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OCR for page 78
6
Technology Management Strategy
This chapter of the report describes a technology
management strategy by which the Army can most
successfully leverage multimedia information technolo-
gies for battlefield applications. The chapter is directed
at Army decision makers who must translate goals and
advice into action as they define and implement the
Army's strategic plan for information technology manage-
ment during the next several years.
INTRODUCTION
Although some of the recommendations presented in
the following sections echo recommendations that have
been made before (Howard et al., 1996~) and have also
appeared in high-level vision statements made by the
Army's top management (Franker, 1994; Frankel et al.,
1995; Sullivan, 1994), the committee feels that it is
essential to reiterate these recommendations because (a)
the committee wishes to add its weight to these recom-
mendations in the hope of accelerating their implemen-
tation; (b) the committee wishes to provide specific
support for these recommendations in the context of
applications of multimedia information technology; and
(c) the committee is concerned that these recommenda-
tions are not being implemented aggressively enough to
achieve the desired outcomes.
BE A HUNTER GATHERER OF TECHNOLOGIES
In Chapter 3 of this report the committee provided an
overview of 17 building block technologies that can be
used to create multimedia information systems in a wide
variety of generic application domains. In Chapter 3 the
committee also gave examples of how multimedia infor-
mation technologies are being applied in commercial
cellular and wireless communication systems, electronic
commerce, intelligent transportation systems, and resi-
dential information services. These commercial applica-
tions represent a worldwide market that is 10 to 20
percent of the gross domestic product of developed and
78
developing nations (i.e., trillions of dollars annually).
Thus the committee made an argument that it is unimag-
inable that Army research and development (R&D) efforts
could be the driving force behind most of the building
block technologies that support these applications. The
committee identified specific areas where the Army's
needs are sufficiently different from those of generic
commercial applications and where the Army could focus
its R&D initiatives in order to produce a competitive
advantage for itself.
Based on these observations, the committee believes
that the Army must seek out and acquire the best
technologies wherever it can find them to meet its overall
strategic objectives, and it should apply them in an
opportunistic fashion to meet the demands of the battle-
field. Most important, the Army must focus on leveraging
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology to achieve
the rapid deployment of those technologies in highly
effective applications, ahead of its adversaries. It must
refrain from setting rigid requirements and specifications
that imply a need for technologies that do not exist and
corresponding development activities that will slow
down the deployment of applications. There must be an
iterative process by which requirements are traded
against technical feasibility, with time-to-deployment as
a key parameter to be optimized.
In the commercial world, the concept of time-to-de-
ployment highlighted above is known as "time-to-mar-
ket." Commercial firms have recognized that information
technologies evolve quickly, that advantages over com-
petitors are short-lived, and that a critical success factor
in deriving advantages from information technologies
and in competing in the marketplace is the speed at
which new capabilities can be deployed.
Commercial firms have moved away from a vertically
integrated structure and toward a horizontally integrated
structure (as described in Chapters 3 and 5) in order to
focus on those areas where they intend to differentiate
themselves from their competitors. They have become
hunter-gathers of technologies by purchasing technolo-
gies they might have previously developed themselves
and by forming alliances to gain access to technologies
they need, as discussed in Chapter 3 under Leveraging
Commercial Off-the-Shelf Technology.
OCR for page 79
TECHNOl OGY~NAG~~ LOGY
The Army must follow the lead of the commercial
world by differentiating itself from potential adversaries
via the speed and efficacy with which it deploys tech-
nologies in Army-specific applications and not, in most
cases, by the technologies themselves.
In order to utilize COTS technology acquired in this
mode to the maximum extent possible, it is essential that
the Army's physical layer platforms (i.e., physical wireless
communications capabilities, physical computer termi-
nals, and other physical processing, storage, and display
subsystems) be capable of supporting the COTS software
that must be layered on top of these physical platforms
in accordance with the Army's layered technical architec-
ture. As an example the Army should focus on physical
packaging technologies that will allow computer termi-
nals, storage subsystems, etc., that are developed in the
commercial world to be directly utilized in Army battle-
field applications by applying this protective packaging.
This would be an example of adapting COTS physical
layer technology. As another example (stated previously
in Chapter 4) the Army should create a wireless battlefield
communications capability, based on such things as
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) acting as battlefield cell
sites or repeaters that have capabilities comparable to
those of commercial wide area wireless communications
systems, so that commercial applications that depend on
those capabilities can be directly applied to battlefield
applications.
TARGETING INNOVATION
It is essential that the Army target its limited R&D
investment resources on those aspects of inflation
technology where (~) the Army has unique requirements,
and (b) there is reasonable probability of obtaining a
competitive advantage from R&D investment.
The existence of a gap between requirements that the
Army may wish to meet and the capabilities of available
commercial or Army-specific technology may not be
sufficient to justify an R&D effort by the Army to close
that gap. In many cases, a similar gap will exist between
the requirements of commercial applications (i.e., unmet
commercial market needs) and the capabilities of existing
technologies. Examples include multimedia database
management systems, graphical user interface technol-
ogy, and distributed computing environments and oper-
ating systems. In those cases, commercial firms are likely
to invest heavily in R&D initiatives to close those gaps,
which raises the question of whether Anny-specific R&D
initiatives will result in any competitive advantage for the
Army. In those cases, Army investment will often be
better spent on participation in standards activities and
79
perhaps in joint activities with commercial firms to
improve the alignment of emerging commercial tech-
nologies with Army needs. In addition, the Army should
closely monitor commercial trends and developments,
including the successful or unsuccessful commercial
application of emerging technologies, in order to maxi-
mize the timely and effective insertion of emerging
technologies into Army applications.
In those cases where an Army requirement has no
commercial counterpart, or where the commercial coun-
terpart represents a small potential commercial market
opportunity, it is possible that R&D investments funded
and led by the Army may lead to innovations that place
the Army at a competitive advantage (e.g., adaptive
antennas for interference or jammer suppression in wire-
less networks). Since there is no large commercial market
opportunity driving the same innovation, it is less likely
that the Army will find its R&D results overtaken by
commercial results in the same area. Nevertheless, the
Amy should closely monitor commercial market trends,
including trends that may be proprietary (and therefore
require appropriate nondisclosure agreements) to assure
that the Army is not duplicating larger commercial RHO
efforts. It is essential that Army innovations be inserted
into the overall Army information technology architec-
ture in such a way as to facilitate the future insertion of
commercial technology in the event that superior com-
mercial technology emerges. This typically implies the
use of a carefully layered technical architecture. In addi-
tion to focusing on the creation of carefully targeted
activities to create multimedia information technologies
where the Army can expect to produce a differentiating
advantage for itself over its adversaries, the Anny should
focus on the innovative application of generic multime-
dia technologies to battlefields with an emphasis on
time-t~deployment as discussed above.
BALANCED PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The committee believes that the Army must achieve a
better balance in its procurement processes for systems
based on information technologies between the impera-
tive of making procurement fair and competitive and the
imperative of successfully and effectively meeting time-
to-deployment objectives for technologies which have
life cycles as short as 18 months.
Commercial functional specifications are initially es-
tablished as part of a business plan based on market
analyses and tradeoff studies. Those initial functional
specifications are often modified based on new informa-
tion regarding customer needs and existing or emerging
competitive products. Such decisions are based on return
OCR for page 80
80
COMMERCIAL MUL71MEDIA TECHIVOl OGI~ FOR ~-FIR~ C~Y~YBA 1-] ~ AS
on investment and time-to-market considerations. Modi-
fications to functional specifications are made in order to
achieve overarching business objectives, and system or
application-specific requirements may be translated to
more general purpose requirements to facilitate potential
software reuse. The `general-business strategy is one of
bringing products to the marketplace as early as possible,
followed by evolutionary upgrades to provide additional
capability or significant cost savings.
Vendor selection in the commercial world is not
always based on the lowest-cost bidder. Best values are
often negotiated as a result of tradeoffs of cost, the ability
to meet requirements and to deliver product in a timely
fashion, and the estimated risks in meeting commitments.
Consideration is given to the mutual best interest of
vendors and buyers who may operate in long-te~
teaming arrangements. Vendors are encouraged to offer
best solutions, which may not meet 100 percent of
requirements.
During the system development process, vendors
often tailor existing products to meet requirements, and
there is widespread use and reuse of COTS software in
order to minimize costs and development time. Systems
are designed to fit into a defined product or product line
architecture to achieve commonalities that foster reuse of
technology. Prototyping is commonly used early in the
development process to refine requirements and to vali-
date the vendors understanding of the buyers needs (see
Chapter 3, under Adopting a Spiral Model). Joint cus-
tomer and development teams work to clarify require-
ments and incorporate new requirements when there is
minimum impact on cost and schedule.
In summary, commercial acquisition practices are
based on flexibility and tradeoffs of requirements versus
cost and schedule. They very often involve a team
approach to system development. And they are strongly
oriented toward reuse and tailoring of existing systems.
An underlying philosophy is to anticipate product im-
provements and provide for their accommodation in the
initial system release.
The lesson to be reamed from commercial practice is
that the Army acquisition process needs to be flexible. It
needs to accommodate technologies that are changing as
an acquisition is under way. It needs to be flexible to
accommodate complex tradeoffs between cost, technical
feasibility, target requirements, and time-to-deployment,
many of which are not fully understood even at deploy-
ment It needs to foster a partnership between the
supplier and the purchaser where the focus is on meeting
the Army's needs to deploy systems that are superior to
those of its adversaries and to upgrade those systems over
time to maintain that superiority. It cannot be based on
rigid requirements set at the beginning of a procurement,
which may drive uo costs and delay deployment of
needed capabilities far beyond any associated benefits of
meeting those rigid requirements.
Setting rigid requirements for systems years in advance
of their likely deployment will result in the deployment
of obsolete technologies (owing to the rigidity of speci-
fications that imply specific technologies or preclude the
use of innovative new technologies) with their associated
cost and performance penalties. Opportunities will be
lost to deploy capabilities that were not believed to be
feasible at the time the requirements were set . Efforts
and resources will be wasted in the development of
Army-specific technologies to meet requirements that
could have been satisfied more opportunistically by
existing or emerging commercial technologies at lower
cost and with higher performance in most, if not all,
relevant parameters.
ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE AN ARCHITECTURE
In Chapter 3 of this report, the committee introduced
a generic multimedia architecture that provided a con-
ceptual framework for describing the building block
technologies that were discussed. Chapter 3 also de-
scribed some lessons learned in the commercial world
on both the advantages of establishing and enforcing a
technical architecture and on the difficul~ of doing so.
The committee also noted the difference between a
framework architecture and a specific, enforceable tech-
nical architecture.
A specific, enforceable technical architecture must
define the specific building blocks that are to be used to
build information systems throughout the enterprise.
When more than one building block alternative is al-
lowed, the documentation supporting the architecture
must specify the conditions under which one or the other
alternative is to be chosen, and it must specify how
interoperability will be achieved by systems that utilize
different altematives.
The advantages of developing and enforcing a tech-
nical architecture were discussed briefly in Chapter 4.
Specific advantages include interoperability; reuse of the
building blocks, modules, and objects; insertion of new
technologies; and facilitation of ad hoc modifications.
Interoperabi~ity
When systems employ the same building blocks, or
where interoperability concerns between heterogenous
building blocks are considered in advance, it is far easier
to interconnect systems and to have them interoperate
without extensive, costly, and time consuming develop-
OCR for page 81
TECHlVOlOGY~NA God ~ LOGY
ment of new interfaces between systems. For example,
if systems employ a common packet communications
protocol like TCP/IP, then one system can easily transfer
data packets to and from another system using the same
packet communication protocol. If systems employ the
same database management systems, then they can more
easily access each other's data (although a common
database management system is not sufficient for data
sharing). If systems represent multimedia information in
the same formats, and if they attribute the same meaning
to the same names for information objects, then they can
easily share information in abstract form without the need
for translation.
Reuse of Boilding Blocks, Modules, and Objects
When systems conform to a common architecture and
employ standard building blocks, it is possible to reuse
the functionality of building blocks, and the modules and
objects within building blocks, across multiple systems
without having to redevelop them multiple times. Thus
a database management system, and specific data
structures that are created to perform a map management
function, for example, can be reused in other systems
and applications that require map management
functions.
Insertion of New Technologies
When systems condo to a well-defined, layered
architecture, it is possible to upgrade various building
blocks independently to take advantage of new technolo-
gies. For example, if security functions are modularized
properly in the design of the architecture and in its
implementation, then a newer encryption method can be
readily inserted without requiring the redesign of all of
the building blocks to accommodate changes that would
otherwise "ripple" through the entire system. A new
method of providing wireless communication can be
inserted into all systems without disturbing the function-
ality that draws upon that layer of the architecture.
Facilitation of Ad Hoc Modifications
When systems conform to a well-defined technical
architecture, one can make rapid ad hoc modifications
to the deployed system or systems to meet unforeseen
needs. Thus, communication paths between systems or
applications that were not foreseen can be added as
needed in nearly "real time." Access to information by a
commander that was not foreseen as a mission require-
81
ment can be quickly implemented if the appropriate
access control permissions are granted. This property of
"kludge-ability" has been recognized as an important
benefit of information systems that conform to a well-de-
fined technical architecture (Defense Science Board,
19941.
Management Issues
While all of these advantages of a well-defined and
enforced technical architecture are well known and have
been articulated before, and while the committee is
aware that the Army has taken steps toward creating a
technical architecture for the digital battlefield with Ver-
sion 3.1 of the C4I Technical Architecture (Department of
the Army, 1995), the committee is concerned that the
speed at which such a technical architecture will be
developed and implemented may not be fast enough to
satisfy the needs of Force ~I.
The committee notes that one of the biggest manage-
ment challenges in implementing an architecture is in
creating the incentives for suppliers and program man-
agers to transition to that architecture. An architecture
produces strategic benefits (as articulated above) for the
Army as an enterprise. However, for any individual
program, particularly the first programs that conform to
the architecture, there may be tactical reasons not to
conform. A particular program may find that it is more
costly to implement the architecture because it cannot
benefit from such things as reuse of existing functionality
until the architecture is widely implemented. The archi-
tecture may initially be unfamiliar to the program man-
ager and its suppliers, and there is a temptation to find
excuses for bypassing the architecture to meet shorter
term or tactical objectives.
Thus the committee urges the top management of the
Army to put in place incentives for program managers
and suppliers to conform to the architecture as it emerges.
The committee also recommends that the Army increase
the number of technical experts who are involved in the
creation of the Army's technical architecture so as to
expedite the architecture's emergence and the realization
of the associated benefits.
The committee recognizes that one of the challenges to
management in transition to a modem technical infomlation
architecture is existing "legacy" systems that do not conform
to this architecture. The approach of upgrading legacy
systems by replacing their functions with standard, reusable,
new-technology building block components and develop-
ing inte~vorking capabilities between legacy systems and
modem open systems was discussed in Chapter 3 under
Leveraging Legacy Investments and Fostering Rapid Accep-
tance of Information Technology. Alternative number
OCR for page 82
82
COMMERCL91 MULTlMEDk4 TECH.~O£OGI~ FOR -ST C~Y~YBA -1 lL~IFrns
three, discussed there, is particularly relevant to the Army
because it addresses a situation where there is a large
number of legacy systems.
The goal is to open up interfaces to the legacy systems
that, over time, make data contained in these systems
accessible to all systems and applications and that allow
existing system-specific user interfaces to be replaced
with modem graphical user interfaces (and other modern
user interfaces) that access multiple systems and appli-
cations in an intuitive, user-friendly way. The interfaces
will also allow the processing functionality within legacy
systems to be replaced, over time, with building block
processing functionality that conforms to the technical
architecture.
While the transition of the large base of legacy systems
will be a major undertaking, the committee believes that
the sooner a technical architecture is developed,
adopted, and enforced, the less costly and difficult this
transition will be.
By replacing existing user interfaces with modem
graphical user interfaces, the Army can make its systems
more intuitive to use. This in turn should facilitate
training, improve operator performance, and reduce the
layers of people necessary in the processing chain. By
replacing existing, incompatible communications inter-
faces, the Army will make it possible to communicate
between systems without the reentry of data or the
relaying of messages by human operators, thus reducing
decision cycle times and reducing the numbers of people
in the communication chain. By making legacy system
data accessible via open interfaces, the Army will ulti-
mately improve the ability of its commanders and indi-
vidual soldiers to access the information they need for
multiple applications.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMMERCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS
For the Army to anticipate emerging technologies in
the commercial sector, to learn from commercial suc-
cesses and failures, and to be effective as a hunter-gath-
erer of technologies, it must build strong relationships
with leading commercial information-technology R&D
organizations. Relationships should include organiza-
tions that endeavor to create underlying or enabling
technologies as well as those organizations on the lead-
ing edge of application of technologies in systems and
end-user products. It is also essential that the Army's
special needs be made known to commercial R&D firms
so that these needs can influence the development of
COTS technology. These strong ties can be forged in a
number of ways.
For those technologies discussed in Chapter ~ where
the committee recommended that the ArTny adopt com-
mercial technologies, the Army should carefully track
commercial trends in order to incorporate these evolving
commercial technologies to keep Aridly systems and
applications at the forefront of what commercial tech-
nologies make possible. For those technologies in Chap-
ter ~ where the committee recommended that the Army
adapt commercial technologies and attempt to influence
commercial technology trends, the Army should focus on
articulating its special needs, participating in the stand-
ards activities, and funding dual-use R&D activities. If
necessary, it should fund Army-specific R&D to imple-
ment the needed adaptations. By committing a substan-
tial amount of its resources to participating in and
accessing commercial R&D activities, the Army will be
far less likely to find itself conducting isolated R&D
activities that duplicate larger and more effective com-
mercial efforts yet fail to incorporate the latest enabling
commercial advances.
The Army should maintain a strong internal and
sponsored R&D effort focused on unique Army applica-
tions and the identification of Army needs, and the Army
should actively articulate these needs to the commercial
R&D community. The Army should participate in external
R&D activities in carefully selected areas in order to
influence technology trends and to obtain access to
proprietary emerging commercial technology under ap-
propriate nondisclosure agreements.
In working with commercial companies, the Army can
return real value to the commercial companies by pros
viding something that the companies have always had
trouble obtaining, namely, solid end-user requirements.
Commercial technology suppliers often must gamble
simultaneously on new technologies and new-market
creation with only limited understanding of the real
needs of the customers they hope to senre with their new
products. This has resulted in many technical successes
and market failures. By becoming an applications test-
bed, the Army can help reduce this commercial risk at
the same time that it steers commercial development to
meet its needs.
From actual warfighter experience and quick-turn-
around experiments (such as those at III Corps), the Army
can generate end-user requirements to which the com-
mercial technology suppliers can build systems and
equipment with increased confidence. The committee's
work underlying this report has shown that virtually
eveIy system feature, attribute, or capability that commer-
cial technology suppliers would build (ostensibly) to suit
the Army would also have a counterpart for some class
of commercial customer. Although the AITny's needs do
not cover every building block technology, they cover
most of them. In particular, the Army has leading-edge
OCR for page 83
TECHIVOL OG Y MA NO CEMENT STRA TED Y
needs for near-real-time integrated information
handling.
Therefore, the committee recommends that the Army
proactively adopt the behavior of a "pseudo-commercial"
customer with concrete, experience-based needs, ready
to experiment with commercial technology suppliers in
the development and beta testing of new multimedia
information systems and equipment.
Additionally, the Army should encourage its R&D staff
to spend a substantial amount of time and effort on
understanding the latest R&D trends in industry (e.g.,
rotational assignments at commercial firms should be
encouraged). Likewise, the Army should encourage com-
mercial firms to place individuals with knowledge of the
latest commercial trends in rotational assignments in
Army R&D centers. The Army should increase its efforts
to attract experienced R&D managers from commercial
firms to participate in Army R&D management and
high-level decision-making processes.
RESPOND TO THE NEED FOR REINVENTION
As discussed in Chapter 5 of this report, commercial
experience indicates that radical organizational and in-
stitutional changes are needed to leverage information
technology to its fullest potential. Therefore, the Army
should expect that the rapid advances in communications
and computational capabilities resulting from trends in
commercial multimedia technologies will result in more
than quantitative improvement in the ability of soldiers
and commanders to execute existing command and
control paradigms. It is likely that the Army will have to
reinvent its doctrines related to command and control to
take into account the entirely new paradigms that these
capabilities will enable.
For example, the ability of commanders to directly
access information that has been automatically filtered
and processed into a form that is useful to them can
enable the elimination of layers in the command and
control hierarchy, just as information technologies have
enabled the elimination of middle management layers in
industry. This can result in much more rapid decision
making, leading to the ability to execute much more rapid
responses to the unfolding battlefield.
While the provision of wireless communication de-
vices to individual soldiers at the squad level may have
been too expensive in the past and may have resulted in
unmanageable levels of communication, modern low-
cost integrated circuitry has transformed wireless two-
way communications devices into common consumer
appliances. Coupled with modern information filtering
and network management technologies it is possible
83
that every soldier will have access to and be accessible
via the battlefield information networks of the future.
ADOPT A SPIRAL MODEL; EMPHASIZE
SIMULATION, MODELING, AND EXPERIMENTATION
The Army must adopt a spiral model of development
where the iterative specification of requirements, proto-
typing, testing by users, and refinement/respecification
of requirements proceeds in periods measured in months
to create new systems and applications (as described in
Chapter 3, in the subsection Adopting a Spiral Model).
To achieve the desired iteration speeds, realistic
prototyping, and the desired user feedback, this process
must make heavy use of simulation, modeling, and
experimentation.
In January 1993, a Defense Science Board panel
reported that "Ewle believe that Advanced Distributed
Simulation technology is here today, and that this tech-
nology can provide the means to improve training and
readiness substantially, to create an environment for
operational and technical innovation for revolutionary
improvements, and to transform the acquisition process
from within" (Defense Science Board, 19931. A key to
fulfilling this vision lies in bringing concept developers
together with users and engineers. This collaboration
should take place early in the development process on
a common virtual battlefield where they can visualize and
discuss the merits of various designs and implementation
approaches. Under this process, the effects of alternative
design decisions can be easily visualized and their effects
on key performance parameters identified.
One of the principal questions that must be addressed
in the acquisition of any system is whether to adapt,
modify, and combine existing off-the-shelf components
or to initiate a substantially new system design effort.
Such questions inevitably turn out to be multidimen-
sional, involving many tradeoffs and requiring many
supporting analyses. These are exactly the kinds of
questions for which common experiences on a virtual
battlefield by developers and users are most valuable.
Users are able to envision the proposed system much
more concretely and to anticipate problems in its use.
Developers can observe the way users interact with the
system and will frequently gain insights that would not
othe~vise become apparent until much later (and many
dollars later) in the acquisition process.
It is important to bear in mind that the introduction of
a new capability onto the battlefield rarely leaves other
functions unchanged. Modeling and simulation can help
explore the changes that could be introduced by the
tactical employment of a proposed system. As discussed
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84
COMMERCIAL MULTIMEDIA TECHl!iOLOGIES FOR 7~WEN7Y-FIRST C~Y~YBA~IF~OS
in Chapter 5, evaluators must be especially alert for
changes in tactics that could be permitted or enabled by
the new system and for adaptive changes in tactics by
the opposing forces. In some cases, these countertactics
may nullify many of the envisioned advantages of the
proposed system. In addition, modeling and simulation
can be used to explore other issues, such as training new
units to use the system and the implications of the
logistics loads that the proposed system would place on
the combat service support infrastructure.
In many cases, detailed models of the system are not
needed to support these analyses. Especially in the initial
phases of concept evaluation, a system can be described
in terms of performance probabilities, approximate rep-
resentations of the physics involved, and a rough repre-
sentation of the user interface. If initial results appear
promising, the richness of the simulation and user inter-
face can be incrementally improved to support more
detailed tests. Later, in the demonstration and validation
and engineering development phases, more elaborate
models and simulations may be used to focus on specific
detailed design issues and tradeoffs.
Information systems can be particularly challenging
because performance is difficult to quantify and validate.
Through distributed simulation, human interface behav-
ior and performance can be evaluated with live players.
There is also a significant potential payoff in that software
developed to simulate information systems can closely
approximate the look and feel of the proposed systems.
It is very likely that the software components developed
for the systems simulation, particularly in the area of
displays and interfaces, can be incorporated into actual
systems.
An important area that should receive continuing, and
perhaps increased, emphasis is research on human per-
ception and performance in highly complex, temporally
sensitive, information rich environments. Although a
great deal of work has been undertaken, and is under
way in understanding how to present complex multime-
dia information to users in commercial applications rang-
ing from entertainment to medicine, the committee
believes that much more remains to be done to under-
stand how to facilitate and optimize the flow of multi-
media information to commanders and between
commanders and their subordinates in battlefield
applications.
Experiments, such as those being conducted as part
of the Louisiana Maneuvers, are critical for evaluating and
iteratively improving new applications, systems, and
subsystems that employ multimedia information tech-
nologies. Such experiments or exercises serve to deter-
mine operational deficiencies and to uncover new
doctrine to reinvent the battlefield. The Army will have
to continue to invest heavily in large-scale experimenta-
tion in order to optimize the application of commercial
technology, make necessary modifications to meet mili-
tary requirements, and to test and evaluate military-
unique technologies that are needed to meet Army
operational requirements.
MEASURING PR06RESS
Organizations make better progress toward a goal
when they have a way of keeping score on how well
they are doing. When the goal is a qualitative one, hard
numbers are usually not appropriate. Borrowing a prac-
tice from the software industry, as discussed in the last
subsection of Chapter 3 (Process Improvement), the
committee recommends that the Army create and adopt
a Qualitative "index," like the sample shown on the
toi~ow~ng page, to show the series of steps it expects to
pass through on its way to becoming a "Level 4" user of
commercial technologies. Based on commercial experi-
ence with that process, the Army should expect that
progression through these levels is a long-term proposi-
tion in which none of the levels can be skipped.
The committee recognizes that the Army needs to
define its own goals and levels of achievement in this
area. But such a qualitative index could (a) point toward
a desired goal, (b) show what the Army considers to be
progress toward the goal, and (c) provide a means of
"keeping score" on progress.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee offers the following additional recom-
mendations based on its intuitive reaction to some of the
presentations it heard and the trips it made during the
course of this study.
Putting Low Cost Multimedia and Wireless Appliances
Into the Hands of Squad-teve! Soldiers
The committee believes that the ongoing and acceler-
ating appearance of low-cost consumer appliances that
employ multimedia information technologies (e.g., wire-
less personal communications devices, pagers, facsimile
machines, portable personal computers, global-position-
ing-system appliances) will stimulate the ad hoc intro-
duction of these appliances into Army applications by
commanders and soldiers. The committee believes that
this insertion of technologies is inevitable, and in most
OCR for page 85
TECHNOL OF Y MANA CEMENT 512A DIG Y
85
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cases it is preferable to the alternative of not making use
of the best commercially available technology in the
battlefield. The committee recommends that the Army get
ahead of this trend by accelerating the deployment of
such low-cost COTS appliances in a standard way to
avoid the proliferation of incompatible systems.
The committee believes that low-cost (several hun-
dred dollars wireless communications appliances could
be made available by the Army to squad leaders and
individual soldiers for use in battlefield applications.
These "radios" need not be highly "ruggedized," and
could be viewed as throwaway items. Concerns with
respect to security and detection could be addressed with
minor modifications of COTS technology. For example,
simple security codes could be required for activation.
The use of low power, code division multiple access
(CDMA), one of the technologies being deployed for
emerging commercial personal communications systems,
would make these wireless transmitting appliances resis-
tant to detection, just as frequency-hopping spread spec-
trum does in today's military radios. These radios could
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be designed to communicate with nearby jeeps, tanks,
or other armored vehicles which would act as base
stations and would translate their signals into formats
used for longer distance communications on the battle-
field. In addition, these base stations could be used to
filter information flows and manage communications to
avoid traffic or information overload.
Encouraging innovation
The committee observed the rapid insertion of inno-
vative new technologies at III Corps at Fort Hood. These
technologies were being evaluated using the spiral model
of development described above. The committee would
like to recommend to the Army that the innovative, rapid
insertion and evaluation of technology observed at Fort
Hood be used as a role model for the Army as a whole
and be institutionalized as the "path forward" into the
twenty-first century. This is the kind of activity that is
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86
CO~C~L MUM ~CHNOLOGI~ FOR -FIRST CE~YA~YBA BRIMS
representative of Level 2 of the recommended qualitative
index discussed earlier.
SUMMARY
This chapter has described a technology management
strategy by which the Army can successfully leverage
multimedia information technologies for battlefield ap-
plications. The strategy includes the following recom-
mendations:
.
.
The Army should be a hunter-gatherer of technolo-
gies, seeking out and acquiring the best technolo-
gies wherever it can find them to meet overall
strategic objectives and applying them in an oppor-
tunistic manner to meet battlefield demands.
The Army should take advantage of the distinction
between those technologies that are emerging and
evolving in the commercial marketplace and will
be available to everyone and those technologies
that the Army can reasonably expect to create as
competitive enablers to differentiate the Army from
its adversaries.
· The Army must achieve a better balance in its
procurement processes between keeping the proc-
esses fair and competitive and effectively acquiring
and deploying information technologies with ex-
tremely short life cycles.
· The Army should create and enforce a technical
architecture that (a) promotes reuse of building
block technologies across multiple systems, in-
teroperability between systems, and expedited in-
sertion of new technologies to achieve cost
reductions and performance improvements; and
(b) facilitates ad hoc modifications of systems and
applications to meet short-term needs in crisis
situations.
.
The Army should be an active participant in tech-
nology development in the commercial sector.
· The Army should respond to the need for reinven-
tion. It should expect a requirement to reinvent its
doctrines related to command and control to lever-
age the rapidly evolving technologies and to remain
competitive with its adversaries.
The Army must adopt a spiral model with a strong
emphasis on simulation, modeling, and experimen-
tation.
The Army should create and adopt an appropriate
qualitative index for uses in measuring progress
made toward achieving its technology management
goals.
In addition to recommendations on a sound technol-
ogy management strategy, the committee also offered
recommendations based on intuitive reaction to some of
the presentations it heard and site visits it made during
the course of this study. The committee recommended
that the Army encourage innovation and be proactive in
putting technologies into the hands of soldiers.
REFERENCES
Defense Science Board. 1993. Impact of Advanced Distributed Simula-
tion on Readiness, Training, and Prototyping. Defense Science
Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology. January.
Defense Science Board. 1994. Report of the 1994 Summer Study Task
Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield. Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.
October.
Department of the Army. 1995. Department of the Army C4I Technical
Architecture. Version 3.1. March 31.
Frankel, M. S. 1994. The 1994 Army Science Board Recommended
Technical Architecture for the Digital Battlefield. Army Research,
Development and Acquisition Bulletin. November-December.
Frankel, M. S. (Chair), P. C. Dickinson, J. H. Cafarella, W. P. Cherry,
G. D. Godden, I. M. Kameny, W. J. Neal, T. P. Rona, M. B.
Zimmerman, D. C. Latham. 1995. Technical Information Architecture
for Army Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.
1994 Summery Study. Washington, D.C.: Army Science Board. April.
Howard, W. (Chair), S. Personick, R. Gallagher, R. Bajcsy, C. Carlson,
G. Klein, and D. Mook. 1994. ARL (Army Research Lab) and the
Digitization of the Battlefield. (Unpublished ARL Report.) Decem-
ber 17.
Sullivan, G. R. 1994. Force XXI: Digitizing the Battlefield. Army Research,
Development and Acquisition Bulletin. November-December.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
multimedia information
