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APPENDIX I
Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense
University
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental security of the United States is not under any
near-term threat. Nevertheless, our interests are global in today's
interdependent world and we must be concerned with and prepared to
counter a wide variety of threats to them. There are a few
self-evident places where potential threats would be so serious as
to almost certainly trigger a vigorous U.S. response, most notably
clear military aggression by Iraq or Iran in the Gulf or by North
Korea in NorthEast Asia. However, given the uncertain, unstable
nature of this post-Cold War world—and the internal debate
about where our vital or important interests lie and what
situations warrant what kind of U.S. action—it is exceedingly
difficult to foresee and thus plan for a response to specific
contingencies. Therefore, one should be prepared to deter/deal with
(i.e., dissuade, coerce, prevent, or limit and contain if
prevention fails) various categories of threat from various
quarters using those instruments best suited to the particular
situation. Some of these will not be responsive to the sort of
conventional deterrent actions that we have developed for threats
seen as likely during the Cold War, i.e., usually direct,
cross-border aggression, sometimes indirect subversion with state
support, or organized international terrorism with state support,
plus readiness to respond to state-initiated nuclear attack.
Even during the Cold War period, there were domestic debates
over whether certain deterrent actions proposed by different
administrations were justifiable (e.g., direct assistance to the
Contras). More so today than before, the decision to take deterrent
action, and what kind to take, must take into careful consideration
the capability of the administration to generate sustained public
and political support.
The range of situations for which deterrent action is considered
today is broader than before, with greater emphasis on purely or
primarily internal upheavals in countries with little or no outside
involvement, no evident major threat to our interests, and often
with limited near-term potential for spreading into broader
conflict. The type of deterrent action envisaged also tends to be
more varied, ranging from decisive use of major military power by
the United States (often with U.N. approval) to coalition actions
(often under U.S. control) that envisage the restricted application
of military force (i.e., peace operations). There is also a greater
tendency to look to economic sanctions as a deterrent, an
alternative or a supplement to the use of military force. This
general situation,
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deriving from a world in uncertain transition, is apt to prevail
though at least the first decade of the 21st century. Over the past
5 years it has placed an increasing strain on our national security
strategy decisions, and operations—within successive
administrations and upon the armed forces as well as between the
administration, the Congress, and the public. As one looks ahead,
it will be even more important to understand clearly the nature of
deterrence not only as we perceive it, but also as it is likely to
be perceived by those who may be subjected to deterrence. The
outlook, values, and interests of decision makers for states or
subnational entities apt to be subjected to deterrence will in many
instances be quite different from our own. In the increasingly
frequent event that we do not wish to resort to all-out war, this
will be of great importance to the success or failure of
deterrence.
BACKGROUND
During the Cold War, these threats came mostly from states whose
interests and whose concepts of incentives and disincentives
resembled our own closely enough for us to understand and develop
deterrents likely to be effective. Thus, in the near term or over
the long term, the United States and its allies were able to
prevail over the Soviet-Cuban threat to the Caribbean and Central
America; keep in check the North Korean conventional threat to
South Korea; put an end to Iranian attacks on shipping and threats
to our friends in the Gulf, and repulse Iraq's attack upon Kuwait;
strengthen the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
states to the point that they were no longer vulnerable to Vietnam
or China; and keep the Soviet Union from direct military
intervention in the Middle East. We were also able to negotiate
safely with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) the
dangerous missile and nuclear issues, as well as limit conventional
forces in Europe.
However, there were several important exceptions where we failed
to deter and/or win and where others had similar failures. The
nature of these situations is instructive for issues of today's
deterrence and the impact of different value systems. Our inability
to prevail in Indo-China from 1960 to 1975, and the withdrawal of
U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1983, came in part because we
misperceived the cultures and motivations of those whom we were
opposing. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was
primarily brought about not by U.S. actions but rather by the
special motivation and the willingness of the Afghan Resistance to
sacrifice, which the Soviets misperceived much as we did with
respect to the Vietnamese. The U.S. decision in October 1993 to
withdraw our forces from Somalia, after the failure to neutralize
Aideed and his Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia, was
comparable to Lebanon in 1983. Similarly, as discussed at our
group's first meeting on February 22, 1995, Israel misjudged the
culture and motivations of Egypt and Syria in 1973. It has also
been unable to devise successful security strategies or tactics to
deter Hisbollah in South Lebanon and Hamas in Israel and the
Occupied Territories.
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However, in the case of Hamas, events of October to December
1995 afforded genuinely hopeful prospects that its political and
terrorist threats could be reduced over time to much less virulent
levels and that the serious danger of it causing the collapse of
the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians had been
overcome. Persistence by Israeli and Palestinian National Authority
(PNA) leaders in concluding the Oslo negotiations, the timely
handing over of major West Bank towns to the PNA, and preparations
for elections produced a major boost in popular support for Arafat
and the PNA at the expense of Hamas and other Palestinian radicals,
and an increased will and capability of the former to apply tough
controls to the latter. In South Lebanon, Israel was able to reach
an understanding with Syria (and indirectly with Hisbollah) that
conflict would be confined to the security zone in South Lebanon,
with no Katyusha rockets fired into Israel and Israeli attacks
outside the zone. Guerrilla warfare by Israel and its Lebanese
allies vs. Hisbyollah and others continued unabated inside the
zone. When increasing Israeli Defence Force casualties and a close
election campaign brought the Israel government to bomb and shell
targets outside the security zone, the resulting political uproar
internationally led to Israel again reverting to the previous
formula of containing the ongoing conflict.
These examples raise the questions of commitment, morale,
persistence, and sustained support for operations (especially when
casualties continue) as vital elements of success or failure on
both sides. Perceptions of these elements by the other party can be
all-important, since they can lead one side or the other to believe
it can break the will of the other over time. They also raise the
question of containment vs. prevention, in both the short term and
long term.
The Long Commission found that basic U.S. misunderstanding of
the political, cultural, and psychological factors in Lebanon (and
Syria) were behind the policy decisions that led to U.S. Marines in
1983 becoming a party to the conflict in Lebanon and therefore
being subjected to attack by the same ''unfair" or "inhuman"
methods used by parties who did not have sophisticated weapons. We
had a blind spot, caused in part by cultural misperception of the
potential enemy and in part by a subconscious arrogance or feeling
of military superiority and comfort stemming to some degree from
our overwhelming technological and military capabilities. A roughly
similar situation existed in Somalia 10 years later. In any event,
not only the threat but also the actual use of carrier air and
16-inch guns failed to deter the attack on the Marines in Beirut;
nor did helicopter gunships, AC 130s, and the Joint Special
Operations Command deter Aideed's militias from attacking U.S.
forces. In both cases, the failure to explain to the U.S. public
and Congress what U.S. forces were doing, and why it was worth the
risk, aggravated the backlash when trouble hit and brought about
the withdrawal of the United States. This raises the question of
our own value systems and how they can become a counterdeterrent,
which is discussed below. It is a particularly important question
given today's muddled perception of what the United States is
willing to risk, and for what.
For Israel, the Agranot Commission found a similar cultural and
psychological blind spot: the implicit assumption that Israel had
taught the
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Arabs such a lasting lesson in 1967 and had such an
overwhelmingly evident advantage in military sophistication and
technology that Egypt and Syria had to be bluffing in 1973 rather
than positioning their forces for an actual attack.
VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT
WORLD
Today, the likelihood of cultural misperceptions, especially by
the United States, is even greater. Absent the Cold War, there is
much greater diversity as to what forms the basis for major
decisions by other governments; and ethnicity, religion, tribalism,
and other cultural factors have much more influence than at any
time since before World War I, alongside or together with a
broadened concept of nationalism. At the same time, there has been
a quantum leap in effectiveness of popular pressure upon
governments, whether in the larger number of substantially more
democratic states, or in transition states (e.g., China and Russia)
or in some authoritarian states where there are powerful "special
interest" groups. These could be ethnic, as in Croatia and Serbia,
or religious as in Iran. (They both have a special fervor that
makes deterrence more difficult.) Even long-established governments
in the industrialized countries of Europe and Japan are having
greater difficulty making what we would consider to be "rational"
decisions or policies, rather than going with popular opinion down
what seems a misguided path. Moreover, the power and solidity of
the traditional nation state are being eroded by a number of
factors, including the much freer flow of information,
international business, and people between and among countries. In
some countries, the central government has collapsed completely or
has been on occasion so constricted by subnational groups or
movements of one kind or another as to be virtually paralyzed
(e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan,
Georgia, Algeria, etc.). The world thus finds itself faced with
subnational entities whose calculations and incentives and
disincentives are at variance with those of most states. There are
also transnational movements such as Islamic radicalism, narcotics
trafficking, and international crime which are either new or
stronger, replacing the transnational threats of communism or Arab
nationalism in reinforcing national and subnational instability and
threatening behavior.
A reasonably accurate understanding of the impact of cultural
factors on the attitudes and action of states and subnational
movements has thus become still more important when it comes to
designing and employing an effective set of deterrents. For
deterrence to be effective in individual instances, and to enhance
the potential future dissuasive power of deterrence—as well as
to increase popular political support for such actions at
home—the United States will usually need to make use of some
form of coalition, formalized (e.g., United Nations Security
Council [UNSC]) or informal, and almost always including regional
states.1 This not only increases
the total pressure (psychological,
1 Even when the United States has unilaterally
taken the political and military lead to establish a coalition and
provided most of the military might for a coalition to deter (or
prevent/roll
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military, economic, etc.) on the one to be deterred and eases
the burden on the United States (military and financial), but it
also offers the greatest promise for our understanding which
approaches will work the best for particular nations (or
subnational groups) with their peculiar cultures or value system.
The regional states usually have much deeper understanding than
does the United States of these factors and are therefore of great
help, even if their military weakness makes them seem so much less
capable as to be of dubious value as participants. They can also
enable the U.S. message to get across more clearly to the intended
recipient, so that the perception better matches the intent.
Since many of the potential "lesser" threats that we might
decide to deter are not threats to our security and are long term
and often indirect in nature (i.e., threats to friendly states or
regions that are not allies—and are not vital to our
security), and since the difficulty of resolving the problem
definitively is so great (i.e., totally mastering local
factions/militias and/or establishing a durable, popular
government), it may make great good sense to settle for containing
a threat or problem. If a problem is not allowed to worsen and/or
spread, containment could be adequate for our purposes. For
instance, the immediate U.S. concern over fighting in Croatia and
Bosnia was associated with fears of a repeat of Sarajevo triggering
a Europe-wide war, via Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and
Turkey. Such a spread could have raised the stakes to the point
that U.S. ground forces would need to join the rest of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in direct, large-scale
intervention. Containment reduced the strategic negative effects of
the fighting for the United States, even if the human and moral
effects remained extremely negative.
Although the U.N. peace operation (UNPROFOR) failed to stop the
fighting (and the United States refused to provide any ground
forces for fear of possible casualties where its vital interests
were not evident), it played an important role in international
efforts that mitigated death and suffering and successfully
prevented the conflict from spreading. However, the concern of the
United States and other European governments continued to grow over
(1) continued fighting, (2) damage to the future efficacy of NATO,
as well as the United Nations, and (3) the possible eventual
spillover. This led to new-found U.S. resolve and leadership,
including the will to commit 20,000 ground forces,
back) what it considered to be unacceptable
threats to its interests, it has gotten very substantial value out
of the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council and sometimes the
Organization of American States (OAS). This was notably the case in
1950 with Korea, 1965 with the Dominican Republic, 1990 with Iraq,
1992 with Somalia (UNITAF), and 1994 with Haiti. The endorsement
has meant the difference between participation or nonparticipation
of many states that contributed military forces and/or financing to
these operations, which were outside the formal U.N. peacekeeping
system. Without the UNSC (and OAS) endorsements and the additional
participation, the U.S./coalition deterrent would have been much
weaker in military and political power, as well as credibility and
staying (or will) power. This weakness would have included the
perception of the message by actual or potential enemies and the
degree of support at home. In this sense "multilateralism" was of
inestimably greater value than "unilateralism," very possibly the
difference between success and failure, despite the major role of
the United States.
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and resulted in a peace agreement amongst warring parties and a
60,000-person force—under NATO command (IFOR) rather than the
United Nations—to see to its implementation.
Another sort of containment situation going beyond what is
normally considered deterrence could be a failed state such as
Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, or Burundi. Rather than press on to the
ideal end result of a restored, stable democratic
government—with the commitment, resources, time, and risk
involved—it may be acceptable to stop the killing, lower the
level of violence, and settle for imperfect local institutions that
offer some hope for longer-term improvement. The international
community has learned (the hard way) that it is most effective when
it responds very quickly to the internal crisis in such situations,
and when the nature of the response avoids neocolonization
(significant nation building), especially when that requires
long-term commitment of major military forces. The latter usually
involves an intrusive outside role such as to produce a virulent,
often violent backlash. Tragic as it might seem, limited
humanitarian intervention to contain violence and care for the
starving, the displaced, and refugees may well be the realistic
answer.
In the case of Cambodia, the international community undertook
not only to end the decades-old combined internal-external
conflict, but also to remake civil society into a liberal
democracy. In the face of impending major conflict with the Khmer
Rouge faction, initial objectives were sharply scaled back,
external involvement ended, more than 300,000 refugees returned,
elections were held, and the operation was terminated. However, the
scaled-back operation meant that Western-style democracy has not
taken root in the traditionally alien environment. The United
States, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the United
Nations have undertaken a similar mission in Haiti. Major human
rights abuses and violence have been sharply reduced and elections
held freely. However, the nature of Haitian democracy, which
appears likely to prevail over intentional norms, will almost
certainly fall short of original objectives, and some sort of
continued but reduced international security support has proved to
be needed to prevent a new outbreak of major violence.
In trying to cope with this disorderly new world, the question
of effective deterrence frequently comes back to the question of
how vital is the perceived interest in deterring any particular
situation and of the price one is willing to pay. The examples of
Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, and the U.S. reaction, are
seen around the world as guidelines on how to defeat U.S. forces.
This means that for any deterrence involving actual or potential
use of forces to be successful there must be a careful decision,
fully explained and justified to the public, to take at least
limited casualties, plus a message conveying to the one to be
deterred that the United States is indeed willing to run such a
risk. (During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia prior to May 4,
1993, the Somalis saw that the U.S. military was well prepared and
did not shrink in dangerous situations. By mid-October 1993 the
Haitian thugs had seen from events in Somalia that the United
States could be scared off.) The public perception on both sides
can be critical in situations short of an all-out U.S. military
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commitment. More broadly, this means not only a readiness to run
some risks but also a constancy of purpose and consistency of
policy so that friend and potential foe are satisfied that the
United States is credible. As we have seen, the sudden U.S. shift
to firmness and resolution in Bosnia produced a peace agreement and
shored up international resolve. In Somalia, initially, and in
Haiti, firmness and overwhelming force led to an unopposed entry by
peace forces as it has done for IFOR in Bosnia.
Questions remain about the fate of the lofty political goals and
overall security for local population after IFOR leaves Bosnia
given the limitations placed upon its support for basically
civilian objectives (including the police function and refugee
reform). Questions also remain as to whether this apparent new
firmness in U.S. foreign policy and world leadership will endure or
whether there will be a return to apparent indecision, due to the
nature of Clinton administration policy making, problems with
Congress, and/or public lack of interest in active U.S. involvement
abroad. The conclusions eventually drawn abroad on this basic
question of commitment and consistency will have much more effect
that any other single issue on the future effectiveness of U.S.
deterrence.
In today's world, economics plays a huge role, and the U.S.
economy has become very intertwined with and dependent on the
economics of East Asia, West Europe, Mexico, and Canada, not merely
oil from the Gulf. Threats to these economic interests are more
subtle and less susceptible to conventional forms of deterrence,
especially since their long-term importance to the United States is
less visible and less generally understood in the near term when
deterrent action must be taken if it is to be effective.
To protect our economic interests and security, the United
States needs to nurture the web of interlocking global, regional,
and bilateral economic, military, and political relationships it
has initiated or helped others to develop over the past 50 years.
This includes economic institutions and agreements such as the
International Monetary Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IMF/IBRD), regional development banks, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
G-7 (group of seven states [United States, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Canada, Japan, and Italy] for world economic issues), and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
(GATT/WTO); political or security institutions such as the United
Nations, European Union (EU), NATO (and the Partnership for Peace),
OAS, and ASEAN; and even the weaker Organization of Security
Cooperation for Europe (OSCE), Organization for African Unity
(OAU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); and Organization of Islamic
Countries (OIC). It also means formal bilateral
military-to-military cooperation, as well as other special
relationships with the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Australia,
Canada, Mexico, Egypt, and Israel, etc., and a variety of other
bilateral and multilateral links between the United States and the
rest of the world. In today's world, other organizations dealing
with nonproliferation, the environment,
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international crime, narcotics, terrorism, and so on, are
becoming increasingly important.
In addition to institutions and formal agreements, there are a
variety of more tangible means that the United States has used
effectively to support other countries and thereby deter or help
overcome threats to them. These include a U.S. forward military
presence, on the ground or at sea, temporary or permanent. The
basing or temporary stationing of U.S. forces in a country (or a
region) whose stability it wishes to support, prepositioning of
military equipment, and training of and combined exercises with
local forces are all signals of U.S. intent. When coupled with the
perception of strong U.S. will, they can be powerful deterrents. On
the other hand, as has been seen in Saudi Arabia today (and was
seen widely in the 1950s and 1960s), an overly visible U.S.
military presence can generate a backlash.
By strengthening these relationships and demonstrating constancy
rather than allowing them to be beset by doubt, the United States
can increase its chances of heading off trouble and its capability
of dissuasive deterrence, as well as its chances of success should
preventive deterrence or containment be required. As discussed
above, the regional and coalition elements of deterrence have
assumed greater importance in today's world, particularly in
dealing with the problem of different value systems.
CASE STUDIES
At this point, let us shift to a brief review of several case
studies in deterrence where value systems have played a major role.
An interesting case study is the Gulf War, where the United States
began in early 1987 to develop a web of close military-to-military
relationships with all five of the GCC states, employing
instruments such as contingency planning, training (in the United
States and in the region), joint exercises, and combined operations
to protect shipping and the oil installations in the Gulf against
Iranian (or Iraqi) attacks, using indigenous ports and airfields
and involving local forces to a limited degree, consistent with
their political caution and their military capabilities. U.S.
military dispositions were worked out informally with Arab
governments, with as little visibility as possible. There was also
some involvement of naval vessels from the United Kingdom, France,
and other NATO countries. The effectiveness of this U.S.-led
operation (Earnest Will) in shutting down Iranian small-boat
attacks on shipping, virtually stopping Iranian mine laying, and
protecting offshore oil and gas platforms, was impressive to the
Gulf states and to Iran. The latter concluded that the United
States would persist and not be intimidated, particularly after the
USS Stark was hit by a missile with 37 U.S. sailors killed
and not a hint that the United States would terminate or curtail
the operation. The perception of escalating U.S. pressure on Iran,
plus increasingly effective Iraqi ground attacks, caused the
Ayatollah Khomeni to "drink the bitter wine" and end the war.
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The success of operation Earnest Will eased the doubts created
by U.S. and Israeli covert arms supplies to Iran in 1985-1986 and
regained ground in an area clearly considered vital to U.S.
interests. The mutual confidence, knowledge, and habits of
cooperation this developed were put to good military use after Iraq
invaded Kuwait. Having these regional Islamic governments fully
supporting and appearing alongside the U.S. and Western armies in
Desert Storm, plus the unanimous U.N. Security Council endorsement,
brought in other Moslem states that would otherwise not have
participated (e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Morocco). Having such
substantial Islamic participation in the coalition was critical in
winning the local psychological operations (psyops) battle and
defection of many Iraqi troops on the ground, as well as the much
broader politico-religious struggle against Iraqi-supported and
other radical Islamist groups in a number of Moslem states that
tried to stir up animosity against the United States and against
Desert Storm.
Preinvasion regional attitudes (as well as those in the United
States) may have encouraged Saddam Hussein to think he could
get away with invading Kuwait, and thus weakened any dissuasive
deterrent. However, positive regional attitudes toward Desert Storm
plus practical cooperation were essential for success in
prevention. The net effect of the 1990-1991 campaign, continued
close U.S.-GCC military cooperation (including numerous exercises
and prepositioning), the high priority consistently accorded the
Gulf by the Clinton administration, and the rapid muscular U.S. and
Kuwaiti response to the October 1994 forward Iraqi troop movements
(followed by rapid Iraqi withdrawal) demonstrated how effective
more conventional dissuasive deterrence can be in an area of vital
interest when it is executed properly. Iraq could have punched into
Saudi Arabia or Kuwait had it moved at once in October 1994 but was
obviously deterred by the daunting prospect of what would come in
response, once the United States moved more military force forward
and had the strong support of regional states. However, when the
United States decided upon retaliation against Iraq in September
1996 because of Iraq's limited action against its Kurdish
population—with no sign of a threat to the south—it
displayed a lack of political and cultural sensitivity. This meant
an overt refusal by earlier "coalition" powers such as Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Western Europeans to allow use of their
facilities for U.S. aircraft.
Another threat that is getting priority attention is the effort
to prevent Islamist radicalism from toppling pro-West or "moderate"
regimes like dominoes. It is instructive to look at the differences
between Algeria and Egypt, on the one hand, and Morocco, Tunisia,
and Jordan, on the other. In the latter three countries, a
potentially explosive Islamic threat has been gradually defused
over the past 5 years. With political encouragement and public and
private economic help from Western Europe, the United States, and
international and private financial institutions, the three have
made serious inroads on socioeconomic problems, demonstrating their
determination and capability to make progress in helping the
population as a whole, as well as minimizing corruption. They have
also allowed increased popular political participation,
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including nonrevolutionary Moslem political parties, even while
cracking down hard on radical revolutionary movements, Islamic and
sectarian. In the case of Algeria, on the other hand, political
participation by Islamic parties was suddenly nullified and has
continued to be banned, while little progress has been made on the
huge socioeconomic problems and the appearance of government
corruption that brought popular support for the Islamist parties.
Egypt is much closer to Algeria than to the other three in
(mis)handling its problems, thereby giving Islamist radicals
obvious advantages. It has had to fall back heavily upon
oppression, which has had a positive security effect but is often a
long-term boost to the opposition in such situations.
The wrong way for the West to approach the problem of Islam is
to see it as a monolithic, hostile ideology, as we once saw
Communism, or to see it as one that is susceptible to a military
solution, one which NATO is able and ready to challenge. For very
sound reasons, King Hassan of Morocco publicly chastised former
Secretary General Claes of NATO for making a public statement to
just this effect, thereby giving an amplitude of powerful political
ammunition to Iran, Iraq (although hardly Islamist, it has feigned
such a posture with some positive effect), Libya, the Sudan, and
other radical regimes and movements (e.g., Armed Islamic Group of
Algeria, Ghamma of Egypt). NATO and the EU subsequently found means
to ease the angst in North Africa caused by Claes's statements, and
the impression that the new "Mediterranean" consultative
arrangements with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Israel
were aimed at Islam. Had they not, it would have given a huge push
toward a self-fulfilling prophecy, playing into the hands of
Islamic radical opponents of the United States, NATO, and friendly
Moslem regimes.
Here is an issue where clashing with or utilizing,
understanding, or misperceiving foreign culture and its
repercussions can be of immense import. Mishandling the Islamist
issue can cause great long-term damage to U.S. and Western
interests, given the powerful boost that religion provides to
ordinary political power and motivation, and its potentially
destructive effect on the stability of friendly regimes,
availability of oil, control of weapons of mass destruction,
proliferation of terrorism, and large-scale exodus of refugees
(from North Africa to Europe). (The U.S.-led campaign over 15 years
to force a change in Iran's basic world outlook by economic
pressure has had little effect. This is in part because the regime
in Teheran has been able to portray the United States as
anti-Islamic. Up until the new U.S. policy toward Bosnia, Islamist
propaganda had substantial negative effect in portraying the United
States as refusing to be involved because the Bosnians under attack
were Moslem.)
Another case study is Somalia, where adequate knowledge of
Somali culture during Operation Restore Hope was combined with
overwhelming force used with restraint, close cooperation with
regional states, coordinated militarypolitical-humanitarian
activities, and an excellent psyops/political-action campaign
(aided by regional governments.) This combination succeeded in
deterring any but isolated armed attacks on U.S. and other Unified
Task Force (UNITAF) forces and kept casualties on all sides to a
minimum. UNITAF
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ensured that its Somali-language radio and newspaper had a
different verse from the Koran every day, substantially reducing
the effects of anti-U.S. and antiUNITAF propaganda by radical
Islamist agitators. Using psyops and constant political dialogue,
as well as the threat of force and continuous patrols to avoid
surprise attack, the U.S. civilian and military leadership was able
to restrain Aideed and the SNA, and other leaders and their
militias, so that there were no major or sustained attacks on
UNITAF, even at moments of considerable antiUNITAF anger and
frustration for the Somalis. The United States and UNITAF were seen
as basically even handed. They were able to get Somali factions and
clans (warlords) to eschew force as the chosen means of political
advancement, instead focusing them on peaceful political combat by
means of their own choosing.
One of the main reasons for the later armed confrontation by the
United States and the United Nations with Aideed and his SNA was a
shift in attitude and political posture by the former and a
breakdown in dialogue with the latter. This caused Aideed to see
them as hostile to his vital long-term interest in becoming the
president of Somalia and caused them to see Aideed as an enemy who
should and could be "marginalized." The United Nations also stopped
cooperating with regional governments (which were advising against
confrontation with Aideed), thereby cutting off a vital
communications channel. Another factor contributing to the violent
confrontation was an impression by the SNA that—compared with
the confident, alert UNITAF-—the U.N. forces were less
vigilant and were confused and uncertain over command and control,
and when and whether to use force. Thus, during the second half of
the operation in Somalia, deterrence failed, much as it had 10
years earlier in Lebanon.
For Haiti the same basic combination of overwhelming force (used
with restraint), political dialogue, and humanitarian and economic
assistance effectively deterred potential armed resistance from
Cedras and others, at the outset and subsequently. Like Aideed
initially, their vital interests were not seen to be at risk (e.g.,
Cedras's freedom, fortune, and honor were all saved). Good psyops
and the participation of a number of other Caribbean and some Latin
American countries were an important part of the success achieved
by the U.S.led multinational force during the first 15 months in
Haiti.
A final case study is that of North Korea. By working closely
with Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia, the United States was
able to enhance its knowledge of how to deal with a rogue state
developing a nuclear capability, as well as to increase the
psychological and political pressure, and the possibility of
economic pressure, on Pyongyang. Aware of the essentiality of
regional support, the United States modified its hardline, "stick
but no carrot" approach and adopted one combining the two. In
exchange, it obtained meaningful political support from China and
others. The meeting between former President Carter and the late
North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was critical. Yet without a
significant U.S. buildup of both its own and ROK military power,
and credible signals of its intent for an even greater buildup, the
regional states might well
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not have decided to join in applying nonmilitary pressure to
Pyongyang. And the latter might not have agreed to the "framework"
compromise agreement which froze its nuclear program, allowed
International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, and greatly reduced
any near-term prospects for conflict. Without regional cooperation,
the odds are high either that there would have been a major
confrontation and very possibly an armed conflict with North Korea
and/or that the latter would not have suspended its nuclear
activities. The United States was obliged to calculate its real
interests in continuing to try and force Pyongyang's hand on its
earlier limited nuclear activities, running the risk of no regional
support and the danger of a conflict, on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, pursuing a peaceful regional political solution that
could block Pyongyang's ambitious future nuclear program but not
provide an early answer to its previous activities.
CONCLUSION
Paradoxically, although the United States is the only superpower
and enjoys overwhelming military superiority without a real threat
to its security, it must arguably pay closer attention than at any
time since before World War II to the interests, values, and
attitudes of other countries if it is to protect its own longterm
interests. This extends to its ability to deter threats to these
interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a power and of
Communism as an ideology left the United States more powerful but
also removed the threat that caused many countries to turn toward
the United States for protection and be attentive to its interests.
The absence of such a threat makes them more independent, an
independence that is reinforced in many countries by their economic
progress (both absolute and relative to the United States) and by a
higher degree of dependence by the U.S. economy on that of other
countries. This means that despite its power the United States will
need to work harder to retain the relationships established over
the past half century, notably by displaying greater constancy and
decisiveness, continuing its active involvement with and commitment
of its material as well as political assets to international
problems, and not succumbing to internal pressures to turn
radically inward. It also means paying more attention to the value
systems of other states (and subnational players) and being more
willing to move quickly to help them if there is a threat to U.S.
interests, before a situation moves to the level of a major crisis
and requires a major commitment of resources to be effective.
Conversely, it means moving more rapidly to deter potential
threats, again before they materialize into action or reach a
buildup stage where a major commitment of resources is required for
any type of preventive deterrence to be successful.
And, above all, it means dispelling the general impression
abroad of the United States as turning every day more inward,
unaware of or uninterested in the subtleties of the new world
realities, assuming that, safe in its superpower status, it can
retreat with impunity from its past commitments and make little
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effort to maintain them, unwilling to commit more than sharply
diminished material governmental assets for this purpose.
NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC
IMPLICATIONS
Several specific implications for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
emerge from looking at the above perspective in light of the study
titled The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the
21st Century (National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996),
as well as U.S. military operations over the 5 years since Desert
Storm ended.
First, the Navy must remain committed as a priority to keeping
open vital sea lines of communication, to the degree possible in
cooperation with other countries but by itself if need be. It must
also remain committed to and capable of combined lower-scale
logistics support for joint and combined/coalition operations.
Second, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to have a
critical role in deterring, or fighting if deterrence fails, major
regional conflicts (MRCs). However, the likelihood of MRCs has gone
down since the concept was developed during the Bottom-Up Review.
Moreover, the best means of deterring an MRC or containing a
conflict at a lesser level is by rapid action, visible on the
ground to potential allies and foes. The nature and size of
operations to be undertaken will vary tremendously, but few will
require major combat, at least in the initial stage. This calls for
continued emphasis on a flexible forward presence of highly capable
personnel, weapons, and supplies, available for rapid action and
prepared for any eventuality. Together with this, there should be
the presence and perception of overwhelming U.S. forces relative to
the potential or actual adversary. Perception is as important as
reality, particularly in the early stages, so that psychological
operations and other information warfare techniques can be
particularly useful.
Third, in most cases the United States will seek and should be
able to obtain coalition partners for its operations, especially
after any initial, rapid U.S. unilateral action or action with a
very limited number of others. This is important in terms of better
understanding local value systems, generating political support,
and conveying the U.S. message to potential foes, as well as
reducing the burden on the United States alone, even if there are
operational drawbacks to many potential coalition members which
must be controlled. This means constant attention by the Navy and
Marine Corps to forward presence and collaborative activities with
military forces of other countries, both to solidify cooperative
attitudes and to enhance interoperability. Combined exercises and
operations, training, common equipment, and other activities should
be stressed, with local forces, as well as the presence of U.S.
forces.
Fourth, a better understanding of local and regional values is
essential and can often be more important than firepower alone.
This means more attention to area and language training and to the
collection and, above all, analysis of intelligence. In the latter
regard, nongovernmental sources are often better
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informed on many important issues. The emphasis on forward
presence, suggested above, can also contribute to this better
understanding. Closer cooperation with the Department of State and
local embassies, including the use of more political advisors, is
another useful approach. This is true not only at the level of
regional commanders in chief, but also at lower operational
levels.
Fifth, related to all of the above, including local political
and cultural considerations, availability of U.S. air power, and
force protection, are the JulySeptember 1996 problems that beset
U.S. forces in the Gulf. Too much of a highly visible U.S. military
presence 5 years after Desert Storm began to take its toll in
terrorist attacks upon U.S. facilities and refusal to allow U.S.
aircraft to use local air bases to attack Iraq. This reinforces
earlier arguments for relying much more on aircraft carriers rather
than assuming the availability of land facilities.
Sixth, whether one likes it or not, in many situations military
operations will be less than all-out war and will require close
cooperation with civilian agencies of the United States and other
governments, as well as international and nongovernmental or
private voluntary organizations. Systematic training for such
cooperation will be important for the future, particularly in the
broad and variable concept of how to establish and operate most
effectively civil military operations centers and/or humanitarian
operations centers. For most limited military operations (as
operations other than war), success will depend on a balanced
approach combining four basic elements:
• Military and security matters (including police, arms
control, demobilization, and the like),
• Humanitarian and economic matters (including relief,
initial reconstruction, planning, and processes for longer-term
rehabilitation),
• Political and diplomatic matters (with various local
authorities and other governments), and
• Public information (both public affairs and psychological
operations).
Combining the assets of the Marine Corps and the Special
Operations Command can frequently provide the most effective
immediate approach to such problems, followed by larger and/or
long-term involvement of other forces if necessary.
These observations could easily be extended or amplified.
However, they all seem to follow the general thrust of the
Regional Conflict study in arguing for a lighter, more flexible
Marine Corps able to deploy even more rapidly with strong Navy
support and able to understand better and work more effectively
with foreign countries. There should be no stinting on improved
weapons and other technological advances. However, there should be
recognition that in many operations, advanced technology and
firepower will not be the total answer for success and, unless
accompanied by other factors suggested above, could be
counterproductive.
Representative terms from entire chapter:
regional states
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