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6 Technology Management Strategy This chapter of the report describes a technology management strategy by which the Army can most successfully leverage multimedia information technolo- gies for battlefield applications. The chapter is directed at Army decision makers who must translate goals and advice into action as they define and implement the Army's strategic plan for information technology manage- ment during the next several years. INTRODUCTION Although some of the recommendations presented in the following sections echo recommendations that have been made before (Howard et al., 1996~) and have also appeared in high-level vision statements made by the Army's top management (Franker, 1994; Frankel et al., 1995; Sullivan, 1994), the committee feels that it is essential to reiterate these recommendations because (a) the committee wishes to add its weight to these recom- mendations in the hope of accelerating their implemen- tation; (b) the committee wishes to provide specific support for these recommendations in the context of applications of multimedia information technology; and (c) the committee is concerned that these recommenda- tions are not being implemented aggressively enough to achieve the desired outcomes. BE A HUNTER GATHERER OF TECHNOLOGIES In Chapter 3 of this report the committee provided an overview of 17 building block technologies that can be used to create multimedia information systems in a wide variety of generic application domains. In Chapter 3 the committee also gave examples of how multimedia infor- mation technologies are being applied in commercial cellular and wireless communication systems, electronic commerce, intelligent transportation systems, and resi- dential information services. These commercial applica- tions represent a worldwide market that is 10 to 20 percent of the gross domestic product of developed and 78 developing nations (i.e., trillions of dollars annually). Thus the committee made an argument that it is unimag- inable that Army research and development (R&D) efforts could be the driving force behind most of the building block technologies that support these applications. The committee identified specific areas where the Army's needs are sufficiently different from those of generic commercial applications and where the Army could focus its R&D initiatives in order to produce a competitive advantage for itself. Based on these observations, the committee believes that the Army must seek out and acquire the best technologies wherever it can find them to meet its overall strategic objectives, and it should apply them in an opportunistic fashion to meet the demands of the battle- field. Most important, the Army must focus on leveraging commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology to achieve the rapid deployment of those technologies in highly effective applications, ahead of its adversaries. It must refrain from setting rigid requirements and specifications that imply a need for technologies that do not exist and corresponding development activities that will slow down the deployment of applications. There must be an iterative process by which requirements are traded against technical feasibility, with time-to-deployment as a key parameter to be optimized. In the commercial world, the concept of time-to-de- ployment highlighted above is known as "time-to-mar- ket." Commercial firms have recognized that information technologies evolve quickly, that advantages over com- petitors are short-lived, and that a critical success factor in deriving advantages from information technologies and in competing in the marketplace is the speed at which new capabilities can be deployed. Commercial firms have moved away from a vertically integrated structure and toward a horizontally integrated structure (as described in Chapters 3 and 5) in order to focus on those areas where they intend to differentiate themselves from their competitors. They have become hunter-gathers of technologies by purchasing technolo- gies they might have previously developed themselves and by forming alliances to gain access to technologies they need, as discussed in Chapter 3 under Leveraging Commercial Off-the-Shelf Technology.
TECHNOl OGY~NAG~~ LOGY The Army must follow the lead of the commercial world by differentiating itself from potential adversaries via the speed and efficacy with which it deploys tech- nologies in Army-specific applications and not, in most cases, by the technologies themselves. In order to utilize COTS technology acquired in this mode to the maximum extent possible, it is essential that the Army's physical layer platforms (i.e., physical wireless communications capabilities, physical computer termi- nals, and other physical processing, storage, and display subsystems) be capable of supporting the COTS software that must be layered on top of these physical platforms in accordance with the Army's layered technical architec- ture. As an example the Army should focus on physical packaging technologies that will allow computer termi- nals, storage subsystems, etc., that are developed in the commercial world to be directly utilized in Army battle- field applications by applying this protective packaging. This would be an example of adapting COTS physical layer technology. As another example (stated previously in Chapter 4) the Army should create a wireless battlefield communications capability, based on such things as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) acting as battlefield cell sites or repeaters that have capabilities comparable to those of commercial wide area wireless communications systems, so that commercial applications that depend on those capabilities can be directly applied to battlefield applications. TARGETING INNOVATION It is essential that the Army target its limited R&D investment resources on those aspects of inflation technology where (~) the Army has unique requirements, and (b) there is reasonable probability of obtaining a competitive advantage from R&D investment. The existence of a gap between requirements that the Army may wish to meet and the capabilities of available commercial or Army-specific technology may not be sufficient to justify an R&D effort by the Army to close that gap. In many cases, a similar gap will exist between the requirements of commercial applications (i.e., unmet commercial market needs) and the capabilities of existing technologies. Examples include multimedia database management systems, graphical user interface technol- ogy, and distributed computing environments and oper- ating systems. In those cases, commercial firms are likely to invest heavily in R&D initiatives to close those gaps, which raises the question of whether Anny-specific R&D initiatives will result in any competitive advantage for the Army. In those cases, Army investment will often be better spent on participation in standards activities and 79 perhaps in joint activities with commercial firms to improve the alignment of emerging commercial tech- nologies with Army needs. In addition, the Army should closely monitor commercial trends and developments, including the successful or unsuccessful commercial application of emerging technologies, in order to maxi- mize the timely and effective insertion of emerging technologies into Army applications. In those cases where an Army requirement has no commercial counterpart, or where the commercial coun- terpart represents a small potential commercial market opportunity, it is possible that R&D investments funded and led by the Army may lead to innovations that place the Army at a competitive advantage (e.g., adaptive antennas for interference or jammer suppression in wire- less networks). Since there is no large commercial market opportunity driving the same innovation, it is less likely that the Army will find its R&D results overtaken by commercial results in the same area. Nevertheless, the Amy should closely monitor commercial market trends, including trends that may be proprietary (and therefore require appropriate nondisclosure agreements) to assure that the Army is not duplicating larger commercial RHO efforts. It is essential that Army innovations be inserted into the overall Army information technology architec- ture in such a way as to facilitate the future insertion of commercial technology in the event that superior com- mercial technology emerges. This typically implies the use of a carefully layered technical architecture. In addi- tion to focusing on the creation of carefully targeted activities to create multimedia information technologies where the Army can expect to produce a differentiating advantage for itself over its adversaries, the Anny should focus on the innovative application of generic multime- dia technologies to battlefields with an emphasis on time-t~deployment as discussed above. BALANCED PROCUREMENT PROCESS The committee believes that the Army must achieve a better balance in its procurement processes for systems based on information technologies between the impera- tive of making procurement fair and competitive and the imperative of successfully and effectively meeting time- to-deployment objectives for technologies which have life cycles as short as 18 months. Commercial functional specifications are initially es- tablished as part of a business plan based on market analyses and tradeoff studies. Those initial functional specifications are often modified based on new informa- tion regarding customer needs and existing or emerging competitive products. Such decisions are based on return
80 COMMERCIAL MUL71MEDIA TECHIVOl OGI~ FOR ~-FIR~ C~Y~YBA 1-] ~ AS on investment and time-to-market considerations. Modi- fications to functional specifications are made in order to achieve overarching business objectives, and system or application-specific requirements may be translated to more general purpose requirements to facilitate potential software reuse. The `general-business strategy is one of bringing products to the marketplace as early as possible, followed by evolutionary upgrades to provide additional capability or significant cost savings. Vendor selection in the commercial world is not always based on the lowest-cost bidder. Best values are often negotiated as a result of tradeoffs of cost, the ability to meet requirements and to deliver product in a timely fashion, and the estimated risks in meeting commitments. Consideration is given to the mutual best interest of vendors and buyers who may operate in long-te~ teaming arrangements. Vendors are encouraged to offer best solutions, which may not meet 100 percent of requirements. During the system development process, vendors often tailor existing products to meet requirements, and there is widespread use and reuse of COTS software in order to minimize costs and development time. Systems are designed to fit into a defined product or product line architecture to achieve commonalities that foster reuse of technology. Prototyping is commonly used early in the development process to refine requirements and to vali- date the vendors understanding of the buyers needs (see Chapter 3, under Adopting a Spiral Model). Joint cus- tomer and development teams work to clarify require- ments and incorporate new requirements when there is minimum impact on cost and schedule. In summary, commercial acquisition practices are based on flexibility and tradeoffs of requirements versus cost and schedule. They very often involve a team approach to system development. And they are strongly oriented toward reuse and tailoring of existing systems. An underlying philosophy is to anticipate product im- provements and provide for their accommodation in the initial system release. The lesson to be reamed from commercial practice is that the Army acquisition process needs to be flexible. It needs to accommodate technologies that are changing as an acquisition is under way. It needs to be flexible to accommodate complex tradeoffs between cost, technical feasibility, target requirements, and time-to-deployment, many of which are not fully understood even at deploy- ment It needs to foster a partnership between the supplier and the purchaser where the focus is on meeting the Army's needs to deploy systems that are superior to those of its adversaries and to upgrade those systems over time to maintain that superiority. It cannot be based on rigid requirements set at the beginning of a procurement, which may drive uo costs and delay deployment of needed capabilities far beyond any associated benefits of meeting those rigid requirements. Setting rigid requirements for systems years in advance of their likely deployment will result in the deployment of obsolete technologies (owing to the rigidity of speci- fications that imply specific technologies or preclude the use of innovative new technologies) with their associated cost and performance penalties. Opportunities will be lost to deploy capabilities that were not believed to be feasible at the time the requirements were set . Efforts and resources will be wasted in the development of Army-specific technologies to meet requirements that could have been satisfied more opportunistically by existing or emerging commercial technologies at lower cost and with higher performance in most, if not all, relevant parameters. ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE AN ARCHITECTURE In Chapter 3 of this report, the committee introduced a generic multimedia architecture that provided a con- ceptual framework for describing the building block technologies that were discussed. Chapter 3 also de- scribed some lessons learned in the commercial world on both the advantages of establishing and enforcing a technical architecture and on the difficul~ of doing so. The committee also noted the difference between a framework architecture and a specific, enforceable tech- nical architecture. A specific, enforceable technical architecture must define the specific building blocks that are to be used to build information systems throughout the enterprise. When more than one building block alternative is al- lowed, the documentation supporting the architecture must specify the conditions under which one or the other alternative is to be chosen, and it must specify how interoperability will be achieved by systems that utilize different altematives. The advantages of developing and enforcing a tech- nical architecture were discussed briefly in Chapter 4. Specific advantages include interoperability; reuse of the building blocks, modules, and objects; insertion of new technologies; and facilitation of ad hoc modifications. Interoperabi~ity When systems employ the same building blocks, or where interoperability concerns between heterogenous building blocks are considered in advance, it is far easier to interconnect systems and to have them interoperate without extensive, costly, and time consuming develop-
TECHlVOlOGY~NA God ~ LOGY ment of new interfaces between systems. For example, if systems employ a common packet communications protocol like TCP/IP, then one system can easily transfer data packets to and from another system using the same packet communication protocol. If systems employ the same database management systems, then they can more easily access each other's data (although a common database management system is not sufficient for data sharing). If systems represent multimedia information in the same formats, and if they attribute the same meaning to the same names for information objects, then they can easily share information in abstract form without the need for translation. Reuse of Boilding Blocks, Modules, and Objects When systems conform to a common architecture and employ standard building blocks, it is possible to reuse the functionality of building blocks, and the modules and objects within building blocks, across multiple systems without having to redevelop them multiple times. Thus a database management system, and specific data structures that are created to perform a map management function, for example, can be reused in other systems and applications that require map management functions. Insertion of New Technologies When systems condo to a well-defined, layered architecture, it is possible to upgrade various building blocks independently to take advantage of new technolo- gies. For example, if security functions are modularized properly in the design of the architecture and in its implementation, then a newer encryption method can be readily inserted without requiring the redesign of all of the building blocks to accommodate changes that would otherwise "ripple" through the entire system. A new method of providing wireless communication can be inserted into all systems without disturbing the function- ality that draws upon that layer of the architecture. Facilitation of Ad Hoc Modifications When systems conform to a well-defined technical architecture, one can make rapid ad hoc modifications to the deployed system or systems to meet unforeseen needs. Thus, communication paths between systems or applications that were not foreseen can be added as needed in nearly "real time." Access to information by a commander that was not foreseen as a mission require- 81 ment can be quickly implemented if the appropriate access control permissions are granted. This property of "kludge-ability" has been recognized as an important benefit of information systems that conform to a well-de- fined technical architecture (Defense Science Board, 19941. Management Issues While all of these advantages of a well-defined and enforced technical architecture are well known and have been articulated before, and while the committee is aware that the Army has taken steps toward creating a technical architecture for the digital battlefield with Ver- sion 3.1 of the C4I Technical Architecture (Department of the Army, 1995), the committee is concerned that the speed at which such a technical architecture will be developed and implemented may not be fast enough to satisfy the needs of Force ~I. The committee notes that one of the biggest manage- ment challenges in implementing an architecture is in creating the incentives for suppliers and program man- agers to transition to that architecture. An architecture produces strategic benefits (as articulated above) for the Army as an enterprise. However, for any individual program, particularly the first programs that conform to the architecture, there may be tactical reasons not to conform. A particular program may find that it is more costly to implement the architecture because it cannot benefit from such things as reuse of existing functionality until the architecture is widely implemented. The archi- tecture may initially be unfamiliar to the program man- ager and its suppliers, and there is a temptation to find excuses for bypassing the architecture to meet shorter term or tactical objectives. Thus the committee urges the top management of the Army to put in place incentives for program managers and suppliers to conform to the architecture as it emerges. The committee also recommends that the Army increase the number of technical experts who are involved in the creation of the Army's technical architecture so as to expedite the architecture's emergence and the realization of the associated benefits. The committee recognizes that one of the challenges to management in transition to a modem technical infomlation architecture is existing "legacy" systems that do not conform to this architecture. The approach of upgrading legacy systems by replacing their functions with standard, reusable, new-technology building block components and develop- ing inte~vorking capabilities between legacy systems and modem open systems was discussed in Chapter 3 under Leveraging Legacy Investments and Fostering Rapid Accep- tance of Information Technology. Alternative number
82 COMMERCL91 MULTlMEDk4 TECH.~O£OGI~ FOR -ST C~Y~YBA -1 lL~IFrns three, discussed there, is particularly relevant to the Army because it addresses a situation where there is a large number of legacy systems. The goal is to open up interfaces to the legacy systems that, over time, make data contained in these systems accessible to all systems and applications and that allow existing system-specific user interfaces to be replaced with modem graphical user interfaces (and other modern user interfaces) that access multiple systems and appli- cations in an intuitive, user-friendly way. The interfaces will also allow the processing functionality within legacy systems to be replaced, over time, with building block processing functionality that conforms to the technical architecture. While the transition of the large base of legacy systems will be a major undertaking, the committee believes that the sooner a technical architecture is developed, adopted, and enforced, the less costly and difficult this transition will be. By replacing existing user interfaces with modem graphical user interfaces, the Army can make its systems more intuitive to use. This in turn should facilitate training, improve operator performance, and reduce the layers of people necessary in the processing chain. By replacing existing, incompatible communications inter- faces, the Army will make it possible to communicate between systems without the reentry of data or the relaying of messages by human operators, thus reducing decision cycle times and reducing the numbers of people in the communication chain. By making legacy system data accessible via open interfaces, the Army will ulti- mately improve the ability of its commanders and indi- vidual soldiers to access the information they need for multiple applications. RELATIONSHIPS WITH COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS For the Army to anticipate emerging technologies in the commercial sector, to learn from commercial suc- cesses and failures, and to be effective as a hunter-gath- erer of technologies, it must build strong relationships with leading commercial information-technology R&D organizations. Relationships should include organiza- tions that endeavor to create underlying or enabling technologies as well as those organizations on the lead- ing edge of application of technologies in systems and end-user products. It is also essential that the Army's special needs be made known to commercial R&D firms so that these needs can influence the development of COTS technology. These strong ties can be forged in a number of ways. For those technologies discussed in Chapter ~ where the committee recommended that the ArTny adopt com- mercial technologies, the Army should carefully track commercial trends in order to incorporate these evolving commercial technologies to keep Aridly systems and applications at the forefront of what commercial tech- nologies make possible. For those technologies in Chap- ter ~ where the committee recommended that the Army adapt commercial technologies and attempt to influence commercial technology trends, the Army should focus on articulating its special needs, participating in the stand- ards activities, and funding dual-use R&D activities. If necessary, it should fund Army-specific R&D to imple- ment the needed adaptations. By committing a substan- tial amount of its resources to participating in and accessing commercial R&D activities, the Army will be far less likely to find itself conducting isolated R&D activities that duplicate larger and more effective com- mercial efforts yet fail to incorporate the latest enabling commercial advances. The Army should maintain a strong internal and sponsored R&D effort focused on unique Army applica- tions and the identification of Army needs, and the Army should actively articulate these needs to the commercial R&D community. The Army should participate in external R&D activities in carefully selected areas in order to influence technology trends and to obtain access to proprietary emerging commercial technology under ap- propriate nondisclosure agreements. In working with commercial companies, the Army can return real value to the commercial companies by pros viding something that the companies have always had trouble obtaining, namely, solid end-user requirements. Commercial technology suppliers often must gamble simultaneously on new technologies and new-market creation with only limited understanding of the real needs of the customers they hope to senre with their new products. This has resulted in many technical successes and market failures. By becoming an applications test- bed, the Army can help reduce this commercial risk at the same time that it steers commercial development to meet its needs. From actual warfighter experience and quick-turn- around experiments (such as those at III Corps), the Army can generate end-user requirements to which the com- mercial technology suppliers can build systems and equipment with increased confidence. The committee's work underlying this report has shown that virtually eveIy system feature, attribute, or capability that commer- cial technology suppliers would build (ostensibly) to suit the Army would also have a counterpart for some class of commercial customer. Although the AITny's needs do not cover every building block technology, they cover most of them. In particular, the Army has leading-edge
TECHIVOL OG Y MA NO CEMENT STRA TED Y needs for near-real-time integrated information handling. Therefore, the committee recommends that the Army proactively adopt the behavior of a "pseudo-commercial" customer with concrete, experience-based needs, ready to experiment with commercial technology suppliers in the development and beta testing of new multimedia information systems and equipment. Additionally, the Army should encourage its R&D staff to spend a substantial amount of time and effort on understanding the latest R&D trends in industry (e.g., rotational assignments at commercial firms should be encouraged). Likewise, the Army should encourage com- mercial firms to place individuals with knowledge of the latest commercial trends in rotational assignments in Army R&D centers. The Army should increase its efforts to attract experienced R&D managers from commercial firms to participate in Army R&D management and high-level decision-making processes. RESPOND TO THE NEED FOR REINVENTION As discussed in Chapter 5 of this report, commercial experience indicates that radical organizational and in- stitutional changes are needed to leverage information technology to its fullest potential. Therefore, the Army should expect that the rapid advances in communications and computational capabilities resulting from trends in commercial multimedia technologies will result in more than quantitative improvement in the ability of soldiers and commanders to execute existing command and control paradigms. It is likely that the Army will have to reinvent its doctrines related to command and control to take into account the entirely new paradigms that these capabilities will enable. For example, the ability of commanders to directly access information that has been automatically filtered and processed into a form that is useful to them can enable the elimination of layers in the command and control hierarchy, just as information technologies have enabled the elimination of middle management layers in industry. This can result in much more rapid decision making, leading to the ability to execute much more rapid responses to the unfolding battlefield. While the provision of wireless communication de- vices to individual soldiers at the squad level may have been too expensive in the past and may have resulted in unmanageable levels of communication, modern low- cost integrated circuitry has transformed wireless two- way communications devices into common consumer appliances. Coupled with modern information filtering and network management technologies it is possible 83 that every soldier will have access to and be accessible via the battlefield information networks of the future. ADOPT A SPIRAL MODEL; EMPHASIZE SIMULATION, MODELING, AND EXPERIMENTATION The Army must adopt a spiral model of development where the iterative specification of requirements, proto- typing, testing by users, and refinement/respecification of requirements proceeds in periods measured in months to create new systems and applications (as described in Chapter 3, in the subsection Adopting a Spiral Model). To achieve the desired iteration speeds, realistic prototyping, and the desired user feedback, this process must make heavy use of simulation, modeling, and experimentation. In January 1993, a Defense Science Board panel reported that "Ewle believe that Advanced Distributed Simulation technology is here today, and that this tech- nology can provide the means to improve training and readiness substantially, to create an environment for operational and technical innovation for revolutionary improvements, and to transform the acquisition process from within" (Defense Science Board, 19931. A key to fulfilling this vision lies in bringing concept developers together with users and engineers. This collaboration should take place early in the development process on a common virtual battlefield where they can visualize and discuss the merits of various designs and implementation approaches. Under this process, the effects of alternative design decisions can be easily visualized and their effects on key performance parameters identified. One of the principal questions that must be addressed in the acquisition of any system is whether to adapt, modify, and combine existing off-the-shelf components or to initiate a substantially new system design effort. Such questions inevitably turn out to be multidimen- sional, involving many tradeoffs and requiring many supporting analyses. These are exactly the kinds of questions for which common experiences on a virtual battlefield by developers and users are most valuable. Users are able to envision the proposed system much more concretely and to anticipate problems in its use. Developers can observe the way users interact with the system and will frequently gain insights that would not othe~vise become apparent until much later (and many dollars later) in the acquisition process. It is important to bear in mind that the introduction of a new capability onto the battlefield rarely leaves other functions unchanged. Modeling and simulation can help explore the changes that could be introduced by the tactical employment of a proposed system. As discussed
84 COMMERCIAL MULTIMEDIA TECHl!iOLOGIES FOR 7~WEN7Y-FIRST C~Y~YBA~IF~OS in Chapter 5, evaluators must be especially alert for changes in tactics that could be permitted or enabled by the new system and for adaptive changes in tactics by the opposing forces. In some cases, these countertactics may nullify many of the envisioned advantages of the proposed system. In addition, modeling and simulation can be used to explore other issues, such as training new units to use the system and the implications of the logistics loads that the proposed system would place on the combat service support infrastructure. In many cases, detailed models of the system are not needed to support these analyses. Especially in the initial phases of concept evaluation, a system can be described in terms of performance probabilities, approximate rep- resentations of the physics involved, and a rough repre- sentation of the user interface. If initial results appear promising, the richness of the simulation and user inter- face can be incrementally improved to support more detailed tests. Later, in the demonstration and validation and engineering development phases, more elaborate models and simulations may be used to focus on specific detailed design issues and tradeoffs. Information systems can be particularly challenging because performance is difficult to quantify and validate. Through distributed simulation, human interface behav- ior and performance can be evaluated with live players. There is also a significant potential payoff in that software developed to simulate information systems can closely approximate the look and feel of the proposed systems. It is very likely that the software components developed for the systems simulation, particularly in the area of displays and interfaces, can be incorporated into actual systems. An important area that should receive continuing, and perhaps increased, emphasis is research on human per- ception and performance in highly complex, temporally sensitive, information rich environments. Although a great deal of work has been undertaken, and is under way in understanding how to present complex multime- dia information to users in commercial applications rang- ing from entertainment to medicine, the committee believes that much more remains to be done to under- stand how to facilitate and optimize the flow of multi- media information to commanders and between commanders and their subordinates in battlefield applications. Experiments, such as those being conducted as part of the Louisiana Maneuvers, are critical for evaluating and iteratively improving new applications, systems, and subsystems that employ multimedia information tech- nologies. Such experiments or exercises serve to deter- mine operational deficiencies and to uncover new doctrine to reinvent the battlefield. The Army will have to continue to invest heavily in large-scale experimenta- tion in order to optimize the application of commercial technology, make necessary modifications to meet mili- tary requirements, and to test and evaluate military- unique technologies that are needed to meet Army operational requirements. MEASURING PR06RESS Organizations make better progress toward a goal when they have a way of keeping score on how well they are doing. When the goal is a qualitative one, hard numbers are usually not appropriate. Borrowing a prac- tice from the software industry, as discussed in the last subsection of Chapter 3 (Process Improvement), the committee recommends that the Army create and adopt a Qualitative "index," like the sample shown on the toi~ow~ng page, to show the series of steps it expects to pass through on its way to becoming a "Level 4" user of commercial technologies. Based on commercial experi- ence with that process, the Army should expect that progression through these levels is a long-term proposi- tion in which none of the levels can be skipped. The committee recognizes that the Army needs to define its own goals and levels of achievement in this area. But such a qualitative index could (a) point toward a desired goal, (b) show what the Army considers to be progress toward the goal, and (c) provide a means of "keeping score" on progress. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS The committee offers the following additional recom- mendations based on its intuitive reaction to some of the presentations it heard and the trips it made during the course of this study. Putting Low Cost Multimedia and Wireless Appliances Into the Hands of Squad-teve! Soldiers The committee believes that the ongoing and acceler- ating appearance of low-cost consumer appliances that employ multimedia information technologies (e.g., wire- less personal communications devices, pagers, facsimile machines, portable personal computers, global-position- ing-system appliances) will stimulate the ad hoc intro- duction of these appliances into Army applications by commanders and soldiers. The committee believes that this insertion of technologies is inevitable, and in most
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I: . ~~.i: ~~ ~ :;. ~ -I: .. i: :: ~~ : :: - :::': -.:~::.".'::~,2-'~:~i ;~: I' :~- ~"'~' I: '-::'' ' " i A: .: ^ ::: .~ ,,~ ~-~ A:. I;, .,.:., ,.: i I...: ':~, I- :: ' A' .: . ·::- ~, : :.~ ~ :. .~ - - ~ - ..~: :.::. . :; IS 9- TV ~ ;~::~ -: ~ ~ At I..,; ...,.'~:: .::,,. -:.:.,,'::,' . ::': '.:-:::.:' .: ' ::': I. ~'.:,~'': ' I:',' ':. " ''a' ' ..i..' - ~~'~ ~ · ~ Widespread commercidi~wd~n01ggy~ Ed :::: ~~:~ ~~:~:~:fac~i~ted:~-~b~Iity~.ease of-use withih~:~mong : :::: ~ ::-. ' ~-~ ~,:~.' ~ : .~ :'... ~::.~:.~..: .,; .. .- :::: :: :: :::::::. If:: :- ~ ::::: ::::-.-': If:::- . :': ~:.-~: ~ if: ~:i': .:: .. .: . .~ ~.~.~ - ~:..~: ~~ ~~..~: : .:-' -.:: I. -:: it:,:.::: .< - ': ~ . ..:~:i~::~: ~ :: I:-: I' ~ ~ ~~e : :Expa~icn~accepted as~:~::legi~.~md~t i: i.: i: -~:;~::::~: Reinverldon of ~v Recesses: and ormn~dons Ed Olaf: cases it is preferable to the alternative of not making use of the best commercially available technology in the battlefield. The committee recommends that the Army get ahead of this trend by accelerating the deployment of such low-cost COTS appliances in a standard way to avoid the proliferation of incompatible systems. The committee believes that low-cost (several hun- dred dollars wireless communications appliances could be made available by the Army to squad leaders and individual soldiers for use in battlefield applications. These "radios" need not be highly "ruggedized," and could be viewed as throwaway items. Concerns with respect to security and detection could be addressed with minor modifications of COTS technology. For example, simple security codes could be required for activation. The use of low power, code division multiple access (CDMA), one of the technologies being deployed for emerging commercial personal communications systems, would make these wireless transmitting appliances resis- tant to detection, just as frequency-hopping spread spec- trum does in today's military radios. These radios could I. ~ :. ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ - ~ ~~ :: be designed to communicate with nearby jeeps, tanks, or other armored vehicles which would act as base stations and would translate their signals into formats used for longer distance communications on the battle- field. In addition, these base stations could be used to filter information flows and manage communications to avoid traffic or information overload. Encouraging innovation The committee observed the rapid insertion of inno- vative new technologies at III Corps at Fort Hood. These technologies were being evaluated using the spiral model of development described above. The committee would like to recommend to the Army that the innovative, rapid insertion and evaluation of technology observed at Fort Hood be used as a role model for the Army as a whole and be institutionalized as the "path forward" into the twenty-first century. This is the kind of activity that is
86 CO~C~L MUM ~CHNOLOGI~ FOR -FIRST CE~YA~YBA BRIMS representative of Level 2 of the recommended qualitative index discussed earlier. SUMMARY This chapter has described a technology management strategy by which the Army can successfully leverage multimedia information technologies for battlefield ap- plications. The strategy includes the following recom- mendations: . . The Army should be a hunter-gatherer of technolo- gies, seeking out and acquiring the best technolo- gies wherever it can find them to meet overall strategic objectives and applying them in an oppor- tunistic manner to meet battlefield demands. The Army should take advantage of the distinction between those technologies that are emerging and evolving in the commercial marketplace and will be available to everyone and those technologies that the Army can reasonably expect to create as competitive enablers to differentiate the Army from its adversaries. · The Army must achieve a better balance in its procurement processes between keeping the proc- esses fair and competitive and effectively acquiring and deploying information technologies with ex- tremely short life cycles. · The Army should create and enforce a technical architecture that (a) promotes reuse of building block technologies across multiple systems, in- teroperability between systems, and expedited in- sertion of new technologies to achieve cost reductions and performance improvements; and (b) facilitates ad hoc modifications of systems and applications to meet short-term needs in crisis situations. . The Army should be an active participant in tech- nology development in the commercial sector. · The Army should respond to the need for reinven- tion. It should expect a requirement to reinvent its doctrines related to command and control to lever- age the rapidly evolving technologies and to remain competitive with its adversaries. The Army must adopt a spiral model with a strong emphasis on simulation, modeling, and experimen- tation. The Army should create and adopt an appropriate qualitative index for uses in measuring progress made toward achieving its technology management goals. In addition to recommendations on a sound technol- ogy management strategy, the committee also offered recommendations based on intuitive reaction to some of the presentations it heard and site visits it made during the course of this study. The committee recommended that the Army encourage innovation and be proactive in putting technologies into the hands of soldiers. REFERENCES Defense Science Board. 1993. Impact of Advanced Distributed Simula- tion on Readiness, Training, and Prototyping. Defense Science Board, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. January. Defense Science Board. 1994. Report of the 1994 Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. October. Department of the Army. 1995. Department of the Army C4I Technical Architecture. Version 3.1. March 31. Frankel, M. S. 1994. The 1994 Army Science Board Recommended Technical Architecture for the Digital Battlefield. Army Research, Development and Acquisition Bulletin. November-December. Frankel, M. S. (Chair), P. C. Dickinson, J. H. Cafarella, W. P. Cherry, G. D. Godden, I. M. Kameny, W. J. Neal, T. P. Rona, M. B. Zimmerman, D. C. Latham. 1995. Technical Information Architecture for Army Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 1994 Summery Study. Washington, D.C.: Army Science Board. April. Howard, W. (Chair), S. Personick, R. Gallagher, R. Bajcsy, C. Carlson, G. Klein, and D. Mook. 1994. ARL (Army Research Lab) and the Digitization of the Battlefield. (Unpublished ARL Report.) Decem- ber 17. Sullivan, G. R. 1994. Force XXI: Digitizing the Battlefield. Army Research, Development and Acquisition Bulletin. November-December.
