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OCR for page 24
Scope and Organization
of the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies
INTRODUCTION
The scope of the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies (GCES) of the
Bureau of Reclamation program changed considerably between its inception
in 1983 and its termination in 1995. In fact, one weakness of GCES was the
instability of its conceptual and geographic boundaries. The scope and
organization of GCES are instructive in part because they reflect beneficial
maturation of the Bureau of Reclamation's (BOR) environmental analysis
effort and in part because they illustrate some difficulties inherent in gov-
ernment environmental research projects.
SCOPE AS DEFINED BY MANAGENIENT OPTIONS,
RESOURCES, AND THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT
Management Options
il
The objective of GCES was to establish a basis for forecasting the ways
n which various options for managing Glen Canyon Dam would affect all
resources of value to society. In light of this objective, it is remarkable that
GCES management failed to develop and feature a comprehensive list of
management options in planning GCES. Part of the explanation lies in the
resistance of the BOR itself to the consideration of management options that
were beyond its planning horizon. For example, the BOR, with encour-
agement from the U.S. Department of Energy's Western Area Power Admin
24
OCR for page 25
Scope and Organization of the GCES
25
istration (\/VAPA), initially resisted any notion that the dam could be managed
in a way that would be inconsistent with the production of maximum power
revenues as reflected by historical operation of Glen Canyon Dam (BOR,
1995~. Thus, GCES at first was restricted to studies that reflected far less than
a full slate of options. In fact, the resistance to consideration of all options
extended well beyond BOR to virtually every other agency and constituency.
Agencies, groups, and individuals, including scientists, have commonly
judged management options on a mainly intuitive or single-factor basis.
As pointed out in the first National Research Council (NRC) review of
GCES (NRC, 1987), GCES under the direction of the BOR should have been
planned around a list of all management options not precluded by law or
unrealistic in cost or feasibility. Table 2.1 provides such a list. As shown by
the table there is considerable flexibil ty for management of resources through
variations in the operation of Glen Canyon Dam within the legal requirements
for delivery of water and prudent protection of the dam from catastrophic
flooding. Had such a list originally been part of GCES planning, the studies
would have been directed more quickly toward the questions that
management ultimately faces. Instead, the items on the list were acknow-
ledged incrementally over about a decade.
During preparation of the operations environmental impact statement
(EIS) in 1994, and with encouragement from the 1992 Grand Canyon
Protection Act, the BOR embraced the principle of adaptive management. In
following this laudable principle, the BOR committed itself to frequent review
of management options (Table 2.1), along with a list of resources, and to
adjust management practices as necessary to optimize the aggregate value
of all resources. GCES would have proceeded more efficiently had the BOR
recognized this need initially rather than toward the end of the program, but
the final adoption of adaptive management through the EIS is an important
achievement for GCES and for the BOR.
Resources
Resources potentially affected by variations in the operation of Glen
Canyon Dam are listed in Table 2.2. Until the BOR began responding to the
results of GCES (ca. 1985), the dam had been managed entirely around water
storage and delivery, flood prevention, and the production of power revenue.
Water storage and delivery are not subject to administrative modification
because they are fixed by law and because flood control is essential for
OCR for page 26
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OCR for page 27
Scope and Organization of the GCES
27
TABLE 2.2 Resources Potentially Affected by Variations in the Operation of
Glen Canyon Dam
1. Recreation
A. Trout Fishing
B. Rafting
11. Hydropower and hydropower revenues
Ill. Biotic communities
A. Aquatic communities (including endangered species)
B. Riparian communities (including endangered species)
IV. Sites of cultural or archaeological significance
V. Nonuse values
protection of the dam. Marketing of hydropower is required by law but is
flexible operationally and thus confers on management the responsibility to
assess the relationship between power production and the value or welfare
of other resources. GCES was the first systematic attempt to describe and
quantify the effect of dam operations on resources other than hydropower.
GCES did not initially make simultaneous commitments to studies of all
the resources potentially affected by operations. It focused at first on sed-
iment supply and sediment dynamics (see Chapter 5), which are important
for recreation (Chapter 7) and for fishes, and on biotic communities, with
particular emphasis on endangered species (Chapter 6~. GCES was slow to
acknowledge the relevance of cultural studies (Chapter 8) and initially ex-
cluded studies of power production (Chapter 9) because the BOR and WAPA
began with the assumption that the dam would continue to be managed for
production of maximum power revenues.
Even after the BOR accepted the modification of operating regimes for
the benefit of other resources, with the loss of some power revenues, it
resisted open (i.e., involving external independent analysis) studies of power
production because studies of power had been internal to the BOR and
WAPA since operation of the dam began. The EIS on power production did
what GCES could not do initially, which was to require an open and complete
study of power production in relation to dam operations. This was ultimately
OCR for page 28
28
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
an extremely important contribution to the understanding of resources in
relation to operations. Without it, GCES would have been far less valuable
because it would not have led to reliable quantitative estimates of power re-
venue losses in relation to operational changes offering environmental be-
nefits.
As shown by Chapter 9, studies of power and power revenue proved to
be far more controversial and problematic than originally expected. Models
in use by WAPA at the onset of the studies projected costs that were un-
justifiably high and even outrageous for modest operational changes (NRC,
1991~. The formation of a study group involving not only the BOR and WAPA
but also environmentally oriented experts and independent consultants ul-
timately produced by consensus a very different view of power production
revenues.
Another resource of interest that remained long unstudied is shown in
Table 2.2 as nonuse values. As described in Chapter 7, nonuse value refers
to that aspect of an environmental resource that derives from appreciation of
a particular state of the resource by those who are not using it. Although
relatively new, this is now an acknowledged dimension of comprehensive
environmental studies (Chapter 7~. Nonuse value seems particularly relevant
in the case of the Grand Canyon because of the high aesthetic and intangible
values attached to the region nationally and internationally and by Native
American tribes (the BOR received 33,000 comments on the draft EIS for
operation of Glen Canyon Dam). Even so, or perhaps for this very reason, the
bureau long resisted inclusion of nonuse value studies but in 1995 acceded
to them as an addendum to the EIS. Not surprisingly, the studies of nonuse
value, which were conducted by an independent consultant with admirable
use of peer review and outside critique, produced estimates of nonuse value
that vastly exceed all tangible values, including power production revenues
(Chapter 7~. While the administrative response to this information is yet to be
resolved, the information itself is clearly warranted as a component of GCES.
The Ecosystem Perspective
In 1987 the NRC committee was concerned about evidence that GCES
lacked an appropriate conceptual framework around which to build its study
and prioritize its expenditures. Phase 11 of GCES, however, embraced the
ecosystem concept as a basis for planning. This advance was very impor-
tant, but various factors prevented its full execution.
OCR for page 29
Scope and Organization of the GCES
29
The ecosystem concept, which now has been widely embraced by federal
agencies under the heading of ecosystem management (Lewis, 1994), is
essentially a substitute for using a list of issues or resources in organizing
environmental studies. While such lists continue to be important in all en-
vironmental studies, including those of the Colorado River, the study plan
must take into account the relationships among physical, chemical, biotic,
and anthropogenic components of the environment. The ecosystem concept
acknowledges that management of environmental systems operates within
a framework whose components are functionally connected.
Following NRC criticism (NRC, 1987) that the GCES study plan was
haphazard and diffuse, GCES managers adopted an explicit ecosystem
frameworkforthe design and operation of studies. This move was reinforced
by the appointment of a senior scientist, also in response to NRC recom-
mendations. One purpose of appointing the senior scientist was to add
expertise in ecosystem analysis to the GCES.
The most common way of applying the ecosystem concept to a particular
location is by diagrammatic representation of the system. In the process of
constructing such a diagram, analysts of the system must acknowledge in a
comprehensive way the interactions that are likely to be critical to an un-
derstanding of the problems at hand.
The GCES produced its ecosystem diagram (Figure 2.1) when its pro-
gram was already well under way. Critique of the GCES ecosystem diagram
is possible, especially given the hindsight provided by a decade of GCES. On
the whole, however, the diagram captures in a reasonable way the major
components of the system and their relationships, especially with regard to
the controversies that motivated GCES. By the time the diagram had been
produced and refined, however, disposition of GCES resources was dictated
either by precedentfrom earlierGCES studies orbylegal oradministrativefiat
(see below). Thus, GCES did not provide an ideal test of utility for the
ecosystem diagram.
As a test of the importance of the ecosystem diagram to GCES, in 1994
the NRC committee inquired about GCES support for each of the ecosystem
components and causal connections shown in the diagram. This exercise
demonstrated that a number of the significant causal connections shown in
the diagram were not under study by GCES. In this sense, GCES was only
incidentally an ecosystem study, even though it did ultimately cover quite a
number of components and connections. Flaws in the diagram are brought
out in the chapters of this report on individual components of the system.
The primary flaw related to the ecosystem concept for GCES was, how
OCR for page 30
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OCR for page 31
Scope and Organization of the GCES
31
ever, practical rather than conceptual.
The scope of work for GCES, and the priorities for GCES investments,
were ultimately defined almost entirely by the list of resources shown in Table
2.2. The weakness of this approach is that each resource has specific
advocates, which may be agencies, public groups, or commercial interests.
Advocacy thus becomes a key factor influencing the design of studies, and
the essential connection to operations is lost, as is the concept of ecosystem
analysis. For example, GCES resources were used for studies of bald eagles,
which began to populate the Grand Canyon seasonally in considerable
numbers during the 1 980s. There is at best a very weak connection, however,
between the welfare of the bald eagle population and any conceivable variant
on operations of the Glen Canyon Dam. Many examples, accounting ul-
timately for as much as half of the GCES budget, can be traced to this type
of boundary expansion of GCES. The reasons for boundary expansion can
be found mainly in forces associated with law and politics. The GCES was
never completely driven by an ecosystem model. Rather, its focus changed
over time as various external constituencies were able to convince Congress
and the Department of the Interiorto intervene in GCES and the EIS process.
OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE SCOPE OF GCES
Administrative Policy
The initial definition of scope for GCES was almost purely administrative
in the sense that it did not reflect the geographic or conceptual extent of
effects that might reasonably be connected with dam operations. The BOR
directed GCES to deal with the Colorado River immediately below Glen
Canyon Dam and to consider only changes in operations that would be neu-
tral with respect to power revenues. One objective of the BOR was to contain
the cost of GCES. Another factor, however, may have been the desire of the
BOR and of WAPA with which BOR necessarily has a close working rela-
tionship, to reduce the likelihood of challenges to the principle that dam
operations can be changed in ways that reduce power revenues, if en-
vironmental benefits accrue from such changes.
The initial administrative definition of scope was unrealistic. The flexibility
of dam operations within the constraint of maximum power revenues is so
small that studies restricted to this scope would be of limited use.
Expansion of GCES was probably inevitable given the range of interests
OCR for page 32
~2
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
and political forces that came to bear, especially through the EIS, on the
BOR. The NRC committee played an important role in questioning the
premisethatflexibility of operations could tee viewed onlywithinthe constraint
of maximum power production. To its credit, the BOR ultimatelyaccepted the
advisability of viewing the scope of GCES much more broadly and thus more
realistically. By the end of GCES, the initial unrealistic constraints on its
scope had disappeared.
In Rs last several years GCES came under the influence of factors that
were not always directly related to the effects of dam operations. GCES
expanded geographically to the upper end of Lake Powell, up the tributary
canyons, above the present high-water mark, and out to tribal lands on the
rim. A rational administrative approach would have been to ask, as a means
of limiting scope, whether a given type of study or inquiry could reasonably
be connected to variations in the operation of Glen Canyon Dam. Instead, the
BOR adopted the more expedient principle of simply setting an annual dollar
cap (often a quite generous one, extending to as much as $12 million per year
at its peak) on the GCES and essentially ignoring the necessity of con-
nections between scope and the clam's operation. As explained below,
several factors contributed to this change in administrative policy.
Law and Politics
In several instances the scope of GCES was affected by federal laws that
extended the program well beyond the connections between resources and
dam operations. When GCES began, no EIS was in progress orwas planned.
When Interior Secretary Lujan invoked the National Environmental Policy Act
(NE PA) by calling for two ElSs (one for operations and one for power
production), the scope of GCES was affected. The NEPA checklist for EIS
production called repeatedlyfor information that could only come from GCES
and thus modified GCES scope and scheduling. For example, studies of
archaeological sites by the National Park Service were arguably far more
elaborate than they needed to be if defined by the original objectives of GCES
rather than the more inclusive requirements of the EIS, which were
augmented by the Park Service's interest in obtaining an archaeological
inventory with monies originating outside its budget.
As explained more fully in Chapter 10, individual agencies used their
mission statements as guiding principles in defining research objectives ra-
ther than the specific needs of GCES. The research conducted by a myriad
OCR for page 33
Scope and Organization of the GCES
33
of cooperators under the GCES umbrella would have been more effective if
all the parties involved had devised a system to focus on resources on the
stated purpose of GCES. Much of the information that was collected outside
the obvious scope of GCES is scientifically sound and will prove useful in
other contexts, but the inability of the "cooperators" (Table 2.3) to devise a
system for focusing resources on the stated purpose of GCES was a
remarkable and consistent feature of the program, and resulted in great
expansion of expenditures and diffusion of focus. Because federal laws and
high-level politics were involved in these processes, it is impossible to fault
individuals and certainly not the primary organizers of GCES, who to a large
extent were buffeted by forces well beyond their control.
In 1987 the NRC committee criticized the GCES for failing to derive and
follow a specific plan that, in turn, would be linked to alternative possibilities
for operating Glen Canyon Dam. While the committee was quite successful
in encouraging a badly needed expansion in the scope of GCES during the
mid-1 980s, it was later much less successful in trying to move GCES toward
greater focus of resources on a predetermined plan and exclusion of
expenditures that could not be justified by the objectives of the program.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY GROUP
By the early 1980s, when GCES began, patterns for the use of power
revenue from Glen Canyon Dam had been in place for almost 20 years. The
intrusion of GCES as a new demand on the power revenue stream was
vehemently and openly opposed by WAPA, which argued that power re-
venues ($50 million to $100 million per year, depending on the market for
electricity) should not be used for this purpose. Nevertheless, roughly 10
percent of power revenues was used for GCES over its 13-year life. As a
result of the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (see Chapter 3), long-term
monitoring, which is the successor to GCES, will constitute an expense that
is reimbursable to the U.S. Treasury after the EIS Record of Decision is
issued. Thus, future costs of environmental studies below Glen Canyon Dam
will be borne by U.S. taxpayers at large, rather than by users of power from
Glen Canyon Dam.
Although the GCES was initiated and managed by the BOR, it involved
extensive participation by other federal and state agencies and by Native
American tribes. Decisions about the course of GCES were made by the
BOR manager but typically with strong advice from the cooperators. The
OCR for page 34
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OCR for page 35
Scope and Organization of the GCES
35
cooperators not only provided advice on the course of study but also re-
ceived and expended GCES monies or served as conduits for GCES con-
tracts (Table 2.3~.
The organizational structure of GCES contained several weaknesses that
became increasingly evident over its history. While the BOR should be
credited with assigning a full-time position to the management of GCES and
placing the GCES budget in principle at the disposal of the project manager,
the BOR failed to reinforce the independence and effectiveness of project
management. The immediate reporting hierarchy ofthe project manager was
initially critical of the fundamental basis for GCES and particularly of its
expansion to a realistic geographic and conceptual scope. Although this
situation changed during the last years of GCES, it handicapped the early
phases of project development. Equally important was the level of admin-
istrative placement of the GCES management, which reported to a district
office of the BOR.
The BOR is an agency of the U.S. Department of Interior, as are the
cooperators, with the exception of the Native American tribes and the Arizona
Game and Fish Department. Thus, the GCES project manager, who was
reporting to a district administrator inside one of the agencies among the
cooperators, was outranked by most of the individuals who made up the
cooperating group. The NRC committee perceived this difficulty early in
GCES and recommended in 1987 (NRC, 1987) that GCES Phase 11 be or
ganized in such a way that the project manager would report to an Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, thus being connected to the administrative umbrella
over all of the federal cooperators. This change was not made.
The effect of administrative flaws on GCES is difficult to evaluate.
Subsequent chapters of this report will show, however, that GCES suffered,
notwithstanding energetic and adaptable leadership, from a consistent
inability to exercise control over the cooperators for the benefit of general
project objectives. In practical terms the project manager was unable to
withhold funds from agencies that failed to meet contractual obligations and
had difficulty in confining or directing the scope along lines that were contrary
to those preferred by individual cooperators.
CONCLUSIONS
The initial design of GCES was severely flawed in definition of scope and
in organization for a variety of reasons. Over several years, through adjust
OCR for page 36
36
River Resource Management in the Grand Canyon
meets made primarily through the response of the GCES management and
the BOR to outside comment and critique, many of the flaws were reduced
or eliminated. Thus, the scope and organizational strength of GCES im-
proved over the Ice of the project. If these institutional adjustments can be
carried into other projects of the BOR or other management agencies, future
environmental projects will be less costly and more effective in meeting their
goals.
While GCES improved in a number of important respects over its history,
its effectiveness was impaired even in its latest phases by a number of
unsolved problems related to scope and organization. These include es-
pecially the internalization of expenditures among the federal cooperators, the
inability of the project manager to exercise free authority over critical
decisions because of the administrative structure of the project, and the
introduction of ancillary objectives through law or ad ministrative fiat that were
not necessarily relevant to the project's objectives.
The GCES has shown that federally sponsored environmental assessment
should be organized around three sets of considerations: 1) a list of re-
sources, 2) a list of management options, and 3) the ecosystem concept.
Omission or incomplete treatment of any of these three considerations will
greatly impair the usefulness of the final outcome of environmental ass-
essment. Furthermore, given that large, federal environmental studies will in
the future increasingly involve multiple federal agencies with differing missions
and priorities, the project manager for any large environmental assessment
must be grantecl, for the benefit of the project, sufficient independence and
authority over financial resources to override undue influence by individual
agencies. The GCES experience shows that concentration of authority in the
project leadership, and initial commitment to complete consideration of all
management options and resources, including those that may be out of favor
or controversial, will be the most likely strategies to conserve resources and
produce outcomes useful to management.
REFERENCES
Bureau of Reclamation. 1995. Operation of Glen Canyon Dam. Final
Environmental Impact Statement. U.S. Department of the Interior, Wash-
ington, D.C.
OCR for page 37
Scope anal Organization of the GOES
37
Lewis, W.M., fir. 1994. The ecological sciences and the public domain.
University of Colorado Law Review 65:279-292.
National Research Council. 1987. River and Dam Management: A Review of
the Bureau of Reclamation's Glen Canyon Environmental Studies.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
National Research Council. 1991. Colorado River Ecology and Dam Man-
agement. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
canyon dam
