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10
Institutional Influences on the
Glen Canyon Environmental Studies
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF GCES
Institutional frameworks influence the quality, quantity, efficiency, and
cost of scientific activities. Research almost always reflects the nonscientific
influences of aciministration, politics, bureaucracies, and, of course, funcling.
The Glen Canyon Environmental Studies (GCES) were strongly affected by
the institutional environment within which they developed and operated. The
purpose of this chapter is to explore the connection between institutional
arrangements and the scientific research conducted in GCES. Factors to be
considered include the structure of GCES itself, interagency conflicts and
goal substitution, external oversight, and the funding and timing of research.
The chapter concludes with some generalizations about GCES that might be
useful lessons for other similar government research initiatives.
The internal structure of GCES changed as the organization gained
experience and grew (see Chapter 2~. In theory, its final configuration (after
1993) reflected atwo-part management teem administering multiple research
groups and contractors. The GCES program manager directed the basic
operations of GCES, including personnel and budget, and was the major
liaison between GCES and outside agencies. The program manager con-
ducted most of the organizational activities of GCES and coordinated the
agency's interaction with the public. The second member of the management
team was the senior scientist, who was responsible for direct oversight of the
scientific research, including planning and execution. The senior scientist's
most critical responsibility was the maintenance of scientific quality. The
National Research Council (NRC) review committee, after their review of
186
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
187
GCES Phase I (NRC, 1987), argued that division of the administrative duties
of GCES from the scientific duties would be advantageous. In practice, this
division of labor turned out to be imperfect because the program manager
had primary control over most aspects of the research, while the senior
scientist served more as an internal critic and organizer of the intellectual
effort. The senior scientist devoted 40 percent of his time to these re-
sponsibilities by mutual agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), but
experience showed that his responsibilities were more commensurate with a
full-time position.
GCES was administered by the BOR, an agency of the U.S. Department
of the Interior (Figures 10.1 and 10.2~. Within the BOR, GCES was underthe
Upper Colorado Regional Office in Salt Lake City, Utah. Although as a
scientific research unit, GCES was unique within the bureau, its institutional
position in the region was similar to that of regional operational units such as
planning, construction, and maintenance. In reporting to the regional cli-
rector, the administrator of GCES was forced to deal with a portion of the
BOR's hierarchy especially sensitive to local interests. As a result, the GCES
administrator competed for influence and control with local water and power
users who had long-established lines of communication with the office of the
regional director.
Decisions about GCES often took a strongly regional perspective. For
example, when contemplating scientific experimentation with releases from
Glen Canyon Dam, regional administrators naturally were most concerned
with the effects of operational changes on regional power marketing PAPA,
1990~. If decisions had been made at a higher level within the BOR, other
considerations of broader significance could have come into play more
strongly, such as the national significance of the Grand Canyon and the
importance of GCES as a prototype research effort that might be necessary
in other locations for other large dams operated by the bureau. Much to the
BOR's credit, after considerable debate, the regional administrators agreed
to forego some power revenues in order to conduct the experimental releases
that were part of GCES (Patten, 1991~.
GCES was part of just one of several regional offices. This arrangement
became a problem when the research interests of the BOR were different
from the research interests of other federal agencies within the Interior
Department. Because the conduct of scientific research begins with the
formulation of research issues or questions, the position of GCES determined
an early focus on issues primarily of interest to the BOR. Despite the fact that
other Interior agencies, particularly the National Park Service and the Fish and
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188
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
Secretary
of the
Interior
Commissioner,
Bureau of
Reclamation I Safety
Office
Regional
Director,
Upper Colorado
River Basin
Public |
Affairs I
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Office
Assistant
Regional
Director
Information
Resource
Division
l
Property
l
.
Design Planning
Construction
Assistant Assistant
Regional Regional
Dirt ctor Director
Contracts
L
Water
and Land
1
Personnel
Power
l
~ 1 1
Colorado River
Studies Office
Glen Canyon
Environmental
Studies
FIGURE 10.1 General organizational chart showing the bureaucratic position of GOES in the
BOR and Department of the Interior. SOURCE: Redrawn from data provided by D. Wegner,
Bureau of Reclamation.
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
Project
Manager
Senior
Scientist
Research
Advisory
Panel
Hydrology
and
Limnology
Economics
and
Sociology
Sediment
and
Beaches
189
Logistics
Geographic
Control
Database
Management
Geographic
Information
Systems
Aquatic
Studies
Endangered Cultural
Species Resources
Databases
Ecosystems
Archives
FIGURE 10.2 Organizational chart showing the general design of the GCES. SOURCE:
Redrawn from data provided by D. Wegner, Bureau of Reclamation.
Wildlife Service, were included in the research, their interests were initially
secondary. The original narrow focus changed over the life of GCES, with a
continual widening of research activities to more directly account for the
interests of other agencies (see Chapter 2~. A better arrangement would have
been to place GCES administratively in such a way that the research unit
could fully accommodate the needs of several agencies from the beginning
(NRC, 1987~. The placement of the research unit in the Interior Department
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190
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
such that it reported to an assistant secretary would likely have resulted in
better coordination of scientific research questions and a more rapid route to
consensus among the various agencies. Instead, the history of GCES is
marked with interagency conflicts that could have been minimized or avoided.
Placement of GCES above the regional level would also have broadened
the perspective of the project. GCES developed as an effort specifically
focused on Glen Canyon Dam and Grand Canyon. Researchers in other
areas, however, were simultaneously investigating similar problems on other
rivers. An exchange of information and ideas between these studies never
took place, even though in some cases the work was being conducted under
the direction of the BOR. Bureau-sponsored research on Trinity River below
Trinity Dam in Northern California, for example, included specific in-
vestigations of dam operations designed to move sediment through the
downstream system, and experimental flows were used in a test case very
similar to those of GCES (U.S. Senate, 1984; Kondolf and Wolman, 1993~.
Although the GCES project manager visited the Trinity River and held
conversations with workers there, no comparative studies or formal transfer
of results occurred. It also appears that BOR-sponsored research on the
Gunnison River was completely ignored by GCES investigators, even though
the work on the Gunnison included experimental releases intended to move
boulders in downstream rapids (Chase, 1992; Auble et al., 1991~. While the
Trinity and Gunnison rivers and their canyons are smaller landscape features
than Grand Canyon, the strong similarities in research questions and the use
of experimental flows argue for substantial interchange of information and
ideas.
INTERAGENCY CONFLICT IN THE EVOLUTION OF GCES
During the 13 years of GCES research, conflicts developed between the
BOR and the National Park Service (NPS), the Fish and Wildlife Service,
various state agencies, Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), and the
Colorado River Energy Distributors Association. Conflicts with NPS were
probably inevitable because of the overlapping jurisdictions of the Park
Service and the BOR (Johnson and Carothers, 1987~. During the early
phases of GCES, there was a notable lack of cooperation between the two
agencies (NRC, 1987~. During the later phases of GCES, cooperation
improved, although research activities appeared to be separate. For ex-
ample, the NPS sponsored extensive investigations of beach erosion pro
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
191
cesses, including collapse of beach faces, the erosive role of pore pressure
from ground water within the beaches, and the general adjustments by
beeches to changes in stream flow (Cluer, 1991~. Meanwhile, research by the
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) emphasized sand transport and storage at a
larger scale, as well as depositional processes that created beaches and
affected archeological sites (Hereford et al., 1991~. The draft final reports of
all these activities do not show any significant integration of the research
activities, almost as though each agency pursued its own activities without
reference to the other.
Institutional barriers between the NPS and the BOR and other agencies
may also have been responsible for awkward funding arrangements for
individual researchers. Because the BOR contracted much of GCES research
to other agencies, the most important investigators often were not BOR
employees or independent contractors. Much of the archeological research,
for example, was conducted by NPS employees. Rather, they owed their
institutional allegianceto anotheragency: a most important general ecologist
was an NPS employee, a most critical native fish specialist was an Arizona
Department of Game and Fish (ADGF) employee, and the primary sediment
transport experts were USGS employees. In all of these cases the re-
searchers had primary responsibilities to their home agencies ratherthan the
BOR, so when funding or scheduling conflicts arose, the bureau's position
was secondary. The result was instability for GCES because important
reports were delayed, and their results could not be used for midcourse
corrections or further planning for other related projects.
Significant conflict developed between GCES and the Fish and Wildlife
Service during the last phases of the research. This conflict focused on
endangered native fish species and demonstrated the problems inherent in
positioning the primary research organization low in the organizational
hierarchy of the Interior Department. GCES was charged with investigating
the effects of Glen Canyon Dam operations on native fishes, particularly the
humpback chub. Through several years early in GCES, the BOR's con-
tractors collected data about the fishes and began formulating conclusions
(e.g., Kubly, 1990~. When the Secretary of Interior decided that an en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS) was to be written concerning the dam's
operations, the GCES data and conclusions were an obvious source of
scientific information. The Endangered Species Act, however, required that
the Fish and Wildlife Service provide an opinion concerning endangered
species in the canyon (Behnke and Benson, 1980~. The Fish and Wildlife
Service then undertook an expensive research effort, funded through the
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River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
GCES budget, in order to develop its own conclusions.
Later, when the BOR endorsed a preferred alternative for operating the
dam as part of the EIS, it relied on the conclusions of the GCES. The Fish
and Wildlife Service, relying on its own research, settled on a different set of
operating rules. The result was that two agencies in the Interior Department
took different positions on how best to protect the endangered fish, and both
positions were based on research funded through GCES. By late 1993 the
issue was settled by an arrangement whereby the Fish and Wildlife Service
agreed to support the BOR's position in return for a guarantee of continued
funding to the NPS for investigations of the endangered-fish population. The
entire effort would have been more effective if the institutional arrangements
for the research had been centralized within the Department of Interior
(perhaps in such an agency as the National Biological Survey), so that the
research could have beenfocused, noncluplicative, and productive of a single
defensible conclusion. Differences of opinion and interpretation in research
efforts are inevitable and generally healthy, but their early resolution saves
time and money.
Earlier in GCES, another conflict had developed around research on the
effects of dam operations on fishes. The trout fishery immediately down-
stream from the dam was viewed by the state of Arizona as an important
recreational benefitofthestructure (Moues, 1980), and research bytheADGF
had been funded by both the state and to a lesser degree by the bureau
through GCES. ADGF had developed considerable scientific expertise re-
garding the trout and game species in Lake Powell, but when the Secretary
of Interior directed the BOR to write an EIS for the dam operations, the bureau
initially refused to include the state agencies as cooperators in the effort. At
a symposium held in Santa Fe in 1990 on the state of knowledge for the
Grand Canyon environment, the NRC committee was especially critical of the
BOR's exclusive policy regarding cooperators on the environmental impact
statement. Eventually, the bureau included as cooperators all the interested
parties in an effort to build a consensus for a preferred alternative.
During the subsequent 3 years, in an attempt to broaden its base of
support, the BOR gradually expanded its group of cooperators, and the state
wildlife agencies were included. Eventually, the BOR completely reversed its
exclusionary position and invited a wide range of interests to become
cooperators, many of whom had direct interests in the scientific research in
the canyon. This expansive policy was successful in improving the exchange
of information and aided in the process of building a consensus position for
a preferred alternative for operating Glen Canyon Dam. The expanded range
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
193
of interests also impacted the research structure of GCES by broadening the
range of questions that were asked. Native American concerns and interest
in non-use values expressed by representatives in the discussions, for
example, resulted in new research questions that became part of the ex-
panded GCES agenda.
The WAPA, as the federal agency marketing hydroelectric power from
Glen Canyon Dam, and the BOR, as the agency using hydroelectric power
revenues from the dam to repay costs, have had a direct interest in scientific
research in the canyon because the conduct and outcomes of the research
might affect future dam operations PAPA, 1990~. The Colorado River Energy
Distributors Association (CREDA) represents the interests of electrical con-
sumers of a significant portion of the power generated by Glen Canyon Dam.
Most of CREDA's members are rural electrical cooperatives and small towns;
these consumers are highly sensitive to changes in electric rates. Hy-
droelectric marketers and consumers therefore were direct players in the
administration of science in the canyon throughout the history of GCES.
Initially, the hydroelectric interests wanted the research to be concluded as
quickly as possible so that the dam could be operated to its maximum
potential for electric power production (Barrett, 1992~. Their position, simply
stated, was that the scientific research was prohibitively expensive. They
consistently made this position known to the regional director of the BOR,
who oversaw the GCES, and they were always present to state their position
at public meetings of the researchers and even at meetings of the NRC
committee. Initially, their position was that a delay in implementing new
operating rules for the dam was costly in terms of foregone power revenues.
Despite the problems inherent in the interaction between the NRC committee
and the GCES while research was on-going, the continuous involvement of
the committee as an external, unbiased review body resulted in an improved
research effort and a more fruitful expenditure of public resources. To have
waited until the completion of the research and then offer committee
guidance would have diminished the potential contribution of the NRC.
By 1990 two points had become clear: first, GCES research in the
canyon would not be completed quickly, and, second, researchers were
beginning to make the case that the dam should be operated for a time in an
experimental mode that might further restrict operations for power pro-
duction. At the 1990 meeting of researchers and administrators in Santa Fe
and in subsequent statements, WAPA and especially CREDA began to state
support publicly for scientific research in the canyon. The hydroelectric
power interests obviously wanted to see reasonable answers to their ques
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River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
tions about the effects of dam operations as a way of preventing further, long-
term delays on normal operations. Short-term costs appeared to be a rea-
sonable investment in a more stable and predictable future unencumbered by
additional research.
WAPA and CREDA's members were naturally opposed to adjusting dam
operations for research purposes, even in the short term, because
researchers wanted flows that reduced the value of Glen Canyon Dam
electrical output. Through a year-long series of negotiations by GCES
managers, the regional BOR office, and WAPA, a plan for research flows was
agreed on. WAPA, in discussions with the NRC committee, suggested that
costs in terms of lost power revenue would exceed $30 million. Estimates
varied from time to time, but the WAPA model (\/\/APA, 1989) was not
especially accurate (Hughes, 1991; see Chapter 9~. Conversations between
BOR representatives and the NRC committee after the flows were complete
suggested the actual foregone revenue was much less (about $3 million).
During the period of research flows, CREDA raised their electrical rates by
almost 40 percent and declared that a significant portion of the increase was
caused by scientific research in the canyon (Barrett, 1992~. The NRC
committee concluded that the increased costs resulted from two other
sources more important than GCES: low runoff, which resulted in reduced
power production from the dam irrespective of the research flows (ne-
cessitating the purchase of more expensive replacement power), and
adjustments in rates to reflect generally increasing costs that would have
occurred in any event.
The lesson to be learned from the conflicts between GCES and the
hydroelectric power interests is that not only is science expensive, but its
costs can impinge on the interests of particular groups rather than a general
unidentified population. In attempting to satisfy hydropower users, scientific
researchers found it necessary to modify their plans in order to reach a
compromise between what was scientifically optimal and what was politically
acceptable.
GOAL SUBSTITUTION BY AGENCIES WORKING FOR GCES
Interagency conflict was not always obvious and direct during the
conduct of GCES. Some agencies worked on the scientific research in the
Grand Canyon as contractors for the BOR and GCES. GCES administrators
assumed that the contractors would adopt GCES goals, but in some cases
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
195
the NRC committee found that contracting agencies in fact were more
interested in pursuing their own goals by using GCES funds as a means of
support. The contracting arrangements therefore had a strong influence on
the scientific products that ultimately resulted (see Chapter 2~.
For example, the USGS sought to pursue its own research and mon-
itoring interests through GCES. Stream gauges in the canyon might logically
be operated as part of the national network of stream gauges on the nation's
most important rivers, receiving funding from a national appropriation to the
USGS for such efforts. In order to obtain critical gauge data, however, the
GCES budget shouldered the cost for maintaining gauges on the Colorado
River in the Grand Canyon. Thus, instead of GCES simply supporting ad-
ditional needed research on using and interpreting the data, it paid for the
initial collection. In some cases the USGS had research interests in or near
the canyon, and particular researchers desired support for special projects
theywanted funded. Unable to support research into historical photographic
sites, extended investigations into debris flow processes, exploratory flow
moclels, and some tributary studies, the USGS sought funding for these from
GCES. These topics were potentially of interest to GCES but in some cases
did not have high priority. Instead of working directly with GCES to develop
a coordinated series of projects specifically targeted to BOR's needs, the
USGS proposed unrelated projects reflecting its own interests. Eventually,
GCES declined to fund some proposed projects or funded others only briefly,
but the end result was a poorly integrated research effort in the earth and
water science areas.
Agency ties to GCES were not wholly disadvantageous. In the final
analysis, some of the best science in the GCES program was that derived
from the work of the USGS, but the relationship of GCES to USGS was an
uneasy one.
An example of successful communication between agencies also involves
the USGS. After the first phase of GCES, it became apparent that BOR's
models of the dynamics of sediment in the canyon failed to describe
observed conditions and that they were not useful for predictive purposes
(NRC, 1987; see Chapter 5~. After discussions with GCES personnel, USGS
researchers established specific projects that would show how much
sediment was moving through the system, how it was deposited in pools
along the canyon, and how it was moved to beaches during high flows
(Schmidt and Graf, 1990~. Using observations of actual processes in the river
rather than abstract modeling, the USGS effort not only successfully
contributed to basic scientific knowledge about river processes but also
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River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
contributed useful applied knowledge that the BOR later used in considering
options for dam operations (BOR, 1993~. It was an example of science at its
best because the goals of the funding agency (the BOR) and the research
group (the USGS) were similar and had been agreed on prior to the research.
Goal substitution also occurred within the BOR when the need for an EIS
was announced. As the best source of information about the Glen Canyon
Dam and the Colorado River, GCES managers and researchers immediately
became involved in the preparation of the EIS. GCES administrators began
to manage research that supported the needs of the EIS, particularly as
related to cultural and archeological resources. A great deal of GCES in-
tellectual effort went into debating the appropriate flow option that would be
designated as the preferred alternative in the EIS.
As a result of these institutional arrangements, the goals of the BOR's EIS
supplanted the goals of GCES, and the conduct of science was diverted from
the long-term perspectives of GCES to the short-term perspectives of the EIS.
Consistent preoccupation with short-term goals to the detriment of useful
long-term research has been common in BOR research (Leopold, 1991~. One
casualty of the emphasis on the short term may have been the long-term
monitoring plan (Patten, 1993), which was originally conceived as a precise
product of GCES research. With the advent of the EIS, however, the long-
term monitoring plan became part of the EIS. The plan was highly general
rather than specific (NRC, 1994~.
One outcome of the fragmented GCES research spread throughout
several agencies was a remarkable lack of integration of results. Because
contracting agencies partlyfollowecl their own agendas and sometimes their
own time tables (private contractors were more responsive to GCES
requirements), GCES Phase 11 ended without a final integrated report. This
shortcoming was especially serious because the basic philosophy of the
studies was that they were ecosystem studies that not only provided
understanding of the various components of the natural and artificial
environment of the canyon but that they also explored the connections
among those components. Part of the lack of integration, however, was also
due to inadequate planning by GCES management. Integration must be a
part of the effort from the beginning, rather than viewed as only the final task.
Interim progress reports can be used during the research itself to begin the
early development of an integrated perspective that can grow and mature as
the project progresses.
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River Resource Management in the Grancl Canyon
the highest-qualTty product, it seemed that the two participants were some-
times in an adversarial relationship. Such adversarial relationships between
an NRC committee and its client agency are not unusual, but in most other
cases the tension has decreased as the work progressed (Graf, 1993~.
One problem with the relationship between the NRC committee and
GCES was the dual role of the committee in providing advice during the
research and in providing judgments at the conclusion of the work. When the
committee made recommendations/hat subsequentlywere notfollowed, the
committee was highly critical. For example, the committee strongly urged
GCES to take into account nonuse values in its calculations regarding the
economics of power generation by Glen Canyon Dam. GCES was slow to
include such approaches in its work, and this engenclered sharply negative
responses from the committee. Eventually the BOR included nonuse values
in its economic studies (Colby and Goodman, 1993), but the results lost some
of their effectiveness because they came very late.
The NRC committee review process is not especially well suited to
providing advice for research in progress, because all NRC reports, including
brief letter reports, must pass through an extensive review and evaluation
system of their own. The process is reasonably efficient when compared to
similar arrangements in other organizations, but it still requires about 2
months. As a result, the advice needed by a sponsoring agency may be stale
by the time it arrives, particularly if the work is seasonal. The hydrological and
ecological systems that concerned GCES imposed many constraints on
timing, which were also complicated by administrative time tables and the
complicated process of meshing release schedules for the dam, research
needs, and the EIS schedule (BOR, 1991~. While research is in progress, the
comments of a review body can sometimes be more disruptive than helpful.
In any case, micicourse corrections in research depend on timely submission
of documents for review and expeditious handling of the documents by the
review agency.
There were notable successes in the relationship between GCES and the
NRC committee. GCES managers and researchers sometimes used the
committee as a sounding board for ideas, and the intellectual exchanges
often were of high quality. Presentations of research and results in oral form
provided workers with an opportunity to refine their thinking before going on
to other more public forums. Occasional contact with GCES managers and
researchers provided the committee members with insights that allowed them
to function much more efficiently in their evaluations than otherwise would
have been possible. Involvement of the committee in early planning for the
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
199
second phase of GCES studies resulted in several substantial improvements
that carried through the remainder of the project, including the establishment
of the Office of the Senior Scientist and the effort to diversify the research
contracting process. The committee played a key role in, for example,
pointing out critical and unacceptable weaknesses in the original studies of
sediment transport, identifying the need for a senior scientist on the man-
agement team, indicating the significance of omissions of nonuse values in
the power economics studies, endorsing research flows, broadening the
geographic scope of the work, and calling for external review of the research
by advisers other than the senior scientist.
THE ROLE OF FUNDING IN GCES
During the life of GCES, there were always two sets of plans: research
and finance. The financial planning was, to a remarkable degree, un-
predictable on an annual basis and outside the control of GCES managers.
Annual fluctuations were considerable (Figure 10.3~. Because the exact
amount of support expected for the following year was often unknown, the
conduct of multlyear research efforts was a risky business. The long-term
requirements of natural science research and the short-term planning for
agency budgets often conflicted with each other. For example, assessments
of chemical characteristics of water, sediment, and biological samples require
a multlyear effort. Selection of sample sites, initial collection of samples,
preparation of materials, and ancillary measurements prececlethe laboratory
chemical analysis. Frequently, repeat sampling is required to obtain an
understanding of the chemical stability of the system involved. When GCES
workers assessed chemical contents of biological materials, they en-
countered problems in an important part of the work because the length of
time needed for the research was longer than the annual funding cycle.
When funding for the USGS, the agency in charge of the chemical analysis,
decreasecl during GCES, the samples were available, but there was no money
to analyze. Research on native fishes was especially constrained by the
short-term nature of predictable funding levels.
The annual funding cycle for the research was an outcome of the
institutional arrangements for the work. GCES received its funding from
power revenues generated bythe operation of Glen Canyon Dam through the
regional office of the BOR in Salt Lake City. The level of funding made
available to GCES was therefore a function of the internal priorities of the re
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200
15
n
Cal
O 10
o
an
0
._
= _
._
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
1 1 ~ I I I
Annual Total
- GCES Budge
O _
1980
/
. /
,
1 985
1 990
1 995
FIGURE 10.3 Annual funding history of GCES. SOURCE: From data provided by D. Wegner,
Bureau of Reclamation.
gional office and of the revenues generated from a source that was somewhat
variable from one year to the next because of variations in water flows and
market conditions. WAPA(1988J predictions of power revenues were made
by using questionable assumptions (Hughes, 1991), which further com-
plicated the financial picture.
The mismatch between short-term budgets and long-term research might
have been rectified by a multlyear funding scheme similar to the approach
used by the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the Agricultural Research Service, and other federal
agencies. These organizations authorize research for a particular level of
funding over several years. Each year, as the federal budget is approved, the
agency funds the next installment in the grant or contract. While GCES
attempted to replicate this approach, funding uncertainties made short-term
financial support the order of the day, to the detriment of more appropriate
and more stable multlyear commitments (Leopold, 1991~.
Legal requirements that directed certain funds for particular purposes
also constrained the management of GCES research. During GCES Phase
1, most of the research was determined by the need to understand the Grand
Canyon environment. Funding for Phase 11 research was much higher than
for the earlier work (Figure 10.3), but the total budget is somewhat mis-
leading. Beginning in 1989, increasing amounts of the total GCES buciget
were apportioned to mandated research consisting of investigations required
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
201
by law or policy (Figure 10.4; see Chapter 2~. Occasionally, mandated re-
search produced information not directly useful to GCES or produced
monopolistic research rights for other agencies to clear with issues and data
within the legitimate scope of GCES. When numerous archeological sees
appeared to be endangered by dam operations in the canyon, laws related
to the preservation of antiquities came into play that demanded some ex-
penditure of funds to assess the sites. When the Department of the Interior
decided to produce an EIS and use the GCES framework for the funding of
supporting research, the diversion of funds from standard scientific research
to marinated research became even more pronounced, especially with regard
to endangered native fishes.
At first archaeological studies were conducted by the National Park
Service (NPS) pursuant to various federal laws and did not include par-
ticipation by Native American Tribes. Then, various I ndian tribes with interests
and history in the Grand Canyon received financial support to conduct
investigations of cultural connections to sites in the canyon that were of
religious or historical significance. Funding for such work was from the GCES
budget, which was augmented for the purpose, but administrative costs for
the work, particularly time, effort, and coordination, were extensive. By
policy, the federal government preferred to offertribes the opportunity to train
their own members to conduct as much of the work as possible. Some tribes
preferred to contract at least part of their investigative work to researchers
outside the tribe, but the end result was that by 1992 less than half of the total
GCES budget was allotted to scientific research outside the mandates
superimposed on the original goals of GCES (Figure 10.4~. Whether or not
this research caused a decline in the quality of other science in the GCES
effort is unclear.
A funding issue that plagued GCES from start to finish was the manner in
which contracts were arranged. During the first phase of the research, the
BOR contracted almost exclusively with its own investigators or with
government agencies with which it had close relationships. The pool of
potential researchers for any given part of the project was therefore limited,
and reviewers of the early research questioned the failure of the BOR to more
widely advertise for bicis on the proposed work (NRC, 1987~. One objective
of the senior scientist was to open the process of requesting proposals to a
broadly defined research community that included government workers,
private companies, university researchers, and individuals. During the
second phase of research, however, the range of investigators was only
moderately more general than in the first phase. The contracting and adver
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202
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in
c, 0.6
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~ 0.4
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0.2
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1 980
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
1
GCES Science (non-mandated)
i
· , ~
~ '
.
Mandated
, 'A 'A
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,
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._
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1 985
1 990
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FIGURE 10.4 Portion of GCES annual budget allotted directly to GCES science and to
mandated research required by other laws or customs. SOURCE: From data provided by D.
Wegner, Bureau of Reclamation.
tising requirements for federal agencies turned out to be so cumbersome that
it was impossible to secure the services of researchers through broad
solicitation and still meet the time limitations imposed by the annual funding
process. As a result, qualified researchers and organizations not in direct
contact with GCES had no opportunity to bid on the work, and the BOR had
no assurance that it ultimately contracted with the most cost-efficient or
scientifically effective workers. The GCES experience suggests that com-
petitive bidding for scientific research should be pursued by federal agencies
as a means of controlling costs and assuring quality.
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
203
Management of GCES also lacked control over the reporting of results by
federal agencies. GCES administrators reported that they were unable to
stop payments to agencies that were late in generating reports. If a con-
tractingagencyfailed to produce a report, GCES could notwithhold payment
and had to continue payments into the next year in order to obtain data and
results. Thus, the constraints and controls available in contracts with private
agencies seemed not to be available for public agencies. As a result,
government agencies had much less incentive to produce their work in a
timely fashion and infect may have had an inceptive to clelaytheir production
in order to obtain extended funding.
TIME CONSTRAINTS IN GCES RESEARCH
Time constraints posed as many problems for GCES research as clid
financial considerations. Timing affected the research because of unforeseen
changes in the natural system and uncertainty about the amount of time
available to conduct the research. Rigid planning and inability to make
midcourse changes in research severely reduced the effectiveness of thefirst
phase of GCES because of the timing of major changes in the ecosystem
resulting from the 1983 flood (NRC, 1991~. While it might be argued that there
was no way to predict the timing of the flood, which was actually a reservoir
spill, research planning should have taken into account the possibility that
drastic changes might occur during the project. Although the timing of the
flood was a research opportunity, it was treated as an unwanted intrusion on
the conduct of the research. GCES managers learned a great deal from the
failure to plan adequately for the flood, and in subsequent work they adopted
innovative plans forthe research that not only allowed them to accommodate
radical changes in discharge but that actually called for such changes.
Researchers adjusted their own work to the timing of the natural processes
and, more importantly, to those processes controlled by experimental re-
leases of water from the dam (Glen Canyon Environmental Studies, 1992~.
Researchers therefore used time in the second phase much more effectively
because they were more flexible in at least some aspects.
Specific time I imitations for GCES research were the prod ictable outcome
of research conducted within bucigets, but throughout the history of the
studies there was considerable uncertainty about the duration of the research
effort. Especially during the second phase of GCES, managers of the work
were uncertain each year whether the work would continue the next year.
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204
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
This uncertainty forced many researchers to adopt designs focused on quick
results rather than the best results. When the Department of Interior decided
to generate an EIS, its established schedule added more short-term thinking
to GCES, which was the primary data source for the EIS. It was only with the
acivent of the long-term monitoring plan, mandated by the Grand Canyon
Protection Act of 1992, that planning horizons expanded to more realistic
proportions.
FUTURE INSTITUTIONS
The Department of Interior is now considering the formation of a research
center, based in Flagstaff, to house the administrative entity that will conduct
the long-term monitoring program and research associated with Glen Canyon
Dam and its operation. This new entity, anticipated to report to the Assistant
Secretary for Water and Science, will inherit the data and other products of
the GCES, and will be an important part of the adaptive management
program because it will supply data and expertise for the interpretation of the
data. The research center will have the same needs for long-term planning,
sound use of scientific methods, and external review as GCES required
previously. Of particular importance is the need for an external review panel
of inclependent scientists who can offer credibility to the center's research
and who can introduce new ideas. All major research foundations, museums'
and experimental facilities have such panels, and the Glen Canyon research
center would require one to be considered legitimate by the scientific com-
munity.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The quantity, quality, and usefulness of scientific research are partly the
result of the institutions within which the work takes place. Despite a varied
history, the GCES made substantial contributions to basic and applied
science for the Grand Canyon environment, as shown by this report. The
following recommendations may be useful for the future:
1. Organizations such as GCES should be located within the Department
of Interior at an appropriate level that reports to an assistant secretary to
ensure the efficient flow of funding, plans, information, and products.
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Institutional Influences on the GCES
205
2. Competitive bidding for all future research in Glen Canyon and similar
areas should be open to all qualified agencies and individuals to ensure that
the best and least expensive alternatives are used.
3. As a means of quality control, contracts with other government ag-
encies should be designed to ensure transfer of funds from GCES only upon
the delivery of products and reports.
4. Deadlines for completion of scientific research should be clearly
specified by GCES and rigorously enforced through contract mechanisms.
Scientists, whether working in government agencies or as private consultants,
should all be held to the same standard: work should be completed on time
and within original budget estimates. If it is not, GCES should terminate
further funding and seek remedies for the deficiencies.
5. Studies such as GCES should take into account similar research being
conducted in other areas.
6. Long-term planning (several years) is essential for effective research
and wise use of financial support.
7. In deciding which contractors to support, projects such as GCES
should evaluate not only the quality of proposals but also the degree to which
the proposed work directly supports project objectives.
8. The funding of research should be based on management needs, not
on perceived political requirements.
9. Final integration of projects such as GCES research should be an
integral part of the research plan. The essence of the ecosystem approach
to research and adaptive management is the definition of relationships and
connections among the elements of the system. The GCES effort explicated
indiviclual elements without connection to others.
10. For projects of broad scope or long duration, the position of senior
scientist should be full time rather than part time.
11. Any internal research center administered by the BOR for the
purpose of managing the continuing Glen Canyon research (such as the
proposed research center at Flagstaff) should have the benefit of an external
oversight and review board to provide unbiased advice and perspective.
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206
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
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Representative terms from entire chapter:
grand canyon
