National Academies Press: OpenBook

Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections (1996)

Chapter: 3 Findings and Reccomendations

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Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
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3
Findings and Recommendations

Recommendation 1

All Medicare choices1 that meet the standard conditions of participation and that are available in a local market should be offered to Medicare beneficiaries to increase the likelihood that beneficiaries can find a plan of value. Traditional Medicare should be maintained as an option and as an acceptable "safe harbor" for beneficiaries, especially those who are physically or mentally frail.

Number and Type of Health Plans to Be Offered

Findings

Medicare beneficiaries are currently offered traditional Medicare, Medigap policies, and, in many areas of the country, a growing number of alternative health plans. New initiatives in Medicare and proposed reforms of the Medicare program would

1  

For the purpose of this chapter, the term Medicare choices is an umbrella term for traditional Medicare, Medigap insurance, and alternative health plans (including managed care).

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

broaden the number and range of alternative health plans offered.

For most Medicare beneficiaries the range of options and the responsibility for choosing among those options are likely to be significantly greater than those currently available to a large percentage of the working population. Unlike private employers, which have the power to limit the number and types of plans offered, current Medicare practice and proposed reforms would allow any plan that meets specified conditions of participation to sell coverage to Medicare beneficiaries.

Although the committee was cautioned that a large number of choices may increase the confusion for Medicare beneficiaries, it may also increase the ability of Medicare beneficiaries to find a plan that they like, for example, a plan that includes their chosen doctor, that offers valued additional coverage, or that provides convenient access to services. The fear of not being able to continue to see a chosen caregiver has been shown to be a major reason why elderly individuals are reluctant to move into managed care arrangements. Competition among a larger number of health plans will likely produce more innovation on the part of health plans to find ways to be more responsive to the wants and needs of beneficiaries.

The committee also was concerned that limiting the numbers of plans, beyond requiring them to meet benchmark2 conditions of participation, would raise policy and political issues, given the size of the Medicare program and the proportion of total U.S. health care revenues that it represents. Setting limits would have a vast impact on competitors and the market as a whole.

Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that all Medicare choices that meet the benchmark conditions of participation be offered to beneficiaries. Conditions of participation should be carefully constructed to bear the burden of assuring informed choice by beneficiaries and accountability by health plans for access to

2  

Benchmark is defined as a floor, with the expectation that participating plans would exceed this level.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

quality systems of care. All Medicare choices should have to meet common conditions of participation.

This policy may result in the marketing of plans with limited appeal and small numbers of Medicare beneficiary enrollees over time. The committee recommends that these kinds of plans be tracked over time and evaluated for their potential impacts on risk selection3 and administrative costs and the extent to which they cause confusion among beneficiaries.

The Traditional Medicare Program

Findings

Given how little is known about ensuring informed choice and holding health plans accountable for providing quality care to Medicare beneficiaries and given the consequent risks for the beneficiaries, the committee believes that traditional Medicare must remain an option and a safe harbor for beneficiaries4 This option should be at least as good as the existing Medicare program in terms of benefits, beneficiary cost-sharing, choice of providers, geographic access, and other factors.

The committee believes that maintaining traditional Medicare as a choice is critical for allowing large numbers and a wide range of plans to be offered to Medicare beneficiaries. Without the ability to retain the traditional Medicare program as an option and safe harbor, particularly for beneficiaries who are physically and mentally frail, the committee would not recommend widening the Medicare marketplace to the extent that is advocated in this report.

The committee is aware that traditional indemnity plans are becoming a relic for the market under age 65; many fee-for-service plans have been discontinued because of their high pre-

3  

As in other sections of the report, the committee understands the inadequacy and limitations of current risk adjustment methods and recommends that further research be supported in this critical area. In the meantime, however, practical requirements necessitate that available techniques be used to make best-judgment decisions.

4  

The committee defines safe harbor as a program that is financially stable and that remains an option for the foreseeable future.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

miums, their noncompetitive benefits, and adverse risk selection. Within this environment, special challenges exist for the future viability of the traditional Medicare program. Constraints on Medicare spending are adding new urgency to managing the costs of care delivered in the traditional Medicare program. Maintaining traditional Medicare as an option is likely to be difficult and could require additional costs to government.

The committee was not able, within the time frame and scope of its task, to make the difficult estimates of these potential costs to government or their wider social implications. The committee is mindful, however, of efforts by the National Academy of Social Insurance, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC), PPRC, and others to explore ways in which Medicare's fee-for-service program can be shaped in the future to make it more efficient and to improve its management and delivery of care.

Subrecommendations

In the framework of the findings presented above, the committee recommends that HCFA, under its demonstration authorities, accelerate its efforts to identify private sector purchasing and management techniques that can be adopted appropriately for use by the traditional Medicare program as an alternative to price reductions and, when possible, to offer additional benefits to maintain the program's value. HCFA's current development of "centers of excellence" for high-technology procedures seems an example of such an adaptation.

As indicated elsewhere, it is also critical that risk selection measurement and adjustment technologies be improved for use by traditional Medicare and health plans. As improved technology for measuring risk selection is developed, HCFA should study the traditional Medicare program's risk pool relative to those of other health plans and assess whether program funding fairly reflects Medicare's risk profile to enable it to offer a product of competitive value to beneficiaries. The federal government should also study and pilot test ways to pay health plans more fairly for chronically ill beneficiaries to encourage health plans to invest in and market to those beneficiaries.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

Risk Selection

Findings

It was beyond the scope of the present study to address problems of risk selection among the multiple Medicare choices and to recommend steps to correct for those problems. During its deliberations, however, the committee found that mechanisms to prevent or correct for risk selection are critical to the ultimate success of any system offering multiple health plan choices and that the existing Medicare AAPCC cannot be relied on to achieve success in this area.

The number and range of health plan choices being proposed for Medicare beneficiaries and variations in benefits, premiums, and marketing are likely to greatly increase the potential for risk selection among those offering the various Medicare choices. Since risk selection can seriously undermine the viabilities of the traditional Medicare program and individual plans, it is important that this problem be addressed and controlled.

Ultimately, the committee is concerned about incentives and the capability of physicians with a direct financial interest in a plan to recruit (or avoid) subscribers on the basis of whether that individual is a high- or low-level user of health services.

Recommendation 2

Enrollment and disenrollment guidelines, appeals and grievance procedures, and marketing rules should reflect Medicare beneficiaries' vulnerability and lack of understanding of traditional Medicare and Medigap insurance and their current lack of trust in important aspects of alternative health plans.

Beneficiary Enrollment and Disenrollment

Findings

The committee found that numerous factors make it critical to facilitate the Medicare enrollment and disenrollment process in an environment of market competition and broader choice:

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
  • Medicare beneficiaries are apprehensive about managed care, the concept of risk, the choice process, and lock-in provisions that would prevent beneficiaries from leaving a plan with which they become dissatisfied after enrollment.
  • Many Medicare beneficiaries are poorly informed about traditional health insurance in general and are even more poorly informed about their Medicare choices and the choice process. A considerable amount of beneficiary dissatisfaction, especially among those beneficiaries who are new to managed care, appears to be related to misunderstandings of the basic structure, payment and care practices, and the choice process.
  • Some beneficiaries unknowingly lose their Medigap insurance coverage or face a premium increase if they join a managed care plan and later return to Medicare.
  • Managed care uses practice protocols and definitions of what constitutes medical necessity and appropriate care that vary from those used by the traditional Medicare program. These differences can result in various types and levels of service for specific illnesses and conditions. It is often difficult for beneficiaries to understand these protocols and their implications for the specific services offered by various plans before enrolling in a plan.
  • Many Medicare beneficiaries are disadvantaged in the choice process by physical or mental frailty or by poor vision or hearing.
  • Some Medicare beneficiaries who receive their care from HMOs now must enroll in and disenroll from plans as they move between summer and winter residences. The portability of a managed care plan may be further hindered by annual open enrollment policies and lock-in provisions.
  • Beneficiaries can be negatively affected by health plan changes beyond their control, such as when their provider ceases to contract with the plan.
  • Beneficiaries who make misinformed choices can be hurt financially or clinically, or both. The committee is most concerned with minimizing adverse clinical outcomes, but would err on the side of greater leniency in allowing beneficiaries to leave a plan with which they are dissatisfied.
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
Subrecommendations

Given the findings presented above, the committee recommends a transition period of 2 years from the time that legislation is implemented during which the federal government would continue the current option of permitting monthly changes of enrollment by Medicare beneficiaries. After this transition period, enrollees should be locked into the plan that they have selected for 1 year, with the following exceptions. All enrollees will have 90 days from the time of enrollment in a health plan to disenroll and enroll in traditional Medicare, and newly entitled beneficiaries and beneficiaries who have never before chosen a health plan (i.e., those who have been enrolled in the traditional Medicare program) should have the prerogative of changing plans or rejoining the traditional Medicare program within 90 days. Beneficiaries should be allowed to return to their previous Medigap policy with no additional premium costs and with no restrictions placed on preexisting conditions if they disenroll from a health plan within 90 days and return to the traditional Medicare program.

The committee would like to see the federal government encourage plans to offer adequate out-of-area coverage for their enrollees who reside out of the plan's service area for more than 3 months. This can be achieved through interplan reciprocity or point-of-service options.

Grievance and Appeals Procedures

Findings

The current Medicare appeals process has been shown to be slow and not adequately advertised by HCFA or health plans. Furthermore, the current appeals process is tailored more to reviewing whether a service should be reimbursed by Medicare or a health plan and less on the important issue of whether a needed service was denied.

In a competitive environment, to attain better risk selection, health plans have the incentive to encourage healthier people to enroll in the plan and to discourage from enrollment those who

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

need more services. This could prompt plans to be less responsive to the grievances of sicker Medicare enrollees.

Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that the existing appeals process be strengthened, streamlined, and better publicized.

Furthermore, the committee recommends that the federal government make available an expedited review and resolution process for Medicare choices (by an agency independent of the health plan and the traditional Medicare program) to review emergency conditions, such as the following: (1) when a situation is life-threatening, (2) when the time involved to review the appeal under the usual process would result in a loss of function or a significant worsening of a condition or would render the treatment ineffective, or (3) when advanced directives or end-of-life preferences are involved.

The federal government should carry out this expedited review through an independent private nonprofit agency in each area of the country. The agency should review any negative findings with the health plan involved and report to the federal government any recommended changes to improve the plan's performance. The cost of this independent, expedited review process should be covered by the Informed Choice Fund (for a more detailed description of this fund, see below). The federal government should be able to assess the costs of these reviews on the health plans when the number of such reviews and negative findings becomes excessive.

Health Plan, Medigap Insurance, and Traditional Medicare Marketing Practices

Findings

Past experience with Medigap policy sales has demonstrated the potential for widespread abuse. Federal and state regulatory mechanisms have been put into place to deal with these abuses. However, greater incentives for abuse exist with the sale of alternative health plans. The commission on a single sale can be a significant portion of an agent's compensation.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

Health insurance is also complex, and it is difficult for beneficiaries to compare the benefits offered by competing health plans. It will likely remain so for most Medicare consumers. Many Medicare beneficiaries are particularly vulnerable in their need and desire for adequate health care coverage and have been found to have low levels of understanding of Medicare choices.

All of these factors that make elderly beneficiaries especially susceptible to improper marketing practices are underscored by the fact that elderly people have a preference for and rely on one-to-one interactions as a way of learning about their health plan options.

Subrecommendations

To promote comparable levels of accountability, the committee recommends that serious consideration be given to having a new entity approve in advance the public information and marketing materials used by health plans and by the traditional Medicare program (see p. 107). Additionally, the federal government should work with state governments to oversee the marketing of Medigap policies to individuals in the framework of the new requirement for a single open season and conditions of participation.

The committee recommends that the agents and marketers of health plans and Medigap policies be required to inform Medicare beneficiaries up front of their commission for the sale of the policy. Unsolicited door-to-door marketing and outbound telephone marketing should be prohibited. Rigorous marketing rules of conduct should be required to protect beneficiaries. For example,

  • retroactive disenrollment should be permitted if enrollment takes place as a result of misleading marketing,
  • compensation to marketing agents should be tied to retention of the enrollee in the health plan, and
  • retention rates should be reported to potential enrollees by the health plan and by agents.
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

The committee recommends that the federal government define the basic requirements of any marketing presentation by a health plan or Medigap insurance provider, including such items as providing a copy of a brochure or pamphlet that clearly compared standard health plans, a description of the lock-in provision and a discussion of the availability of the beneficiaries' providers under the plan, and marketing materials in the primary language of the buyer. The federal government should also collaborate with states to ensure consistency in these requirements and should be able to effectively sanction health plans and Medigap insurance providers that break the marketing rules.

Recommendation 3

The committee recommends that special and major efforts be directed to building the needed consumer-oriented information infrastructure for Medicare beneficiaries. This resource should be developed at the national, state, and local levels, with an emphasis on coordination and partnerships. Information and customer service techniques and protocols developed in the private sector should be used to guide this effort, and the best technologies currently available or projected to be available in the near term should be used.

Beneficiary Information Needs for Informed Choice

Findings

Many Medicare beneficiaries do not understand the Medicare choices. Many are fearful of any change in Medicare and distrust the new choices of health plans. A wide range of unbiased information about Medicare choices may increase the level of trust. The committee has found that Medicare beneficiaries want and need standardized, unbiased, clearly understandable information, including the following:

  • how the different Medicare choices actually work;
  • the out-of-pocket costs of the various plans;
  • the experiences of people similar to themselves (e.g.,
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
  • people of the same age, health, sex, ethnicity, and cultural background) seeking care under the various Medicare choices;
  • how patients have access to and are treated by their doctors (both primary care and specialist physicians) under the various options;
  • the accessibility of the services that they are likely to need, especially hospital and ancillary services, as well as the accessibility to cutting-edge care and where it is provided;
  • an indication that the information is accurate, timely, reliable, and trustworthy (beneficiaries are savvy in discerning the quality and inherent biases of the information); and
  • how participating physicians are paid.

Some groups of beneficiaries, especially those with chronic conditions, desire more specific information, such as protocols for treatment or whether a particular prescription drug is provided in their Medicare choice.

Medicare beneficiaries appear to be active users of media of all types, older adults are particularly oriented toward one-to-one communications with another individual. Furthermore, the committee is pleased with the progress being made by private credentialing organizations like NCQA and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to develop data sets that can be used to certify plans and inform consumers, such as HEDIS.

Subrecommendations

In efforts to communicate the information in Box 3-1, ''Medicare Choices: Information for Beneficiaries," to Medicare beneficiaries, a broad range of mass media and other forms of communication should be used. Emphasis should be placed on providing beneficiaries with easy telephone access to individuals who can guide them on the use of the materials providing comparisons of health plans and who can provide additional clarification and information on plans and providers. To the degree possible, health plans will be asked to submit information in a format that will allow beneficiaries or their families to access the information via the Internet.

To establish trust, a private, nonprofit organization should

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

validate and publish summaries of performance data and make more technical backup data available to beneficiaries and others who have a reasonable right to know. Beneficiary surveys should be standardized across plans, they should be audited, they should include a representative sample of those who are covered (including by ethnicity), and they should oversample beneficiaries with chronic or disabling conditions. Materials should be adapted for use by those with special physical limitations, such as poor vision and hearing.

To keep its information as complete and current as possible, this organization should obtain expert advice from national quality and service accreditation organizations in the continuing development of data needs, comparative reports, and surveys for the purposes described above.

Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center

Findings

There exists a critical need to increase understanding of and trust in the restructured Medicare program by the public. Medicare beneficiaries and the general public need to be provided with a broad and objective education about the coverages, costs, and purposes of Medicare and the new health plan choices.

Objective and responsive information on all aspects of Medicare choices is also needed to hold the health system and plans accountable. An increase in the amount of this type of information will augment Medicare beneficiaries' trust in the Medicare program and the choice process.

The committee finds that the private sector's information and communication technologies for assembling, cataloging, and making available information on various health plan features to consumers have advanced well beyond those currently being used to serve Medicare beneficiaries. An example cited frequently at the symposium and in the commissioned papers is the notion of customer service centers that allow telephone access to representatives with on-line support. The central availability of the federal government's access to standard data from participating health plans, the traditional Medicare program, and Medigap insurance offers an opportunity to use this tech-

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

BOX 3-1
Medicare Choices: Information for Beneficiaries

To provide the necessary information for informed purchasing, the committee recommends that the federal government make available to beneficiaries, directly or through health plans, the following types of information on Medicare choices:

  1. The enrollment and disenrollment rules, the choice process, and the range of services available from the health plans.
  2. How traditional Medicare and Medigap insurance, in comparison with alternative health plans, pay and contract with providers, for example, choice of providers and portability.
  3. Comparative benefits, including
  • emergency and out-of-plan urgent care;
  • hospital services (including access to centers of excellence);
  • nursing home, home health, and hospice services;
  • prescription benefits;
  • physician services, including the availability of specialists;
  • foot care, dental care, and mental health care; and
  • services of alternative providers such as chiropractors.
  1. Comparative costs, including premiums, cost-sharing, and balance billing, with examples of comparative costs for different classes of beneficiaries, for example, the well elderly; disabled, institutionalized, and chronically ill people; and individuals with major illness episodes while on Medicare. Medigap insurance premiums should be shown to be in addition to the Part B premium.
  2. Comparative performance on clinical, structural, and satisfaction benchmarks:
  • scientifically valid process and outcome measures in a form salient and relevant to beneficiaries, including the
    • percentage of beneficiaries with diabetes who receive an annual eye examination,
    • percentage of female Medicare beneficiaries who receive an annual or biannual mammogram and Pap smear,
    • percentage of males who receive a prostate examination,
    • percentage of beneficiaries who receive preventive services, such as hypertension screening and influenza and pneumococcal vaccinations, and
    • recidivism rate for various diagnoses;
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
  • access measures, including
    • the percentage of referrals denied or unavailable,
    • the average waiting time to obtain a referral,
    • average times to obtain an appointment once a referral has been made,
    • ease of phone access and average waiting times in a physician's office, and
    • physician turnover rates; and
  • satisfaction measures (specifying those with chronic conditions or disabilities), including
    • disenrollment information, including the percentage of persons who disenroll within 3 months of enrollment,
    • appeals and grievance information, including the numbers, reasons, and resolutions of grievances and appeals per Medicare choices organization,
    • access and quality findings from HCFA monitoring surveys and relevant state regulatory reports, and
    • findings from surveys commissioned by the organization on satisfaction with physicians and hospital care, access to specialists, and other factors found to be important to beneficiaries.
  1. A clear description of the details of each plan and the Medigap policy, including
  • in- and out-of-network access and costs;
  • how referrals are made (e.g., who makes the referral decisions and on what basis);
  • appeals and grievance systems;
  • up-to-date listings of all providers by type and specialty, credentials, and whether an individual provider is accepting new patients from the plan;
  • financial and contractual arrangements between plans and providers that may influence their decisions regarding services in the judgment of the federal government;
  • financial and solvency status; and
  • use of out-of-area specialty centers.

On request, policies or protocols for covering or providing specific services (such as a prescription drug) or services for specific conditions (such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, diabetes, and joint replacement) should be provided.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

nology to better ensure informed choice by beneficiaries and accountability by health plans.

Furthermore, regional and local variations in health plans and health care, coupled with the strong desire among beneficiaries for one-to-one communication, suggest that additional information and service activities be carried out by ombudspersons or agencies at the regional and area levels. Models for such activities exist in information, counseling, and assistance (ICA) programs, which are funded primarily by HCFA.

Subrecommendations

To further these objectives, the committee recommends that the federal government contract with and oversee a private, nonprofit agency to develop a state-of-the-art Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center that would (1) administer a Medicare customer services answer center; (2) develop, collect, and distribute open enrollment materials and enrollment data; (3) reconcile enrollment data and payments to plans, including monthly changes and related transactions; (4) provide an evaluation component for the purpose of continual improvement and plan feedback; and (5) contract for regular customer service satisfaction surveys.

The Center would strive to offer Medicare beneficiaries national and regional or local access to the types of services provided by the benefits departments of the nation's large employers, building on the regional-area work of organizations such as ICA programs.

The Center will provide education, counseling, and legal assistance and will process complaints, grievances, and appeals from plan members through regional and local agents such as ICA programs. It will install a tracking system to report all complaints, grievances, and appeals, and will report this information to beneficiaries annually and to health plan chief executive officers monthly.

In carrying out this effort, the Center will take advantage of the most effective and efficient methods of electronic communication, including toll-free telephone communication, on-line communications, town meetings, newsletters, and multimedia tech-

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

niques, to provide information about plans and the process of choice that is as detailed as possible.

The Center's national, regional, and area activities would be funded by the federal government through the Informed Choice Fund (see below).

Choice Facilitating Organizations

Findings

The committee finds that many independent private organizations that already exist or that might well develop can assist beneficiaries with making informed choices among the options available through the Medicare program. These facilitating or mediating organizations offer services ranging from providing objective additional information on plans and choices beyond what the Center offers, to evaluating plans by additional objective criteria, to prescreening and selecting plans that the organization's customers or members might choose, to bargaining for better value from the plans. In fact, many employers are offering such services to their Medicare-eligible retirees, making Medicare HMOs or Medigap policies, or both, available to them during their annual open seasons.

These Choice Facilitating Organizations do raise some concerns. Insurance brokers or other parties with financial interests may misuse these opportunities to market products rather than provide objective advice. Also, even well-functioning organizations could divert feedback on the services offered by a plan from the Center and its regional agents and dilute the effectiveness of the Center's national reporting. The committee leans toward limiting the establishment of these organizations to groups that do not have a vested financial interest in the choices that consumers make or, at a minimum, requiring such organizations to adequately disclose their sources of funding and potential biases that might result from these financial interests.

Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that nothing in law or regulation should inhibit the development of private organizations

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

whose major purpose is to facilitate choice for Medicare beneficiaries, including groups that offer preselected panels of health plans. Although the committee believes that such organizations should be limited to groups that do not have a vested financial interest in the choices that are made, at a minimum, these organizations should be required to fully disclose their sources of funding and potential biases that might result from these financial arrangements. One committee member raised some additional concerns about these organizations which are outlined in Appendix A.

To help make the Choice Facilitating Organizations as useful to beneficiaries as possible, the federal government should require health plans and the traditional Medicare program to make available appropriate information to such organizations that have a legitimate interest in that information, such as the data behind quality or accreditation scores.

The committee advocates that public and private entities experiment with such organizations, including providing funding from the Informed Choice Fund (see below) to those that meet the criteria of independence and objectivity to augment the work of the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center. Choice Facilitating Organizations may be particularly useful during the early phase of Medicare choice development.

The Informed Choice Fund

Findings

The provision of information on Medicare choices to Medicare consumers is in its infancy stage. Most of the information about quality and performance that has been developed and collected has been for large purchasers, plan administrators, or clinicians, not as part of an effort to educate and inform individual consumers.

Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that an Informed Choice Fund be developed for use by the federal government for the purpose of strengthening the infrastructure used to inform Medicare

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

beneficiaries of their health plan choices. The Informed Choice Fund would be used to fund the operations of the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center. Demonstration grants to Choice Facilitating Organizations could be made from this Fund, as desired by the federal government, after the operations of the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center are funded.

The Informed Choice Fund would derive its income from a predictable revenue source, such as a fixed amount from each Medicare beneficiary or a flat amount or a percentage of the monthly Medicare premiums.

Recommendation 4

The federal government should require all Medicare choices to be marketed during the same open season to promote comparability and to enable beneficiaries to adequately assess and compare the benefits and prices of the various options.

Coordination of Traditional Medicare, Medigap Insurance and Health Plans: Medicare Choices

Findings

Comparing the prices and benefits of the various Medicare choices is difficult at present because they are not marketed at the same time or under the same ground rules. For example, the beneficiary may not see the high cost (frequently $1,000 or more) of the traditional Medicare program with Medigap insurance relative to the cost of a managed care plan. In addition, beneficiaries who leave Medicare and their Medigap policy for a managed care plan may find that they cannot repurchase their Medigap policy because of a preexisting condition.

The committee finds that the division of responsibility for enforcing the rules of participation in and compliance with these programs between state and federal government complicates the process of informed choice, grievance and complaint resolution, and plan accountability and fragments the offering of health plans across state lines.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
Subrecommendations

It is within this context that the committee recommends that the selection of Medicare choices be coordinated. All three types of plans should be offered during open enrollment periods and under the same conditions of participation (see page 104).5

The federal government should work with state governments to coordinate the federal requirements surrounding Medicare choices with existing state regulations for Medigap insurance and private insurance. The U.S. Congress should consider what policy-making and enforcement activities are most appropriately and effectively conducted by the federal government and which can be delegated to state governments to ensure consistency and economy.

Standardized Packaging, Pricing, and Marketing of Benefits

Findings

Through the course of its deliberations, the committee found that although standardized benefits might simplify the choice process for elderly individuals, standardization is likely to dampen innovation and responsiveness to a broader range of consumer desires and preferences. However, the committee also appreciates the advantage for the beneficiary of the current standard benefit categories under Medigap insurance, which facilitate comparisons of the benefits and costs of different benefit options and comparisons of different insurers providing the same option. The committee acknowledges that many employers and private organizations have developed formats that allow the benefits of competing health plans to be clearly displayed and compared. It would be relatively simple for Medicare to do the same.

Terminology relating to the benefits offered by health plans varies greatly and makes it difficult to make clear comparisons

5  

The Physician Payment Review Commission's 1996 Annual Report to Congress provides a worthwhile discussion of the pros and cons of annual versus continuous open enrollment seasons.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

among health plans. More research is needed on the types of information that beneficiaries want and need to exercise informed choice and how best to present that information.

Subrecommendations

The committee wants to preserve the general approach taken by the law governing Medigap insurance without restricting choice to the same extent. It believes that health plans should be moved toward standardized packaging, pricing, and marketing of selected benefit packages to allow beneficiaries to more easily compare the benefits offered by different plans. The committee recommends all plans be required to offer and price a basic benefit package (current Medicare Part A and Part B services) and have the option of offering and pricing two other popular benefit packages defined by the federal government and included in basic comparisons promulgated by the federal government. These popular benefit packages should include added benefits shown by market sales and surveys to be of special interest to the elderly (services such as pharmacy, eye care, and foot care) and ones that are popular given the cost. Health plans would be free to offer and price benefit packages other than these two that add to the basic benefit, but these other packages must be clearly identified as nonstandard, must offer substantial differences from the basic benefit package, and would not be included in the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center's standard published comparisons. The federal government should commission the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center to develop and use formats that allow beneficiaries to make easy and clear comparisons of benefits and other information on Medicare choices, drawing on the best practices used by employers and private and public organizations. The federal government should also suggest questions that Medicare beneficiaries should ask about nonstandard packages.

To make this process even easier, the federal government should promulgate common terminology related to benefits. All Medicare choices should use this terminology to describe the benefits of each of their offerings.

The federal government should coordinate its activities with

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

those of state governments to ensure consistency between these benefit packages and those of Medigap insurance.

Recommendation 5

The committee is concerned about the increasing restrictions on physicians (and the potential conflict of interest of physicians) when they act in their professional role as advocates for their patients and carry out their contractual responsibilities and receive economic incentives as health plan providers. The committee favors the abolition of payment incentives or other practices that may motivate providers to evade their ethical responsibility to provide complete information to their patients about their illness, treatment options, and plan coverages. So-called anticriticism clauses or gag rules should be prohibited as a condition of plan participation.

Physicians and Professionalism

Findings

The committee recognizes that physicians' advice to beneficiaries is a quintessential part of ensuring informed choice. Because of the inherently personal nature of the physician-patient relationship and its special importance to elderly patients, the committee is concerned about the increasing restrictions on physicians (and the potential conflict of interest of physicians) when they act in their professional role as advocates for their patients and carry out their contractual responsibilities and receive economic incentives as health plan providers. The committee is particularly concerned about reported contractual restrictions (such as anticriticism clauses) on physicians acting in their professional role as a source of advice to their patients. Physicians must maintain their freedom to talk to their patients with full honesty about the clinical aspects of their care and treatment options.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that neither the Medicare choices' payment incentives nor their coverage and treatment protocol policies motivate providers to evade their ethical responsibility to provide patients with complete information about their illness and treatment options (such as referrals to a specialist), what to the best of the provider's knowledge the patient's plan covers, and which health plans in the provider's experience provide the broadest range of services to the patient in question.

Competition among Medicare choices is likely to restrict the definitions of inappropriate services by refining the definitions of medical necessity and appropriate services to contain costs and ensure quality. The committee finds that it is important for beneficiaries to have access to the unbiased judgments of their practicing physicians regarding their health needs in the context of plan procedures and protocols so that they, as patients, can make informed choices and thereby shape this new understanding of "appropriate."

Within the scope of its responsibilities, the federal government should identify practices that inhibit open communication between a provider and a patient in any setting and either prohibit them as conditions of participation of plans or require the plan to disclose such practices to potential enrollees. The committee recommends that the federal government require plans to disclose to plan enrollees how physicians get paid, whether they are rewarded for withholding referrals, and any other restrictions affecting how physicians can inform or treat plan enrollees. Similarly, educational materials should make clear the incentives in traditional Medicare and Medigap insurance to provide unnecessary care and the risks of these incentives.

Recommendation 6

The federal government should hold Medicare choices accountable by requiring them to meet comparable conditions of participation as a Medicare option and by monitoring and reporting on their compliance with these conditions.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

Conditions of Participation for Medicare Choices

Findings

Some private and public employers have administered choice programs for many years and have developed and are continuing to improve the conditions of participation of health plans for ensuring that beneficiaries can make informed choices and for ensuring accountability on the part of the health plans. The very nature of accountability for Medicare health plans suggests that minimum standards should be established for health plans in areas where beneficiaries cannot reasonably be expected to make informed choices or where they might be easily confused or misled. This process of informed choice should be facilitated so that plans compete to exceed those minimum standards.

The committee finds that managed care plans not only pay for the services of providers but that they also use contractual arrangements to establish incentives for and place controls on providers' services. Thus, a beneficiary's choice of health plan can affect not only whether services are covered but also how they are provided. To further the responsiveness of plan management and providers to the special needs and demands of Medicare beneficiaries, the committee suggests that plans actively and meaningfully include beneficiaries in their governance and board activities and otherwise integrate the consumer voice into the plan's management and decision making structure.

This said, the committee acknowledges that performance and disclosure requirements cannot compensate for limits on monetary resources for coverage. No amount or type of oversight and regulation can offset the intrinsic limitations on quality and access that necessarily follow from low levels of funding by the political process or the inability or unwillingness of beneficiaries to pay additional fees for health services.

Subrecommendations

The committee recommends that the federal government be given the flexibility to adjust the conditions of participation to

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

take into account the evolution of higher standards and new systems and structures for ensuring informed choice and public accountability of Medicare choices. (See Box 3-2.)

Quality Assurance and Outcomes

Findings

The availability of Medicare choices introduces a potential for competition among plans on the basis of improvements in quality of care. To capitalize on this potential, the quality of service provided by health plans must be measurable and must be communicated to beneficiaries in a way that is relevant to them so that quality can be taken into account and so that a beneficiary can make an informed choice. Choice in health care, as in any environment, also introduces incentives to restrict the provision of or payment for services to remain competitive. This can produce effective and needed economies by reducing inappropriate or noncovered services. It may also, however, reduce the amount of appropriate care provided. Quality measures, monitoring, and meaningful ways of disclosing and communicating findings are needed so that the federal government and beneficiaries can hold plans accountable for reaching an appropriate balance between restricting inappropriate care and providing appropriate care.

The committee finds that quality measurement and communication are still in the early stages of development, especially quality measurements based on outcomes. Important initial efforts are under way by private credentialing agencies, such as NCQA's HEDIS, JCAHO, the Foundation for Accountability, and others, to develop reporting systems and measures of health plan quality. These efforts, however, reduce but do not eliminate the risk of poor quality.

Subrecommendations

To best ensure quality, all Medicare choices should be subjected to comparable state-of-the-art standards and monitoring for quality. The federal government should use the best of the currently available technology to set standards and monitor the

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

BOX 3-2
Conditions of Participation

The committee recommends that all Medicare choices meet the following minimum standards:

  • participate in the annual open season and sell policies to Medicare beneficiaries during that open season or on certain other occasions, such as when a beneficiary first becomes eligible;
  • offer open enrollment, guaranteed renewal, and no clauses precluding enrollment because of a preexisting condition for newly eligible beneficiaries and for beneficiaries changing plans;
  • offer Part A and B benefits (except for Medigap policies) and meet other Medicare benefits requirements;
  • provide information specified by the federal government to ensure informed choice by beneficiaries;
  • meet quality certification requirements comparable to those already in use and in development by recognized national private accrediting entities and require appropriate progress and improvement against such standards over time;
  • have resources, including appropriate mixes of specialists and referral resources, to provide benefits throughout service areas to a reasonable degree defined by the federal government so as not to divide metropolitan areas or counties except when natural barriers or other conditions divide service areas;
  • provide a user-friendly, well-communicated, and responsive appeals and grievance process and allow retroactive disenrollment of beneficiaries who are determined by a fair and appropriate process to have misunderstood the implications of their choice and who have suffered serious financial or other consequences;
  • meet fair marketing standards; * meet specified fiscal solvency and financial disclosure requirements, allow compliance audits of financial and quality assurance operations, agree to use federal government-promulgated terms for describing coverages, and agree to accept enrollees without prejudice in all circumstances and particularly when the beneficiary has been enrolled in a plan that has gone out of business or become insolvent within the prior 60 days;
  • not discourage providers from advising patients regarding their treatment options and plan coverages;
  • provide such data to the federal government as required for it to test the plan's performance and compliance; and
  • provide such information as it may require to the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center.
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

quality of health plans. When the standards and processes of private credentialing agencies meet or exceed those of the federal government, private organizations should be used to reduce duplication in the market. The federal government might well foster competition and innovation among private credentialing agencies for different aspects of this function.

Communication with beneficiaries about the quality of a health plan and traditional Medicare plans should be done by the Medicare Customer Service and Enrollment Center by using the latest information available from credentialing processes and the latest techniques for communicating plan performance. In this vein the federal government should give priority to research and demonstrations on communicating quality performance information to beneficiaries.

The committee recommends the development of common definitions for reporting quality for use by individual plans and for auditing plans against their own published reports to the federal government.

Managed Care and Underserved Populations

Findings

The committee is concerned about ensuring access to health plans and their services for all beneficiaries, including those in vulnerable populations and underserved areas. Although the average Medicare beneficiary has been shown to have good access to care, certain groups who have been identified as vulnerable in traditional Medicare may be at risk for access problems in Medicare managed care. These groups have been identified by PPRC to include African-American beneficiaries and those who live in Health Professional Shortage Areas or urban and rural poverty areas. Evidence indicates that managed care arrangements have been slow to include underserved populations, especially those in rural areas (Institute of Medicine, 1996).

At the workshop and through the commissioned papers the committee was made aware of the special value that elderly individuals place on having easy access to their physicians, and the importance that they place on being treated by their providers in a respectful and a socially and culturally sensitive way.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

The committee heard again and again that elderly individuals place key importance on their ability to have access to "their" traditional providers with whom they have developed a personal relationship.

The importance of considering the effect of personal and cultural factors on access is heightened by the changing demographics of the U.S. population. The committee heard that certain Medicare beneficiaries (particularly low-income and minority groups) may be at significantly higher risk of not being able to continue to be seen by their traditional network of providers in an environment of managed care. Because of the lower socioeconomic status of many individuals who are members of minority groups, a managed care plan may be the only delivery option that is affordable.

As managed care plans continue to develop they will have an increased responsibility to improve access for underserved populations. The committee believes that health plans should be held responsible for serving their entire service area without compromising access or quality of care. The committee found that some providers who have served their communities for many years or who are part of essential community provider networks, have not obtained the credentials required by some managed care organizations either because of institutional racism or common practice within their specialty to forego board certification. It is important that health plans develop several measures of clinical competence that are sensitive, valid, and reliable in their ability to assess clinical competence through both outcome and process indicators. The committee heard testimony that managed care plans often do not disclose their credentialing standards and policies. At the very least, such disclosure should be required. The committee lauds the efforts under way in HCFA, PPRC, a number of health foundations and other groups to track and address key issues that could arise in monitoring access to care under a restructured Medicare program.

Subrecommendations

Broad access for Medicare beneficiaries is key. The committee recommends that the federal government ensure that there is adequate access and choice of plans for individuals in all

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

socioeconomic, cultural, and language groups and for underserved areas and populations. Elderly beneficiaries particularly value care that is respectful, personalized, and culturally sensitive. When warranted and documented (i.e., when access is demonstrably inadequate), the federal government should require the plans in an area to improve their contracting with community-based providers who meet quality-of-care standards as a condition of participation.

Recommendation 7

Serious consideration should be given and a study should be commissioned for establishing a new function along the lines of a Medicare Market Board, Commission, or Council to administer the Medicare choices process and hold all Medicare choices accountable. The proposed entity would include an advisory committee composed of key stakeholders, including purchasers, providers, and consumers.

Medicare Market Board and HCFA

Findings

Bearing in mind the recommendations that the committee has made regarding ensuring public accountability and informed purchasing for beneficiaries in an environment of choice, the committee had a number of concerns as it relates to the choice management capabilities of HCFA, as it is currently structured, to effectively manage Medicare choices. The committee spent considerable time discussing the challenges and complexities of effectively managing two very different and potentially competing programs. For example:

  • The administration of the multiple choice program and the management of the traditional Medicare programs involve very different missions and orientations.
  • The two functions require different types of management, staff expertise, backgrounds, and knowledge. The committee is concerned that staff and senior managers with extensive experience in managing various aspects of multiple choice in the private sector be recruited and employed for this effort.
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
  • The functions call for different organizational and corporate cultures, one operating a stable traditional public indemnity insurance program and the other a purchaser- and customer-oriented program that is required to be responsive to a diverse group of private programs in a rapidly changing and dynamic marketplace.
  • A faster response to changing market conditions and opportunities is required for the effective management of competing plans to provide the best options for beneficiaries. Such responsiveness may be hard to achieve with the regulatory constraints of HCFA.
  • The committee believes that these strengthened and new responsibilities for managing the choice of plans must be supported by adequate organizational, financial, and staffing resources, which are needed to effectively and efficiently accomplish the mission described here.
Subrecommendations

The committee believes that these growing choice management functions would benefit from an organizational identity with the stature to facilitate recruitment of the needed leadership and staff and to build public trust. For that reason the committee recommends that serious consideration be given to establishing a new function along the lines of a Medicare Market Board, Commission, or Council that would include an advisory committee with key stakeholders (i.e., purchasers, providers, and consumers).

The committee was not able to research adequately the question of where this function should be located in government. The committee is aware of current initiatives to simplify and streamline government regulations as well as the efforts being made by HCFA to address some of the committee's concerns. The committee's discussions included the option of incorporating the new Medicare Market Board entity within HCFA, but with dedicated management and resources; establishing a Federal Reserve Board type of agency that has greater flexibility in rule making; establishing a PPRC- or ProPAC-type entity reporting to the Congress; as well as other possibilities.

With that in mind and given the potential impact of the

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×

proposed new entity on the health care economy and the wellbeing of 37 million beneficiaries, the committee recommends that the U.S. Congress commission a study on what functions should be included in any new entity and what functions should stay with the present organizational structure, the roles and experience of federal agencies with a comparable mix of functions, the rationale for their structure, their organizational placement (including their relationship to the U.S. Congress and the executive branch) to better assess the advantages and potential shortcomings of moving in this direction.

In recommending the consideration of a new function such as a Medicare Market Board, the committee was cognizant of the fact that even a new entity will be limited or circumscribed by the realities of the political and fiscal environments in which it must operate and be accountable.

The committee envisions any proposed entity to have general responsibilities in the following areas:

  • Data collection, data publication, consumer education, and support
    • Contract with a Customer Service and Enrollment Center for these functions and augment the Center's services by using Choice Facilitating Organizations.
  • Health plan standards
    • Consult experts and conduct research and demonstrations to refine the conditions of participation by health plans on an ongoing basis to reflect the service and quality that the government expects for Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of the plan that they choose. The conditions would be set on a national basis and would be measurable and subject to an annual evaluation of compliance. To the greatest extent possible they would be consistent with standards used by the private sector to minimize duplication.
    • Invoke specific sanctions in the event that the standards of a plan fall below the set standards.
  • Benefits, quality, and fair payment to health plans
    • Continually review clinical developments and services pertaining to what constitutes quality or appropriate care and refine the definitions of benefits under Medicare Part A and Part B.
Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
×
    • Review developments in the health insurance marketplace and refine the standard benefit description, pricing, and marketing requirements.
    • Review risk selection in the traditional Medicare program and health plans and develop procedures or recommendations to the U.S. Congress for controlling or adjusting for adverse and favorable selection.
  • Evaluation and improvement of multiple choice in Medicare
    • Review the workings of the multiple choice market for Medicare beneficiaries and report to the U.S. Congress on the extent to which beneficiaries are able to make informed choices, the extent to which government and beneficiaries are succeeding in holding plans accountable for ensuring quality of care and containing costs, and ways to improve the system's performance.
    • Review traditional Medicare and health plan costs and performance to determine whether the amount and form of the federal government's contribution to costs (e.g., premium payment) yields the government and its beneficiaries both containment of costs and assurance of quality.
    • Report and recommend changes to the U.S. Congress to better hold plans accountable to these ends.

In conducting each of its responsibilities, it would adhere to rigorous conflict-of-interest standards.

Suggested Citation:"3 Findings and Reccomendations." Institute of Medicine. 1996. Improving the Medicare Market: Adding Choice and Protections. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5299.
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Medicare beneficiaries are rapidly moving into managed care, as attempts to restrain the growth of this costly entitlement program progress.

However, advocates for patients question whether the necessary information and structures are in place to enable Medicare consumers to select wisely among private-sector managed care options. Improving the Medicare Market examines how to give Medicare beneficiaries the same choice of health plan options enjoyed in the private sector—yet protect them as consumers and patients.

This book recommends approaches to ensuring accountability and informed purchasing for Medicare beneficiaries in an environment of broader choice and managed care—how the government should evaluate and approve plans, what role the traditional Medicare program should play, how to help to elderly understand their options, and many other practical matters.

The committee discusses the information requirements of Medicare beneficiaries and explores in detail how best to respond to their special needs. And it examines the procedures that should be developed to provide the necessary protections for the elderly in a managed care system.

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