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2 Review of Army Requirements This chapter reviews the Army's operational needs and functional requirements as they relate to the application of technologies to en- hance the use of informa- tion by battlefield com- manders and their staffs. MILESTONE DESERT STORM The Persian Gulf War, where the United States mar- shaled world opinion and led an international coalition to defeat Iraqi forces and force their withdrawal from Kuwait in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, marked a historic milestone in several respects. U.S. and Russian cooperation and the international response to Iraqi aggression made it clear that the bipolar, Cold War era was over. More importantly, from the standpoint of this study and the evolution of modern warfare and military technology, the Gulf War could be described as the first war of the information age. It provided a sharp glimpse of the potential advantage to be gained by military forces that can harness modern technologies for the control of information on the battlefield. With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military and civilian leaders began a review of potential threats to national security and how to respond to them. The resulting new National Military Strategy envisions smaller military forces capable of rapid force projection from the continental United States and forward deployed locations. Force levels are to be maintained at sufficient strength to deal with two regional contingencies nearly simultaneously. The following coarse definitions of various Army units were used by the committee during this study, which focused on echelons at the corps level and lower. A corps is a large fighting unit that typically consists of two or more divisions plus supporting arms and logistical service units. Its strength can vary widely, depending upon the mission and units assigned to the corps. There are several types of divisions ranging in size from about lO,OOO soldiers (Light Infantry Division) to about 18,000 soldiers (Armored and Mechanized Infantry Divisions). Three brigades, each in the range of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, normally make up a division. Several battalions (up to 1,000 soldiers each) make 12 ARMY M8DERNI~TION PROGRAM In keeping with the new strategy, the U.S. Army has reduced its war fighting strength by about 30 percent over the past three years. It has eliminated one corps, eight active and two reserve component divisions, and several smaller units, with further reductions programmed.! At the same time, in spite of budget reductions, the Army has pursued a modernization plan intended to maintain a technological edge over any potential enemy. In the words of the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D. West, Jr., and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan (in their joint cover letter to the Army Modernization Plan (Department of the Army, 1994c)), "America's Army must respond to the crises of today and tomorrow . . . with such overwhelming, technically superior force as to render any potential adversary impotent and minimize our cost in soldiers' lives." The Army, as an institution, has recognized the power of information and the technologies for handling and processing information on the battlefield to achieve overwhelming superiority. There is universal agreement within the Army's leadership that the power of informa- tion was perhaps the key lesson to be learned from the Gulf War. Neither has that lesson been lost on potential adversaries.2 If the U.S. Army is deployed in a future regional conflict, it can expect the enemy to employ modern communications and information technologies in support of enemy battlefield operations. The United States will need better systems and information to prevail. Given the speed with which such technologies are advancing, if the U.S. technological advantage is lost, it will be very difficult to regain. With a smaller. post-Cold burr_ . c_ _ ~ . ~ ~ . .. . w ar force, Ine Army nas placed a nigh priority on up a brigade. Approximately three to five companies of about 100 to 150 soldiers each normally make up a battalion. Several platoons (around 40 soldiers each) make up a company. The platoon is made up of several of the smallest units, known as squads, which have about 10 soldiers each. ~Modern communications and information technologies are avail- able to any Third World nation with the money and the will to purchase them on the commercial market. Other nations are already adopting such technologies to their military requirements. For example, commer- cial satellites are available for communications, position location, data distribution, and imagery.

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REVIEW OFARMYREQUIREMENTS maintaining, and indeed improving, its advantage in applying information technology to achieve battlefield success. To accomplish the new National Military Strategy in the information age, the Army has a modernization vision designed to ensure the retention of Land Force Domi- nance. The Army has defined several modernization objectives essential to achieving this vision: Project and sustain army forces; Protect the force; Win the information war; Conduct precision strikes against enemy forces; and Dominate the maneuver battle. While no one of these objectives is more important than the others, winning the information war has impli- cations for all the others. WINNING THE INFORMATION WAR Winning the information war has three essential com- ponents: (1) effective use of information by friendly forces, (2) protection of friendly information from the enemy, and (3) attack against enemy information and information systems.3 The third component involves actions by friendly forces to destroy, degrade, or spoof the enemy's information, as well as the covert penetration of enemy information systems to know what the enemy knows. This third component is not within the scope of this study. Therefore, the discussion below considers only the first two components. The first component, effective use of information by friendly forces, entails the gathering, processing, trans- mission, dissemination, and display of battlefield infor- mation accurately, efficiently, and in a timely manner. The second component, protection of friendly informa- tion, entails preventing the enemy from (a) knowing what the friendly force knows; (b) gaining accurate information about friendly force locations, activities, status, or intentions; and (c) destroying or modifying information in friendly databases or disrupting commu- nications or access to data. Army statements of requirements and the emphasis in most of its internal combat and materiel development communities have focused on improving the effective use of information by battlefield commanders. The 3General references for this section are Army Combined Arrns Center, 1994; Department of the Army, 1993a; Department of the Army 1993b; Department of the Army, 1994a, and Department of the Army, 1994b. 13 Army's experiments, field exercises, and technology demonstrations have placed a priority on improved battle command, which combines the art of deciding, leading, and motivating by commanders in battle with the means of communicating a commander's decisions and intent to soldiers and their leaders in order to achieve mission success. Also, recognizing the importance of protecting information, the Army has consistently stated the need for secure, nonjammable communications and the pro- tection of automated systems from penetration, manipu- lation, or the introduction of computer viruses. Army Battle Command Priorities The Army's concept of future battle and the key role of battle command on future battlefields are articulated in the Training and Doctrine Command's Pamphlet 525-5 (Army TRADOC, 1994~. The vision of future battle com- mand is reflected in the Army Battle Command Systems (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993~. Both documents, along with the information provided to the committee by Army briefers, offer broad statements of Army requirements for battlefield communications and information distribution. All the sources available to the committee have placed emphasis on the application of technologies to enhance the use of information by com- manders and staffs, under the unique conditions of the battlefield, to achieve a decisive advantage over the enemy. Repeatedly, Army leaders and requirements documents put the Army's priorities for the application of information technologies on the following operational needs. I m p r 0 v e ~ 5 i t u a t i 0 n a I A w ~ r e n e s s Situational awareness demands the accurate and timely (near-real-time) knowledge of friendly and enemy locations and status. Locations of friendly platforms and units are most important to avoid fratricide, to improve coordination, and to focus unity of effort on the overall mission. Information on friendly unit status should be scalable by echelon and must be sufficient for the relevant commander to judge the ability of subordinate organizations to accomplish the mission. Enemy informa- tion is needed both for intelligence and targeting. Com- manders need to know where enemy forces are and their capabilities and intentions, so judgments can be made about the ability of the enemy to interfere with the friendly unit mission and about which enemy formations should be attacked and when. Shooters need to know enemy locations with sufficient precision and timeliness to ensure successful engagement.

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14 COM~ERCIAl MULE ~CHNOLOGI~ FOR -FIRST CE~YA~YBA l l DEFIERS This requirement implies the need for sensors to detect and track the enemy; intercept capabilities to learn what the enemy knows and his intentions; accurate position location and automated monitoring of friendly platforms and units; interconnected communications networks to carry data, images, and voice wherever needed; a data- base that can be accessed from remote locations, pro- vides "rolled up" data that are suitable and scalable to each echelon, and also permits selective shredding or de-aggregation of data to the lowest level; flexible, easily understood graphics that can be readily manipulated; and decision support aids to assist commanders in analyzing information and assessing alternative courses of action. To avoid information overload, particularly at the lowest levels, it is important for commanders at each echelon to be able to filter the data so they receive only the relevant information and to adjust the filters as requirements change. Common, Relevant Picture of the Battlefield All commanders, shooters, and supporters need to have the same understanding of the battlefield loca- tions, activities, capabilities, intent, terrain, and battlefield geometry in the same relevant time frame. Command- ers need to be able to describe the mission and explain their intent to their subordinates in real time so it is accurately understood by all. The implications of this requirement are: the need for a common distributed database; the ability to access the database from anywhere on the battlefield; the need for interconnected communications networks with the capa- bility to transmit up-to-date imagery, data, and voice and permit the selective access to data as it is broadcast; and the ability to "eavesdrop" voice communications in sub- ordinate and adjacent units. The information must be able to be portrayed graphically, organized to meet the needs of individual commanders, filtered and scalable to each echelon, readily "pulled" from the relevant database (wherever it may reside), and displayed so the relevant information is clearly visible and understood. Command On-the-Move Information must be available to the commander anywhere on the battlefield. Command presence is an essential element of a commander's ability to lead and motivate. It is also essential for the commander to see and hear for himself what is happening on the battlefield. Some information and communications capabilities must be available under all circumstances, regardless of the mode of travel. Commanders must be able to access the full capability of the battle command system quickly, from any node, anywhere on the battlefield during brief halts and at subordinate or adjacent unit locations. This implies the need for reconfigurable software;4 common hardware, standards, and protocols; communications and information systems that can be quickly put into opera- tion; and easily accessible communications networks that overlay the entire battlefield. Improved Target Handoff Improved situational awareness and the common picture of the battlefield are essential to improving target handoff procedures. There is a need for linking sensors and shooters through automated systems that reduce or eliminate lengthy, and often confusing, voice links. Hu- man involvement through the establishment of priorities and criteria for engagement, initiation procedures, or override capability will be required, but linking sensors with relevant computers and communications will im- prove the accuracy and timeliness of targeting data and permit the automated transfer of the target from a detec- tion sensor or another shooter for rapid, precise engage- ment. For example, the linkage of the tank laser range finder with an on-board computer, position location device, turret orientation sensor, and digital radio would permit the accurate transfer of a target from the tank commander to another tank, an Apache helicopter, or the direct support artillery by simply touching a fire request prompt on the screen display. Battle Space Expansion Commanders must be able to see and act throughout the depth, breadth, and height of the battlefield. The application of overwhelming combat power no longer requires the employment of large massed formations, or even the delivery of massive, sustained fires. Simultane- ous attack of key targets and enemy formations through- out the battlefield coupled with rapid, unexpected deep maneuver confuses the enemy, then paralyzes him, and finally creates panic, fear, and disintegration, resulting in the defeat of even unengaged forces. Information tech- nology offers the means to expand the battle space by enabling rapid transmission and distribution of sensor data and intelligence so that the commander can see all 4Reconfigurable software provides an ability to change functionality rapidly anywhere on the battlefield without affecting the communica- tions network. It should be possible to convert workstations on the battlefield to perform different automated functions by simply loading the appropriate software.

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REVIEW OF ARMY REQUIREMENTS of the battlefield, know more than the enemy knows, and accurately target and attack the enemy while controlling his own forces with precision. The expanded battlefield implies the need for a combination of satellite, fiber, wire, and long-range wireless data communication networks and automated systems that work together to gather, sort, assemble, transmit, and display the information obtained where and when it is needed. Information Protection Preventing the enemy from knowing what the friendly force knows and protecting friendly information systems from destruction, disruption, or manipulation are essen- tial to maintaining an accurate picture of the battlefield and up-to-date situational awareness. To provide such protection requires nonjammable communications, non- penetrable databases, and unbreakable cryptographic and other security systems. Exploit Modeling and Simulation Although models, simulators, and simulations might not be classified as "operational needs" in the purest sense of operational requirements for battle command, their application can aid significantly in battle preparation and analysis. In addition to the requirements for information distri- bution on the battlefield to support Army battle com- mand, Army leaders have emphasized an urgent need for the application of advanced simulation technology to support training, battle rehearsal, and the exploration of future concepts and materiel requirements. The Army envisions a distributed interactive simulation environ- ment that would permit linking live field operations (soldiers employing organic equipment) with virtual reality environments (manned simulators) and construc- tive simulations (computer-driven, with or without hu- man interaction). Organic electronic equipment (radios, telecommunications, displays, sensors, automated com- mand and control systems, etc.) can be employed within this synthetic environment to permit soldiers and units to train or rehearse battle plans as they intend to fight. The environment also permits the realistic operational em- ployment of systems and units for the evaluation of advanced doctrinal concepts, future organizations, mate- riel requirements, and the testing and evaluation of developmental equipment. A detailed description of distributed interactive simulation is contained in a Mod- ernization Plan (Department of the Army, 1994c) and an investment strategy (Department of the Army, 1994d). The distributed interactive simulation environment is 15 intended to overlay the Army's organizational structure permitting widely separated units to train together, to rehearse battle plans prior to execution, to evaluate completed missions, to explore future concepts, and to test and evaluate materiel during the research, develop- ment, and acquisition cycle. The six operational needs, along with the seventh need to exploit modeling and simulation technology, are summarized in Table 2-1. Table 2-1 breaks out the major functional requirements that support each need. TABLE 2-l Summary of the Army Operational Needs, Including Simulation, and Functional Requirements Army Operational Needs (Including Simulation) Functional Requirements Improved situational awareness Common, relevant picture of the battlefield Command on-the-move Improved target handoff Battle space expansion Information protection Sensors Intercept capabilities Accurate position location Automated platform monitoring Interconnected communications networks Remotely accessed databases Decision support aids Scalable data Flexible graphics Common distributed database Ability to access database Interconnected communications to transmit imagery, data, voice/selective access "Eavesdrop'. voice capability Portrayed graphically/scalable/ easily understood Reconfigurable software Common hardware, standards, protocols Rapid operation/turn-on Easily accessible networks Linkage of sensors, computers, and communications Satellite, fiber, wire, and long-range wireless communications Automated systems Nonjammable communications Nonpenetrable databases Unbreakable crypto and other security systems Exploit modeling and simulation Distributed interactive simulation Support exploration of future requirements

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16 Additional Insights After reviewing the various briefings and documents that outline the Army's requirements for future battle command, a member of the committee arranged inter- views with several Army leaders.5 The purpose of these interviews was to verify what the committee had learned and to seek further insights into the Army's concepts for the application of information technologies. There was a generally consistent thread that ran through all of these individual discussions. All of the Army leaders emphasized the importance of "digitizing the battlefield" in order to take advantage of the potential afforded by modern information technology, and all identified the same broad requirements as articulated in the briefings and documents available to the committee. In addition, the discussions also provided a sharper view of some important considerations associated with achiev- ing the Army's future battle command concept. These considerations are addressed below. Improved Acquisition. Some frustration was expressed regarding the time it takes to progress from requirements to a fielded product. The speed with which microelec- tronic and information processing technologies are ad- vancing almost guarantees that a deliberate development and procurement process using current procedures will lead to the fielding of obsolescent systems. The Army must be able to adopt and adapt commercial off-the-shelf technology to its needs. However, the application of some subsets of commercial technology, particularly hardware and wireless communication technologies, will be most difficult at brigade level and below. The battle- field environment and the basic tasks and missions to be performed at these levels present difficult Army-specific challenges, and commercial, off-the-shelf technology is in some cases not well suited to these requirements. Information Filtering. Intelligence data, and situation reports, and other kinds of essential information must be "pushed" so that they are available to all locations and levels. An adjustable information filtering capability would ensure that relevant information is passed where needed and that commanders would be able to "pull" additional information when needed. 'General Wishart interviewed the following persons: Major General Joe Rigby, Director, Army Digitization Office, on October 11, 1994; Brigadier GeneralJoe Oder, Director of Requirements, Of rice of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, on October 13, 1994; General Frederick Franks, Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, on October 17, 1994. On January 4, 1995, a small group of committee COMMERCIAL MULTI.lIEDIA TECHNOLOGIES FOR TWEN7.Y-FIRST CENTURYARMYBA 77lEFIFl as Battlefield Data Transmission. The Army needs an improved multimode, multiband battlefield information transport system at reasonable cost that can be prolifer- ated in quantity to the lowest levels. Displays. Emphasis should be placed on providing user-friendly, easily operated displays that do not distract the commanders or operators from their primary combat functions. Displays must assist the commanders in ac- complishing the mission; this is particularly important for those systems provided at the lowest (platform) level where leaders and crew members must focus their full sensory perceptions on the battlefield around them. Next in importance are scalable data the ability to roll data up and then de-aggregate it, integrate it with useful graphics, and present it in an easily understood display. Operations Other Than War It is important to note that the Army requirements outlined in this chapter have been derived primarily from the vision behind creating the digital battlefield for Force XXI.6 Information technologies designed to satisfy these Army requirements must operate on Army-specific infra- structure in a battlefield environment. These same tech- nologies must be easily portable to indigenous infrastructure, where such infrastructure exists, during contingency deployments or operations other than war. The technologies and the architecture for applying them to Army requirements must include well defined inter- faces for modular, flexible, and reusable systems that will allow for applications to Army-specific infrastructure as well as to indigenous infrastructure when available. A Word of Caution Developing and providing the systems and networks to meet the Army's vision of future battle command demand a word of caution, particularly with regard to meeting the requirements for a shared, common under- standing of real-time battlefield truth. It will be important for the automated processes that manipulate the infor- mation to be visible and understood by those who use members met with the Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, and on March 2~21, 1995, a group of six committee members visited the facilities and ranges at Fort Hood, Texas. 6Force X~ is the transformed Army of the 21st Century in its entirety. The central and essential feature of this Army will be its ability to exploit information (Army Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force, 1995).

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RENEW OF~Y~QUIR~E~S the information to avoid misleading or misinforming. The speed with which information processing and communi- cations technologies can manipulate and transmit data means that erroneous information, misinterpreted infor- mation, or misunderstood information that is improperly processed and repeated electronically throughout the battlefield can make a bad situation worse and can do so very rapidly. SUMMARY The Army has recognized the power of information and the technologies for handling and processing infor- mation on the battlefield. A smaller Army, based primarily in the United States and required to respond rapidly to worldwide contingencies, must have continuous access to accurate, current information. Commanders must be able to use information and protect it. Commanders at all echelons must have a shared, common understanding of real-time battlefield truth. Misinformation can be po- tentially disastrous. Without accurate, timely information and the communications to ensure its availability to commanders and staffs throughout the battlefield, a 17 smaller U.S. force may not prevail against a determined enemy with reasonably modern technology. REFERENCES Army Combined Arms Center. 1994. Battle Command Operational Capability Requirements. August 24. Army Director, Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force. 1995. America's Army of the 21st Century Force XXI. Fort Monroe, Virginia. January 15. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 1993. Operational Requirements Document for Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). Draft. December 24. Army TRADOC. 1994. Force ~ Operations. Pamphlet 525-5. August 1. Department of the Army. 1993a. Army Enterprise Strategy The Vision. July 20. Department of the Army. 1993b. Operations. Field Manual, FM 10~. June 14. Department of the Army. 1994a. Statement of Work, Battlefield Digiti- zation, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below. August 19. Department of the Army. 1994b. Operational Requirements Document for Force XXI Brigade and Below Battle Command (FB3C) (Formerly Army Brigade and Below Battle Command (AB2)). 081400, April. Department of the Army. 1994c. The United States Army Modernization Plan. Update (F 9~99). May. Department of the Army. 1994d. U.S. Arrny Modernization Plan, Dis- tributed Interactive Simulation (DIS). Draft. July 31. Sullivan, G.R. 1994. Speech by Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff, to the Association of the United States Army. October 18.