue Army-specific devel-
opment.
The committee examined how battle command in a
typical Army corps combat operation might be affected
by emerging multimedia information networking capa-
bilities. The committee also reviewed macrolevel expe-
riences in the private sector associated with applications
1
of multimedia technologies. The resulting perspective
formed the basis of committee projections concerning the
need for the Army to "reinvent" itself in order to gain the
full benefits of multimedia technologies. Finally, the
committee laid out the essential elements of a technology
management strategy for the Army.
The committee determined that the time frame of its
study would extend approximately 15 years into the
future (i.e., from 1995 to 20103. The earliest impact of the
new multimedia technologies, beyond experimental and
ad hoc applications, is expected to occur around the year
2000 as they are first deployed into operational units. The
Army's Enterprise Strategy envisions widespread deploy-
ment of applications associated with digitization of the
battlefield by the year 2010. The committee believes that
multimedia information technologies and applications
are evolving so rapidly that it is not realistic to project
their nature and specific implications for Army battle-
fields more than a decade into the future. However, the
committee also believes that its recommendations on
technology management apply today and will continue
to apply beyond the time frame of the study.
The remainder of this summary conveys the major
findings that resulted from the committee's work and the
principal conclusions and recommendations.
ARMY REQUIREMENTS
The Army has recognized the power of information
and the technologies for handling and processing infor-
mation on the battlefield. A smaller Army, based primarily
in the United States and required to respond rapidly to
worldwide contingencies, must have continuous access
to accurate, current information. Commanders must be
able to use information and protect it. Commanders at
all echelons must have a shared, common understanding
of real-time battlefield truth. Wrong information, misin-
formation, or disrupted access to information can be
potentially disastrous. Army leaders and requirements
documents put priorities on the following operational
needs:
.
Improved Sit2~ationalAwareness. Situational aware-
ness demands the accurate and timely (real-time)
OCR for page 2
2
COMMERCIAL MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES FOR TWEN7-Y-FIRST CEN7URY ARM YBA l 'lZ>I~S
knowledge of friendly and enemy locations and
status.
.
· Common, Relevant Picture of the Battlefield. All
commanders, shooters, and supporters need to
have the same understanding of the battlefield lo-
cations, activities, capabilities, intent, terrain, and
battlefield geometry- in the same relevant time
frame.
· Command On-the-Move. Information must be avail-
able to the commander anywhere on the battlefield.
Improved Target Handoff: There is a need for
linking sensors and shooters through automated
systems that reduce or eliminate lengthy, and often
confusing, voice links.
Battle Space Expansion. Commanders must be able
to see and act throughout the depth, breadth, and
height of the battlefield.
Information Protection. Preventing the enemy from
knowing what the friendly force knows and pro-
tecting friendly information systems from destruc-
tion, disruption, or manipulation are essential.
Exploit Modeling and Simulation. In addition to the
requirements for information distribution on the
battlefield, Army leaders have emphasized an ur-
gent need for the application of advanced simula-
tion technology to support training, battle rehearsal,
and the exploration of future concepts and materiel
requirements.
The operational needs described above are summa-
rized in Table ES-1. Table ES-1 also breaks out the major
functional requirements that support each of the needs.
RELEVANT COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
The committee configured a generic layered architec-
ture as a basis for identifying relevant building block
technologies. This architecture is consistent with the DoD
Technical Architecture for Information Management,
with Army Science Board recommendations, and with
the Common Operating Environment of the Army C4I
Technical Architecture. The committee's generic multi-
media architecture is shown in Figure ES-1.
Naming of the various layers of the architecture ex-
plicitly reflects the fact that multimedia technologies are
strongly dependent upon software. Layer I includes
lightweight portable terminals, storage systems, and com-
munications subsystems and systems to support people
on the move. Layer II includes protocols for interconnect-
ing subsystems, systems, networks and gateways, oper-
ating systems for managing computational resources, and
distributed computing environments for managing dis-
TABLE ES-1 Summary of the Army Operational Needs, Including
Simulation, and Functional Requirements
Army Operational Needs
(Including Simulation)
Functional Requirements
Improved situational awareness
Common, relevant picture of
the battlefield
Command on-the-move
Improved target handoff
Battle space expansion
Information protection
Exploit modeling and simulation
Sensors
Intercept capabilities
Accurate position location
Automated platform monitoring
Interconnected communications
networks
Remotely accessed databases
Decision support aids
Scalable data
Flexible graphics
Common distributed database
Ability to access database
Interconnected communications
to transmit imagery, data,
voice/selective access
'eavesdrop' voice capability
Portrayed graphically/scalable/
easily understood
Reconfigurable software
Common hardware, standards,
protocols
Rapid operation/turn-on
Easily accessible networks
Linkage of sensors, computers,
and communications
Satellite, fiber, wire, and
long-range wireless
communications
Automated systems
Nonjammable communications
Nonpenetrable databases
Unbreakable crypto and other
security systems
Distributed interactive simulation
Support exploration of future
requirements
tributed sof~vare processes. Layer III provides capabili-
ties such as information filtering, database management,
and user-friendly multimedia user interfaces. Layer IV
provides generic applications/enablers such as multime-
dia teleconferencing capabilities and groupware, which
can be tailored for Army-specific applications (e.g., simu-
lation systems) residing on the top layer, Layer V. Woven
throughout the architecture in what the committee con-
siders to be a sixth "layer," Layer VI, are network
management and security technologies.
OCR for page 3
EXECU77VE SUMMARY
The relevant building block technologies, categorized
according to the layers named above, are depicted in
Figure ES-2. (Note that the building block technologies
are numbered in the figure from bottom to top layers to
indicate the order in which discussed in the report.)
These technologies, and the capabilities they enable, are
evolving rapidly under the pressure of commercial mar-
ket forces and underlying technological advances. This
bodes well for the availability of solutions from the
commercial world to satisfy the Army's requirements.
Some examples of commercial system-level applica-
tions of these technologies include cellular and wireless
telecommunications systems, electronic commerce, intel-
ligent transportation systems, and residential information
services. Cellular and wireless users are increasingly
demanding more reliable and secure service with the
ability to move around freely. In electronic commerce,
network integrity, reliability, and security are major con-
cerns. Applications of intelligent transportation systems
include sending sensed traffic information to centralized
nodes, distribution of traffic information to mobile trav-
elers, location tracking and reporting, and map delivery
systems for guiding travelers. Residential information
services are striving to achieve user-friendly graphical
(and other) user interfaces.
Lessons learned in the commercial world include the
following:
3
layer V Specific Applications
As,
.~
s
1
it,
Creation of an effective communications and com-
puting architecture requires that a few resonant
minds create it, that they be given time to work,
and that the architecture be enforced.
With standards, enterprises can exploit their com-
petitive advantages without having to be vertically
integrated suppliers of end-to-end systems.
Development efforts should be focused on areas
where one intends to achieve a differentiating ad-
V. Specific Applications
IV. Generic Applications/Enablers
II. System Software
I. Physical Platforms
FIGURE ES-1 Generic architecture for multimedia
communications.
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14 Simulation. systems and applications
Layer IV Gerze~c Applications/Enablers
13 Multimedia messaging capabilities
12 Decision support tools, groupware,
multimedia teleconferencing
11. Multimedia information access capabili-
ties
Layer lI - Middleware
10. Multimedia information analysis and
processing building blocks and middle-
ware services
9. User-friendly multimedia user interfaces
8. Multimedia database management sys-
tems
7. Information filtering systems
LayerI~System Software
6. Distributed computing environments
and operating systems
5. Protocols and related functionality to
support communications
Layer WPhysical Platforms
4. Information capture technologies
3. Communications platforms that support
people on the move
2. Storage systems for multimedia informa-
tion
1. Lightweight, rugged, portable appli-
ances and terminals
FIGURE ES-2 Building block technologies in the generic multimedia
architecture.
vantage over competitors,! and everything else
should be outsourced.
Businesses tend to solve problems using as much
off-the-shelf technology as possible; they meet the
need and leave the detailed requirements flexible.
The issue of "what to do with legacy systems" is
growing in importance.
· The spiral model of development (i.e., quick itera-
tion through requirements specification and respe-
cification, prototyping, and testing) leads to
tin the context of Army battlefields, 'competitors" correspond to
' potential adversaries.'
OCR for page 4
4
COMMERCIAL MUL77MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES FOR TWE~IY-FIRST CEN7V2YARMYBA7TLEFIELDS
substantially lower development costs, more rapid
development, and substantially greater satisfaction
of real user needs.
These lessons, and others, provide support for the
committee's later recommendations to the Army regard-
ing the use of commercial multimedia technologies.
MEETING ARMY NEEDS WITH COMMERCIAL
MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES
The committee mapped the commercial building
block technologies onto the Army's operational needs
and functional requirements. Table ES-2 summarizes
this mapping; the building block technologies in Table
ES-2 are numbered according to Figure ES-2. Note that
most of the needs and requirements require a combi-
nation of two or more of the building block technolo-
gies. Also, most of the building block technologies can
be used to satisfy multiple needs and requirements.
Thus, common technologies can be leveraged across
the array of needs. An open architecture facilitates such
leveraging and provides a means to insert new tech-
nologies rapidly.
The committee proceeded to make recommendations
for each building block technology according to the
following designators:
The designator C indicates that the commercial
market pull is so great that industry will develop
this technology faster than the Army could. The
Army should adopt these technologies off-the-shelf
to meet its needs because it will not likely be able
to create a competitive advantage by pursuing
Army-specific development.
· The designator M indicates that the committee
recommends the Army modify or adapt commercial
technologies to meet its requirements. Where this
is the case, it is advisable that the Army consider its
requirements with a view toward commercial prod-
uct availability.
The designator A indicates that the technology is
one in which the Army should invest. In this case
the committee believes that the Army requirements
are unique and that industry will not develop this
technology on the time scale the Army needs.
Furthermore, the Army has a reasonable opportu-
nity to develop a competitive advantage vis-a-vis
its adversaries by investing in these technologies.
This competitive advantage will likely result from
developing an enabling technology which more
effectively leverages commercial off-the-shelf tech-
nologies in battlefield applications.
.
Because each building block technology may meet
some Army requirements, but not others, the committee
has also recommended a combination of C, M, or A in
some cases. A summary of the committee recommenda-
tions is given in Table ES-3.
With reference to Table ES-3, the recommended Army
investment is heavily focused at the bottom layer and top
layer of the architecture and on security technology in
Layer VI. For the most part, the middle-layer technologies
should be acquired through commercial sources. With
respect to security concerns, isolating Army-specific se-
curity requirements by using standard interfaces between
security functionalities and the building blocks in Layers
II-IV will best allow the Army to keep up as commercial
building block technologies evolve.
A recurring observation was that the Army should use
commercial off-the-shelf technology wherever possible,
even to the extent of redefining requirements to do so.
To support this recommendation, the committee argued
that most estimates of the size of the emerging commercial
multimedia market for technologies, services, and appli-
cations range from 10 to 20 percent of the gross domestic
product of developed countries. This enormous market,
whose applications are in many ways similar to Army
applications, creates a correspondingly enormous market
pull for the creation of technologies by commercial
suppliers. The Army can achieve maximum competitive
advantage over its adversaries in the same way that
commercial firms achieve market advantage by focusing
on applying these technologies as quickly as possible in
battlefield applications, rather than by competing in the
creation of the underlying technologies themselves. Fur-
thermore, when the Army does invest in research and
development to create technologies other than applica-
tions to meet unique Army requirements, the principal
purpose in doing so should be to produce physical
platforms, communications capabilities, and security and
network management functionality that will enable the
Army to adapt commercial off-the-shelf technologies to
Army applications. These adaptations result from stringent
military requirements for such things as anti-jam radio
characteristics or resistance to electromagnetic pulse.
The committee did note a few exceptions to the above
in technologies such as automatic pattern recognition for
image analysis, and large-scale distributed simulation,
where the Army has requirements that are more compel-
ling than those in commercial applications.
By means of an operational example, it became clear
to the committee that application by the Army of the
information technologies discussed above can have far-
reaching effects. While the activities are nominally the
same whether supported by automated systems and
multimedia communications or by manual systems and
messengers there are many differences. These are the
OCR for page 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TABLE ES-2 Summary of Army Operational Needs, Including Simulation, and Functional Requirements and Their
Most Relevant Enabling Building Block Technologies
Army Operational Needs
(Including Simulation)
Functional Requirements
Building Block Technologiesa
A. Improved situational awareness A1 Sensors 4
A2 Intercept capabilities 4,10
A3 Accurate position location 4,10
A4 Automated platform monitoring 4,10
A5 Interconnected communications 3,5,16
networks
A6 Remotely accessed databases 2,3,5,6,7,8,11,16
A7 Decision support aids 10,12
AS Scalable data 2,7,10,11
A9 Flexible graphics 9
B. Common, relevant picture of the B1 Common distributed database 2,3,5,6,8
battlefield
B2 Ability to access database
B3 Interconnected communications to
transmit imagery, data, voice/selective
access
B4 'eavesdrop" voice capability
B5 Portrayed graphically/scalable/easily
understood
2,3.5,6,11,15,16
3,5,11,13,15,16
3,5,11,12,15
8,9
C. Command on-the-move C1 Reconfigurable software 6,17
C2 Common hardware standards, 1,3,5,6,17
protocols
C3 Rapid operatiorL/turn-on 1,3,5,6
C4 Easily accessible networks 3,5
D. Improved target handoff D1 Linkage of sensors, computers and 3,4,5,6
communications
E. Battle space expansion E1 Satellite, fiber, wire, and long-range 3,5
wireless communications
E2 Automated systems 2,7,8,9,10,11,12,13
F. Information protection F1 Nonjammable communications 3,15,16
F2 Nonpenetrable databases 2,15
F3 Unbreakable crypto and other 15
security systems
G. Exploit modeling and simulation
G1 Distributed interactive simulations All
G2 Support exploration of future All
requirements
a There are 17 technologies, represented here by number. The list of 17 appears in Figure ES-2.
speed and accuracy of information distribution, continu-
ous and automatic update of databases, simultaneous
informing of all involved, and freedom of commanders
and staffs from repetitive tasks. The effect on unit organ-
izational structure and tactics could be dramatic.
Smaller forces, widely separated, will be able to
operate simultaneously and at a vastly increased pace
and tempo. Ammunition and logistics stockage levels can
probably be reduced as support units maintain a real-
time, accurate knowledge of each unit's status and deliver
the needed supplies on time and without requests.
Smaller staffs employing automated systems and support
aids will be able to coordinate the operations of more
subordinate formations and provide more accurate and
more timely support to commanders.
The scenario implies an information architecture
where data are a corporate resource shared by many
applications. The technology challenges in this regard lie
OCR for page 6
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OCR for page 7
L:XECU77~ SUMMARY
in transitioning legacy systems; building open and dis-
tributed computing environments that are secure and
reliable; and provisioning and managing the capacity of
information servers, processing resources, and commu-
nications. These are major challenges that will be ad-
dressed mostly by commercial technology trends. The
Army should monitor these trends and adopt the best
commercial practices. Even in the case of security, some
commercial encryption schemes might be acceptable,
although the Army will have to influence commercial
trends to accommodate any unique requirements.
REINVENTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE
The changing business environment coupled with
accelerated technological introductions have made no
corporation exempt from re-examining the basics of its
business. However, successful corporate change seldom
results from technology alone the nature of the work
and the structure of the organization usually change as
well.
Three successful corporate reinvention cases consid-
ered relevant to the Army were discussed in detail:
· Citicorp brought the workstation environment and
corporate information to virtually every employee
with large productivity gains. Citicorp also has been
restructuring its business, outsourcing more non-
critical business functions, and dramatically down-
sizing its work force.
· Federal Express successfully implemented an en-
terprise-wide tracking and monitoring system for
its packages, which stemmed from the realization
that knowing the location of a package was as
important as the shipment itself. The Federal Ex-
press story underscored the need for iterative de-
sign and development.
· The Ford Motor Corporation made a significant
turn-around in the 1980s. Much of its success can
be attributed to continuous quality improvements
and participatory management techniques. Ford's
redesign of its accounts payable department is
frequently cited as a reengineering success story.
Only about one in four reengineering projects suc-
ceeds. Among the many ways they fail are (a) attempting
to reengineer processes or business functions that are
better left alone; (b) not starting small and building from
success; (c) not having the critical skill sets available; and
(d) not being able to change the culture to accommodate
reengineering. The rapid evolution of information tech-
nologies and the application of information technologies
7
in Army battlefields have implications that can be inferred
from these commercial corporate reinvention experi-
ences. The Army will need to change its organization,
doctrine, and tactics. It will need to actively experiment
with new organizational structures, doctrine, and tactics,
and it will need to iteratively design and develop systems
that derive maximum impact from information technolo-
g~es.
It is wrong to believe that just the technologies will
change. The Army will have to analyze the role and
functions of unit staffs in the information age and the
purpose served by each level of command, with an eye
to the following:
Processes and work flow in unit staffs will change.
They can be smaller and are likely to be restruc-
tured around the functions that must be performed.
It may be possible to eliminate one or more levels
of command. Flatter, more integrated, and less
vertical entities will evolve. Intervening levels be-
t~veen the decision maker and executor will be-
come redundant and an impediment to efficient
operations.
Operations can take place faster and be synchro-
nized over a wide area. The implications for Army
doctrine and tactics are likely to be extensive. While
the effects are not yet fully evident, corporate
experience indicates that those who fail to reassess
the fundamental way business is conducted and
adjust to newly enabled ways will not leverage the
advantages of information technologies.
Success is made with plans of limited scope that
are intended to be built, tested, redesigned, and
expanded. Digitizing the battlefield will require
much experimentation and refinement. Thus, Army
battle laboratories will become even more critical
and probably expanded in coming years.
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
The key elements of a technology management
strategy by which the Army can leverage multimedia
information technologies for battlefield applications
are described below. Although some of what follows
may echo familiar themes, the committee wants to
reiterate them to (a) accelerate their implementation,
(b) provide support in the context of applying multi-
media information technologies, and (c) emphasize its
concern that they are not being implemented aggres-
sively enough. In particular, the committee believes
that these recommendations are specifically relevant to
multimedia information technologies and applications
because of the very short time scales within which
OCR for page 8
8
COMMERCIAL MUl AMMO ~CHNOLOGI~ FOR -FIRST CE~YA~YBA~I~S
these technologies evolve and because of the wide-
spread application of these technologies in commer-
cial domains.
The technology management strategy consists of eight
primary recommendations. The recommendations follow
in boldface type:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The Army should be a
hunter-gatherer of technologies, seeking out and
acquiring the best technologies wherever it can find
them, to meet overall strategic objectives, and ap-
plying them in an opportunistic manner to meet
battlefield demands. The Army should leverage com-
mercial off-the-shelf technology (i.e., design applications
and systems that can utilize such technology rather than
setting objectives and requirements that require the in-
vention of nonexistent technology). The Army should not
compete with the commercial sector in developing gen-
erically applicable technology.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The Army should care-
fully distinguish between: (a) those technologies
that are emerging and evolving in the commercial
marketplace and will be available to everyone, in-
cluding the Army's adversaries, and (b) those tech-
nologies that the Army can reasonably expect to
create as competitive enablers to differentiate the
Army from its adversaries. For those technologies that
fall in the former category, the Army should focus on
their expedited and innovative use in battlefield applica-
tions. For those technologies that fall into the latter
category, the Army should invest in Army-proprietary
research and development efforts to achieve the desired
differentiating advantages. Recommendations for specific
building block technologies are summarized in Table
ES-3.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The Army must achieve a
better balance in its procurement processes be-
tween the imperative to make these processes fair
and competitive and the imperative to effectively
acquire, insert, and deploy information technolo-
gies whose life cycles can be as low as 18 months.
Specifically, the Army must recognize the iterative inter-
action between requirements and what is technically
feasible.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The Army should create
and enforce a technical architecture. That architec-
ture should (a) promote reuse of building block tech-
nologies across multiple systems, interoperability
between systems, and expedited insertion of new tech-
nologies to achieve cost reductions and performance
improvements; and (b) facilitate ad hoc modifications of
systems and applications to meet short-term needs in
crisis situations.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Arrny should be an
active participant in technology development in the
commercial sector. The Army should access informa-
tion regarding commercial technology trends, influence
commercial technology trends to accommodate Army-
specific requirements, and proactively endeavor to bene-
fit from commercial experiences and innovations in the
application of technology. To accomplish this, the Army
should act in the role of a leading-edge customer provid-
ing commercial firms access to its needs. It should
actively participate in standards activities. The Army
should continue to participate in internal and external
research and development activities directed toward its
. .
unique requirements.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The Army should respond
to the need for reinvention. It should expect that rapid
advances in communications and computational capa-
bilities resulting from trends in commercial multimedia
technologies will result in more than quantitative im-
provement in the ability of soldiers and commanders to
execute existing command and control paradigms. It is
likely that the Army will have to reinvent its organiza-
tions, doctrines, and tactics related to command and
control to leverage these rapidly evolving technologies
and to remain competitive with its adversaries.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The Arrny must adopt a
spiral model of development where the iterative
specification of requirements, prototyping, testing
by users, and refinement/respecif~cation of require-
ments proceeds in periods measured in months to
create new systems and applications. This process
must make heavy use of simulation, modeling, and
experimentation in order to achieve the desired iteration
speeds and to achieve realistic prototyping and desired
user feedback.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The Army should create
and adopt a qualitative index to measure progress
made toward achieving its technology management
goals. A Commercial TechnoloQv and Practice.s Index
· i. r ~
_ C~ ~ _ ~
consisting or tour levels was developed by the committee
as an example.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
multimedia technologies