nonnuclear weapons states, and nonnuclear weapons states agree not to produce or accept nuclear explosives.
• Nuclear weapons states agree to make civilian applications of nuclear technology freely available to nonnuclear weapons states party to the NPT, provided such civilian activities are being carried out under "full scope" safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
• By its nature this arrangement is discriminatory in freezing by treaty designated "haves" and "have-nots" in respect to nuclear weapons. To make this discriminatory regime acceptable to all NPT signatories, the nonproliferation bargain further provides (codified in Article VI of the NPT) that the nuclear weapons states shall diminish their nuclear arsenals and work toward their eventual elimination. Although this is not explicitly stated, the implication is that the nuclear weapons states should diminish the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of international policy to the maximum extent consistent with their national security.
• The nuclear weapons states shall give both "negative" and "positive" security assurances to nonnuclear weapons states, meaning that they shall be committed not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states and shall give assurances to protect nonnuclear weapons states against threatened or actual nuclear attack by other states.
• Whether this bargain will in fact hold or erode in time is one of the great challenges facing humanity. In the past it has never been possible to stem the diffusion of new military technologies once introduced. Technical barriers such as prohibitions on the transfer of critical materials and technology can only slow but not prevent proliferation. Although fissionable materials are essential to the construction of a nuclear weapon, most potential proliferators could produce the material indigenously given adequate resources. Nuclear weapons of very substantial, but less than optimum, capability can be constructed without access to information classified by the United States. Technical competence is growing throughout the lesser-developed world. Thus, ultimately, nuclear weapons proliferation can be prevented only if the nonnuclear weapons states are persuaded that their national security is served better without the possession of nuclear weapons than by their acquisition. Unless proliferation is to be countered by force or threat of force, the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, must view all elements of the nonproliferation bargain with utmost seriousness in revising their deterrence policies and therefore the roles which they expect nuclear weapons to play in the future.