the ABM treaty. Theater missile defenses, currently permitted under the ABM treaty, could be forced by the evolution of the theater-level threat to grow in capability to the point that their technical characteristics also challenge some of the ABM treaty constraints. This issue will require continual review in terms of threats, costs, and effectiveness; impact on the security of the United States, our allies, and others; and other important factors.
The agenda laid out above is a substantial one for policy makers, with tasks falling into two main categories. First are preparatory actions and capabilities that should be brought into existence in peacetime, including, in particular, the size, composition, deployment, and states of readiness of our military forces, together with their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), logistics (especially including mobility and prepositioning), and many other elements of military strength. Second, for actions that can be taken only when a contingency actually occurs, or is thought to be about to occur, there should be plans well thought out in advance, reflected in training, exercises, and well-tested capabilities of our forces for the kinds of operations that may be required. The policy alternatives should be reviewed continually, so that the availability and viability of alternatives can be assessed on the basis of forethought in regard to each situation as it arises.
And finally, from these deterrent capabilities and preparations will derive the support for the condition of security, stability, and world order that should be our broader goal. It will be the task of policy makers to assess the adequacy of this support and augment it if required.