7 Conflict Management Training for Changing Missions

Our analysis of the Army's new missions calls attention to the kinds of skills that are needed to conduct them effectively. In this chapter, we identify the combat and contact skills needed for peacekeeping and operations other than war (OOTW) activities, then review current military training programs for the applicability of their skills training to mission requirements. Training programs worldwide devote relatively little time to the development of contact skills. We therefore propose a number of ways to improve conflict management training for particular missions. We also discuss factors that limit the effectiveness of this kind of training, interfere with the evaluation of the training, or limit mission effectiveness.

Preparing For Operations Other Than War

Combat and Contact Activities

A useful way to think about needed mission skills is to make a distinction between those used in combat operations and those involved in contact with individuals and groups. By combat skills, we refer to basic military skills used in situations in which there is a physical threat, weapons discharge, combat engagement, or internal security operation. By contact skills, we refer primarily to communication skills involved in exchange and liaison duties, interviews and public relations, negotiations and related discussions, civil-military cooperation, mediation of disputes, and interagency cooperation. Missions are likely to differ in terms of their mix of combat and contact activities; they also differ according to the rank and duties of the



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--> 7 Conflict Management Training for Changing Missions Our analysis of the Army's new missions calls attention to the kinds of skills that are needed to conduct them effectively. In this chapter, we identify the combat and contact skills needed for peacekeeping and operations other than war (OOTW) activities, then review current military training programs for the applicability of their skills training to mission requirements. Training programs worldwide devote relatively little time to the development of contact skills. We therefore propose a number of ways to improve conflict management training for particular missions. We also discuss factors that limit the effectiveness of this kind of training, interfere with the evaluation of the training, or limit mission effectiveness. Preparing For Operations Other Than War Combat and Contact Activities A useful way to think about needed mission skills is to make a distinction between those used in combat operations and those involved in contact with individuals and groups. By combat skills, we refer to basic military skills used in situations in which there is a physical threat, weapons discharge, combat engagement, or internal security operation. By contact skills, we refer primarily to communication skills involved in exchange and liaison duties, interviews and public relations, negotiations and related discussions, civil-military cooperation, mediation of disputes, and interagency cooperation. Missions are likely to differ in terms of their mix of combat and contact activities; they also differ according to the rank and duties of the

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--> military personnel involved in the operation. A chief difference among missions is whether the soldier's role is that of primary party or third party, as shown in Figure 6–1. A recent survey conducted by the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center (Last and Eyre, 1995) used the distinction between combat and contact activities. Canadian soldiers in the Bosnian (N = 197) and Croatian (N = 185) United Nations (UNPROFOR) operations were asked a number of questions about their experiences during the time period November 1993 to April 1994. Ninety-six questions, arranged in nine groupings, were asked of samples at three ranks: enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers. Of these, 50 questions were relevant to the combat-contact distinction: 32 deal with combat activities, 18 with contact activities. From the answers, profiles were constructed for each operation. These profiles show the relative balance of combat and contact experiences for the two missions and how these experiences vary by rank. The results show that combat skills are important at all levels, but that contact skills are more significant with increasing rank. The proportion of combat and contact experiences for the enlisted and NCO ranks was roughly equal for both operations. Officers reported about twice as many contact (about 40 percent) as combat (20 percent) activities in the Bosnian operation and almost three times as many contact (40 versus 15 percent) activities in the Croatian operation. The most frequent combat experiences reported were being a target for rocks thrown, encountering mines, coming under small-arms fire, being restrained, and being held at gunpoint. The most frequent contact experiences reported were working with interpreters, negotiating with civilian police and belligerent factions, and interacting with local civilians. With regard to activities involving negotiation, almost all officers and many senior NCOs reported experiences with a soldier or officer of one of the warring factions; only 29 percent of the enlisted group reported having these experiences. A smaller percentage of officers (60 percent) reported negotiating with civilian leaders of one of the factions; an even smaller percentage of the enlisted group reported these experiences (about 15 percent). With regard to mediation or conciliation, about 50 percent of the officers and senior NCOs had these experiences, compared with only about 10 percent of the enlisted soldiers. This leads to the conclusion that developing contact skills is clearly essential for officers, and it may be important to develop them even at the lower levels. It is also apparent that contact skills are increasingly important in many of the newer operations other than war. In traditional peacekeeping operations, only senior officers could be expected to have direct interactions with the protagonists and thus require some contact skills. Junior

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--> officers and enlisted personnel might never have to use such skills, as they might be stationed as part of an interposition force in an area of low population density (e.g., the Sinai Desert). Operations other than war such as election supervision and humanitarian assistance require military personnel at all levels to be prepared to interact directly with the local population, perhaps on a daily basis. If contact skills are important, then it is important to know to what extent training programs emphasize these skills. The Canadian survey is a first attempt to document what is actually done in OOTW missions. Nevertheless, it is largely limited to one type of mission, which we referred to above as limiting damage. The survey documents that these missions are characterized by a mix of combat and contact experiences and that the relative emphasis on these skills varies for the different ranks. These types of missions may consist of more combat activities than monitoring missions and more contact than coercive missions. The different missions may also entail different mixes of contact and combat skills in the training packages for the different ranks. Such comparisons await the results of similar surveys conducted in conjunction with other types of missions. The Canadian effort is a useful model for those surveys. Training Programs The combat versus contact distinction can also be used to depict what is being done in programs that train military personnel for operations other than war. The committee considered 79 programs worldwide that are summarized in a September 1994 training catalog issued by the Inspector General's Office of the Department of Defense (DoD). The catalog is divided between U.S. and international (33 countries) training activities; the U.S. programs are further divided into DoD (and its separate services) and non-DoD programs. Following a general description of the program, the specific topics taught in courses or addressed in roundtable discussions are listed. For example, elective courses dealing with peace operations at the Army War College are listed as "collective security and peacekeeping," "peace operations exercise," and "conflict resolution and strategic negotiation." Examples of subject areas included in the training packages at the Army Command and General Staff College are "non-combatant evacuation,'' "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief," "combatting terrorism," and "arms control." This information was used to assess the extent to which the programs emphasized the training of contact and combat skills. Using keywords to identify contact skills, we calculated a ratio of the number of contact to combat skills included in each program's training curricula.1 The ratio consisted of the number of contact skills divided by

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--> the total number of topics listed for each program. The results of this analysis indicate: Across the 79 programs, including both U.S. and international, an average of 13 percent of the topics or activities listed involved contact or interpersonal skills. For the 59 programs in which at least one contact skill was mentioned, an average of 25 percent of the topics involved the use of contact or interpersonal skills. There is little variation among the programs in terms of the number of contact skills included, with a range for most programs from 0 to 5 (or 0 to 25) percent. There is little difference between U.S. and foreign programs, nor is there much difference between the DoD and non-DoD programs or among the programs sponsored by the different services. The program that includes the most contact skills—five—is conducted by NATO. The program with the highest percentage of contact relative to combat skills is the U.S. central command.2 With regard to the total number of skills being taught, there is considerable variation, with a range from 0 to 21. Among the more encompassing programs are the Air Command and Staff College (21 skills), NATO (16), Uruguay's Navy course (15), the United Nation's military observer training in the United Kingdom (14), the United Nation's soldier training courses (14), and specialized training in the Philippines (14). Taken together, the results of the two analyses make it apparent that a gap exists between the skills being trained and the activities that occur in peacekeeping and related missions. Fetherston also recognized this gap, noting that "at best only a small fraction of course time is spent on [conflict resolution or cross-cultural orientation skills]—approximately 5 percent in any of the programs [that devote the most teaching hours to contact skills], either national or regional" (1994:208). There is a diversity of opinion among U.S. military and foreign officers about whether traditional military skills are sufficient for most operations other than war. Nevertheless, it is evident that current training programs are skewed more in the direction of the view that combat skills are adequate for most personnel, regardless of mission. Yet it is apparent to the committee that a significant gap in the training of contact skills exists. The gap is accentuated further by uncertainty with regard to which skills are most pertinent to which types of missions. Having reached this conclusion, however, leads to the questions of what specifically should be trained and how the training should be done. These questions are addressed in the sections that follow.

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--> Developing Contact Skills There is a large literature on approaches to developing communication and related interpersonal skills. Fetherston (1994) considered training issues in the context of theory and practice—she views training as a critical link between them. She depicts the link in terms of a cyclical framework in which "conceptual analysis leads to developments in training which lead to changes in practice. … (T)hese changes then initiate testing and revising which finally feed back into the conceptualization process" (1994:164-165). The process is visually represented in Figure 7-1. She illustrates the links with examples from cross-cultural training and concentrates on skills and attitudes that relate to effective interactions between members of different cultures. Drawing on a review of literature by Hannigan (1990), Fetherston emphasizes the general communication skills of listening, entering a dialogue, initiating interaction, dealing with misunderstandings, language, and interaction management (see also Harbottle, 1992). She notes that although subject-matter expertise is important, it is insufficient without these communication skills. These are also the skills needed for effective third-party intervention in general. The review of literature also identifies attitudes that relate to cross-cultural effectiveness. In addition to positive attitudes and respect for the host culture, she notes that "a critical aspect of intercultural interaction [is] to be able to judge when it is best to be flexible and when it is better to be persistent" (1992:168). This is also a critical aspect of all international negotiations, as illustrated in the recent collection of papers on flexibility edited by Druckman and Mitchell (1995). With regard to approaches used in developing these skills, Fetherston distinguishes among six types of training methods: fact-oriented training, FIGURE 7-1 Cyclical development of the theory and practice of peacekeeping. Source: Fetherston (1994:165). Copyright A.B. Fetherston. Reprinted with permission of St. Martin's Press, Incorporated.

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--> attribution training, cultural awareness training, cognitive-behavior modification, experiential learning, and interactional learning. She agrees with an earlier judgment made by Grove and Torbiorn (1985) that fact-oriented training is inappropriate because it does not allow for changes in one's usual patterns of interacting with others. These authors favor experiential learning because of its emphasis on learning through actual experience, allowing the trainee to notice the impact of his or her behavior on others.3 That impact is likely to be understood better if the trainee can internalize the host's values, which is a goal of attribution training (see Brislin, 1986; Danielian, 1967). Indeed, it is likely that a combination of methods works best. Although it is important to develop general communication and interaction skills, it is also necessary to know when to use them. Some skills may be more useful for certain types of missions or for certain stages of a particular mission. Insufficient attention has been paid to this issue, due at least in part to a lack of differentiation among missions or among stages of missions. With regard to missions, the taxonomy described above contributes to distinctions among types of missions. With regard to stages, Fisher and Keashly's (1991) contingency model of conflict escalation, refined further by Fetherston (1994), has implications for thinking about developmental processes within peacekeeping missions. (See also Grove and Torbiorn's [1985] adjustment-cycle model of cross-cultural experience, which is discussed below.) And with regard to developing specialized skills, Johnson and Layng (1992) present an approach that builds skills that can be elicited in response to specific occasions or challenges. Focusing on the conflict process, Fisher and Keashly (1991) developed a typology of conflict escalation that distinguishes among four stages: discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction. At each stage, the relationship between protagonists changes significantly. The preferred method of conflict management by the parties themselves becomes increasingly competitive, going from joint decision making in Stage 1 to outright attempts at destruction in Stage 4. Intervention activities also change in terms of goals and intervention strategies: assisting communication through negotiation in Stage 1, improving relationships through consultation in Stage 2, controlling hostility through muscled mediation in Stage 3, and controlling violence through peacekeeping in Stage 4. (See the summaries in Fetherston, 1994:Appendices 3 and 4.) Interestingly, peacekeeping is used in this model only after a conflict has escalated to a destructive stage. These models describe developmental processes. Each specifies the conditions under which certain processes are likely to occur as well as the intervention or training strategies that are appropriate. The Fisher and Keashly (1991) model links intervention approaches to steps on a ladder of escalation. Grove and Torbiorn (1985) link training methods to periods of adjustment.

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--> These are complementary models. The former has implications for the military mission; the latter addresses issues that are relevant to the individual soldier. Both models are useful for identifying the kinds of interventions or adjustment problems for which training is needed. Neither model suggests, however, how the training or preparation ought to be done. Guidance for training programs is provided by the research literatures on cross-cultural training and on conflict management. Fetherston (1994) reviews the literature on cross-cultural training and communication skills, and, as we noted above, uses this work as an example of linking theory with practice. She devotes less attention to the research on conflict management strategies. That body of research is also an example of linking theory with practice and deals with third-party intervention strategies in a more direct way than the cross-cultural training research. Of course, these skills have broad applicability, allowing us to draw on a large research literature for relevance to OOTW missions. Conflict Management Training Training in conflict management skills is recognized as an important part of preparation for peacekeeping and other OOTW missions. Despite the absence of these skills that we noted in many of the training programs worldwide, there is a noticeable trend toward incorporating units on negotiation and mediation in courses at the United Nations and at various military colleges and training facilities in the United States and Canada.4 One of the more systematic approaches to the training of negotiation skills is the course designed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Its training strategy covers four aspects of negotiation: its aim, the principles of negotiation, the elements of negotiation, and negotiation phases (including preparations, negotiation proper, closing, and reports and follow-up). Using a mix of lectures and role-playing exercises, the trainers provide advice about how to negotiate, and the trainees experience the process and the impact of their moves on that process. The advice given is to proceed in steps. With regard to the negotiation proper: start with tension-reducing gestures, understand all parties' limits of concession, narrow down differences, use persuasive skills, be correct and impartial, and request renewed negotiation. Although such training is useful, it does not link the training to distinctions among types of missions. Nor do the programs distinguish among the missions in terms of primary versus third-party roles or distributive versus integrative relationships. Making these distinctions would tailor training to the kinds of skills needed for particular missions. To further improve the training programs, we suggest the use of up-to-date material and progressive in-class simulations.

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--> First, we suggest that the classroom material presented to the soldier be brought up to date, so that it reflects the current state of knowledge in the field. The current material is quite dated, having a strong orientation to distributive and primary-party processes. Also, mediation and other third-party processes were at times confused with negotiation. Second, we suggest that in-class training be more extensive as well as varied and attempt to equip the soldier with a broad set of contact skills. The ideas here are quite basic: a soldier learns by doing, and the more varied the practice, the more flexible and effective the soldier will be (see also Druckman and Bjork, 1994:Ch. 3). We suggest a confidence-building approach to skills acquisition. For some specific examples, consider primary-party (negotiation) training. It should move from a simple arena to a more difficult one—for instance, from negotiations over a fixed sum to negotiations with integrative potential. There could be one-trial negotiations, followed by multiple trials. Initially, issues could be simple, followed by negotiations over more complex issues. Some issues could be on divisible items, others not. With such progressions, the negotiations can be moved from simple to more complicated arenas, giving the soldier not only negotiation experience but also experience in increasingly varied and difficult contexts. In terms of other relevant forms, the negotiation experiences could move: from low emotion issues to high emotion issues, from familiar (car purchase) to unfamiliar negotiations (Dutch auction), from no alternatives to the negotiation to both sides having alternatives, from no power difference to high power difference, from no constituencies to multiple constituencies, from one opponent to several opponents, and from an ethical to an unethical opponent. We suggest a similar approach for teaching the soldier third-party (mediation) skills. Initially, the soldier needs to be exposed to current knowledge on mediation and schooled as to when third-party versus primary-party approaches are required. Subsequently, the soldier should participate in increasingly varied and difficult third-party simulations. Specifically the simulations could move: from conflicts over one issue to conflicts over multiple issues, from conflicts with fixed outcome solutions to those with integrative solutions, from conflicts with two parties to those with multiple parties,

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--> from conflicts in which there are no alternatives to ones in which disputants have multiple alternatives, and from mediations requiring no strategies to those that do. The conflict management research that would be drawn on for this instruction is divided between studies that deal more with distributive issues or bargaining processes and those more relevant to integrative or problem-solving processes. These are distinct approaches to negotiation, one primarily tactical, the other problem solving. As such, they can be thought of as techniques used to train negotiators. In the following sections, we describe these approaches, summarize key studies, and note both strengths and weaknesses with each approach, including attempts made to evaluate them. Distributive Processes Recall that our scaling exercise produced two dimensions along which the 16 missions were categorized. One was the distributive/integrative dimension and the other was the primary/third-party dimension. Consider now the distributive end of the first dimension. The emphasis of this approach is on moving an opponent to one's own preferred position. To the extent that tactics can be scripted or consist of procedures that are easily learned, the approach is somewhat mechanistic and manipulative, focusing on what the soldier can do to move the other party toward his or her desired outcome. The bargaining literature (both popular and academic) is replete with descriptions of various tactics that are intended to be used to influence the other to accept one's terms in competitive situations. This approach is suited to missions in which adversarial parties are clearly defined, gains and losses to the parties can be calculated, the main goal is to achieve a settlement (rather than a longer-term resolution), and efforts are not made to turn over control (in the short term) to the disputing parties themselves. Examples are collective enforcement, preventive deployment, pacification, and antiterrorism. In addition to the combat skills needed for these missions, the soldier, in the role of primary or third party, is often faced with highly partisan disputes that require hard bargaining. The research literature suggests a number of bargaining tactics that can be used to encourage settlements of competitive disputes: Concede first on small issues, using this to make the case for later reciprocation by the other on larger issues (Fisher, 1964; Deutsch et al., 1971); By conceding less and infrequently early in the negotiation, a bargainer creates expectations for agreements on his or her terms (Druckman and Bonoma, 1976);

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--> Commit yourself to a position by presenting clear evidence that indicates you cannot offer any more concessions (Schelling, 1960); Persuade the opponent of rewards in making concessions, making it clear that the concession should not be viewed as compromising a commitment to a larger principle (Schelling, 1960); Increase the size of a demand after tabling a concession (Karrass, 1974); Take actions that prevent the other from losing face. Face loss often leads to rigid positions, even those that incur material losses (Brown, 1977); Propose a deadline to force action especially when the terms on the table are favorable (Carnevale and Lawler, 1986); Develop acceptable alternatives to negotiated agreements. They reduce a decision-making dilemma in the face of deadlines (Fisher and Ury, 1981); By shifting the talks to higher levels, the bargainer can relieve his or her reluctant adversary from taking responsibility for making the needed concessions (Druckman, 1986); and By avoiding the appearance of being tactical, the negotiator may avoid imputations of mistrust and antagonism (Snyder, 1974). Among its strengths, this approach is based on a large body of empirical research dating from Siegel and Fouraker's 1960 book on bargaining behavior. Their work provided a paradigm for experiments on the impacts of alternative concession-making strategies on outcomes. Important reviews of this literature are Walton and McKersie (1965), Kelley and Schenitzki (1972), Rubin and Brown (1975), Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), Hamner and Yukl (1977), and Pruitt (1981). A recent meta-analysis illustrates the cumulative nature of the studies and distinguishes among strong and weak influences on bargaining behavior (Druckman, 1994). Among the problems with the distributive approach are that it (a) assumes the "other" is receptive or responds in a passive manner to one's use of tactics, (b) says little about whether the other is playing a similar or different tactical game, (c) has little to say about continuing or repeated interactions among the parties or their relationships, (d) reduces opportunities for creative problem-solving by focusing only on the distributive issues, (e) ignores the deeper sources of conflict that may overshadow the interests at stake, and (f) may leave parties feeling that they fell short of their goals or leave them with the uncomfortable feeling that they were manipulated or manipulated the other party into accepting their positions. Furthermore, by encouraging intransigent posturing, this approach provides few incentives that would encourage the other to be flexible. Many of the self-help books and seminars approach negotiating from the viewpoint of the tactician bent on maximizing returns. Popular examples are the books written by C. Karrass (1974), G. Karrass (1985),

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--> Cohen (1980), and Nierenberg (1968). These books are used often as texts in seminars conducted by the authors. One well-known seminar titled "Negotiate to Win" highlights strategies for getting the best deal in competitive situations (Cooper Management Institute, 1993). Using role-playing exercises, the trainer provides opportunities for seminar members to experience the "seven commandments of good negotiating": trade every concession, start high, make smaller concessions especially at the end, "krunch" early and often (with examples of how to do this),5 be patient, nibble at the end, and look for creative concessions to trade. When these well-known tactics are taught, trainees are alerted to the importance of face-saving and the need to create a positive atmosphere through the use of "soft'' language. Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to evaluate effects of the training on negotiating performance over time. Nor are the trainers favorably disposed toward such evaluations—when asked about evaluations, trainers often remark that their success is indicated in the marketplace, where subscribers "vote" and profits result. Little thought goes into whether the training improves performance. Considerable attention is given to ways of marketing the seminars to attract new customers. Although accepting the distributive bargaining approach, these trainers largely ignore the insights from the research studies cited above. Integrative Processes The emphasis of this approach to training is on a search for high joint-payoff solutions that endure. Bargaining is eschewed in favor of creative problem solving. A premium is placed on establishing a cooperative atmosphere, on acknowledging the other's plight or the reasons he or she takes particular positions, and on diagnosing the sources of conflict, rather than executing tactics to win. Some of the features of this approach involve the way roles are defined and the kinds of behavior that is enacted: The approach is less concerned with settlements than with enduring resolutions and improved relationships. While searching for sources of conflict, the parties also identify factors that aggravate the conflict or contribute to tensions among themselves. While emphasizing process activities, the approach recognizes the importance of a thorough understanding of the substantive issues at stake. This approach contrasts to the distributive bargaining approach in several ways: (a) it focuses on conflicts that result primarily from misunderstandings and stereotyped perceptions rather than interests, (b) it seeks to create relationships based, at least to some extent, on interdependence, (c) it

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--> that soldiers participate in increasingly complex role-playing negotiations, that the in-class training equip soldiers with a broad set of contact skills, and that soldiers be trained to deal with cultural differences. To these suggestions we add some additional ones, drawn from the chapter on developing leaders. That chapter emphasized that three factors—training, development, and facilitating conditions—jointly determine the amount of leadership improvement. Those three factors also determine a soldier's OOTW competence. Operating under this assumption, we suggest that OOTW training programs should have a content that is clear and meaningful and that builds on the soldier's prior knowledge. The training methods should take into account the trainee's/soldier's current skill level and motivation. And trainees/soldiers should receive relevant feedback, from a variety of available sources, that is accurate, timely, and constructive. Just as useful as training programs are developmental activities, because effective behavior is most often learned from new experiences coupled with feedback engaged within them. As noted in Chapter 4, developmental techniques include (1) special developmental assignments, (2) job rotation, (3) mentoring, (4) after-action reviews, (5) multirater feedback workshops, (6) developmental assessment centers, and (7) action learning. Although some of these techniques will perhaps not be applicable to OOTW skills development, we suggest that they all be considered for implementation. Finally, competence in OOTW missions, like that of leadership, is based to a large extent on organizational conditions. Such conditions include support for skill development from top leaders, reward systems that encourage the skill development, and cultural values that support learning and development. We encourage readers, including Army officials, to consider the specific aspects of these conditions (which are delineated in Chapter 4) and to extrapolate these from leadership to OOTW skills development. Unit performance may, however, depend on more than the skills of its members. Team training is also likely to contribute to effectiveness. Such factors as teamwork and coordination, shared mental models, and related forms of team information processing, promotive interactions, and shared identities have been shown to influence performance on group tasks. (See Druckman and Bjork, 1994:Ch. 6 and 7, for a review of the studies.) They may also enable units to move easily from one type of mission to another. A research challenge is to ascertain the extent to which individual versus unit-level skills contribute to effectiveness. An applied challenge is to develop training procedures that contain the desired mix of individual and team-training exercises.

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--> Evaluation Effective training in contact skills should prepare soldiers to deal with the challenges posed by operations other than war. The extent to which it also contributes to successful missions, however, is not quite so clear. Meaningful performance measures may be difficult to construct, making the committee's suggestions on this point rather problematic in this context. In this section, we discuss problems of evaluation with regard to both the individual soldier and the overall mission. Effectiveness of Training The value of predeparture training turns on an answer to the question: Has the training prepared soldiers to deal effectively with the challenges posed by the missions? This question is rarely addressed in discussions of training or preparation; for example, Fetherston (1994) devotes only two pages to these issues; many of the evaluations to date consist of ratings of the course materials and presentations rather than assessments of the skills learned and used. This may be due to the small number of programs initiated to date to train soldiers in contact skills. It may also reflect, however, an early stage in thinking about the tasks and challenges of operations other than war. Before considering evaluation issues, it is necessary to understand the challenges posed by different missions, the skills needed to meet these challenges, and the training needed to acquire and maintain these skills. Evaluation issues will receive more attention as we develop an increased understanding of the missions. The Canadian survey discussed above addresses the issue of mission challenges. By asking soldiers how often they perform various activities, we can identify the key challenges posed by the mission. Missing, however, from the surveys are questions about the skills needed to perform these tasks. By asking soldiers what was needed in order to perform the tasks, we can identify the key skills corresponding to the mission's challenges (the question of whether the soldiers themselves can accurately identify such skills remains). The idea of matching skills to challenges is the basis for the benchmark approach to leadership development pioneered by the Center for Creative Leadership (McCauley and Hughs-James, 1994; McCauley et al., 1989). Examples of job challenges for executives are unfamiliar responsibilities, developing new directions, high stakes, and influencing without authority. Examples of some corresponding skills are comfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and acting with flexibility; finding alternatives to solving problems, persevering under adverse conditions, and negotiation with external parties; decisiveness, straightforwardness, composure, and acting with flexibility; and persevering under adverse conditions, getting cooperation,

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--> and building and mending relationships. These are also challenges and skills likely to be found in many OOTW missions. We add to this list the skills of gathering and processing information as well as using feedback to perform situation analyses, managing impressions or posturing for tactical maneuvering, and timing of moves for implementing tactics. By highlighting the match between challenges and skills, this approach provides information that addresses the question: What should soldiers be trained to perform? Another question is how to go about providing the needed training or preparation. With regard to conflict management skills, some guidance is provided by the research completed to date. Trainers can import into their programs research-based knowledge about the conditions and strategies that lead to settlements or resolutions. For example, the research findings discussed above in the section on distributive processes indicate that certain factors influence the extent to which bargainers are likely to be intransigent or flexible in seeking compromise agreements. These factors include the way disputants prepare for bargaining, their orientation toward the interaction, the other's pattern of making concessions, whether there are time pressures, whether the bargainers' interactions are observed by others, and whether their positions are linked to broader values or ideologies. Bargainers are more likely to seek compromise agreements when they do not perform before an audience that creates face-saving pressures, when there are time limits for reaching agreements, when they study the issues prior to bargaining over a large number of issues, and when they are faced with an opponent who conveys a genuinely cooperative attitude toward the interactions. (For a review of these and other findings, see Druckman, 1994.) These are examples of aspects of a situation that can be arranged as part of a tactical approach to negotiating beneficial agreements. Similarly, recent studies have identified some conditions that contribute to integrative agreements. In our earlier discussion of this approach, we reviewed the findings obtained by Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) and by Kressel and his associates (1994) on the attitudes and procedures that can produce beneficial and durable outcomes. Deutsch and Brickman's (1994) list of skills needed for effective third-party conflict resolution is also relevant. It includes (1) establishing an effective working relationship with the disputants, (2) establishing a cooperative problem-solving attitude, (3) developing a creative group process and group decision making, and (4) acquiring relevant substantive knowledge about the problems. More specifically, the intervening party needs to learn how to obtain and use feedback in competitive situations. Although this approach is promising, more research is needed to discover how best to acquire and maintain the relevant skills over time and in different conflict situations. Soldiers can learn the necessary attitudes and procedures: showing a

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--> high concern for the other's outcomes as well as one's own, engaging in information exchange about priorities and needs, and learning how to obtain and use feedback. These skills can also be practiced in simulation exercises that allow the trainee to apply and adapt them to novel situations. Although research on the elicitive approach has identified skills needed in the facilitator role, there has been little research to date on the effects of these behaviors on conflict-resolving processes or outcomes. The sensitivity to cultural perspectives emphasized by this approach is likely to be relevant to a variety of operations other than wars, and, for this reason, research on impacts is needed. Nevertheless, whether these skills are relevant to most or only some types of missions remains to be determined. This is also a question to be addressed for the skills associated with the other approaches discussed above. (Trainers would benefit from the large amount of research on individual skill acquisition and transfer; for a review, see the committee's earlier volumes, especially Druckman and Bjork, 1991:Ch. 3, and Druckman and Bjork, 1994:Ch. 3). Confounding the Training-Effectiveness Nexus Although appropriate training may be an essential component of preparing individual soldiers for an operation other than war, there are some questions as to the impact that this training will have on mission effectiveness vis-à-vis other factors. There is a tendency among peacekeeping veterans and other military personnel to attribute primary or exclusive importance to the operational components of the force in identifying key factors in mission success (Erskine, 1989; Jonah, 1991; Pelcovits, 1991; Murray, 1983). This may largely be the product of a narrow orientation toward the components of an operation over which the military has some control rather than a broader perspective on the contextual factors faced by the operation. It is also a function of whether one defines success at the micro level (the effective performance of certain specific military duties) or whether macro-level concerns are paramount (Was the mission as a whole successful?). There is some evidence that individual soldier behavior and the organizational performance of a traditional peacekeeping force are not decisive in the overall effectiveness of the mission, at least in the absence of clear incompetence or serious operational mistakes (although the efficiency of the operation may be substantially influenced) (Diehl, 1994). Nevertheless, the neutrality of a military force may be critical in the success of those missions that require a more integrative approach to conflict resolution. Neutrality is the centerpiece of much of traditional peacekeeping theory (Urquhart, 1990; Nelson, 1984-1985), and often violations of that principle are associated with problems in the execution of operations (Diehl, 1994). Of course, training can be an essential component of ensuring that the

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--> behavior of individual soldiers or units does not violate principles of engagement (such as those involving neutrality or self-defense). There is some disagreement about the relative importance of training versus actual experience in fostering the desired attitudes and behaviors of soldiers (Moskos, 1976; Grove and Torbiorn, 1985). Yet, even if training is less effective, there is still a void that training can partly fill at the outset of an operation, before some of the military personnel have sufficient experience. Nevertheless, some operations other than war will not even require neutrality, and traditional military training or experience may be sufficient (for example, the coercive missions in the taxonomy). Other factors will limit mission effectiveness even under the best of training scenarios. Operations other than war will be affected by some contextual constraints imposed on the mission. First is the geographic context for deployment. The different missions will vary among themselves (and in some cases among specific deployments of the same mission) according to whether they separate hostile parties at an adequate distance (Mackinlay, 1990), whether the troops can monitor the situation properly and detect violations of established standards or agreements (Diehl, 1994), and whether the troops themselves are relatively invulnerable to attack from hostile elements (Diehl, 1994). The Army may have limited control over the geographic context of its operations. Second, some types of missions will be more difficult to manage than others because of the situation the troops face. The Army would seem to have the most difficulty when there is considerable violence in the area of deployment, compared with situations following a cease-fire (or, ideally, deployment following a peace agreement among hostile parties or in the absence of any prior hostilities). Of course, problems in the area of deployment may be exacerbated by the presence of "accelerators" (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994) such as economic crises, elite fragmentation, and the like. These conditions are those largely out of the control of the military force. Third, beyond the level of violence, the type of conflict present may affect the effectiveness of the mission. Historically, peacekeeping missions, of both the traditional and the post-cold war varieties, have had fewer problems in interstate conflicts than civil ones. Civil conflicts create some inherent difficulties for intervenors, including unfavorable geographic configurations for deployment, a multiplicity of actors, often with irreconcilable preferences, and incentives for some groups to disrupt the operation (Diehl, 1995; Weiss, 1994; Stedman, 1995; James, 1994). Finally, the U.S. Army may find itself involved in operations that include forces of many other states, and U.S. forces may not be solely under the command of U.S. officers. To the extent that other troops' behavior influences the mission's

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--> success and command is exercised according to different rules, norms, and protocols, the impact of U.S. military training on outcomes will be mitigated. Whenever mediation and conflict resolution are a part of training, it must be remembered that such a process is interactive and therefore one must always take into account the other parties involved in the process. Another factor, beyond the contextual ones noted above, that is an intervening variable between training and mission effectiveness is the behavior of other parties in the situation. We noted above that failure to consider this factor was a shortcoming in many distributive bargaining approaches. A key element is the level of host state consent involved in the mission (U.S. Department of the Army, 1994). Whether the host state is supportive (and this assumes that a stable host state even exists) can make the job of the military easier in all of its mission tasks. A related concern is the behavior of third-party states (major powers or neighboring states) who have an interest in the situation; these states may aid or more influentially undermine the operation by direct action or the provision of threats and rewards to those actors that the military mission is trying to influence (Urquhart, 1983; James, 1990; Diehl, 1994); implicitly or explicitly this adds to the number and preference ordering combinations present in the conflict resolution process, thereby complicating the military's effectiveness. Of particular concern to the military is the possible presence of groups or individuals whose interests may be disadvantaged by the operation; it is often these groups and individuals with whom officers and soldiers will come in contact and will need to apply conflict resolution skills. When the self-interests of these groups or individuals comport well with the mission tasks, the operation is likely to be smooth. But to the extent that interests clash with tasks and large numbers of individuals or powerful groups are involved, the effectiveness of the mission will be in jeopardy and even the best-trained and most well-informed mediators will encounter difficulties. In Bosnia, UN personnel often found it difficult to negotiate safe passage of humanitarian shipments, in part, because of Serbian interest in inhibiting aid to (and indeed attacking) Muslim-populated areas. Finally, the timing of interventions is often a key element affecting the success of a mission (Fisher, 1990; Kriesberg, 1991; Touval and Zartman, 1985). Unfortunately the military may have little control over when it is deployed in a given area. Too often the deployment occurs after the situation has reached a crisis stage (e.g., a riot has not abated after several days, a war has broken out, significant numbers of refugees have died). It may be too late to have an optimal impact on the problem, and correspondingly there may be inherent limits on how effective the military operation can be.

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--> Evaluating Overall Mission Effectiveness As difficult as it may be to evaluate the effectiveness of international training programs on soldier behavior, the problems mount when one attempts to extend evaluation to the mission as a whole. Not only is it the case, as noted above, that a multiplicity of factors influence mission effectiveness, but also defining exactly what constitutes effectiveness is often unclear for operations other than war. In studies of peacekeeping missions, analysts and United Nations officials have tended to either ignore a global assessment of mission effectiveness or rely on unspecified face validity criteria (for a general treatment of evaluation problems vis-à-vis the United Nations, see Stiles and MacDonald, 1992). Yet even moving to a more systematic evaluation scheme does not solve all the problems. An obvious standard for evaluation of success at the macro level would be the extent to which the purpose of the mission, as evidenced in the mandate, was fulfilled (James, 1969; Lefever, 1967). Nevertheless, mandates are often political documents developed in the United Nations or other bodies that are meant to convey broad purposes while maximizing the level of political support behind them. Accordingly, mandates can be vague (Fetherston, 1994), and there is considerable room for disagreement on how purposes are defined and how best to operationalize them; indeed, such ambiguity may be the price of approval in a multilateral coalition. Some operations, such as the multinational force in Beirut, actually had varying mandates across the coalition partners. Finally, a clear mandate is often cited as a factor in the overall success of a peacekeeping mission (Weinberger, 1983; Mackinlay, 1990), thereby begging the question somewhat if mandate fulfillment is used as a standard of success. A second approach is to consider the specific accomplishments of the operation; these might include the number of people fed, cease-fires achieved, and so on. This type of evaluation allows an analyst to look at tangible items but still leaves open the question about what standard to compare or evaluate the operation against. Did the operation succeed if it accomplished only a few tasks? Obviously, success in this mode is relative and one must specify the basis for comparison. One standard might be comparing the operation's accomplishments to the situation that would have been present in the absence of the operation or that would be the result of traditional military or diplomatic initiatives (Johansen, 1994). Yet there are several flaws in this use of ''counterfactuals" (Fearon, 1991).9 It is most clearly useful when one can point to starving children or damage wreaked by natural disasters. Yet evaluating operations other than war in this way leads one to adopt a "better than nothing" standard that will almost always yield a positive assessment (e.g., Yoder, 1994). Furthermore, we do not know for sure what the absence of military intervention might mean for a given situation.

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--> The lack of U.S. or multilateral action may not mean that the status quo is perpetuated, but rather that local actors will manage to work out the difficulties that they face; indeed, there is some suggestion that humanitarian assistance missions, for example, may prolong some conflicts (DeMars, 1995). Evaluating operations against traditional military or diplomatic actions also calls for significant speculation that is hostage to assumptions and scenario constructions; variations on those assumptions and scenarios may yield dramatically different conclusions, and there is often no way to validate such assessments empirically. A third standard for evaluation is to consider the impact that operations have on the local people affected by the operation (Johansen, 1994); this may be defined as creating a capacity for the host population to help itself (Pelcovits, 1991). One indicator of this might be the level of popularity enjoyed by the force among the local population (Skogmo, 1989; Nelson, 1991). This approach, however, suffers from the same counterfactual standards noted above and ignores the broader impact that the mission may have on aggregate political processes, which themselves have more of an impact in the short and long run on local people's lives. Other criteria for success focus not so much on what has been accomplished but rather on the manner in which it has been achieved. In these instances, goals specific to the organization carrying out the mission may be valued above those relating to the conflict itself or the local population. Thus, a premium may be put on the efficiency of the operation (Harrell and Howe, 1995; Kemp, 1991), defined in terms of low cost and short deployment times, or on the maintenance of neutrality or impartiality in the conduct of the mission (Berdal, 1995). Success might even be defined in terms of the ability of the OOTW force to avoid casualties, a goal and indicator of success that was used for U.S. troops in Somalia. Although all these criteria may be considered desirable for the organization itself, they may be largely unrelated (or even counterproductive) to the achievement of the mission's purposes or the goals set by the United States government or United Nations for the mission. Based on these limitations, one might be tempted to consider some overall assessment of the mission performance. For traditional peacekeeping operations, Diehl (1994; see also Wiseman, 1991; Skjelsbaek, 1991) argues that all operations should be judged on their ability to deter or prevent violent conflict in the area of deployment. First, we note that this does generally apply to operations other than war deployed in areas with little prospect of armed conflict (i.e., some domestic missions and disaster relief). Second, measuring the operation on the intended outcome places most of the responsibility for success or failure on that military mission. This may not be reasonable, in that we know that even the best-trained personnel cannot be held responsible for armed conflict between belligerents.

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--> To place that burden on the military operation is probably unreasonable and may obscure positive benefits provided by the operation (Johansen, 1994). Another possible standard, and one consistent with our emphasis on conflict resolution, is the ability of the operation to facilitate the resolution of disagreements among the local actors (Diehl, 1994; Moskos, 1976). This is often referred to as a "positive peace" standard (Fetherston, 1994), rather than merely the absence of armed conflict. At the macro level, this cannot be done solely or even directly by military personnel but is under the purview of diplomatic forces. Generally the military operation can provide only the environment under which this resolution can occur. This standard is open to the same critiques as above, namely, that the military operation cannot be held responsible for the failure to achieve a lasting peace; too many other intervening factors are at work. Indeed, there is some question whether macro conflict resolution is even an appropriate criterion on which to assess these operations. Only a few of the operations other than war have as their goal imposing a solution on the problems at hand, and even then the duration of such settlements is uncertain and may not be long enough to be considered true examples of conflict resolution. Conclusions The committee draws the following key conclusions from its discussion of the Army's changing missions and conflict management: Traditional peacekeeping is only one of several types of missions that characterize operations other than war. Sixteen types of OOTW missions can be grouped into two dimensions, one reflecting the distinction between primary and third-party roles, the other distinguishing between distributive and integrative processes. Skills needed for particular missions vary along these dimensions. These skills reflect different mixes of combat and contact skills. Currently, training programs devote a small amount of time to the development of contact skills (for example, cross-cultural communication, negotiation, and mediation activities). We suggest that a larger proportion of the training package focus on these skills. Guidance for training approaches is provided by the literatures on interpersonal and intercultural skills training as well as research on approaches to conflict management. Preparation for operations other than war should include dealing with culture shock, interacting with civilians, dealing with people who have different perceptions of the conflict, and dealing with different social structures. A challenge for trainers is the diversity of missions to which soldiers may be assigned. Research is needed on the transfer of skills from one to

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--> another mission and on skill incompatibility. The implications of the choice between training specialists to be sent on specific missions and training generalists who must then adapt to new challenges, sometimes very quickly, need to be investigated. The costs and benefits of the alternative approaches should also be determined. Research is needed to evaluate the extent to which the training of individuals or small groups (compared with other factors) contributes to the overall effectiveness of missions. Research is also needed to ascertain the conditions for effective collaboration in multilateral and joint-service missions. The conditions may vary with the type of mission, the extent of mutual interdependence among the collaborating parties, and the authority structure. Notes 1   Examples of keywords are cross-cultural communication, conflict resolution or management, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, civil affairs, coordination with agencies, language and cultural training, media relations, and the social aspects of operations. It should also be noted that a number of skills do not fit into either the combat or contact categories, for example, personal hygiene, stress awareness, and fact-oriented historical briefings. 2   The U.S. Institute of Peace emphasizes three skills in their training programs, two of which are contact skills—an international conflict resolution skills training seminar and training in multiparty mediation skills. 3   Fetherston (1994) distinguishes between situational exercises and simulations. Preferring simulations, she notes that situation exercises typically do not allow for unexpected events that require the sorts of adaptations that are experienced in actual missions (see also Stewman, 1995). Without surprises, it is less likely that trainees will develop the flexibility they need to deal with a variety of unknown situations. (See Druckman and Bjork, 1994:Ch. 3, for a discussion of the issue of fidelity between simulated and work situations.) 4   Prominent examples are the United Nations Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center in Nova Scotia. 5   "Krunching" refers to statements made in order to encourage the other to reexamine or change his or her positions. Examples are "Where do we go from here?," "Is there any flexibility on that?," "Can we talk?," and "What more could you do for us on this?'' 6   We note, however, that in many actual circumstances, settlements are a more realistic goal and may in fact be desired. For example, attempts to negotiate a cease-fire are aimed at an end to the fighting. 7   One way to do this is through role-playing exercises. A peacekeeper could react to a delegated opponent instructed to perceive and act like the other side. This procedure was used by the U.S. delegation between rounds of talks during the 1970s over mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe (see Druckman and Hopmann, 1989). A similar procedure is the contrasting-culture adherent pioneered by Danielian (1967). A trainee preparing for overseas service is confronted by a staged contrasting-culture adherent whose script consists of making explicit and challenging the underlying assumptions that characterize the rhetoric of the trainee. 8   Thanks go to Major David Last of the Canadian Army for suggesting these questions. 9   By counterfactuals, we refer to claims about events that did not actually occur. With regard to peacekeeping operations, an example of a counterfactual is the statement that if the operation did not occur, then widespread famine would have resulted.

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