1
Mariners—Their Work and Professional Development

Recently, the professional competence of mariners has come under intense public scrutiny. Marine accidents, such as the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989, have resulted in extensive marine pollution and damage to the marine environment and, in some cases, substantial loss of life. These accidents have involved U.S.-flag and foreign-flag seagoing ships and coastwise and inland tugs with barges. The impact and public perception of these marine disasters have created a need for a better understanding of the causes.

Casualty investigations show that, in many cases, accidents have occurred on well-equipped and seaworthy ships, with competent crews, often with a pilot on board, and in reasonable weather. A number of recent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations have found that the primary cause of many marine accidents was an error of omission on the part of the deck officer that was either undetected or not articulated by others on the ship until it was too late.

Such human errors are exacerbated by weaknesses in traditional ship-bridge organization and management. For groundings, statistics suggest that as many as 71 percent are caused by bridge management error (Wahren, 1993). The well-publicized grounding of the Queen Elizabeth 2 in 1992 is an example. Among its findings, the NTSB enquiry (1993a) criticized the failure of bridge management and teamwork and indicated that this failure was a major contributing cause of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the grounding of the Queen Elizabeth 2 was the failure by the pilot, master, and watch officers to discuss and agree on a navigation plan for departing Vineyard Sound and to maintain situational awareness after an unplanned course change.



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--> 1 Mariners—Their Work and Professional Development Recently, the professional competence of mariners has come under intense public scrutiny. Marine accidents, such as the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound, Alaska, in 1989, have resulted in extensive marine pollution and damage to the marine environment and, in some cases, substantial loss of life. These accidents have involved U.S.-flag and foreign-flag seagoing ships and coastwise and inland tugs with barges. The impact and public perception of these marine disasters have created a need for a better understanding of the causes. Casualty investigations show that, in many cases, accidents have occurred on well-equipped and seaworthy ships, with competent crews, often with a pilot on board, and in reasonable weather. A number of recent National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations have found that the primary cause of many marine accidents was an error of omission on the part of the deck officer that was either undetected or not articulated by others on the ship until it was too late. Such human errors are exacerbated by weaknesses in traditional ship-bridge organization and management. For groundings, statistics suggest that as many as 71 percent are caused by bridge management error (Wahren, 1993). The well-publicized grounding of the Queen Elizabeth 2 in 1992 is an example. Among its findings, the NTSB enquiry (1993a) criticized the failure of bridge management and teamwork and indicated that this failure was a major contributing cause of the accident. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the grounding of the Queen Elizabeth 2 was the failure by the pilot, master, and watch officers to discuss and agree on a navigation plan for departing Vineyard Sound and to maintain situational awareness after an unplanned course change.

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--> Contributing to the accident was the lack of adequate information aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2 about how speed and water depth affected the ship's underkeel clearance. There are many other examples of human errors: … the probable cause of the Ziemia Bialostocka's ramming of the Sidney Lanier Bridge was a failure of the pilot to maneuver the vessel properly because he did not make himself aware of and use all available maneuvering information and his failure to stop the vessel when he realized that it was not responding as he expected (NTSB, 1988b) .… the probable cause of the grounding of the U.S. tank ship Star Connecticut was the failure by the Star Connecticut's master and the Hawaiian Independent Refinery's mooring master to plan and coordinate the vessel's departure from the single point mooring buoy, which resulted in the master's inability to focus on and prioritize the critical tasks associated with departing the single point mooring buoy while maneuvering close to a shoal area known to have unpredictable ocean currents (NTSB, 1992) .… the probable cause of the collision between the Juraj Dalmatinac and the Fremont tow was the failure by the ship's pilots and master to effectively use all available equipment and personnel to evaluate the developing situation so that they could take timely action to avoid the collision (NTSB, 1993b) … the probable cause of the ramming of the Mont Fort by the Maersk Neptune was the failure of the pilot to use the information concerning the radar distance to the anchored vessel provided by the master and the use of excessive speed while approaching his intended anchoring location (NTSB, 1988a). Merely providing more equipment will not prevent accidents. Improved training and education can help prevent maritime accidents and casualties, and many agencies and companies are looking to simulation as one vehicle for improving mariner competency. To make effective use of simulation it is necessary to assess both its benefits and limitations. This knowledge can then be used to develop a technical basis for informed national and international decision making about the appropriate role for simulation in the professional development and qualification of mariners. THE MARINER POPULATION Understanding the mariners who form the trainee population—their professional development needs and how these needs are met—is fundamental to determining the suitability of marine simulation for professional development and licensing. The seagoing workforce is traditionally divided into three broad groups—deck, engine, and steward. Deck personnel, who are the focus of this report, can be divided loosely into two groups—licensed and unlicensed. The licensed

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--> BOX 1-1 Selected Definitions Bridge resource management is a means of organizing the maritime bridge watch to use all resources effectively, including elimination of traditional vertical and horizontal barriers to coordination, communication, and integration. Bridge team management training includes passage planning and team management training that provides participants an opportunity to analyze various navigation scenarios and to demonstrate organizational procedures to assist in the safe conduct of the ship. An integrated bridge has centralized ship control and navigation systems. Navigational, control, and environmental data from differing sources are collected, processed, analyzed, and displayed to facilitate the navigation and control of the ship. Marine certification and marine licensing include the qualification requirements for the issuance of marine certificates of competency (e.g., marine licenses), the process by which these qualifications are fulfilled, examinations of knowledge and demonstrations of competence, administration of licensing programs by cognizant marine licensing authorities, and, by implication, official accountability for performance. For this report, the term marine certification is applied to the international process, and marine licensing is applied to the U.S. Coast Guard program. Navigation is the process of directing the movement of a ship from one point to another. A pilot, also referred to as a marine or maritime pilot, is an individual who operates from an organized pilot association or group and is licensed by a government authority (federal, state, or local authority empowered by a state) to provide pilotage services over specific waters or routes. Piloting refers to specialized work done by pilots. It is the act of directing and controlling the navigation and maneuvering of a vessel in pilotage waters. Shiphandling is very special, close-quarters work done primarily by pilots. It is the control and navigation of a ship by use of engines, rudder, thrusters, and tugs, as needed, taking into account environmental factors such as tide, current, wind, and weather. Ship maneuvering is changes in course in open water, usually to avoid other ship traffic. mariner group consists of two major subgroups—deck officers, who are a part of a vessel's complement, and marine pilots( see Box 1-1, Selected Definitions), who are independent of the vessel. Deck officers can be further subdivided into masters, chief mates, mates, and individuals in these three subgroups with federal pilot endorsements on their U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) license. Unlicensed seamen are generally able-bodied seamen, some of whom may be working their way up to licensed status through personal study, sea service,

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--> on-the-job training, and, in some cases, commercial or union-provided courses. One additional category, trainees, consists of cadets who are working toward their first license within a structured academic program, usually followed by semistructured professional development consisting of on-the-job learning with some structured training. The skills requirements, duties, and responsibilities of each of these mariner categories must be understood when establishing professional development and qualification requirements. Unlike most professions, where specialization is the norm, mariners are generalists, expected to be individually proficient and able to work effectively in the unique shipboard operating and business environment. The licensed deck officer's duties go far beyond the well-known responsibilities of navigator and watchstander, especially aboard modern, highly automated ships. These ships often have short turn-around times in port and are manned by smaller crew sizes who have specialized technical training and are expected to perform a wide range of tasks with minimum assistance. Furthermore, the marine operating environment and associated operational risks are highly situational (NRC, 1994). Thus, the maritime profession and other trades and professions are not analogous. The unusual nature of shipboard work is illustrated by the following observations: The command structure aboard ships follows the traditional naval hierarchy. Deck officers need to have directive control because the ship is a self-contained unit that operates independently. Deck officers must be generalists because they are responsible for all ship operations and business decisions. Deck officers must be able to make timely decisions to respond to sometimes rapidly changing operating conditions and emergency situations. Masters have ultimate responsibility. There are no committees aboard ship to share responsibilities for vessel operations or fault for the consequences of any errors in judgment. Deck officers work with little or no assistance and only limited supervision during watches when they are directly responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel. A deck officer's authority must be immediate and absolute while on watch, subject to the command authority of the vessel's master. Deck officers must be capable of responding to all medical and shipboard emergencies. Unlike the practice for entry positions in most industries, young officers, even those on their first voyage, may assume unsupervised watchstanding responsibility. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), through its Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) guidelines (IMO, 1993) and

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--> emergency operations, provides an international baseline for the professional qualification of deck officers and other bridge personnel for seagoing merchant marine service. Compliance with STCW guidelines is mandatory for IMO member countries that have ratified these international requirements. However, provisions of the STCW guidelines have not kept pace with developments in marine operating capabilities and practices. The guidelines are currently undergoing extensive revisions, which will include guidance for the use of marine simulation (IMO News, 1994). The IMO's role in developing these standards and the provisions of the STCW guidelines are discussed in Appendix B. Most pilots serve local ports and waterways and normally remain within a single pilotage jurisdiction in the country where they are licensed. Therefore, the IMO has not promulgated mandatory standards for marine pilots. It has, however, promulgated recommended guidelines for the administration of pilotage systems and for knowledge required of marine pilots (IMO, 1981). Within most countries, the responsible national licensing authorities set independent, usually much more stringent, standards. The USCG is the responsible licensing authority in the United States for deck officers. Deck Officers Traditional Marine Disciplines The deck officer must first be trained in the traditional marine disciplines. The IMO mandatory knowledge categories for masters and chief mates on ships of 200 gross registered tons or more (IMO, 1993) include the following: navigation (Box 1-1) and position determination; watchkeeping; radar equipment; magnetic and gyro compasses; meteorology and oceanography; shiphandling and maneuvering (Box 1-1); ship stability, construction, and damage control; ship power plants; cargo handling and stowage; fire prevention and fire-fighting appliances; emergency procedures; medical care; maritime law; personnel management and training; radio communication and visual signaling; life saving; and search and rescue.

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--> Ship's Business Ocean shipping is a complex, multimillion dollar seagoing business. Aboard ship, deck officers spend a significant part of their work day managing routine business activities in cooperation with other ship's officers and shore management. Ship's business can include accounting and budgeting; payroll calculations; labor contract compliance and personnel relations; port and cargo documentation; requirements of international, admiralty, and business law, codes, and regulations for carriage of commodities by sea; ocean transportation regulations, customs, and immigration activities; vessel and cargo documentation; charter parties; stowage and inventory control; crew business organization and business meetings; and human relations skills inherent in organizing a vessel's operating teams and managing the social-living environment. Cargo Handling Deck officers are responsible for ship's operations at the terminal, for stowage planning, cargo characteristics, the techniques for stowage and carriage of dry and liquid cargos, and the proper response to problems that arise in the course of carrying routine and hazardous cargos. Emergency Preparedness Ship's officers organize and train the ship's crews in emergency response. They are the vessel's emergency medical technicians and must be trained to dispense medications and drugs and provide first aid and medical attention. They respond to emergencies and control of damage resulting from collision, grounding, fire, or the escape of hazardous and contaminating cargos into the environment. There are no fire, medical, or police departments available to assist the mariner at sea. Marine Pilots Marine pilots and deck officers have many overlapping skills, but their duties and responsibilities are distinctly different; whereas ship's officers are generalists, pilots specialize in a narrower range of skills. Pilots are, however, expected to be proficient in many of the same operating and emergency skills as ship's officers, especially navigation, operations, local knowledge, and emergency procedures (NRC, 1994). Pilot knowledge and skills recommended by the IMO are summarized below and discussed in Appendix B. In the United States, both national (federal) and port-specific (state) pilotage systems are in use. The federal system primarily involves: deck officers who have been certificated by the USCG to pilot U.S.-flag vessels over specific coastwise routes, and

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--> individuals who are not members of a vessel's crew, but who are similarly USCG-certificated and provide coastwise pilotage services, primarily to U.S.-flag ships. State pilotage systems involve marine pilots, not members of a vessel's crew, who provide pilotage services to foreign-flag ships and U.S.-flag ships engaged in domestic and foreign trade. Operating knowledge and skills required of pilots include a broad range of traditional marine disciplines (IMO, 1981; NRC, 1994): terrestrial and electronic navigation and piloting (Box 1-1) seamanship, including use of anchors; shiphandling; use of radar and automatic radar plotting aids; use of tugs for towing and maneuvering; meteorology, plus knowledge of local winds and weather; passage planning; nautical rules of the road and local navigation rules operation of bridge equipment; and vessel traffic systems. Local Knowledge Pilots are experts in knowledge about specific local ports or bodies of water. They serve aboard a mix of vessel types with varying maneuvering characteristics and are experts in how a vessel handles in shallow and restricted waters. A pilot has an intimate knowledge of local waters, including aids to navigation, depths, channels, currents, local wind and weather conditions, courses and distances to steer from sea buoy to berth, and bottom topography. The pilot must be familiar with local customs and working practices of the port, terminal operations, local navigation rules and regulations, and port equipment. Business Practices In addition to providing pilotage services, a pilot is often called on by a ship's master for insight on business practices and local regulations within the port. Therefore, pilots must become knowledgeable about local customs and immigration regulations, maritime law, ocean transportation regulations, and local business practices relating to port operations and cargo movements. Emergency Procedures Pilots must be able to respond to emergency situations, such as loss of steering or propulsion, and must be knowledgeable in port procedures for control

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--> of damage resulting from collision, grounding, fire, or the escape of hazardous cargos into the environment. U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS U.S. Merchant Marine Shipping The status of the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet has changed substantially since the end of World War II, from a position of dominance to that of a minor player. As documented in Table 1-1, the U.S.-flag fleet in 1955 accounted for more than 21 percent of all ships worldwide and 27 percent of the carrying capacity of ships over 1,000 gross tons. That dominant position has steadily declined to less than 3 percent of all ships and 4 percent of carrying capacity worldwide in 1992—and the decline continues. Today U.S.-flag ships play only a minor role in world shipping, including domestic ports and coastal waters. While the U.S.-flag share of the world fleet dropped dramatically, the total capacity of the world fleet grew by a factor of five. From 1955 to 1992, the size of the average ship tripled. ''Super ships." very large crude carriers in excess of 350,000 deadweight tons, joined the world fleet. From these numbers, two points are clear: U.S.-flag ships with U.S.-citizen crews are a small part of the world fleet. Deck officers' responsibilities have steadily increased with increasing ship size. Paralleling the growth of super ships has been a decline in crew size due to the advent of automation and other technological improvements (see discussion below). The number of ships operating from 1955 to 1992 has increased by 58 percent, leading to greater channel and harbor congestion. These factors contribute to a significant increase in watch officer responsibility and a need for comprehensive professional development and high performance standards. Smaller Crew Size Financial and operational considerations have resulted in an international trend toward smaller, multidisciplined crews with a higher level of technical skills and broader deck officer responsibility. Because of the widely varied size and quality of crews aboard ships of different registry, marine pilots in particular must be capable of adjusting to different operating conditions, ranging from ships where traditional operating methods prevail to those where the latest most technically sophisticated systems are used. Generally, U.S. pilots have shown that they are able to function in these widely differing conditions, although many of these situations require an increased emphasis on voyage planning and on full communications, understanding, and agreement among the pilot and deck officers in advance of pilotage transits (NRC, 1994).

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--> TABLE 1-1 Historical Inventory of World and U.S.-Flag Ocean Ships Over 1,000 Gross Tons Year Flag Number of Ships Total Gross Tons (1,000s) Total Deadweight Tons (dwt) (1,000s) Average dwt Percent Total dwt Percent Number of Ships 1955 World 15,148 92,944 129,975 8,580       U.S. 3,304 25,250 35,539 10,756 27.34 21.81 1960 World 17,317 122,027 171,890 9,926       U.S. 2,929 23,754 32,568 11,131 18.95 16.90 1965 World 18,329 151,868 217,229 11,852       U.S. 2,376 20,684 28,283 11,904 13.02 12.96 1970 World 19,980 211,401 326,999 16,366       U.S. 1,579 15,529 21,346 13,519 6.53 7.90 1975 World 22,872 33,042 556,572 24,334       U.S. 857 12,301 17,694 20,646 3.18 3.75 1980 World 24,867 385,711 654,909 26,336       U.S. 864 16,020 24,090 27,882 3.68 3.47 1985 World 25,424 391,979 656,422 25,819       U.S. 744 15,444 23,847 32,052 3.63 2.93 1990 World 23,596 386,736 637,493 27,017       U.S. 636 16,103 24,342 38,274 3.82 2.70 1992 World 23,943 397,225 652,025 27,232       U.S. 619 15,466 23,254 37,567 3.57 2.59 NOTES: 1992 compared with 1955: 81 percent decrease in number of U.S.-flag ships. 58 percent increase in number of ships in the world fleet. 34 percent decrease in U.S.-flag deadweight. 402 percent increase in total world deadweight. 249 percent increase in U.S.-flag ship average deadweight. 217 percent increase in world ship average deadweight. 1992 compared with 1980: 28 percent decrease in number of U.S.-flag ships. 4 percent decrease in number of ships in the world fleet. 3 percent decrease in U.S.-flag deadweight. 0.4 percent increase in total world deadweight. 35 percent increase in U.S.-flag ship average deadweight. 3 percent increase in world ship average deadweight. SOURCE: U.S. Maritime Administration (1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1992). Crew reductions may marginally increase the pilot's workload and, at times, require the pilot to take a more active role in ship-bridge operations. In practice, however, the pilot is more often affected by the trend toward use of less-experienced crews with, at times, only limited proficiency in English than by any reduction in the size of the ship's crew (NRC, 1990).

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--> Crew Rotation Practices Except in a few cases, contractual hiring practices with U.S. maritime unions in the past two decades typically resulted in "rotating" rather than "permanent" assignments for watch officers, with the change-over often measured in weeks or months. As a consequence, watch officers were often less familiar with the equipment and procedures of a particular ship than personnel assigned permanently to the same vessel, a situation that could impair a watch officer's effectiveness. Recently, some U.S. shipping companies and maritime unions have been working to revise assignment practices so that the masters, chief mates, and, in some cases, second mates are permanently assigned to the same vessel. Integrated Bridge Systems At sea, automated ships have generally made the crew's job easier. This trend toward automation, however, has sometimes increased the complexity of the pilot's work. In particular, ships with integrated bridges (see Box 1-1) may have fewer officers and crew aboard to assist pilots than ships with traditional bridge configurations (NRC, 1994). MARINER TRAINING, LICENSING, AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT Professional development of mariners is a shared responsibility of the mariner, maritime academies and training institutions, unions, operating companies, pilot associations, marine licensing authorities, and the IMO (see Box 1-2). The process by which mariner competence is maintained and overseen includes: professional development practices by individual mariners and the organizations with which they are affiliated or employed, marine licensing by regulatory authorities, and the establishment of accountability for performance through professional and official discipline. The Professional Development Process Mariner training basically takes place along two different paths, each serving a specific purpose in the initial training and continuing professional development process. For most mariners, the educational process is clearly task oriented. It has been developed in response to the needs of the industry and to a long-standing tradition of service to the ship and its cargo that still dominates the seafarer's attitude toward the job and education. Training programs vary in purpose and population and include a full range of programs, from subject specific refresher courses to complete programs leading to a marine license.

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--> BOX 1-2 Mariner Professional Development: Training and Licensing U.S. Maritime Administration (MarAd). Supports the training of merchant mariners by approving course curricula for federal and state maritime academies. Operates the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and provides partial funding support for state marine academies, including the acquisition, maintenance, and operation of training ships and simulators. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Responsible for merchant marine licensing and the licensing of federal pilots. Licensing program relies on a three-pronged approach consisting of (1) a stated minimal amount of sea service (now coupled with some equivalency credits for certain simulator-based training), (2) the recommendation of applicant's peers, and (3) a written examination testing the applicant's theoretical knowledge. The USCG approves all courses that are prerequisites for marine licenses, including simulation-based courses. The USCG consults with the MarAd with respect to curricula used at the federal and state maritime academies. State Pilotage Authorities. Primarily responsible for official oversight for qualifying and licensing individuals who provide pilotage services to foreign-flag and U.S.-flag ships engaged in international trade. Pilotage systems at the state level vary in their content and administration (NRC, 1994). International Maritime Organization (IMO). Coordinates and promulgates the development of international guidelines and standards for training, certification, and watchkeeping for mariners engaged in ocean and near-ocean voyages. Develops and recommends guidelines for maritime pilots. Labor Unions. Active in training; some operate substantial training facilities. Operating Companies (shipping and towing). Involvement in training programs is determined by company policy. Traditionally, mariners have prepared to qualify for their first marine license (third mate) through two basic professional development paths: structured marine education (at the baccalaureate level in the United States), which is the route followed by cadets to the third mate's license, and learning by experience (i.e., on-the-job training), which is the route generally followed by the able-bodied seaman to the third mate's license. Once an individual has received the third mate's license there are no formal continuing-education requirements. However, after receiving that license most mariners pursue advancement through a combination of progressive education and sea service. The first of these approaches—the structured approach—is the predominant route for initial training and licensing. This approach includes a comprehensive education program that satisfies minimum sea-service requirements, while

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--> obligation for employers to train their officers, other than some limited responsibility under the doctrine of seaworthiness. These conditions make it necessary to look beyond employers to consolidated programs operated by the maritime academies, labor-management schools, and private contractors to provide continuing education and training for mariners. Vessel operators pay the cost of employer-provided, school-based, and ship-board training. A highly competitive market and a small employer base may make it difficult for some vessel operators to finance mandated training or extensive formal continuing-education programs. Operators have been and will continue to be an effective funding source for training directly related to their specific operations. Traditional Colleague-Assisted Training Colleague training aboard ship remains an important source of deck officer training. Historically, experienced officers have taken an active role in improving the skills of newer officers and crew members. Experienced officers have passed professional standards and procedures from generation to generation through formal and informal training. The extent and effectiveness of this training obviously varies greatly from ship to ship, depending on the aptitude for teaching and the attitude of the master and senior officers toward training. Given the minimal requirements for other forms of continuing education, a good case can be made that peer education is ultimately one of the most important sources of training. Unfortunately, this training, while important, is informal and may be inconsistent, and it does not meet all requirements for meaningful, continued professional development. Pilot Apprentice Programs In contrast to third mates, marine pilots are only given significant responsibility after completing an extensive apprenticeship. In most cases, these programs are conducted by local pilot associations, following traditional pilot development practices. Apprentice pilots make repeated passages over routes served by the association under the supervision of an experienced pilot (NRC, 1994). Historically, U.S.-port pilot associations have maintained specialized training programs where apprentice pilots spend extensive time—commonly two to four years or longer—training aboard ship under the tutelage of senior pilots. These programs provide apprentice pilots experience aboard a wide variety of ships under a broad range of operating conditions before being placed in a position of full responsibility. Several experts who met with the committee reported that, in some ports, pilot associations are adding requirements that apprentices be maritime academy graduates. These experts stated that a growing number of associations

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--> supplement hands-on training with in-house classroom training or with contract classroom and simulator-based training in radar and automatic radar plotting aid operations, bridge team or bridge resource management, shiphandling, and emergency procedures. In some cases, pilots receive subsequent training for new and specialized ship types or for developing shiphandling techniques in modified ports and channels. The trend toward extended training programs and continuing professional development is expected to continue to respond to public expectations for marine safety, to upgrade pilot services for larger, more specialized ships, and to prepare for automated ships with smaller crew sizes (APA, 1993; NRC, 1994). The cost of pilot training, which is currently a concern (especially for small-port pilot associations), is covered, if at all, as part of local pilotage rate structures. This cost varies, based on the pilot's professional background and training needs. Development of pilots from candidates with no prior maritime experience continues in several major pilotage associations. This practice requires a commitment of substantially greater resources than development of individuals with prior seagoing service or maritime education. To the extent that pilot candidates are recruited from the ranks of experienced mariners, including graduates of one of the maritime academies, the federal or state government will have contributed to the individual's professional development. To a limited extent, professional development costs may be subsidized by union and professional organizations. Continuing professional development using advanced training media, especially marine simulation, though long used by several pilot associations, is relatively new in many pilotage systems. Given the organization and structure of U.S. pilotage, the costs of these programs must be borne within each local pilotage system. Some ports may not be capable of providing a sufficient funding base to support the cost of simulator-based training. Other Organized Training Sources Training programs are also available from private simulator-based training contractors and specialized educational facilities (see Box 2-2), such as the Seaman's Church Institute in New York, a charitable organization supported by donations. The Seaman's Church Institute provides fee-based and subsidized training, depending on need. The programs include a wide range of computer-based ship-bridge simulation training similar to that provided by commercial training facilities. Individual Mariner-Funded Training On a limited basis, individual mariners may also pay for training, such as short courses at license-preparation schools that provide training directly related to licensing examinations and renewals. Individuals also sometimes pay the cost

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--> of other, very limited training, primarily to prepare for entry-level positions in small commercial vessel operations. For practical reasons, the high cost of advanced training—particularly simulator-based training—is rarely paid by the individual mariner. It seems unrealistic, therefore, to expect any new or expanded training to be funded by the individual mariner, with the exception, perhaps, of some marine pilots who, working as independent contractors, would consider the cost of training to be a cost of doing business. Marine Licensing In its most basic form, a marine license is a document stating that the individual to whom it is issued meets the regulatory requirements (experience and knowledge) for the stated capability of the license (e.g., vessel categories and size and level of qualification—master, chief mate, second mate, third mate, pilot, operator of uninspected towing vessel). The license serves as an authorization allowing the holder to serve as a member of a vessel's complement or a pilot. In general, a marine licensing authority's official responsibility is to regulate, according to established criteria, the license holder's authority to serve aboard vessels. A mariner's service is also professionally regulated, to varying degrees, by union and operating company policies and practices, or, in the case of independent marine pilots, by pilot associations. (The terms marine certification and marine licensing are defined in Box 1-1.) Licensing authorities usually do not implement or operate professional development programs, although licensing requirements necessarily strongly influence the nature and form of professional development programs. To the extent that marine licensing requires or permits courses or programs, licensing authorities have domain over accreditation of educational and training curricula, programs, facilities, testing media (such as marine simulations), instructors, evaluators, and license assessors. In some cases, certain courses are required. For example, mariners of all flag states that have ratified the STCW guidelines must usually complete a training course to receive radar observer certification. Issuance of a license by a licensing authority implies competency based on that authority's established minimum competency thresholds. The license level and type issued to deck officers and pilots depends on the industry sector where mariners are employed and the level of responsibility for which they are being licensed. License Standards for Deck Officers in the United States Federal licensing examinations are the basic professional assessment for deck officers serving aboard U.S.-flag vessels. The examinations are administered by the USCG to applicants who certify that they have acquired the prerequisite sea service

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--> and other educational equivalents (see Appendix C). Currently, tests for original licenses are comprehensive, multi-part written examinations. Most sections of the examination are multiple-choice questions. Higher-level licenses may be obtained at any point in an officer's career, once he or she has the required period of seagoing experience and passes a written examination similar in form to the original test. At present, there is no requirement for licensed officers to have any specific level of formal education to qualify for a marine license. Renewal of the deck officer's license is usually required at five-year intervals, the maximum interval permitted by the mandatory provisions of the STCW guidelines. If the mariner is actively working in the maritime industry, the USCG's renewal examination is relatively perfunctory. The individual's ability to perform effectively under that license is not tested during license renewal. Changes in Deck Officer Licensing in the United States. USCG records for issuance and renewal of "any gross tons" or "unlimited" licenses for the years 1986 through 1993 are summarized in Table 1-2. These records show a reduction in the new licenses issued and a drop in renewals for all deck officer categories during those years. New issues are down 26.6 percent; renewals are down 14.7 percent. These declines are consistent with the steady decline of the size of U.S.-flag fleet and the gradual reduction of ship crew size, regardless of the increase in individual ship size. Geographical Distribution of Deck Officer Licenses. The committee examined the regional distribution of relevant deck officer license activity and its relationship to the location of known ship-bridge simulator facilities. These data are summarized in Table 1-3. When the committee began its deliberations in 1992, there was some concern that the preponderance of simulator facilities were located on the East Coast, with a dearth of facilities in the West and Gulf coasts. From a review of the market in early 1995, however, it appears that the geographical gaps in simulator availability are being filled, and expansion is expected to continue as industry demand for simulator-based training services grows. Table 1-4 shows total 1994 USCG activity for limited and unlimited licenses by category. The license activity data in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 are summarized from the USCG's (1994) unpublished report, License Activity by Port, which lists license activity at all USCG license-issuing locations. That report does not differentiate between "limited" and "unlimited" licenses. Consequently, license issuance and renewal numbers, particularly in the master's category, represented in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 are substantially greater than those for "ocean unlimited" in Table 1-2. License Standards for Pilots in the United States Pilot licenses are generally obtained through a two-track licensing examination process. Licensing is primarily administered by state pilotage authorities

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--> TABLE 1-2 U.S. Coast Guard Ocean-Onlya License Statistics for Deck Department, Any Gross Tons,b Fiscal Years 1986–1993 License Category 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1986–1993 Total 1986–1993 Average per Year Master                     New issues 173 181 128 120 113 120 166 115 1,116 140 Renewals 769 648 597 586 488 590 615 666 4,959 620 Total 942 829 725 706 601 710 781 781 6,075 759 Chief Mate                     New issues 129 161 77 69 69 113 85 118 821 103 Renewals 199 226 205 166 157 181 157 194 1,485 186 Total 328 387 282 235 226 294 242 312 2,306 288 Second Mate                     New issues 177 155 157 173 135 176 229 175 1,377 172 Renewals 275 247 216 199 141 174 184 214 1,650 206 Total 452 402 373 372 276 350 413 389 3,027 378 Third Mate                     New issues 511 420 315 297 224 467 378 319 2,931 366 Renewals 416 437 360 404 317 413 402 373 3,122 390 Total 927 857 675 701 541 880 780 692 6,053 757 Total 2,649 2,475 2,055 2,014 1,644 2,234 2,216  2,174 17,461 2,183 a Issues and renewals only. No endorsements or failures. b Any gross tons—limited licenses not included. The USCG advises that the above totals may be somewhat inflated by ''double counts." A USCG computer search to identify duplications produced a 9.62 percent double-count factor for deck officers. SOURCE: USCG (1986–1993). under established laws and regulations. In nearly every case, the pilot association, either officially or by custom, administers apprentice programs for the route where the apprentice expects to work. Apprentice pilots make repeated trips, several hundred in many cases, under the supervision of experienced pilots aboard ships traversing the route for which the license is sought. The experienced pilot monitors and evaluates the apprentice's progress and is responsible for the actual vessel piloting. After documenting extensive route experience, the apprentice pilot is usually assessed by the pilot association and examined by the licensing authority (NCR, 1994). Because virtually all pilots are required by their associations or state pilotage authority to hold a federal, first-class pilot's license or endorsement, the USCG also examines most pilots. In addition, most pilots must satisfy basic license requirements for mariners, and many hold some form of marine license prior to becoming an apprentice (NCR, 1994). To be licensed, the applicant for a federal pilot's license

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--> TABLE 1-3 U.S. Coast Guard Limited and Unlimiteda License Activity and Number of Facilities with Category I and Category II Simulatorsb: Summarized by Regionc Port Issue Renewal Total Percent Total Number of Facilities with Category I and II Simulators East Coast, North 1,694 3,227 4,921 26 8 East Coast, South 947 2,082 3,029 17 1 Gulf Coast 987 2,355 3,342 20 1 West Coast, North 646 1,227 1,873 11 2 West Coast, South 618 1,133 1,751 10 1 Alaska 352 214 566 3 0 Hawaii 167 465 632 4 0 Great Lakes 519 650 1,169 7 2 Mid-Continent 156 303 459 2 1 Total 6,086 11,656 17,742 100 16 a Licenses issued for operation of vessels over 1,600 gross tons are "unlimited." b Category I are full-mission simulators. Category II are multi-task simulators. See Box 2-1 for complete IMO definitions of simulator categories. c Regions and ports defined: East Coast, North—Boston, Massachusetts; New York, New York; and Baltimore, Maryland. East Coast, South—Charleston, South Carolina; and Miami, Florida. Gulf Coast—New Orleans, Louisiana; and Houston, Texas. West Coast, North—Seattle, Washington; and Portland, Oregon. West Coast, South—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Long Beach, California. Alaska-Anchorage and Juneau. Hawaii—Honolulu. Great Lakes—Toledo, Ohio. Mid-Continent—St. Louis, Missouri; and Memphis, Tennessee. SOURCE: USCG (1994). or endorsement must demonstrate route knowledge by drawing from memory detailed charts of the pilotage route, showing aids to navigation, geographic and hydrographic data, and other information. The remainder of the examination is similar to the deck officer's license examination, with more-detailed testing of subjects related to shiphandling and local knowledge. After receiving an unrestricted license, pilots are rarely formally re-evaluated. Measures to detect degraded performance, before the performance becomes a causal factor in a marine accident, are informal and unevenly applied. There is, however, a growing trend among pilot associations and stage pilotage authorities to require pilot participation in continuing professional development programs (NRC, 1994).

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--> TABLE 1-4 U.S. Coast Guard Total Limited and Unlimiteda Licenses, by Category, 1994 License Category Issue Renewal Total Percent Total First-Class Pilot 115 982 1,097 7 Master 4,483 9,292 13,775 77 Chief Mate 138 204 342 2 Second Mate 143 224 367 2 Third Mate 437 419 856 4 Mate 770 535 1,305 8 Total 6,086 11,656 17,742 100 a Licenses issued for operation of vessels over 1,600 gross tons are "unlimited." SOURCE: USCG (1994). Other Tests of Mariner Abilities Excluding license examinations, the mariner's abilities are currently tested during his or her career in a number of ways at varying intervals by several evaluating bodies. These tests include: traditional testing through written examination during the normal four-year course of instruction at the state and federal maritime academies; instruction and testing at training facilities and union schools; formal periodic job evaluations by employers, based on company performance standards for job retention and promotion; continuous, informal on-the-job performance evaluations by masters and senior officers aboard ship; and pilot association examinations and check-rides and state license examinations for pilots. There are no post-graduate education requirements for deck officers and pilots working aboard ship, although some practicing mariners do have post-graduate degrees in business, law, or other subjects associated with seagoing work. Some mariners periodically take refresher and upgrade courses to stay current. In addition, all actively sailing deck officers must attend radar training courses prior to each license renewal. Some employers require deck officers to take retraining and refresher courses applicable to their shipboard positions. Some companies perform annual performance evaluations to determine continued mariner competency and monitor employees' career progression. These evaluations are normally conducted by the mariner's senior officer or a company-designated official, usually a senior master. Because the aim is to enhance performance at all stages of the officer's career, evaluations are usually interactive between reviewer and officer. Some companies also include counseling as part of the evaluation process. Evaluations

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--> are reviewed by the employer's human resource staff ashore to determine promotion capabilities, and promotions and continued employment are often based on evaluation results. The Need for Improved Professional Development Systems Traditional approaches to professional development have produced highly competent mariners, although not always systematically and with varying individual qualifications. Marine accidents involve experienced and competent mariners. Furthermore, most investigations include the identification of an error chain involving those mariners. The implication is that needed additional or special professional development is not always provided through the traditional approach. Marine simulation has become a major focus as one method of addressing these concerns. U.S. Mariner Professional Development A growing number of shipping and towing companies, members of the piloting profession, marine educators, and worldwide marine licensing authorities, including the USCG, have recognized the need for improved professional development, licensing, and certification programs. Some operating companies and pilot organizations have seriously begun to review and revise training needs to improve professional performance. These groups have developed training programs intended to achieve the objective of improved professional competence and are increasingly using marine simulation (APA, 1993; Mercer, 1993; Muirhead, 1993; NRC, 1994). There is, however, a diversity of opinion among experts about real training and licensing needs and the suitability of simulation as a medium for satisfying these needs. This diversity is fueled by the fact that, although many of the tasks and subtasks essential to safe and effective vessel operation have been well described (Hammell et al., 1980), much of the work is dated, and there has been little systematic effort to correlate task and subtask descriptions with the nature and form of training. Consequently, there is little reinforcement through practice and task replication of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed during actual operations. A comprehensive understanding of job-tasks and performance is fundamental for many reasons, including: identifying professional development needs; developing and conducting effective educational, training, and licensing programs (including options for remission of sea time); determining the short-term and long-term effectiveness of professional development programs; and assessing human performance in the classroom and on the job.

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--> BOX 1-3 The National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) System of the United Kingdom Aims of the NVQ system: Improve vocational qualifications by basing them on the standards of competence required in employment. Establish a simple framework that will facilitate (1) access, (2) progression, and (3) continued learning There are five levels of NVQ. Each level has a competence definition. A sample of the levels of interest to this study are as follows: Level 1—(in the marine field this might be descriptive of a seaman): competence in the performance of a range of varied work activities, most of which may be routine and predictable. Level 3—(class 3 license): competence in a broad range of varied work activities performed in a wide variety of contexts, most of which are complex and nonroutine. There is considerable responsibility and autonomy, and control of guidance of others is often required. Level 5—(master's license): competence that involves the application of a significant range of fundamental principles and complex techniques across a wide and often unpredictable variety of contexts. Substantial personal autonomy and often significant responsibility for the work of others and for the allocation of substantial resources feature strongly, as do personal accountability for analysis and diagnosis, design, planning, execution, and evaluation. For each level (by vocation) there are detailed definitions of: basic knowledge required, tasks and subtasks necessary to perform, performance criteria, and assessment methodologies. For maritime operations, NVQ is investigating the use of simulators for assessment within the system. SOURCE: Implementing NVQs Workshop (1994). International Professional Development The steady increase in foreign-flag ships in U.S. waters (and the steady decrease of U.S.-flag vessels) presents an additional mariner competency concern. U.S. influence on the training and certification of international mariners is primarily through the IMO and the STCW guidelines. Since ratifying the STCW

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--> guidelines in 1991, the United States has become a leader in efforts to upgrade and improve the guidelines by "placing emphasis on stricter regulatory control for international shipping, and incorporation of modern training and certification methods, including use of simulators" (Drown and Mercer, 1995). Without these improvements in international standards, there can be no meaningful reduction in accidents in U.S. waters. The United Kingdom has undertaken a major effort to improve the professional competency of all major vocations, including mariners. Box 1-3 summarizes the objectives of the U.K.'s National Vocational Qualification system, a system being structured to define levels of advancement within each vocation and to identify training and assessment certification criteria at each level in each vocation. The Need for a Systematic Approach to Professional Development It has been a long-standing practice to focus on knowledge as the basic determinant of mariner competency. The almost exclusive emphasis on knowledge—and general absence of systematic attention to jobtasks and performance in training and marine licensing ship's officers—results in heavy reliance on intuition in mariner professional development and qualification. There are no professional standards for skills development to guide and optimize the content and emphasis of on-the-job training for mariners. The result is a fundamental weakness in the traditional approach to professional development and qualification, because the content and emphasis of training courses and license examinations may not correspond to actual needs. This situation is exacerbated by the relative lack of data to guide a more scientific assessment. Marine simulation, applied in a structured program, based on relevant and focused-task and subtask analyses and skills correlation, represents significant potential to supplement traditional training and professional development (see Chapter 3). Integrating simulation into structured training can ensure high levels of competency nationally and internationally. All forms and levels of simulation could be effectively applied to enhance original learning and refresher training. REFERENCES APA (American Pilot's Association). 1993. APA promotes BRM [bridge resource management] training for pilots. Press release, American Pilots' Association, Washington, D.C., October 5. Drown, D.F., and R.M. Mercer. 1995. Applying marine simulation to improve mariner professional development. Pp. 597–608 in Proceedings of Ports '95. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers. Hammell, T.J., K.E. Williams, J.A. Grasso, and W. Evans. 1980. Simulators for Mariner Training and Licensing. Phase 1: The Role of Simulators in the Mariner Training and Licensing Process (2 volumes). Report Nos. CAORF 50-7810-01 and USCG-D-12-80. Kings Point, New York: Computer Aided Operations Research Facility, National Maritime Research Center.

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--> IMO (International Maritime Organization). 1981. Training, Qualification and Operational Procedures for Maritime Pilots Other Than Deep-Sea Pilots. IMCO Resolution A.485(XII) adopted on November 19, 1981. London, England: IMO. IMO (International Maritime Organization). 1993. STCW 1978: International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping, 1978. London, England: IMO. IMO News. 1994. World maritime day 1994: better standards, training, and certification—IMO's response to human error. IMO News (3):i-xii. Implementing NVQs (National Vocational Qualifications) Workshop. 1994. Business and Technology Educational Council. United Kingdom. Issue 1. September. Mercer, R.M. 1993. Research and Training Aspects of Ship Simulators from an Educational Perspective. Pp. 387–395 in MARSIM '93. International Conference on Maritime Simulation and Ship Maneuverability. St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada, September 25–October 2. Muirhead, P. 1993. Marine simulation performance measurement and assessment: methodologies and validation techniques: a critique. Pp. 417–426 in MARSIM '93. International Conference on Maritime Simulation and Ship Maneuverability. St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada, September 25–October 2. NRC (National Research Council). 1990. Crew Size and Maritime Safety. Committee on the Effect of Smaller Crews on Maritime Safety, Marine Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. NRC (National Research Council). 1994. Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting. Committee on Advances in Navigation and Piloting, Marine Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 1988a. Ramming of the Maltese Bulk Carrier Mont Fort by the British Tank Ship Maersk Neptune in upper New York Bay, February 15, 1988. Mar-88/09. Washington, D.C.: NTSB. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 1988b. Ramming of the Sidney Lanier Bridge by the Polish Bulk Carrier Ziemia Bialostocka, Brunswick, Georgia, May 3, 1987. Mar-88/03. Washington, D.C.: NTSB. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 1992. Grounding of the U.S. Tank Ship Star Connecticut in the Pacific Ocean, near Barber's Point, Hawaii, November 6, 1990. Mar-92/01. Washington, D.C.: NTSB. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 1993a. Grounding of the United Kingdom Passenger Vessel RMS Queen Elizabeth 2 near Cutty Hunh Island, Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts, August 7, 1992. Mar-93/01. Washington, D.C.: NTSB. NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 1993b. Collision of the U.S. Towboat Fremont and Tow with St. Vincent and the Grenadines Registered Containership Juraj Dalmatinac, Houston Ship Channel, December 21, 1992. Mar-93/02. Washington, D.C.: NTSB. USCG (U.S. Coast Guard). 1986–1993. Marine Safety Council Proceedings Magazine. Washington, D.C.: USCG. USCG (U.S. Coast Guard). 1994. Licensing Activity by Port. Unpublished report, USCG, Washington, D.C. U.S. Maritime Administration. 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1992. Annual Vessel Inventory Reports. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation. Wahren, E. 1993. Application of airline crew management training in the maritime field. Pp. 591–599 in MARSIM '93. International Conference on Maritime Simulation and Ship Maneuverability. St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada, September 26–October 3.