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INTRODUCTION In 1994, the National Research Council convened the Pane! on Seismological Research Requirements for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Mon~tonng System (hereinafter, the panel) to examine issues associated with establishing an International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS) for verifying a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Negotiation of such a treaty is currently underway within the Conference on Disarma- ment (CD), with prototype versions ofthe ISMS being explored in a series oftechnical tests organized by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). The latest technical test, GSETT-3, commenced January I, ~ 995, and may phase into the long-term operational effort of the ISMS. While various technologies, including seismology, are essential for monitoring atmospheric and underwater explosions, seismology provides the primary means for monitoring underground nuclear explosions. In many cases, seismic waves from buned explosions can be recorded by global networks of seismometers, and the signals used to detect, locate, and identify the source of the disturbance (allowing nuclear explosions to be distinguished from conventional chemical explosions or natural earthquakes). The seismological component of the CTBT monitoring system being considered within the CD includes the acquisition and processing of seismic data from high-quality stations and provision of the data to participating states to assist them in their national verification functions. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has requested advice from the National Research Council (NRC) on how the data from the CTBT monitoring system might best benefit the broader seismological community. The NRC pane! has been charged with considenng the specific data characteris- tics desired by the broad seismological community, the procedures for providing general access to the ISMS data, and the nature of the research infrastructure that could best support the United States' ability to perform CTBT~ monitoring. It should be noted that the topics encompassed by this charge differ in nature. (~) The recommendations regarding instrumentation characteristics are intended for technical specialists. (2) The recommendations regarding data access involve policy issues for the U.S. National Data ' The specific charges to the panel are given in filll in Appendix A. 9
10 Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System Center, U.S. government agencies involved in CTBT, and the treaty verification community in general. (3) The research infrastructure recommendations involve the federal agencies that support treaty monitoring research. To address this broad range of issues, the pane} was constituted with expertise from the nuclear monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic seismological research arenas. The pane] obtained extensive technical advice from its affiliated members for each of the tasks, along with soliciting additional input from many seismological experts for each of the different topics. Two preliminary reports, addressing the first two charges, were produced and distributed in response to deadlines for the GSE activities related to GSETT-3 and associated planning for the final ISMS. This report provides the panel's full response to all three tasks. Detailed discussion of each task is presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Planned International Seismic Monitoring System To provide a context for considering the three charges before the panel, this chapter outlines the current plans for the ISMS. (A prototype ISMS began operation during GSETT-3, which commenced January i, 1995.) This chapter also presents an overview of the existing U.S. operational capabilities associated with nuclear monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic research activities. The CTBT negotiations are in progress, and the ISMS mode} will evolve. A recent concept for the ISMS is illustrated in Figure 2.1 (from Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Second Quarter, 1994, p. ~ I). This system is focused on nuclear monitoring and is neither designed nor intended to replace any existing international efforts for earthquake monitoring or data acquisition for basic science applications. The current scenario for the ISMS envisions that two main categories of seismic waveform data will flow into the system. The first comprises continuously telemetered data from primary stations, many of which will be short-period arrays and all of which will have at least one broadband three-component seismometer. The second category of data will involve auxiliary stations, all equipped with a broadband three-component sensor with on-demand, dial-up access. Only segmented time windows are expected to be retrieved from auxiliary stations by the TSMS. Many, if not all, of the auxiliary stations will be drawn from existing global seismographic networks, which currently have procedures for accessing and archiving their continuous data. All TSMS stations will have very high quality-control and maintenance requirements. A final category of supplemental data that may be provided to the ISMS involves regional bulletins,
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12 Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System parameter data such as arrival times and amplitudes of various seismic waves, and possibly even waveform data from regional seismographic networks and other sources. An TSMS International Data Center (ISMS-IDC) will receive data from the network of primary stations and use them to produce an automated event list within about one hour of the event. Based on this list. additional data from auxiliary stations will be accessed as needed to refine the event list within 4 hours. Analysts will review the upgraded primary-auxiliary event list and produce a final TSMS bulletin within 2 days of the end of the day of the event. The rapid preparation of this bulletin precludes incorporation of many seismic observations acquired by international earthquake monitoring efforts, so the ISMS-IDC bulletin will not be definitive with respect to global earthquake activity. The degree to which the ISMS-IDC will pursue event identification efforts related to nuclear event monitoring is still unresolved. All of the seismic data and event parameters obtained by the ISMS-TDC will be available to ISMS National Data Centers (ISMS-NDCs), which can utilize this information in independent national verification functions. Each ISMS-NDC may have responsibilities for providing its nation's primary and auxiliary station data to the ISMS-TDC, retrieving seismic data and event parameters from the TSMS-IDC, and servicing internal verification functions. For the United States, it is likely that some of the additional national and multilateral data, combined with ISMS data in national verification Unctions, will be classified, as will the final nuclear monitoring event list. As a result, computer security issues will exist at the interface between the classified operations and the ISMS-NDC. In addition, there will be a need to ensure data validity within the ISMS-IDC-NDC system. The event list produced by the U.S. national verification function will emphasize identification of possible nuclear explosion signals and is not intended to produce the highest possible quality event list of earthquakes. Indeed, for events readily identified as earthquakes on the basis of location, depth, and/or signal character, no effort will be made to optimize the event parameters. For small, shallow events in continental areas, the verification event list is likely to be of very high quality, presumably superior to the event list ofthe ISMS-IDC. In the past, the national event list produced by the U.S. nuclear monitoring system has not been available to the unclassified corrununity. It appears unlikely that this will change, as long as classified data streams are used in constructing the event list, even if unclassified data play the major role. The organizational structure ofthe U.S. ISMS-NDC and oversight responsibili- ties are still unresolved, as is the issue of whether the classified national verification function will be physically separate or collocated with the TSMS-NDC. (Although no decision has been made, it seems probable that AFTAC will continue its role and be the operator ofthe U.S. ISMS-NDC.) The mode} shown in Figure 2.] places the national verification function under the ISMS-NDC, but this is not a required structure. This
INTRODUCTION 13 report will address some of the functionalities of the TSMS-NDC with respect to data archival and distribution. This TSMS concept is being tested under the ongoing GSETT-3 experiment. The prototype ISMS-1[DC is located at the Center for Monitoring Research in Arlington, Virginia, and is operated by ARPA. The prototype U.S. ISMS-NDC is operated by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. AFTAC will combine ISMS data with data from additional National Technical Means (NTM) in the construction of its classified event list. The USGS has a functional role in the data flow to the ISMS-NDC for GSETT-3, contributing seismic data streams that comprise much of the U.S. component of GSETT-3. Note that there is no specific pathway for data distribution from the ISMS-NDC model in Figure 2.1. However, the GSE is presently considering its policies with respect to external data distribution in the GSETT-3. It is broadly recognized that providing access to the data is highly desirable. The panel views data distribution as an essential function to include in GSETT-3, in order to evaluate data distribution mechanisms for the future ISMS. Therefore, Chapter 4 of this report identifies possible pathways by which the unclassified seismic data and event parameters from the U.S. ISMS-NDC can be made available for other efforts related to nuclear test monitoring, earthquake studies, and emergency response. We now review existing operational capabilities and functions of different elements in the seismological systems supporting nuclear test and earthquake monitoring. Existing Seismological Systems . The current nuclear monitoring seismic system in the United States (Figure 2.2) is largely a classified operation, with seismic arrays in the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection Systems (USAEDS) providing data in real-time to AFTAC. The entire system involves data acquisition, data archival, and data processing, but no data distribution. A classified event bulletin with source-type discrimination and yield estimation for suspected nuclear tests has been the primary product ofthis nuclear monitoring system. This has been an almost entirely closed system, with limited external access to the data used in nuclear monitoring operations, even when USAEDS data have been decIassi- f~ed. In part, this is in compliance with bilateral agreements with the host countries for USAEDS facilities, but even some unclassified data with no such restrictions have not been available. This restricted access has precluded incorporation of the high-quality seismological data from the nuclear monitoring arena into other national efforts involving earthquake monitoring, research on earthquakes and earth structure, and even research on nuclear monitoring. The Air Force does not have any responsibility to
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INTRODUCTION 15 support earthquake monitoring, but meeting the demands of CTBT monitoring requires an external research and development program that can contribute to and profit from the efforts of the broader research community. Figure 2.3 shows the planned distribution of the primary stations for the GSETT-3 operation, with those stations actually providing data to the ISMS-IDC as of March I, ~ 995, being highlighted. Seventeen of the stations have only three-component broadband instruments, and 15 include a broadband instrument and an array of short-period vertical sensors. The global distribution of stations is expected to improve continually and to number about 50 primary stations or arrays (49 were committed at the time this report was prepared). As many as 100 auxiliary stations are planned as well, with some of these being drawn from the existing global distribution of broadband stations of the Federation of Digital Seismological Networks discussed below. At present, about 40 such stations around the world have dial-up access capability. The value of the auxiliary stations is often assessed in terms of enhanced location capabilities of the ISMS; but their principal value may well lie in the additional identification capabilities that they provide to the U.S. national verification function. The U.S. earthquake monitoring system is a distributed operation involving many organizations (greatly simplified in Figure 2.21. This effort is supported and operated primarily by the USGS and the NSF-funded IRIS, in collaboration with many university and private-sector efforts. Other goverrunent programs involved in earthquake monitoring include the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Nuclear Regulatory Co~runission (USNRC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and many state agencies. The National Seismic System (Heaton et al. 1989) involves coordination ofthe large number (> 1000) of regional network stations in the United States (Figure 2.4) operated by the USGS and several collaborating universities. The USGS also operates the National Seismic Network (NSN), which is a growing network that will involve about 50 broadband stations deployed within North America. These USGS seismic stations are primarily intended for earthquake monitoring in the seismogenic zones of the country, but the improving accessibility of data from these operations has enabled important basic research applications on global earth structure and earthquake source processes. This U.S. effort is, in turn, part of a larger international effort that has many organizations and collaborative arrangements. Numerous international and national seismographic networks are involved, ranging from isolated stations to dense regional networks of short-period seismometers to sparse global networks of broadband seismometers. Thousands of seismic stations contribute data to the global system, as illustrated by a map of stations contributing data to the International Seismic Centre (TSC) in Figure 2.5. Several data centers acquire, archive, process, and distribute seismic
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20 Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System data; the size, complexity, communications capabilities, and Ending limitations ofthe system have precluded consolidation of all data into a single earthquake monitoring data center. Nevertheless, a remarkable amount of data and the analyses of that data are shared internationally within days and weeks of the time an event occurs. While production of definitive bulletins of event parameters on time scales of days to years is one of the primary objectives of the earthquake monitoring system, rapid location and analysis of earthquakes are important for emergency response and hazard mitigation (NRC Real-Time Seismology, 1991, Heaton et al., 19891. These efforts have increased the requirement for real-time data processing of both regional and global seismic data for activities of both the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the USGS. These include tsunami warning systems operated in Hawaii and Alaska as well as rapid earthquake location and magnitude estimation performed by the USGS National Earthquake Information Center (NETC) in Golden, Colorado. USGS has a major role in providing rapid assessment of international earthquake disasters to the State Department, which is concerned about issues such as political stability of the stricken country and disaster assistance. The USGS efforts in global monitoring are also motivated by the fact that studying earthquakes around the world is an effective means by which to understand the basic nature ofthese phenomena and the natural hazards within the United States. Unlike nuclear test monitoring, earthquake monitoring and basic seismological research are concemed with precise information about all earthquake activity, including the location, type of faulting, and energy release for events of all sizes. Many countries operate additional regional and international seismographic networks and share data with the NEIC and the ISC for preparation of earthquake bulletins. The seismic research community extensively utilizes seismic data from earthquake monitoring networks as well as data from global arrays deployed for basic research. Seismological research is directed at enhanced understanding of earthquakes, basic studies of earth structure and dynamics, and nuclear test monitoring. The nature of this research requires readily accessible archives of current and past data. This requirement has prompted the development of the extensive Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology (TRIS) Data Management System (DMS) as well as several regional network data management systems affiliated with universities. Much of the important international broadband seismic data has been centralized in the past few years. Many international broadband networks are coordinated under the Federation of Digital Seismographic Networks (FDSN), which now involves more than ~ 00 globally distributed state-of-the-art broadband seismic observatories (Figure 2.61. The FDSN data are all archived and distributed by the TRIS-DMS, which effectively serves as the primary global data center for seismological research (Figure 2.2), supplemented by USGS and university data centers. The diverse data requirements of various research
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22 Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring System applications make it valuable to maintain continuous data archives on-line whenever possible, and this has strongly influenced the strategy of the TRIS-DMS. Nuclear monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and basic seismological research activities involve different agencies, data collection and analysis philosophies, and levels of filnding, yet they share the unifying attribute of having continuous ground motion recordings as their primary data sources. As long as seismic instrumentation incorporates current technological capabilities that achieve large bandwidth and dynamic range in the recording system, the seismic data watt have multiple applications. In the past, data collected for one purpose or another have failed to achieve their maximum potential due to limited instrumentation characteristics and/or limited access to the data. There is now no technological excuse for this underutilization of data, because digital seismic data can readily be archived in efficient data management systems that allow multiple users to access the data, independent of their primary objectives. Thus, ISMS data can be combined with existing seismic databases to the benefit of earthquake analysis and investigations of the deep interior of Earth as well as hazard studies and nuclear test monitoring. planning, corrunitment to achieving broad data utilization, and an effective means for widely distributing the data are required so that broad applications of the data are not negated by an unnecessarily restrictive system design. Most ISMS data will be of high quality, but they cannot begin to replace the data generated by the extensive seismological infrastructure for earthquake monitoring and basic research described above. However, ISMS data will benefit those efforts at relatively minor expense. The U.S. national verification function will similarly continue to benefit from reciprocal access to stations from earthquake monitoring and basic research activities (for example, as a backup to ISMS stations when needed), as will the research and develop- ment efforts supporting national verification capabilities. This report will explore some ofthe many points of intersection ofthe different seismological communities and watt advocate procedures that enable optimal utilization of the various types of seismic data. No reliable cost estimates are available either for handling and distributing the data or for funding the research. However. increases over present expenditures are expected to be modest and incremental.