tion in, the ISTC structure by the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy.
The committee also notes the growing interest among U.S. agencies and their laboratories in establishing ties with FSU institutes. These agencies and laboratories share a conviction that increased contact with FSU scientists and engineers is in the U.S. national interest. The ISTC is in a unique position to facilitate collaborative research on such joint projects.
The committee notes the ISTC's interest in placing higher priority on projects with strong potential for commercial applications. the committee supports this course of action, with the qualification that projects continuen to include a majority of weapons scientists and engineers. the committee believes, that the role of the ISTC should not extend beyond precompetitive research (e.g., to product or process commercialization).
Based on its findings, the committee makes the following recommendations:
The United States should continue core funding of the ISTC.
To maintain a focus on the nonproliferation goals of the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy, these departments should increase their roles in the ISTC.
The U.S. ISTC management should seek new funds from U.S. government mission agencies and the private sector.
The ISTC should consider organizing an industrial advisory council.
The ISTC should expand the scope of Western collaboration and encourage more active participation by collaborators.
The ISTC should place more emphasis on involving biological and chemical warfare institutes in its activities.
The ISTC should allow grants to fund communications equipment.
The U.S. Government should expedite the appointment of U.S. representatives and staff to the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine.