Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence

Naval Studies Board
Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications
National Research Council

NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1997



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Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence Naval Studies Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National Research Council NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C. 1997

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Page ii NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. This work was performed under Department of Navy Contract N00014-93-C-0089 issued by the Office of Naval Research under contract authority NR 201-124. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the government, and no official endorsement should be inferred. The United States Government has at least a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license throughout the world for government purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver, perform, and dispose of all or any of this work, and to authorize others so to do. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 96-71712 International Standard Book Number 0-309-05639-X Additional copies of this report are available from: National Academy Press 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Box 285 Washington, D.C. 20055 800-624-6242 202-334-3313 (in the Washington Metropolitan Area) http://www.nap.edu Naval Studies Board National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418 Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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Page iii PARTICIPANTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT DETERRENCE STUDY Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Chair Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Vice Chair David S.C. Chu, Rand Paul K. Davis, Rand Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center John C. Hopkins, Los Alamos, New Mexico Benjamin Huberman, Huberman Consulting Group Glenn A. Kent, Rand Robert L.J. Long, Annapolis, Maryland C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University W.K.H. Panofsky, Stanford, California Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland Brent Scowcroft, Scowcroft Group William Y. Smith, Falls Church, Virginia Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution Victor A. Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses Paul Wolfowitz, Johns Hopkins University

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Page iv NAVAL STUDIES BOARD * David R. Heebner, Science Applications International Corporation (ret.), Chair George M. Whitesides, Harvard University, Vice Chair * Albert J. Baciocco, Jr., The Baciocco Group, Inc. * Alan Berman, Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation * Gerald A. Cann, Raytheon Company * Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor Anthony J. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics Systems, Inc. John F. Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation * Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Special Advisor Robert Hummel, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University David W. McCall, AT&T Bell Laboratories (ret.) Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses * Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University William J. Phillips, Northstar Associates, Inc. Mara G. Prentiss, Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University * Herbert Rabin, University of Maryland Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton Harrison Shull, Naval Postgraduate School (ret.) * Keith A. Smith, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.) Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington * David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University J. Pace VanDevender, Prosperity Institute Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology * Bruce Wald, Arlington Education Consultants Navy Liaison Representatives RADM John W. Craine, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81) RADM Richard A. Riddell, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N91) Paul G. Blatch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N911T1) Ronald N. Kostoff, Office of Naval Research Staff Ronald D. Taylor, Director (as of October 2, 1995) Associate Director (July 1, 1994, through September 29, 1995) Lee M. Hunt, Director (through September 29, 1995) Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Assistant Mary (Dixie) Gordon, Information Officer Christopher Hanna, Project Assistant * Members who also participated in the post-Cold War conflict deterrence study.

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Page v COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation, Co-chair W. Carl Lineberger, University of Colorado, Co-chair Peter M. Banks, Environmental Research Institute of Michigan Lawrence D. Brown, University of Pennsylvania Ronald G. Douglas, Texas A&M University John E. Estes, University of California at Santa Barbara L. Louis Hegedus, Elf Atochem North America, Inc. John E. Hopcroft, Cornell University Rhonda J. Hughes, Bryn Mawr College Shirley A. Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Kenneth H. Keller, University of Minnesota Kenneth I. Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory Margaret G. Kivelson, University of California at Los Angeles Daniel Kleppner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology John Kreick, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company Marsha I. Lester, University of Pennsylvania Thomas A. Prince, California Institute of Technology Nicholas P. Samios, Brookhaven National Laboratory L.E. Scriven, University of Minnesota Shmuel Winograd, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center Charles A. Zraket, Mitre Corporation (ret.) Norman Metzger, Executive Director

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Page vi The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is interim president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and interim vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.

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Page vii Preface This report responds to a request made by RADM T.D. Ryan, USN, Director, Submarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter sent on January 6, 1994. The letter asked the Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, to conduct a study of deterrence in the emerging post-Cold War environment, including attention to nuclear, conventional, economic, diplomatic, and other means of deterring potential adversaries in the acquisition and utilization of military capabilities, state-sponsored terrorism, and interference with international commerce and rights of free passage. The terms of reference for the study resulting from Admiral Ryan's request called for efforts in the following three areas: • Based on the experience of the past 45 years, and with due attention to the altered environment of international security and the emerging characteristics of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, what constitutes a reasonable set of deterrence objectives and what metrics are available for their quantitative assessment? • From a comprehensive evaluation of existing deterrence decision aids and simulations, as well as those adaptable to such purposes, and utilizing a definition of the appropriate elements of a deterrence decision aid, determine their adequacy as a tool for shaping the Navy's deterrence posture, and recommend means for their improvement. • Utilizing the results of the first bulleted item above, and drawing on the results of past Naval Studies Board and related studies, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and systems to carry out the various elements of the deterrence mission of the Navy and Marine Corps. As the Board began its work on the problem, extensive preliminary effort was devoted to devising an approach that would yield credible and useful results for the highest levels of government and the Navy Department. It became clear that the Cold War concept of deterrence had become so imbedded in all aspects of the thinking of the national security community, and therefore the Navy-in terms of Cold War conditions and relationships in the international environment, U.S. understanding of the kinds of threatening activities to be deterred, and U.S. military force structure and force posture--that a study of the subject under the new post-Cold War conditions would have to go back to first principles. This meant that before starting to examine Navy and Marine Corps technology and decision aids relating to deterrence, it would be necessary to explore the meaning and the viability of the deterrence concept itself in the new environment. Only then could the subordinate technical questions posed in the terms of reference be taken up. It was therefore decided to divide the study into

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Page viii two phases along these lines: first, an effort to define the meaning and the elements of deterrence under the new world conditions, and then, an examination of the significance of this new understanding of the concept of deterrence for the Navy and Marine Corps, including the technical issues raised in the terms of reference. To carry out the first phase of the study, a special group of participants1 was convened under the chairmanship of GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), who prepared a detailed outline to guide that part of the study. The group consisted of individuals who could bring to bear from their own experience the knowledge and understanding that had accumulated over the five decades since World War II, in both the practice of deterrence and in the measurement of its effectiveness. The group explored the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, identified enduring principles for the practice of deterrence, and developed insights for new approaches to the practice of deterrence and to associated analysis, modeling, and planning. The special group of participants met only twice and received and discussed the inputs reflected in the individual essays presented in the appendixes. They made no attempt to reach consensus on the wide variety of issues introduced. In this respect this study and report differ from what is customary in studies carried out under the aegis of the National Research Council. The study participants' discussions served the valuable purpose of clarifying the various ideas of individuals irrespective of the different views introduced and still remaining after the discussions. The second phase of the study was carried out under the leadership of David Heebner, the Naval Studies Board's chairman, by Board members2with extensive experience in evaluating, inserting, and using technology in the armed forces, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps. This group also included experts in modeling and simulation and their application to problems arising in evaluation of systems and operations. The group was knowledgeable about instances in the nation's history where actions of military forces and deterrence policy interacted, and about elements of prior Board studies that could contribute to consideration of the subject at hand. The two groups interacted to ensure a seamless connection in the results of the two phases of the study. GEN Goodpaster was appointed a special advisor to the Naval Studies Board for the duration of the study. Several members of the Board participated in the discussions by the special group of study participants, with one Board member, Seymour Deitchman, serving as GEN Goodpaster's vice chairman for that group. Richard Nelson, a member of the special group of participants, contributed to the Board's deliberations in the second phase of the study. The chairman and the vice chairman of the special group of study participants, together with Dr. Nelson, prepared this report's first chapter, 1 The participants in this group are listed on page iii. 2 These members are also identified on page iv.

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Page ix entitled "Deterrence: An Overview." The chapter represents the authors' summary and interpretation of the key points that emerged from the special group of participants' examination of the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world. In addition, several of these participants prepared papers on different aspects of the problem of deterrence. These papers, signed by and the sole responsibility of their authors, are provided in the appendixes to this report. As a source of the richness of the ideas summarized in Chapter 1's new look at the subject of deterrence, these papers offer an opportunity for deeper understanding, and the reader is therefore urged to explore them. It is also the case that a subject of this complexity is not easily assimilated during the conduct of urgent business in the policy-making environment. To assist in this process, GEN Goodpaster prepared a "bridging" chapter, Chapter 2, "Implications for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers." This chapter outlines in concrete terms the key changes from the old to the new international environment, the major challenges presented to policy makers by those changes, and the main areas in which important unresolved issues remain. The Naval Studies Board prepared Chapter 3, "Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps." This chapter takes up the specific questions posed in the terms of reference, listing objectives of deterrence as well as qualitative and quantitative measures by which the potential success of any deterrent action might be judged. Specific emphases in naval forces' capabilities that appear to be called for by the review of deterrence policy needs are also presented and discussed, and decision aids and their application in the deterrence context are examined. It should not be surprising that a subject as broad and fundamental to U.S. national security posture as deterrence should call forth diverse and often contradictory views of both the concept and its implications for policy. As is pointed out in Chapter 1, many such differences remain to be resolved through experience in the international context, and in many cases resolution will await the advent of specific circumstances and the consequent need for decisions in matters of policy and application. Areas of policy requiring continuing attention are highlighted in context throughout the report. Many of the unresolved differences regarding policy were also reflected as differences of view among the study group participants. Every attempt has been made, in Chapter 1, to acknowledge such differences. Special comments made by study group participants in connection with statements in Chapter 1 are included as footnotes at the appropriate points. These views are enlarged on in the papers in the appendixes. All special study group participants and participating Board members also had the opportunity to review, comment on, and influence this, the overall report of the study.

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Page xi Contents   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1   WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD? 1   ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY 2   DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES 3   SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 5   METRICS AND DECISION AIDS 6 1 DETERRENCE: AN OVERVIEW GENAndrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired) and C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council Seymour J. Deitchman, Institute for Defense Analyses (retired) 10   INTRODUCTION 10   THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE 12   THE NEW CONTEXT 15   ENDURING PRINCIPLES 21   DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES 25   ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING 36 2 IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS FOR POLICY MAKERS GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), The Atlantic Council 39   THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT 39   CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE 40   SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES 42   CONCLUDING REMARKS 44 3 SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 45   INTRODUCTION 45   OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY 46   ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE 50   DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION 60

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Page xii APPENDIX A: REVISING THE PRACTICE OF DETERRENCE John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution 64   CHANGING CONTEXT 65   STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 67   THE RUSSIAN CASE 68   THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF DETERRENCE 69   CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE 74 APPENDIX B: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS Paul H. Nitze and J.H. McCall, Johns Hopkins University 75   WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW? 75   COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 76   POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 78   CURRENT CHALLENGES 80 APPENDIX C: EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND COALITIONS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL CHALLENGERS ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Victor Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses 83   INTRODUCTION 83   POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST 84   NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS 85   CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 87   IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNILATERALLY 91   IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THROUGH A COALITION 93   INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY 96   ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 98   CONCLUSIONS 102

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Page xiii APPENDIX D: THE REMAINING UNIQUE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Emeritus) 104   BACKGROUND 104   THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 106   FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION 107   CONCLUSIONS 111 APPENDIX E: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE John C. Hopkins (retired) and Steven A. Maaranen, Los Alamos National Laboratory 113   INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE 113   NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 115   DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE 119   REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 121 APPENDIX F: NOTES ON THE ''BAND" BETWEEN "EXISTENTIAL DETERRENCE" AND THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution 123 APPENDIX G.1: SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN THE NEW ERA Paul K. Davis, Rand 132   A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE 132   TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING THREATS TO NONVITAL INTERESTS 132   POTENTIAL ACTIONS 140 APPENDIX G.2: DECISION MODELING AS AN AID TO STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CRISIS ACTION Paul K. Davis, Rand 141   ABSTRACT 141   INTRODUCTION 141   MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS 142   FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING 150

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Page xiv   A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION 151   CONCLUSIONS 152   BIBLIOGRAPHY 152 APPENDIX G.3: PROTECTING WEAK AND MEDIUM STRENGTH STATES: ISSUES OF DETERRENCE, STABILITY, AND DECISION MAKING Paul K Davis, Rand 153   ABSTRACT 153   INTRODUCTION 153   DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CENTURY 154   AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DETERRENCE 158   DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS: STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES 167   EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF WEAK OR MEDIUM STRONG STATES 172   RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE MAY FAIL 176   CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION MAKING 177   BIBLIOGRAPHY 179 APPENDIX H: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, NATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center 182   CONTEXT 182   BACKGROUND 183   THE PROBLEM 184   NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 186   WHAT IS THE THREAT? 186   THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE 188   REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY 191   CONCLUSIONS 198 APPENDIX I: DETERRENCE: CLASH AND UTILIZATION OF VALUE SYSTEMS Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University 201   INTRODUCTION 201   BACKGROUND 202

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Page xv   VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD 204   CASE STUDIES 208   CONCLUSION 212   NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS 213 APPENDIX J: CONTROLLING INSTABILITIES CAUSED BY ROGUE GOVERNMENTS Glenn A. Kent, Rand 215   THE EMERGING THREAT 215   IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT 215   A DEFENSE IN DEPTH 215   AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH 216   SUGGESTED ACTIONS 218 APPENDIX K: DETERRENCE-QUO VADIS? David L. Stanford, Science Applications International Corporation 220

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