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2
Review of Army Requirements
This chapter reviews the Army's operational needs and
functional requirements as they relate to the application
of technologies to en-
hance the use of informa-
tion by battlefield com-
manders and their staffs.
MILESTONE—
DESERT STORM
The Persian Gulf War, where the United States mar-
shaled world opinion and led an international coalition
to defeat Iraqi forces and force their withdrawal from
Kuwait in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
marked a historic milestone in several respects. U.S. and
Russian cooperation and the international response to
Iraqi aggression made it clear that the bipolar, Cold War
era was over. More importantly, from the standpoint of
this study and the evolution of modern warfare and
military technology, the Gulf War could be described as
the first war of the information age. It provided a sharp
glimpse of the potential advantage to be gained by
military forces that can harness modern technologies for
the control of information on the battlefield.
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military and civilian
leaders began a review of potential threats to national
security and how to respond to them. The resulting new
National Military Strategy envisions smaller military forces
capable of rapid force projection from the continental
United States and forward deployed locations. Force levels
are to be maintained at sufficient strength to deal with two
regional contingencies nearly simultaneously.
The following coarse definitions of various Army units were used
by the committee during this study, which focused on echelons at the
corps level and lower. A corps is a large fighting unit that typically
consists of two or more divisions plus supporting arms and logistical
service units. Its strength can vary widely, depending upon the mission
and units assigned to the corps. There are several types of divisions
ranging in size from about lO,OOO soldiers (Light Infantry Division) to
about 18,000 soldiers (Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions).
Three brigades, each in the range of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, normally
make up a division. Several battalions (up to 1,000 soldiers each) make
12
ARMY M8DERNI~TION PROGRAM
In keeping with the new strategy, the U.S. Army has
reduced its war fighting strength by about 30 percent over
the past three years. It has eliminated one corps, eight
active and two reserve component divisions, and several
smaller units, with further reductions programmed.! At
the same time, in spite of budget reductions, the Army
has pursued a modernization plan intended to maintain
a technological edge over any potential enemy. In the
words of the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo
D. West, Jr., and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Gordon R. Sullivan (in their joint cover letter to the Army
Modernization Plan (Department of the Army, 1994c)),
"America's Army must respond to the crises of today and
tomorrow . . . with such overwhelming, technically
superior force as to render any potential adversary
impotent and minimize our cost in soldiers' lives."
The Army, as an institution, has recognized the power
of information and the technologies for handling and
processing information on the battlefield to achieve
overwhelming superiority. There is universal agreement
within the Army's leadership that the power of informa-
tion was perhaps the key lesson to be learned from the
Gulf War. Neither has that lesson been lost on potential
adversaries.2 If the U.S. Army is deployed in a future
regional conflict, it can expect the enemy to employ
modern communications and information technologies
in support of enemy battlefield operations. The United
States will need better systems and information to prevail.
Given the speed with which such technologies are
advancing, if the U.S. technological advantage is lost, it
will be very difficult to regain. With a smaller. post-Cold
burr_ . c_ _ ~ . ~ ~ . .. .
w ar force, Ine Army nas placed a nigh priority on
up a brigade. Approximately three to five companies of about 100 to
150 soldiers each normally make up a battalion. Several platoons
(around 40 soldiers each) make up a company. The platoon is made
up of several of the smallest units, known as squads, which have about
10 soldiers each.
~Modern communications and information technologies are avail-
able to any Third World nation with the money and the will to purchase
them on the commercial market. Other nations are already adopting
such technologies to their military requirements. For example, commer-
cial satellites are available for communications, position location, data
distribution, and imagery.
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REVIEW OFARMYREQUIREMENTS
maintaining, and indeed improving, its advantage in
applying information technology to achieve battlefield
success.
To accomplish the new National Military Strategy in
the information age, the Army has a modernization vision
designed to ensure the retention of Land Force Domi-
nance. The Army has defined several modernization
objectives essential to achieving this vision:
· Project and sustain army forces;
· Protect the force;
· Win the information war;
· Conduct precision strikes against enemy forces; and
· Dominate the maneuver battle.
While no one of these objectives is more important
than the others, winning the information war has impli-
cations for all the others.
WINNING THE INFORMATION WAR
Winning the information war has three essential com-
ponents: (1) effective use of information by friendly
forces, (2) protection of friendly information from the
enemy, and (3) attack against enemy information and
information systems.3 The third component involves
actions by friendly forces to destroy, degrade, or spoof
the enemy's information, as well as the covert penetration
of enemy information systems to know what the enemy
knows. This third component is not within the scope of
this study. Therefore, the discussion below considers
only the first two components.
The first component, effective use of information by
friendly forces, entails the gathering, processing, trans-
mission, dissemination, and display of battlefield infor-
mation accurately, efficiently, and in a timely manner.
The second component, protection of friendly informa-
tion, entails preventing the enemy from (a) knowing
what the friendly force knows; (b) gaining accurate
information about friendly force locations, activities,
status, or intentions; and (c) destroying or modifying
information in friendly databases or disrupting commu-
nications or access to data.
Army statements of requirements and the emphasis in
most of its internal combat and materiel development
communities have focused on improving the effective
use of information by battlefield commanders. The
3General references for this section are Army Combined Arrns
Center, 1994; Department of the Army, 1993a; Department of the Army
1993b; Department of the Army, 1994a, and Department of the Army,
1994b.
13
Army's experiments, field exercises, and technology
demonstrations have placed a priority on improved battle
command, which combines the art of deciding, leading,
and motivating by commanders in battle with the means
of communicating a commander's decisions and intent
to soldiers and their leaders in order to achieve mission
success. Also, recognizing the importance of protecting
information, the Army has consistently stated the need
for secure, nonjammable communications and the pro-
tection of automated systems from penetration, manipu-
lation, or the introduction of computer viruses.
Army Battle Command Priorities
The Army's concept of future battle and the key role
of battle command on future battlefields are articulated
in the Training and Doctrine Command's Pamphlet 525-5
(Army TRADOC, 1994~. The vision of future battle com-
mand is reflected in the Army Battle Command Systems
(Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993~. Both
documents, along with the information provided to the
committee by Army briefers, offer broad statements of
Army requirements for battlefield communications and
information distribution. All the sources available to the
committee have placed emphasis on the application of
technologies to enhance the use of information by com-
manders and staffs, under the unique conditions of the
battlefield, to achieve a decisive advantage over the
enemy. Repeatedly, Army leaders and requirements
documents put the Army's priorities for the application
of information technologies on the following operational
needs.
I m p r 0 v e ~ 5 i t u a t i 0 n a I A w ~ r e n e s s
Situational awareness demands the accurate and
timely (near-real-time) knowledge of friendly and enemy
locations and status. Locations of friendly platforms and
units are most important to avoid fratricide, to improve
coordination, and to focus unity of effort on the overall
mission. Information on friendly unit status should be
scalable by echelon and must be sufficient for the
relevant commander to judge the ability of subordinate
organizations to accomplish the mission. Enemy informa-
tion is needed both for intelligence and targeting. Com-
manders need to know where enemy forces are and their
capabilities and intentions, so judgments can be made
about the ability of the enemy to interfere with the
friendly unit mission and about which enemy formations
should be attacked and when. Shooters need to know
enemy locations with sufficient precision and timeliness
to ensure successful engagement.
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14
COM~ERCIAl MULE ~CHNOLOGI~ FOR -FIRST CE~YA~YBA l l DEFIERS
This requirement implies the need for sensors to detect
and track the enemy; intercept capabilities to learn what
the enemy knows and his intentions; accurate position
location and automated monitoring of friendly platforms
and units; interconnected communications networks to
carry data, images, and voice wherever needed; a data-
base that can be accessed from remote locations, pro-
vides "rolled up" data that are suitable and scalable to
each echelon, and also permits selective shredding or
de-aggregation of data to the lowest level; flexible, easily
understood graphics that can be readily manipulated; and
decision support aids to assist commanders in analyzing
information and assessing alternative courses of action.
To avoid information overload, particularly at the lowest
levels, it is important for commanders at each echelon to
be able to filter the data so they receive only the relevant
information and to adjust the filters as requirements
change.
Common, Relevant Picture of the Battlefield
All commanders, shooters, and supporters need to
have the same understanding of the battlefield loca-
tions, activities, capabilities, intent, terrain, and battlefield
geometry in the same relevant time frame. Command-
ers need to be able to describe the mission and explain
their intent to their subordinates in real time so it is
accurately understood by all.
The implications of this requirement are: the need for
a common distributed database; the ability to access the
database from anywhere on the battlefield; the need for
interconnected communications networks with the capa-
bility to transmit up-to-date imagery, data, and voice and
permit the selective access to data as it is broadcast; and
the ability to "eavesdrop" voice communications in sub-
ordinate and adjacent units. The information must be able
to be portrayed graphically, organized to meet the needs
of individual commanders, filtered and scalable to each
echelon, readily "pulled" from the relevant database
(wherever it may reside), and displayed so the relevant
information is clearly visible and understood.
Command On-the-Move
Information must be available to the commander
anywhere on the battlefield. Command presence is an
essential element of a commander's ability to lead and
motivate. It is also essential for the commander to see
and hear for himself what is happening on the battlefield.
Some information and communications capabilities must
be available under all circumstances, regardless of the
mode of travel. Commanders must be able to access the
full capability of the battle command system quickly,
from any node, anywhere on the battlefield during brief
halts and at subordinate or adjacent unit locations. This
implies the need for reconfigurable software;4 common
hardware, standards, and protocols; communications and
information systems that can be quickly put into opera-
tion; and easily accessible communications networks that
overlay the entire battlefield.
Improved Target Handoff
Improved situational awareness and the common
picture of the battlefield are essential to improving target
handoff procedures. There is a need for linking sensors
and shooters through automated systems that reduce or
eliminate lengthy, and often confusing, voice links. Hu-
man involvement through the establishment of priorities
and criteria for engagement, initiation procedures, or
override capability will be required, but linking sensors
with relevant computers and communications will im-
prove the accuracy and timeliness of targeting data and
permit the automated transfer of the target from a detec-
tion sensor or another shooter for rapid, precise engage-
ment. For example, the linkage of the tank laser range
finder with an on-board computer, position location
device, turret orientation sensor, and digital radio would
permit the accurate transfer of a target from the tank
commander to another tank, an Apache helicopter, or
the direct support artillery by simply touching a fire
request prompt on the screen display.
Battle Space Expansion
Commanders must be able to see and act throughout
the depth, breadth, and height of the battlefield. The
application of overwhelming combat power no longer
requires the employment of large massed formations, or
even the delivery of massive, sustained fires. Simultane-
ous attack of key targets and enemy formations through-
out the battlefield coupled with rapid, unexpected deep
maneuver confuses the enemy, then paralyzes him, and
finally creates panic, fear, and disintegration, resulting in
the defeat of even unengaged forces. Information tech-
nology offers the means to expand the battle space by
enabling rapid transmission and distribution of sensor
data and intelligence so that the commander can see all
4Reconfigurable software provides an ability to change functionality
rapidly anywhere on the battlefield without affecting the communica-
tions network. It should be possible to convert workstations on the
battlefield to perform different automated functions by simply loading
the appropriate software.
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REVIEW OF ARMY REQUIREMENTS
of the battlefield, know more than the enemy knows, and
accurately target and attack the enemy while controlling
his own forces with precision. The expanded battlefield
implies the need for a combination of satellite, fiber, wire,
and long-range wireless data communication networks
and automated systems that work together to gather, sort,
assemble, transmit, and display the information obtained
where and when it is needed.
Information Protection
Preventing the enemy from knowing what the friendly
force knows and protecting friendly information systems
from destruction, disruption, or manipulation are essen-
tial to maintaining an accurate picture of the battlefield
and up-to-date situational awareness. To provide such
protection requires nonjammable communications, non-
penetrable databases, and unbreakable cryptographic
and other security systems.
Exploit Modeling and Simulation
Although models, simulators, and simulations might
not be classified as "operational needs" in the purest
sense of operational requirements for battle command,
their application can aid significantly in battle preparation
and analysis.
In addition to the requirements for information distri-
bution on the battlefield to support Army battle com-
mand, Army leaders have emphasized an urgent need
for the application of advanced simulation technology to
support training, battle rehearsal, and the exploration of
future concepts and materiel requirements. The Army
envisions a distributed interactive simulation environ-
ment that would permit linking live field operations
(soldiers employing organic equipment) with virtual
reality environments (manned simulators) and construc-
tive simulations (computer-driven, with or without hu-
man interaction). Organic electronic equipment (radios,
telecommunications, displays, sensors, automated com-
mand and control systems, etc.) can be employed within
this synthetic environment to permit soldiers and units to
train or rehearse battle plans as they intend to fight. The
environment also permits the realistic operational em-
ployment of systems and units for the evaluation of
advanced doctrinal concepts, future organizations, mate-
riel requirements, and the testing and evaluation of
developmental equipment. A detailed description of
distributed interactive simulation is contained in a Mod-
ernization Plan (Department of the Army, 1994c) and an
investment strategy (Department of the Army, 1994d).
The distributed interactive simulation environment is
15
intended to overlay the Army's organizational structure
permitting widely separated units to train together, to
rehearse battle plans prior to execution, to evaluate
completed missions, to explore future concepts, and to
test and evaluate materiel during the research, develop-
ment, and acquisition cycle.
The six operational needs, along with the seventh
need to exploit modeling and simulation technology, are
summarized in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 breaks out the major
functional requirements that support each need.
TABLE 2-l Summary of the Army Operational Needs, Including
Simulation, and Functional Requirements
Army Operational Needs
(Including Simulation)
Functional Requirements
Improved situational awareness
Common, relevant picture of
the battlefield
Command on-the-move
Improved target handoff
Battle space expansion
Information protection
Sensors
Intercept capabilities
Accurate position location
Automated platform monitoring
Interconnected communications
networks
Remotely accessed databases
Decision support aids
Scalable data
Flexible graphics
Common distributed database
Ability to access database
Interconnected communications
to transmit imagery, data,
voice/selective access
"Eavesdrop'. voice capability
Portrayed graphically/scalable/
easily understood
Reconfigurable software
Common hardware, standards,
protocols
Rapid operation/turn-on
Easily accessible networks
Linkage of sensors, computers,
and communications
Satellite, fiber, wire, and
long-range wireless
communications
Automated systems
Nonjammable communications
Nonpenetrable databases
Unbreakable crypto and other
security systems
Exploit modeling and simulation Distributed interactive simulation
Support exploration of future
requirements
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16
Additional Insights
After reviewing the various briefings and documents
that outline the Army's requirements for future battle
command, a member of the committee arranged inter-
views with several Army leaders.5 The purpose of these
interviews was to verify what the committee had learned
and to seek further insights into the Army's concepts for
the application of information technologies.
There was a generally consistent thread that ran
through all of these individual discussions. All of the
Army leaders emphasized the importance of "digitizing
the battlefield" in order to take advantage of the potential
afforded by modern information technology, and all
identified the same broad requirements as articulated in
the briefings and documents available to the committee.
In addition, the discussions also provided a sharper view
of some important considerations associated with achiev-
ing the Army's future battle command concept. These
considerations are addressed below.
Improved Acquisition. Some frustration was expressed
regarding the time it takes to progress from requirements
to a fielded product. The speed with which microelec-
tronic and information processing technologies are ad-
vancing almost guarantees that a deliberate development
and procurement process using current procedures will
lead to the fielding of obsolescent systems. The Army
must be able to adopt and adapt commercial off-the-shelf
technology to its needs. However, the application of
some subsets of commercial technology, particularly
hardware and wireless communication technologies, will
be most difficult at brigade level and below. The battle-
field environment and the basic tasks and missions to be
performed at these levels present difficult Army-specific
challenges, and commercial, off-the-shelf technology is
in some cases not well suited to these requirements.
Information Filtering. Intelligence data, and situation
reports, and other kinds of essential information must be
"pushed" so that they are available to all locations and
levels. An adjustable information filtering capability
would ensure that relevant information is passed where
needed and that commanders would be able to "pull"
additional information when needed.
'General Wishart interviewed the following persons: Major General
Joe Rigby, Director, Army Digitization Office, on October 11, 1994;
Brigadier GeneralJoe Oder, Director of Requirements, Of rice of Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, on October 13, 1994; General
Frederick Franks, Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, on
October 17, 1994. On January 4, 1995, a small group of committee
COMMERCIAL MULTI.lIEDIA TECHNOLOGIES FOR TWEN7.Y-FIRST CENTURYARMYBA 77lEFIFl as
Battlefield Data Transmission. The Army needs an
improved multimode, multiband battlefield information
transport system at reasonable cost that can be prolifer-
ated in quantity to the lowest levels.
Displays. Emphasis should be placed on providing
user-friendly, easily operated displays that do not distract
the commanders or operators from their primary combat
functions. Displays must assist the commanders in ac-
complishing the mission; this is particularly important for
those systems provided at the lowest (platform) level
where leaders and crew members must focus their full
sensory perceptions on the battlefield around them. Next
in importance are scalable data the ability to roll data
up and then de-aggregate it, integrate it with useful
graphics, and present it in an easily understood display.
Operations Other Than War
It is important to note that the Army requirements
outlined in this chapter have been derived primarily from
the vision behind creating the digital battlefield for Force
XXI.6 Information technologies designed to satisfy these
Army requirements must operate on Army-specific infra-
structure in a battlefield environment. These same tech-
nologies must be easily portable to indigenous
infrastructure, where such infrastructure exists, during
contingency deployments or operations other than war.
The technologies and the architecture for applying them
to Army requirements must include well defined inter-
faces for modular, flexible, and reusable systems that will
allow for applications to Army-specific infrastructure as
well as to indigenous infrastructure when available.
A Word of Caution
Developing and providing the systems and networks
to meet the Army's vision of future battle command
demand a word of caution, particularly with regard to
meeting the requirements for a shared, common under-
standing of real-time battlefield truth. It will be important
for the automated processes that manipulate the infor-
mation to be visible and understood by those who use
members met with the Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, and
on March 2~21, 1995, a group of six committee members visited the
facilities and ranges at Fort Hood, Texas.
6Force X~ is the transformed Army of the 21st Century in its entirety.
The central and essential feature of this Army will be its ability to exploit
information (Army Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, 1995).
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RENEW OF~Y~QUIR~E~S
the information to avoid misleading or misinforming. The
speed with which information processing and communi-
cations technologies can manipulate and transmit data
means that erroneous information, misinterpreted infor-
mation, or misunderstood information that is improperly
processed and repeated electronically throughout the
battlefield can make a bad situation worse and can do
so very rapidly.
SUMMARY
The Army has recognized the power of information
and the technologies for handling and processing infor-
mation on the battlefield. A smaller Army, based primarily
in the United States and required to respond rapidly to
worldwide contingencies, must have continuous access
to accurate, current information. Commanders must be
able to use information and protect it. Commanders at
all echelons must have a shared, common understanding
of real-time battlefield truth. Misinformation can be po-
tentially disastrous. Without accurate, timely information
and the communications to ensure its availability to
commanders and staffs throughout the battlefield, a
17
smaller U.S. force may not prevail against a determined
enemy with reasonably modern technology.
REFERENCES
Army Combined Arms Center. 1994. Battle Command Operational
Capability Requirements. August 24.
Army Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force. 1995. America's Army
of the 21st Century Force XXI. Fort Monroe, Virginia. January 15.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 1993. Operational
Requirements Document for Army Battle Command Systems
(ABCS). Draft. December 24.
Army TRADOC. 1994. Force ~ Operations. Pamphlet 525-5. August 1.
Department of the Army. 1993a. Army Enterprise Strategy The Vision.
July 20.
Department of the Army. 1993b. Operations. Field Manual, FM 10~.
June 14.
Department of the Army. 1994a. Statement of Work, Battlefield Digiti-
zation, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. August 19.
Department of the Army. 1994b. Operational Requirements Document
for Force XXI Brigade and Below Battle Command (FB3C) (Formerly
Army Brigade and Below Battle Command (AB2)). 081400, April.
Department of the Army. 1994c. The United States Army Modernization
Plan. Update (F 9~99). May.
Department of the Army. 1994d. U.S. Arrny Modernization Plan, Dis-
tributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). Draft. July 31.
Sullivan, G.R. 1994. Speech by Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of
Staff, to the Association of the United States Army. October 18.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
army requirements
