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Page 10
1 Deterrence: An Overview
GENAndrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired)
and
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Seymour J. Deitchman, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired)
INTRODUCTION
How should we think about deterrence in the new strategic
environment? With the demise of the "Soviet threat," we have begun
to focus much of our attention on deterring aggression by countries
using conventional means. And yet, nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence still loom large, because of the weapons' vast and
instantaneous destructive power. In addition, the slow but
apparently inexorable spread of those and other weapons of mass
destruction raises issues that cannot be ignored. The different
weapons—nuclear, chemical, biological—and the actions
that countries and sub- or transnational groups may take to obtain
and possibly to use them, despite treaty constraints, must be
separated and treated differently from each other because the time
scales and physical attributes of the weapons' actions are
different.1 How to deter the use
of any of them, when we2 are
unable, on moral and treaty grounds, to threaten to reply in kind
in any but the nuclear area, and when even that response may be
deemed morally insupportable in many situations, is a matter of
deep concern. In addition, under the obligations taken by the
nuclear weapons states, including the United States, under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as extended for an
indefinite period one year ago, the United States is obligated to
decrease its nuclear arsenals and to decrease the leverage that
nuclear weapons exert in the international arena. It is through
this decrease in leverage that the
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OCR for page 10
Page 10
1 Deterrence: An Overview
GENAndrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired)
and
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Seymour J. Deitchman, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired)
INTRODUCTION
How should we think about deterrence in the new strategic
environment? With the demise of the "Soviet threat," we have begun
to focus much of our attention on deterring aggression by countries
using conventional means. And yet, nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence still loom large, because of the weapons' vast and
instantaneous destructive power. In addition, the slow but
apparently inexorable spread of those and other weapons of mass
destruction raises issues that cannot be ignored. The different
weapons—nuclear, chemical, biological—and the actions
that countries and sub- or transnational groups may take to obtain
and possibly to use them, despite treaty constraints, must be
separated and treated differently from each other because the time
scales and physical attributes of the weapons' actions are
different.1 How to deter the use
of any of them, when we2 are
unable, on moral and treaty grounds, to threaten to reply in kind
in any but the nuclear area, and when even that response may be
deemed morally insupportable in many situations, is a matter of
deep concern. In addition, under the obligations taken by the
nuclear weapons states, including the United States, under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as extended for an
indefinite period one year ago, the United States is obligated to
decrease its nuclear arsenals and to decrease the leverage that
nuclear weapons exert in the international arena. It is through
this decrease in leverage that the
1 Passive defense against chemical and
biological weapons, in the form of protective clothing, antidotes,
and vaccines, is easier than passive defense against nuclear
weapons, although we have given far less attention to such
protection against biological weapons than against chemical
weapons. In an unprotected environment, chemical weapons may tend
to have more localized—although still deadly—effects, and
they are far less lethal per pound of agent delivered than are the
other weapons. Biological weapons may take time to make their
effects felt, and their source may be more difficult to identify if
delivery is clandestine, but they may carry a greater risk of
backfiring against the user. Biological weapons will remain highly
dangerous to civilian populations unless passive protections can be
much enhanced by intelligence, detection and evaluation methods and
installations, and widespread availability of vaccines and
antidotes for all known agents.
2 Throughout, the editorial "we" is used
to refer to the U.S. policy makers and decision makers who must
devise and decide on deterrence actions in any particular
case.
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Page 11
discriminatory aspects of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
are to be erased over time. This ultimate result remains highly
uncertain under current world conditions.
These developments associated with weapons of mass destruction,
together with the issues involved in deterring the use of
conventional force for purposes inimical to our interests, further
complicate the already intricate environment into which we would
extend the concept of deterrence that served so well during the
Cold War period. At the same time, changing attitudes in the United
States, deriving from the subsidence of the most extreme dangers to
U.S. security and that of our long-term allies, have altered the
way we can respond to threats against our interests and against
other nations whose security is related to ours. The tools
available to us to respond have also changed, with the advent of
conventional weaponry of unprecedented precision and power. All of
these factors require new answers to the question of how to think
about deterrence in today's world.
It is not easy to disengage from thinking about matters
affecting the potential for peace, war, and survival that evolved
for half a century. The discussions and the collection of papers
(see the appendixes) that form the foundation of this overview of
the subject represent the best thinking about the problem that
could be generated at this stage of development of the new world
outlook. Some of the points of view presented will solidify in much
the form presented; others are not yet ready to do so. Important
differences remain within the special group of study participants
and in the nation; they are highlighted in this chapter. They occur
especially in areas having to do with:
• The potential uses and value of nuclear weapons in
deterring attacks on close U.S. allies and vital U.S. interests by
states using powerful conventional forces or chemical and
biological weapons;
• Active defense against ballistic missiles attacking the
United States; and
• Assessments of the extent to which less-than-vital U.S.
interests might justify the use of military force, with attendant
casualties, in the eyes of the American public.
To answer the lead question, this chapter first examines what
deterrence means in the new environment. The group of study
participants found that some principles endure; these are reviewed
in the new context. The group next examined ways to extend these
principles into the post-Cold War world situation. Finally, this
chapter examines some approaches to analyzing deterrence policies
that can shed light on how such policies may function in the new
environment and that can help the United States and the U.S. naval
forces prepare for action in future situations.
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THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE
The concept of deterrence applied to international affairs is
generally well understood. However, it can become extremely complex
in application.
In its simplest form, to deter means to inhibit or prevent
someone from doing something. Military force used in some form and
to some degree underpins all types of deterrence. In the context of
an overall policy, however, military force is likely to be only one
tool among many diplomatic, economic, political, and military
responses or anticipatory actions designed to guide development of
an international interaction in directions that will prevent an
outcome inimical to our interests. If deterrence of an undesirable
action on the international scene fails, we may use military force
for "compellance," and if we judge that the threat of force may
trigger a preemptive attack we may use forms of "reassurance,"3beyond
simple declarations to convince an adversary that an attack on our
part is not planned. Each of these concepts, and the
other-thanmilitary tools associated with prevention of hostile acts
or those threatening our interests, has its own qualities and modes
of operation. None is independent of any of the others in actual
policy implementation. In all of them, the issue is to devise means
to affect other nations' behavior, and to recognize that our own
behavior will be affected by their responses. To avoid further
complicating an already extremely complex set of concepts, in
this chapter the term "deterrence" is applied to the entire field
of activities that may be involved in averting actions on the
international scene that can harm U.S. interests and those of our
close allies.4
Deterrence represents an early stage in a broad protection of
our interests, analogous to a military defense in depth. The
protection starts with avoiding war by many means, and ends with
fighting it in both defensive and offensive phases. During the Cold
War, it was an attractive approach for the United States when it
was not feasible to defend everywhere against all conceivable
threats. For example, defending the small, surrounded Western
garrison in Berlin was impractical, but an attack could be deterred
by the threat of certain NATO responses elsewhere. Also during this
period, deterrence became closely associated with nuclear weapons
and their unique ability to threaten immediate and massive
destruction. In the NATO context, the policy of deterrence was
elaborated over the years to include a number of steps ("graduated
response," "flexible response," "selective release") involving a
sequence of graded
3 The term "reassurance"
was initially proposed by Sir Michael Howard to refer to the
climate of reassurance that U.S. participation in European and
global security arrangements during the Cold War conveyed to our
allies (see Sir Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War,"
Survival, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 161-166). It has been
extended by John D. Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution to
"reassurance" that violence in settling their affairs is not
planned among nations (see Appendix A of this report).
4 Richard Garwin notes,
"I believe that it is desirable to retain the concepts of
'reassurance,' 'compellance,' 'defense,' and 'deterrence'; then
there ought to be a pure 'deterrence' as a subcategory
itself."
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responses with conventional and tactical nuclear forces before
an all-out nuclear response would be invoked. This approach
provided an opportunity to convey the will to respond to an attack
in a manner suited to the provocation, without immediately
escalating to a full nuclear exchange.
During this period, deterrence was commonly thought about in
terms of convincing our major opponents that a particular action
would elicit a response resulting in unacceptable damage that would
outweigh any likely benefit. These concepts of deterrence were
extended to other potential flashpoints, such as Korea. We sought
to threaten "unacceptable damage" in an attempt to make the
Vietnamese Communists desist from pursuing their war in South
Vietnam. It was clear from the outcome that the United States
generally underestimated the level of damage, and perhaps
misunderstood the kind of damage, that the North Vietnamese would
consider "unacceptable"—a result that has relevance to that
concept today.
Rather than a simple cost/benefits calculation, deterrence is
more usefully thought of in terms of a dynamic process with
provisions for continuous feedback. The process initially involves
determining who shall attempt to deter whom from
doing what, and by what means. The who may
involve building a robust multinational "coalition of the willing"
with a wide range of capabilities and overwhelming resources with
which to threaten an adversary. This combination of will and
resources must be credible not only in terms of an ability to
inflict unacceptable damage and/or to deny success, but also in
terms of the willingness to pay the necessary costs and bear the
pain that may be associated with executing threats. Positive
inducements also should be considered as part of this range of
capabilities. Of course these capabilities must be communicated in
a clear and authoritative manner to the parties to be deterred,
including demonstration of the capabilities where warranted by the
occasion.
The target of deterrence—the whom-—needs to be
explicitly defined so that the necessary analyses can be undertaken
to understand the adversary's objectives, the importance he
attaches to the action that is to be deterred, key vulnerabilities,
propensity to take risks, bases of power, most valued assets, and
other factors likely to influence key decisions. Not least in
importance is the adversary's value system, in which the same set
of facts and prospects may be viewed quite differently from the way
the United States would view them. Within that value system, the
prejudices, misperceptions, and calculations of a leader who may be
an absolute ruler accountable to no one can loom large in
commanding an understanding of the situation to be deterred as we
view it. Creating this understanding is an essential underpinning
for U.S. and allied deterrence policy and action, and yet it is
sometimes neglected to the detriment of those policies.
The action to be prevented—the what—also needs
to be clearly defined. In principle, we might want to prevent all
acts that violate the principles of international law, especially
when such acts are not consistent with U.S. interests. As a
practical matter, however, we usually focus on those that may
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have the most important consequences for the United States. And,
in some cases, the more serious threats are not those with a high
probability of taking place. For example, even during the Cold War,
the probability of nuclear attack generally was quite low; however,
the consequences of such an attack would be so severe that
deterring such action demanded a high priority.
Finally, the means matter. An attack by conventional
forces calls for one kind of response, and permits graded responses
by various opposing forces. The possibility of attack by weapons
designed to produce mass casualties might be an entirely different
matter. As discussion below makes clear, it is not always apparent
what the promised means of response should be, and deterrence of
such attacks may be deemed to require means, such as theater
missile defense, that entail both tangible and intangible costs
that we have yet to face squarely.
Several important assumptions underlie most thinking about
deterrence. Practitioners tend to assume, for example, that states
are unitary actors, and logical according to our concepts of
rationality. Deterrence also assumes that we can adequately
understand the calculations of an opponent. One of the most
important assumptions during the Cold War was that nuclear weapons
were the most effective deterrent to war between the states of the
East and the West. This assumption, carried into the post-Cold War
era, however, may promote nuclear proliferation. Indeed, some
authors suggest that the spread of nuclear weapons would deter more
states from going to war against one another. The weapons would, it
is argued, provide weaker states with more security against attacks
by stronger neighbors. Of course, this view is also predicated on
the assumption that every state actor's rationality will work
against the use of such weapons, and that nuclear arms races will
therefore not end in nuclear warfare.
In addition to threats of unacceptable damage, a strategy
involving deterrence may also include more positive efforts to gain
the desired behavior through an approach that extends the idea of
"reassurance" to the post-Cold War conditions. The United States
may undertake a variety of measures designed to induce rather than
compel desired behavior, from various political and economic
incentives to agreements on non-threatening force postures. Thus
the notion of “deterrence" in its fullest sense may involve a
complete range of tools to influence international behavior,
including the use of diplomacy, trade, aid, military force, arms
control agreements, and other means at the disposal of the
deterring power. One way of enticing a potential adversary to
forego aggressive behavior is to help the adversary develop a stake
in cooperative arrangements among nations to achieve mutually
agreed ends. As part of this participation, and to help bring it
about, the adversary needs "reassurance," based on observation,
that the opposing military posture is not immediately
threatening-that it serves merely as an "existential" deterrent.
Conversely, changes in such a posture can be made to reinforce
deterrence if necessary, with due attention to avoidance of
misperception on the part of the adversary. In thinking of
deterrence as a process, it is useful to envision a succession of
related, sometimes parallel steps, and to anticipate some options
if deterrence fails. Such steps could include the following:
Detect the onset or plans of
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threatening moves; dissuade the potential aggressor from
making such moves (perhaps through reassurance, carrots, and
implied sticks); deter by putting the sticks in place;
defeat the move if it is made; and destroy the
capability to make such moves in the future. Such a series of
steps, however, does not imply a rigid, linear process. Continuing,
timely feedback is crucial in each stage; parallelism between
deterrence actions promising military reactions and those using
measures of reassurance can provide powerful inducements; and, if
deterrence fails, appropriate responses should be adapted to the
dynamics of the situation, and designed to deny success to the
adversary, rather than automatically following plans made in the
abstract.
THE NEW CONTEXT
The context for deterrence has changed dramatically since the
end of the Cold War. Deterrence of actions inimical to U.S.
interests must now take place in an unstable world in which the
power of nations and of transnational groups is more diverse and
spreading more widely. Devising relationships with many of these
power centers remains a dynamic and changeable process. The problem
of deterrence is thus more complex than it was, and the approaches
to situations requiring deterrent actions must be even more
measured and flexible. The likelihood that the United States may
become involved in warfare using conventional forces, initiated by
states other than the major powers, in matters involving less than
national survival, has increased, while the relative roles of
nuclear and conventional weapons have changed.
In connection with the nuclear threat we now must place more
emphasis on issues of proliferation, while conventional forces are
becoming increasingly important for deterrence in the strategic
sense. The other weapons that produce mass
casualties-—chemical and especially biological
weapons—are coming to be of increasing concern, because they
may be wielded by rogue states or terrorists who do not subscribe
to the commonly accepted tenets of international law.
In the bipolar world, the West developed a generalized notion of
deterrence that sought to prevent the Soviet Union from using force
to further foreign policy goals, mainly by coupling nuclear and
conventional forces so that any use of force between the
superpowers raised the prospect of escalation and nuclear war. This
approach to deterrence was not effective outside the main
NATO-Warsaw pact confrontation in Europe, because it became clear
that we would view it as neither appropriate nor necessary to go to
the extreme of unleashing nuclear weapons against perceived Soviet
proxies in limited conflicts like those in Korea and Vietnam. More
specific invocations of the mere existence of deterrent forces were
more successful. For example, in the Cuban missile crisis the U.S.
blockade of Cuba risked escalation that could have culminated in
the use of nuclear weapons. The willingness of the United States to
take that risk, together with overwhelming U.S. conventional force
superiority in the theater, persuaded the Soviet Union to draw back
from its
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deploy and sustain a nuclear force in Cuba.5 In that case, U.S. security was
directly involved, lending credence to any implied military threat,
including potential use of nuclear weapons if it came to that.
In the current world situation, with one exception to be noted,
U.S. security is not directly threatened, but our interests remain
global. They have taken on an underlying economic character, which
interacts with our desire to see democratic regimes spread and
flourish based on the premise, articulated in the President's
National Security Strategy, that "[t]he more that democracy and
political and economic liberalization take hold in the world . . .
the safer our nation is likely to be . . . . " In addition, as the
developing countries of the world sort out their internal and
external relationships in the post-Cold War environment, this
sorting out process has generated ethnic conflict, large refugee
migrations as people flee violence and war, and the potential for
mass starvation and disease that the United States and its Western
allies may feel obliged to alleviate on humanitarian grounds. Steps
in this direction often involve military forces because they are
well organized, they are disciplined, they can act quickly and with
unique ability to focus resources, and the activities often need
protection. After Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the
humanitarian mission for the U.S. military is becoming a more
formally recognized element of the mission spectrum than was the
case earlier.
The waning of direct threats to our national security and the
rise of more general threats to international stability that are
nevertheless inimical to our interests over the long term require
thought about the nature of our strategic interests and about
appropriate responses to such "less-than-vital" threats. Our
strategic interests must now be seen as those involving the
fundamental elements of our political cohesion, our economic
well-being, and our ability to use our military power to defend
them, wherever they are seriously challenged, rather than involving
only an attack on our homeland. Deterrence in the face of such
threats, which have reduced immediacy but nevertheless retain
strategic importance, will probably require U.S. leadership to
develop a sustained pattern of international responses to low
levels of aggression that makes it clear that such behavior will
not be tolerated by the international community.
Unless Russia, with its remaining large stock of nuclear
warheads and intercontinental delivery systems, again turns
hostile, we no longer face a serious military threat to our
immediate survival. The prospect of war among the major powers is
lower than at any time in centuries. Large-scale aggression is not
a major temptation for the major powers; seizing territory by force
is not worth the risk of major power conflict with the human and
material expense that would be involved, although there may be a
few marginal situations where the chance for a response is thought
to be low, as in the Spratly Islands, or where the stakes are
perceived by those involved to embrace issues of high political
interest, as between China and Taiwan.
5 See GEN Anatoly I. Gribkov and GEN
William Y. Smith, USA, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and
Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis,
edition q, inc., Chicago, 1994.
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There is some evidence that Russia's substantial numbers of
nuclear weapons, representing the only serious threat to U.S.
survival for the foreseeable future, may take on increasing
political significance for Moscow as one of the few residual
military supports for its status as a major power, after the
serious deterioration of other Russian military capabilities. A
more immediate danger is posed by the possible loss to outside
forces of Russian nuclear warheads, or nuclear materials and
expertise that would enable others to make nuclear weapons in a
relatively short time. And the illicit "nuclear weapons" need not
be nuclear explosives; if the bomb that exploded in the New York
World Trade Center had included large amounts of highly radioactive
material, for example, thousands of deaths could have resulted over
time. These possibilities present the most serious security problem
facing the United States and, accordingly, must continue to receive
priority attention. In this case, an effective deterrent strategy
will need to include substantial reassurance efforts
vis-à-vis the Russians, involving cooperative relationships
in many areas, and helping to provide assurance with high levels of
certainty that all Russian weapons and fissile material are secure
and fully accounted for.
The implications of the fundamental change in context are most
significant for the nuclear force postures of the United States and
Russia. Their operational safety is now more important than
operational readiness. During the Cold War these forces were
designed and organized to generate massive strikes from widely
dispersed locations on short notice. But large numbers are no
longer necessary, and time is no longer critical. As a result, the
capabilities that contributed to a high state of readiness during
the Cold War could now pose risks of unauthorized launch. Moreover,
we are likely to have ample warning should Russia again turn
hostile toward the United States or NATO allies. In addition, the
conventional military balance has shifted dramatically in favor of
NATO. Therefore, the primary objective now is to achieve a stable
and enduring posture of deterrence that is not threatening to
either side.
Another hostile superpower with a large nuclear arsenal of size
comparable to our own under the START agreement could emerge at
some future time, an event that would also heighten our concern
about the risks of a major nuclear standoff. Thus far, such an
event appears unlikely, but in any case we should have ample
warning of its development. Consequently, we have turned increasing
attention to the risks attending proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction. The dangers of proliferation
are exacerbated by the existence of a few rogue regimes seeking
such weapons, who appear to want them to establish regional
dominance and to spoil perceived influence by the United States and
its allies, and who we fear may use them in what we view as
reckless disregard of the costs and dangers involved. These
developments pose a new kind of problem for the United States: how
to deal with a small, intensely hostile nuclear power.
First, we must decide how we define our interests where they
interact with the presence of such opponents. Actual or potential
military conflict with a rogue regime at some future time could, if
the rogue regime possesses nuclear
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weapons, place our troops and our allies at high enough risk to
deter us from acting as forthrightly as we might if only
conventional forces were involved. In effect, the possession of
nuclear weapons by a rogue regime would lead us to view the
importance of certain interests differently from how we might view
them otherwise. Nor are we certain whether we would or should use
nuclear weapons in response to attacks involving biological or
chemical weapons.6These problems contribute to continuing
issues in defining the role of our nuclear deterrent if
non-proliferation efforts fail. There is as yet no agreement among
the experts on these issues (including those who participated in
this study). They are examined again, from different perspectives,
at several points below in this chapter.
A second problem, which the experience of the Gulf War has led
us to associate closely with the so-called rogue regimes, is the
role of active defense against delivery of weapons of mass
destruction by long-range ballistic missiles. Through a series of
arms control agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union
limited their defenses against ballistic missiles, and as a
mutually agreed result both remained vulnerable in the interest of
deterring a nuclear war. But, given the change in threat, a debate
has emerged (and has also been reflected in differences of view, to
be highlighted in due course, among the participants in the current
study) over the wisdom of developing a theater missile defense
(TMD) system whose performance characteristics could impact our
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty obligations.
Some argue that such a capability is necessary to defend against
proliferators and that it would help to deter such strikes. The
defenses are believed to be especially needed to protect our allies
against hostile actions by rogue regimes. Others argue that TMD
systems can be easily and inexpensively overcome by alternate
delivery means for weapons especially aimed at civilian targets,
and that development of antimissile defenses threatens to undermine
the fundamental stability among the major nuclear powers that is
reflected in the ABM treaty and, by extension, associated treaties
like START II. These arguments extend to protection of the U.S.
homeland from attack by regional powers who may have small numbers
of nuclear weapons and intercontinental-range delivery means
derived by extending the capabilities of medium-range ballistic
missiles or space launch capabilities (and who may have the ability
to deliver biological weapons by the same means).
This controversy accentuates several issues in crafting a new
set of deterrence policies. They include important linkages between
offensive and defensive systems; the key role of arms control in
constraining both; the implications of technical boundaries between
the theater and strategic-level
6 Richard Garwin notes, ''If the treaties
against possession of chemical and biological weapons are
universalized, then an international coalition could act even
before the use of such weapons, and even against a nation that had
not accepted the biological or chemical warfare treaty. (That is my
meaning of the term 'universalized.')" With the use of nuclear
weapons to respond to biological warfare, the additional problem is
what to destroy. To destroy only the biological warfare production
capability may not be a significant deterrent.
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systems, and the viability of those boundaries as guarantors of
adherence to the ABM treaty; and the important role of the rogue
regimes in setting the stage for the arguments. Examples of the
last include the Iraqi Scud missile attacks against Tel Aviv during
the Gulf War, and the significance for Japan of the prospect of
North Korean long-range missiles that could carry nuclear
warheads.
The problems entailed in stopping or even slowing proliferation
will tax our ability to craft consistent and effective deterrence
policies. The diversity of the actors in proliferation, and the
complexity of our relationships with them, mean that they must be
treated case by case. The ambitious Iraqi nuclear weapons program
that had made significant progress, and Iraqi development of
chemical and biological weapons for delivery by theater ballistic
missiles, highlight the difficulty of learning the details of, much
less deterring, such developments. The approach of involving the
"target" nation in cooperative relationships with other nations,
together with providing reassurance that an attack on that nation
is not planned, is being tried as part of our approach to prevent
acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea, with as yet
uncertain prospects of success. The argument with Russia over
reactor sales to Iran shows how difficult it is to establish and
maintain situation-specific flexibility—the Russians raise the
question of why, if we are willing to give reactors to North Korea,
we do not want them sold to Iran, subject to strict
non-proliferation safeguards. Nuances of differences about the
depth and reliability of inspection and control regimes to guard
against potential diversion of weapons-grade materials become lost
in the first-order political disagreements among the parties in the
exchanges. All such interactions move our policy challenges far
from the straightforward alignment of capabilities to counter
opposing capabilities that characterized deterrence during the Cold
War.
As noted in connection with deterrence of chemical and
biological weapons use by rogue regimes, we must come to grips with
still-unresolved questions about the appropriateness of invoking
the prospect of a nuclear response to deter the use of those
weapons, and if that is not appropriate, what such a deterrent
should be. All such weapons are delivered in a political context.
If the United States and our major allies are not directly
threatened, the use of nuclear weapons against populations who are
viewed as distinct from their "evil" leaders would likely be deemed
inappropriate, no matter what weapons atrocities the leaders
perpetrate. U.S. and allied holdings of chemical and biological
weapons are prohibited by treaty obligations, precluding a response
in kind; such a response would in any case be deemed inappropriate,
for the same reasons. Thus, there is a growing body of opinion,
still in contention, that nuclear weapons should be used by the
United States and the industrialized nations solely to deter the
use of nuclear weapons, while the use of other weapons of mass
destruction should elicit conventional-weapons responses in
addition to a wide array of active and passive countermeasures.
The coalition response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provides a
model to deter such efforts in the future—a determined and
decisive U.S.-led multinational force operating under U.N.
authority. The Gulf War outcome
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demonstrated that high-technology conventional weapons can
strike devastating blows against the political, economic, and
military power base of a country without the need to resort to the
use of nuclear weapons. This demonstration has value in deterring
major attacks with conventional forces, but as noted above that
value might become less certain should another opponent, or Iraq in
a future action, have nuclear weapons at the outset. Thus, one is
led to the conclusion that both are necessary: powerful
conventional weapons that we are willing to use in a strategic
sense, and a nuclear deterrent that nobody would challenge by using
nuclear weapons against us. In addition, U.S. nuclear forces must
be sufficient to deter any combination of attackers who may have
such weapons from using them against us or our closest allies.
The widely held perception, growing since the Gulf War, that the
United States is unwilling to take casualties in conflicts that do
not directly affect important U.S. interests also has important
implications for deterrence in the new strategic environment. The
rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia after 18 soldiers were
killed, and the ongoing uneasiness (before and even during their
deployment) about casualties that might be suffered by U.S. ground
forces in the former Yugoslavia, foster this perception.7Resolution of the issue of whether the
United States has the will to use its powerful deterrent forces in
any specific situation thus remains ambiguous, and detracts from
our deterrent credibility.
Many also believe that we are at the dawn of a new era in the
use of military forces. A military-technical revolution is said to
be occurring that will fundamentally change the way forces are
used. It is based in part on steadily advancing military
technology, especially in the information-based areas of knowing
the dispositions and activities of an opponent's forces and
critical systems and facilities in detail, and being able to strike
at them from long distances in a short time with great precision.
Although it is not yet clear how we can integrate the new
technology into new operational concepts and suitable
organizations, some of the more important components are likely to
include information warfare, precision strike, and decisive
maneuver—i.e., maneuver that overwhelms an opponent before he
can respond. The challenge is to apply these new capabilities and
concepts credibly, in fact or in prospect, to specific problems
that we seek to deter, while preventing an opponent from using them
against us, or mitigating the effects of such use.
The trends and developments that have reduced the chances of war
between the major powers also suggest that international security
arrangements may increasingly emphasize more use of positive,
cooperative relations in place of the threats of punishment that
have dominated deterrence over the past 50 years.
7 Some of the study
participants who contributed to this report felt that the
deleterious effects of U.S. reluctance to use force have been
overstated. They believe that our prior actions, in the Gulf War,
and during the Cold War before that, show that we will use our
military when we deem the provocation to be sufficiently
serious.
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For example, nuclear weapons may be used in
''defense-of-last-resort" circumstances by weaker countries under
mortal attack by powerful neighbors. While the United States does
not now anticipate such circumstances, this cannot be said to be
true for all our allies in all circumstances.
The United States has offered some assurances to the effect that
such weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapons states
that are Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories other than in
circumstances such as alliance with another nuclear power.
Similarly, we have pledged to take positive steps, including
calling in the U.N. Security Council with its nuclear member
states, in response to any threat or use of nuclear weapons against
a non-nuclear state. Thus, in our own strategy, given our
preponderance of conventional strength, we convey the message that
we do not currently visualize using nuclear weapons in response to
a conventional attack on our interests. How the policy would play
out, in terms of warning and response, against a conventional
attack by a country that had nuclear weapons and might evince
willingness to use them against a massive U.S. and allied
conventional response, is a question in need of further
consideration. As in other areas involving the use of nuclear
weapons, decisions on these matters will likely be resolved in ways
particular to specific situations. It would certainly be useful,
however, to give some a priori thought to them, considering the
circumstances.
Any reexamination of this issue should focus initially on
exploring any post-Cold War changes in the policies of all five
declared nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China), which are also the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council. The examination must then be
extended to explore the circumstances of our allies, and the allies
of Russia and China, in different areas of the world, and how a
policy of no first use on the part of the United States would
affect all of our strategic positions vis-à-vis regional
neighbors.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Precision-Guided Munitions
At the core of the concept of deterrence is the known ability to
inflict damage that the opponent will view as unacceptable.
Therefore nuclear weapons have come to be closely associated with
deterrence because of their well-known ability to cause mass
destruction and casualties. Other means of producing mass
casualties, such as chemical and biological weapons, are, for
reasons of principle and treaty obligations, not available for the
United States in a deterrent role, even for response in kind. As
suggested above, we could be self-deterred from using nuclear
weapons in any circumstances where they are not used first, by the
prospect of unintended civilian casualties and destruction.
Traditional conventional weapons, including incendiaries that were
used extensively in World War II, can cause just as much damage to
a nation's vital facilities, given enough time and delivery
resources. Extensive damage to resident populations is also a
byproduct of such attacks; as has been noted at several points
above, inflicting such damage in matters involving less than
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national survival is likely to be viewed as unacceptable to the
U.S. public, and likely our close allies' societies.
The capabilities of conventional weapons have evolved
dramatically, however, offering what many see as an exit from the
mass-casualty dilemma. Highly accurate and lethal advanced
conventional weapons with precision guidance can destroy specific
targets with much less collateral damage, and they can be delivered
at long ranges with relatively low risk of friendly casualties. To
be effective, however, they require accurate and timely
intelligence and full situational awareness about the status of
targets and defenses. These new capabilities and attending support
requirements are currently driving the evolutionary development of
the U.S. armed forces. For the United States in its current world
situation and posture, these weapons may be more credible than
nuclear weapons in deterring any kind of aggression below the level
of a nuclear strike. However, their action, while more precise and
selective, is also much slower in a relative sense—it takes
days or weeks for their full effects to become apparent, as we saw
in the Gulf War and Bosnia, compared with the time to deliver a
single or a few nuclear weapons—and affords more ability to
respond. A party that thinks it can respond successfully will be
less likely to be deterred by the potential use of conventional
weapons. Also, if nuclear proliferation creeps ahead, the relative
postures of the United States and nations whose actions we wish to
deter will change. At low levels of threat, conventional weapons
may be a more effective deterrent than are nuclear weapons, but the
contributions of conventional weapons in deterring a nuclear threat
are another matter. Thus, the relative value of the two kinds of
weapons for deterrence remains to be seen, probably through many
trials, as in the Gulf and Bosnia examples. Again, the choice of
weaponry for deterrence and response will probably depend at least
as much on the specifics of situations and the intensity of threats
to our interests as on the inherent capability of the weapons. In
the long run, therefore, the nuclear and advanced conventional
capabilities are complementary rather than interchangeable, and
both sets of capabilities must be retained within our force
posture.
Extended Deterrence
"Extended deterrence" refers to the umbrella we extend over our
allies to protect their homelands, as well as our own, from attack.
In the Cold War, extended deterrence referred mainly to nuclear
attack, although as this chapter's authors note, nuclear attack and
conventional attack in NATO Europe were, by design, not decoupled
from each other in deterrence policy. Although the threat of attack
on our closest allies is low, the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains
important. And because the threat is low, the relationships that
form this important framework could atrophy unless they receive
regular attention.
Extended deterrence also serves to obviate the need for the
allies to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.
Germany and Japan, for example, could easily (in a technical sense)
develop nuclear weapons but instead rely on a
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close security relationship with the United States. However, the
spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to
smaller states, and neighboring rogue states, coupled with
perceptions about U.S. willingness to respond in local conflicts
not involving deep U.S. interests in the static situation, could
change those states' perceptions of need for their own weapons. In
addition, power relationships in the world will change over time,
and a currently unforeseen, credible threat of an overwhelming
conventional attack against a close ally could arise in the future.
Such a development could resurrect the Cold War era arguments in
favor of using nuclear weapons in extremis to respond to
massive conventional attacks. Thus, although the drift of events
and world power structures appears to favor reserving nuclear
weapons to be used only to deter the use of nuclear weapons,
including their use in extended deterrence, their potential use as
a deterrent against conventional attacks in some future
circumstances cannot be totally ruled out as we maintain our
extended deterrence posture. This is a matter of some controversy.
It may be a case in which, by necessity or by design, ambiguity
should be preserved until the need for a decision in a specific
situation appears.
Applying Deterrence Policy
Existential Deterrence
"Existential deterrence" simply means the existence of powerful
forces that a potential challenger knows can be brought into action
if the need arises. There is always hope that when the United
States expresses a desire to influence the outcome of a situation
in which the use of military force may be involved, the sheer power
we bring to the table by virtue of the existence of the strongest
military forces in the world will weigh heavily in leading to a
resolution of the issues. However, in the new environment as in the
old one, the fact of the existence of those forces, alone, will not
be sufficient to prevent many conflicts or actions against U.S.
interests. This is largely the result of perceptions about the
willingness of the United States to actually commit its formidable
military power in specific situations. Therefore, if a threat is
perceived, it will probably require more direct efforts on the part
of the United States to communicate our will and intention to act
than has been the case in the past. The lessons of history about
the dynamic quality of our interests, and the impact of force
movement and visibility on adversaries' perceptions at critical
times, will be especially important.
In connection with existential deterrence, however, nuclear
weapons play a special role. They provide existential deterrence
whether they are actually deployed or not. Nuclear weapons have
been given credit by some for having produced the longest absence
of all-out world war in recent history. This role of nuclear
weapons might even continue in the form of "virtual extended
deterrence," since most industrial nations could regenerate nuclear
weapons in a period as short as 1 or 2 years if an extended
worldwide conflict were to occur
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again. Moreover, certain U.S. deterrent actions might be
conditioned by knowledge of nuclear holdings by a prospective
antagonist.
Self-Deterrence
The United States can be self-deterred from acting by
establishing overly strict criteria for the use of military force.
The criteria put forth by former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, for example, which established conditions of mission
specificity and the predictability of success, and specified
conditions for withdrawal of forces before an expeditionary mission
could be undertaken, could preclude U.S. intervention in a wide
variety of conflicts that we would nevertheless like to deter.
Similarly, we have implicitly established very high thresholds for
the use of nuclear weapons so that their use is credible only when
the most vital interests—perhaps limited to prior use of
nuclear weapons against the United States, NATO allies, and
Japan—are at stake.
Escalation
A major problem for deterrence is dealing with incremental,
threatening steps taken such that each one may not warrant a major
response, but which cumulatively will result in a situation we want
to deter. Taking a massive punitive action in anticipation of a
possible but not certain outcome toward which only a first small
step may have been taken, will raise public concerns and objections
that can have undesirable domestic and international political
consequences. A related problem involves a kind of
counterdeterrence when an opponent raises the stakes to a level we
find unacceptable. An example of these problems is our effort to
deter North Korea from building nuclear weapons and North Korea's
counter to the threat of sanctions, claiming that they would be an
act of war—something we clearly want to avoid. How to come to
grips with such situations is a major factor in developing a
post-Cold War deterrence strategy. Perceptions of will and
willingness to take risks and suffer the consequences of failed
deterrence will be determining factors in any such situations.
Parallel actions of reassurance must clearly be part of the arsenal
of tools at our disposal when military force alone will not resolve
undesirable situations.
Declaratory Policies
This discussion notes at several points (e.g., in the above
section titled "Communications") the dilemma between enunciating
clear deterrence policies and maintaining ambiguity in situations
where such announcements may either exacerbate a situation or
provide an opening for exploitation or miscalculation by a would-be
aggressor. Yet clear policy declarations are often necessary for
domestic political purposes and to reassure our allies, even as
they may be viewed as stimulating undesirable reactions from
prospective opponents. The circumstances in which declaratory
policies are advisable will vary; often they
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are not predictable, as we found in the cases of Korea and
Kuwait. An intermediate position would eschew explicit declarations
of policy in areas where the dynamics of a situation could change
the policy rapidly, but would maintain a transparent diplomatic and
military posture that could rapidly be translated into action, and
thereby designed to give a potential aggressor pause in a situation
of ambiguity. Given the many remaining uncertainties attending the
formulation of policies regarding the potential use of nuclear
weapons, that area may be one where it is most advisable to assume
such a position. At the same time, for the sake of our own security
and that of our allies, there must be no doubt about the
fundamentals of where our interests and potential for action lie in
areas of our own and our allies' vital interests.
Alliance Implications of Exercising
Deterrence Policy
Unilateral and Multilateral
Deterrence
Unilateral deterrent capabilities are attractive because they
provide more freedom to act, they have simpler requirements than
multilateral actions do and thus can be undertaken more quickly,
and they are likely to be more secure, with preparations that can
be undertaken in secret. However, "mutual deterrence"of one party
by another has lost much of its meaning with the end of the Cold
War. The objects of deterrence—the "deterrees"—are less
easily foreseen. Moreover, the United States has been increasingly
less willing to use its military forces with inherent risks of
large casualties without acting in cooperation with others.
Therefore U.S. unilateral deterrence is becoming progressively less
credible, and a trend toward multilateral deterrence is becoming
more likely, although U.S. leadership is still sought.
Multilateral deterrence offers compensating advantages. Most
importantly, a widely shared effort may be perceived as
overwhelming. Also, with a shared burden, the cost of deterrence is
lower for each party. Furthermore, a multilateral effort is more
legitimate in international perceptions than are unilateral
efforts, particularly when it includes states from different
regions and cultures. A broadly based coalition also may be less
vulnerable to attacks by the party to be deterred, and it would
allow a wider variety of potential responses. Unilateral deterrence
and multilateral deterrence are not always mutually exclusive;
unilateral actions can be used to stimulate or to complement
multilateral actions.
A difficulty with multilateral deterrence, illustrated in
Bosnia, is that it would be more constraining. Achieving agreement
within the deterring coalition as to when and how to react to
provocation could be more difficult, thus potentially presenting
many opportunities for the aggressor to play on individual
coalition members' special interests, and so to divide the
coalition or force it into inaction. In this respect, regional
coalitions of nations that have a commonality of interest in a
specific situation, such as NATO during the Cold War, will prove
more powerful than generalized coalitions such as the United
Nations.
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Alliances and Coalitions
Almost every situation in which we will want to deter some
action inimical to our interests and those of our closest allies
will involve an international coalition, often assembled ad hoc.
Preparatory steps to ready such coalitions for expeditious action
will make it easier to activate them in crises, and will make the
potential of the coalitions more compelling to would-be aggressors.
Such steps may include discussions with governments that may be
involved, review of forces that may be assembled under U.N. or NATO
aegis or some other international agreement, and military visits,
combined practice, and development of common command language and
military force interoperability in peacetime.
To take such steps, we must anticipate where crises may arise.
Although premature publicity about such anticipation can have
adverse political impact both nationally and internationally,
taking the preparatory steps during normal interactions between
governments and forward-deployed U.S. forces, with appropriate
timing linked to ongoing events, should mitigate the risk of
adverse political impact and could in some circumstances add to
deterrence. The particular circumstances of potential coalition
members, their relationships with more powerful neighbors, the
opportunities to benefit from U.S. extended deterrence and to
influence U.S. regional policies and actions, and eased
circumstances for U.S. presence in a region may all be inducements
to enter coalitions despite perceived political risks in doing
so.
Defense Against Ballistic Missile
Attack
There is disagreement, nationally and reflected in some of the
appended papers, about the value of strategic defense of the United
States, whether such defense should be deployed, and the role of
theater missile defense in the broader picture.
The Strategic Significance of
Ballistic Missile Attacks
The capacity to launch ballistic missiles is spreading to over
40 nations, large and small, in different parts of the world, and
some number of these nations will use such missiles for military
and political purposes. The range of missiles that can be used even
by small nations is growing from a few hundreds of kilometers to
over 1,000; nations that will have significant space launch
capabilities will be able to convert those capabilities to attack
targets at distances from 3,000 kilometers to intercontinental
range. Such missiles are viewed as an especially grave threat not
only because of their capacity to attack tactical forces from long
range, but also because of their ability to strike at vital centers
of logistics, industry, and population with warheads of mass
destruction. While the missiles would be vulnerable to destruction
if not held in silos or caves, circumstances could be imagined in
which they can be used in a first strike. Although the ballistic
missiles used by Iraq in the Gulf War had only
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conventional-explosive warheads and were highly inaccurate by
modern standards, they could hit cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Thus, they carried important political implications, and their use
diverted significant effort from the main military tasks of the
coalition opposing Iraq in the war. In this sense of being able to
strike at an enemy's heartland, and of being able to affect
political alignments and war plans in a military conflict, the
weapons must be considered to have "strategic" as well as tactical
value, whether they are used against the United States, or our
forces and bases overseas, or our allies.
Defense in Depth Against Ballistic
Missiles
Active defense against ballistic missiles must be considered, in
the strategic sense, as only the last stage of a defense in depth
that begins with peacetime policies including deterrence of
aggression in the first place. More specifically focused deterrence
attempts to inhibit the spread of effective ballistic missile
capability, through treaties and treaty-like arrangements such as
the Missile Technology Control Regime to which many nations,
including the United States, the nations of NATO Europe, Russia,
and China, subscribe. Deterrence of military conflict of any kind
is the next stage, and deterrence of the use of missiles in such
conflict, and especially of missiles with warheads of mass
destruction, follows. The defense against the missiles themselves
is part of a broad defensive array that encompasses a spectrum of
activities and systems. Included in that array, in addition to
antiballistic missile defense, are attacks against missile launch
sites, antiaircraft defense against attack by manned aircraft and
cruise missiles, and widely distributed defensive measures against
deployment and delivery of weapons of mass destruction by military
units or by clandestine means such as disguised civilian ships and
aircraft entering commercial ports and civilian airfields. A
variety of passive defense measures at potential target sites is
also included. Active defense against ballistic missile attack,
including attacks against both the U.S. homeland and allies'
homelands and deployed coalition forces helping to defend those
homelands, must be viewed in this broader context. All experience
in warfare tells us that none of the stages of this defense in
depth can be expected to work perfectly. But each stage has an
important contribution to make toward a strong cumulative defense.
The potential for success of each stage of defense and the cost
imposed by each on potential opponents will determine how resources
should be distributed across the multistage defense.
Active Defense Against Ballistic
Missile Attack
Active defense against ballistic missile attack has taken on an
aura and importance beyond those of most weapons systems because
during the Cold War the prospect of such defense affected relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union and the size and
nature of the offensive missile holdings of each of the countries.
Deploying antimissile defenses threatens U.S.-Russian treaty
obligations that have lent stability to the offensive strategic
deterrence
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equation. Many argue the need, now, for protection of the United
States against small attacks by states other than Russia, and
protection of allies against analogous attacks.9
The problem of intercepting a missile with high probability, in
the terminal phase of its flight, is well on the way to solution,
although full development and implementation of the capability have
yet to be achieved. Other aspects of defense against ballistic
missile attack are more difficult to solve, however; if the warhead
is nuclear, it must be intercepted before the warhead can continue
on a ballistic trajectory to the target vicinity and detonate with
wide effect, and before detonation on contact with the interceptor
can cause damaging effects from a greater distance. Intercept must
occur during an even earlier stage of a missile's trajectory to
ensure that it does not disperse submunitions carrying chemical or
biological agents-the militarily more effective means of attacking
with those weapons-thereby rendering terminal defenses only partly
useful. Intercept early in the trajectory also avoids the difficult
problem of differentiating decoys from true warheads, a problem
that otherwise presses toward terminal defense after both warheads
and decoys have reentered the atmosphere. These technical pressures
lead to concepts for boost- or ascentphase intercept, and to
"preboost" system concepts to find launchers and missile command,
control, and targeting complexes and destroy them before missiles
can be launched.
The growing number of potential attackers who may threaten our
allies and affect our interests, or who may ultimately threaten our
homeland, suggests a major expenditure on proliferation of
antimissile defenses. Such defenses must also be deployable on
short notice to protect allies in a crisis, if they are not already
in place. Combined with the technical needs for boost-phase
intercept and prelaunch attacks, and separating consideration of
defending the United States for the moment, a desirable
"theater-strategic" goal emerges that would place a "cap" over a
hostile or rogue nation that might threaten to launch ballistic
missiles against U.S. bases or allies' vital facilities and their
populations, to keep such missiles from emerging beyond that
nation's borders. It has been suggested that the United States
might join with Russia to create such a capability. However, if the
Russians had it, they might not agree with us about what a "rogue
nation" is, and they would be able to threaten our allies in NATO
Europe who have strategic deterrents of their own or those where
the dual-capable aircraft of NATO's theater nuclear capability are
based. Thus,
9 Wolfgang Panofsky
points out that "attacks against the United States by states other
than Russia, if they are to occur at all, and protection of allies
against analogous attacks, are likely to be delivered by means
other than ballistic missiles. The United States is vulnerable to
such delivery across unguarded land boundaries, by air, by ships in
harbor, and the like. Thus expending of large sums for defense
against limited ballistic missile attacks seems inconsistent unless
comparable efforts were instituted against other means of delivery.
For example, the unsuccessful effort in drug interdiction has shown
that an effective comprehensive defense seems unattainable without
enormous expenditures and compromise to fundamental American
values."
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even in this context, strategic and tactical or theater missile
defense objectives cannot be cleanly separated.
Part of the argument about defenses focuses on the desirability
of such expenditures for U.S. continental defense, in relation to
deterrence by offensive missiles and systems, in view of the treaty
problems that the deployment of defenses would raise. In that
context it has been noted that even under START II the United
States will have enough nuclear weapons to devastate any attacker,
in a situation that is unsymmetrical against any but the Russians.
Therefore, it is argued by one side of the debate that the threat
of totally devastating retaliation should be sufficient to deter an
attack of the kind that has been of growing concern.
The other side of the dispute points to the attempt that is
being made to differentiate between strategic defenses and those
that we may either put in place or deploy on short notice to defend
overseas base areas and allies as part of broader theater defense
activity. There are differences in defenses designed to protect the
U.S. homeland and those designed to be used at relatively short
range in theater missile defense. Defense against theater ballistic
missiles is acceptable within the constraints of the ABM treaty.
However, as defenses are designed for boost-phase or ascent-phase
intercept from greater distances, and as theater-level missile
ranges increase, so that the speed and reach of terminal defenses
must increase, the technical boundaries between theater missile
defense and strategic defense of the U.S. homeland will blur.
Russia has indicated that it feels strongly about what might appear
as unilateral changes in the ABM treaty, and could hold the arms
reductions of the START II treaty hostage to these concerns.
As this debate proceeds, the results of theater missile defense
developments, and the results of allowable ballistic missile
defense research and development, will influence it and will
ultimately change the dynamics of the argument.
ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING
Although a variety of theoretical works relate to deterrence,
the practice is based mainly on the collective wisdom of those who
have had to devise ways of preventing bad things from happening in
specific cases. Collecting assessments of real experiences results
in some general notions about whether deterrence worked or failed
in the past and why. Often these notions are based on cases in
which deterrence was not an explicit part of the strategy. Such
efforts to apply the concept of deterrence retroactively are not
useful because they often represent the use of selective examples
to support a preconceived idea.
Deterrence has not benefited from a great deal of practical
study because there are relatively few cases available in which an
explicit strategy involving deterrence was developed. The major
case, the strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, offers only
partial instruction applicable to present and future conditions.
Furthermore, understanding of those cases in which deterrence
played a major role tends to be one-sided because the necessary
level of detailed information
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from opponents is not available, although increased access to
former senior Soviet officials and archives will now make more
balanced studies possible. Deterrence theory has also been subject
to implicit constraints imposed by the prevailing cultural values,
and the "tyranny of the best estimate," in which alternatives
posited by different members of the intelligence community are
argued out and compromises are reached to give the "best estimate"
of a situation—a process that tends to focus views according
to majority judgments devised exclusively within our own value
system.
Current research on deterrence expands to draw on notions
derived from behavioral theory, systems analysis, decision science,
and other related fields. At the microlevel, behavioral models
include a simple linear set of relationships involving a stimulus
affecting an organism resulting in a response followed by
consequences. In thinking about such relationships in a more
complex way for the purpose of understanding the dynamics of
deterrence, the key is to focus on the orientation of the organism
both as an individual and as an organization within a culture and
an environment that can affect its or their calculations of
potential risk, loss, and gain. In particular, this analysis should
seek to identify the relevant needs, vulnerabilities, ideas,
feelings, and experiences that are most likely to elicit certain
behavioral responses.
Of particular significance is the focus on feedback in
developing models of relevant systems. Models of decision making
can usefully compare the options of a party to be deterred in terms
of most likely, best-case, and worst-case outcomes, within the
value system and environment of the party. Such models may
incorporate different images of the opponent—such as one that
assumes a pragmatic incrementalist, and another that assumes an
exceedingly ambitious, frustrated leader—and different values,
such as attitudes toward loss of human life. Moreover, given the
difficulty of understanding and predicting how different
personalities in different cultures and circumstances may behave,
it is important to consider alternative images of specific
adversaries and allies, when using these tools for assessment. The
ability to vary context and the decision-making personalities of
the individuals and the organizations in such analysis and modeling
allows formal exploration of different possible responses, guards
against premature or one-sided assessments, and encourages escape
from the "tyranny of the best estimate."
Target analysis—i.e., analysis of the "deterree"—for
the purpose of devising a strategy incorporating deterrence should
clearly identify assumptions and include a comprehensive
examination of the needs and vulnerabilities of the target. These
analyses should be incorporated into net assessments of the United
States compared with potential adversaries and allies. Net
assessments should define the problem, identify U.S. and potential
opponents' and coalition partners' objectives, and place the
situation in the proper context of political, economic, and
security trends and developments, and consequences of success and
failure for each participant. Conclusions should include explicit
judgments about the prospects for success and the level of
confidence in the information and analytical results. Gaps in
information should be identified along with key
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indicators that suggest that assumptions may no longer be valid
or developments are taking a different course, calling for new
assessments.
Neither modeling nor gaming can predict outcomes with any
confidence. However, modeling and gaming can provide useful
insights to strengthen deterrence programs. They are particularly
useful in understanding the dynamics of deterrence that often are
not apparent in static analysis. Modeling can integrate a wide set
of variables and may be particularly helpful in understanding key
relationships and linkages that may not otherwise be apparent.
Modeling also can help in understanding the likely consequences of
alternative strategies. Similarly, gaming with expert surrogates
provides opportunities to observe the interplay between two or more
sides and to understand the rationale behind key responses in
different value systems.
Both of these analytic tools can be useful in examining
important strengths and weaknesses of all sides-—essential
information for effective deterrence. Both can and should be
applied a priori to anticipate potential crisis situations and the
field of possible responses. They can be especially helpful to the
group of ''strategic worriers" called for above and for
familiarizing strategic decision makers with situations and
possible responses they may actually be called upon to face during
their tenures.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
mass destruction
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