informed on many important issues. The emphasis on forward presence, suggested above, can also contribute to this better understanding. Closer cooperation with the Department of State and local embassies, including the use of more political advisors, is another useful approach. This is true not only at the level of regional commanders in chief, but also at lower operational levels.
Fifth, related to all of the above, including local political and cultural considerations, availability of U.S. air power, and force protection, are the JulySeptember 1996 problems that beset U.S. forces in the Gulf. Too much of a highly visible U.S. military presence 5 years after Desert Storm began to take its toll in terrorist attacks upon U.S. facilities and refusal to allow U.S. aircraft to use local air bases to attack Iraq. This reinforces earlier arguments for relying much more on aircraft carriers rather than assuming the availability of land facilities.
Sixth, whether one likes it or not, in many situations military operations will be less than all-out war and will require close cooperation with civilian agencies of the United States and other governments, as well as international and nongovernmental or private voluntary organizations. Systematic training for such cooperation will be important for the future, particularly in the broad and variable concept of how to establish and operate most effectively civil military operations centers and/or humanitarian operations centers. For most limited military operations (as operations other than war), success will depend on a balanced approach combining four basic elements:
• Military and security matters (including police, arms control, demobilization, and the like),
• Humanitarian and economic matters (including relief, initial reconstruction, planning, and processes for longer-term rehabilitation),
• Political and diplomatic matters (with various local authorities and other governments), and
• Public information (both public affairs and psychological operations).
Combining the assets of the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command can frequently provide the most effective immediate approach to such problems, followed by larger and/or long-term involvement of other forces if necessary.
These observations could easily be extended or amplified. However, they all seem to follow the general thrust of the Regional Conflict study in arguing for a lighter, more flexible Marine Corps able to deploy even more rapidly with strong Navy support and able to understand better and work more effectively with foreign countries. There should be no stinting on improved weapons and other technological advances. However, there should be recognition that in many operations, advanced technology and firepower will not be the total answer for success and, unless accompanied by other factors suggested above, could be counterproductive.