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Papers
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Job Evaluation Research
and Research Needs
Donald Schwab
Job evaluation has been available since the late l8OOs and fairly widely
implemented by private-sector organizations since the 1930s and especially
in the 1940s. Extant research was published largely in the 1940s and l950s,
but it was virtually ignored by investigators in the 1960s and 1970s.
Recently, however, spurred largely by interest in comparable worth, atten-
tion once again has been focused on job evaluation.
This paper reviews research on job evaluation and suggests appropriate
questions and methodologies for the conduct of empirical inquiries needed
to assess job evaluation procedures in the context of present challenges. It
begins with a brief discussion of perspectives on job evaluation and the
implications of these perspectives for the processes central to the installation
and maintenance of evaluation systems overtime. Existing research investi-
gations bearing on these perspectives and processes are then reviewed as a
springboard for suggesting research needed on job evaluation. The discus-
sion of needed research also focuses on issues explicitly evolving from the
comparable worth controversy.
PERSPECTIVES
Job evaluation is generally characterized as an administrative procedure
designed to help employers develop and maintain job hierarchies for pur-
poses of making pay differentials. Moreover, there is general agreement that
the objective of job evaluation is to produce an acceptable pay structure
(Munson, 1963:601:
37
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The tine function of job evaluation—and it's an important one—is to rationalize and gain
acceptability for some way of distributing a batch of money in wages.
Although there is widespread agreement on the general objective of job
evaluation, there is considerable disagreement on how acceptability is to be
achieved. The dominant perspective views job evaluation from the point of
view of applied measurement, with accompanying emphasis on characteris-
tics such as objectivity, generalizability, and parsimony (see, e.g., Viteles,
19411. Industrial psychologists and engineers and most textbook authors
have viewed critical job evaluation issues from this point of view.
Acceptability ofthe results of job evaluation from this perspective is seen
as being heavily dependent on the quality of the scores that emerge from the
measuring instruments developed to describe and evaluate jobs. To what
extent are such scores free from random and systematic errors, for example?
How can measuring instruments be changed or improved to reduce such
errors?
A very different perspective on job evaluation has emerged from the
research and thinking of institutional economists (Kerr and Fisher, 1950;
Livernash, 19571. They view job evaluation as a procedure for working out
conflicts that inevitably arise about pay differentials over time. These con-
flicts are largely a function of the fact that internal acceptability (based
largely on job content) varies from external acceptability (based largely on
market factors). While institutionalists sometimes argue that both internal
and external equity are achieved when a job evaluation system is initially
installed (e.g., Livernash, 1957), exogenous forces immediately begin to
pull them apart. The major task for job evaluation, then, is to accommodate
these conflicting forces.
The objectivity of the instrumentation emphasized by the applied mea-
surement perspective contrasts with a view by the institutionalists that sees
job evaluation as a flexible set of rules of the game (Kerr and Fisher,
1950:871: "The technical core of a plan (instrumentation), on which so
much attention is lavished, has generally less bearing on the ultimate results
than either the environment into which it is injected or the policies by which
it is administered." Institutionalists, then, emphasize the historical milieu of
the system's implementation and the administrative procedures used initially
and especially to maintain the system over time. Research and research
needs consistent with this orientation thus emphasize the importance of
accounting for the context and longitudinal elements of job evaluation pro-
cesses within organizations.
AVAILABLE RESEARCH
Job evaluation research to date has been most strongly influenced by the
applied measurement perspective. Five issues of varying significance have
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JOB EVALUATION RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS
39
dominated the empirical literature: (1) the reliability of evaluations, (2) the
predictability of wage distributions, (3) the convergence between evaluation
systems, (4) redundancy in compensable factors, and (5) the impact of rater
characteristics on evaluation scores. ~ Each is reviewed briefly below.
1. Reliability of evaluations. Of obvious importance to an understand-
ing of job evaluation frown a measurement perspective is the question of
reliability. More specifically, research has focused on the degree to which
evaluations of jobs using point systems are free of random error attributable
to the individuals (see, e.g., Ash, 1948; Doverspike et al., 1983; Lawsche
and Farbo, 1949; Lawshe and Wilson, 1947) or groups (Schwab and Hene-
man, 1984) performing the evaluations. In general, studies have found that
unreliability is a serious problem in the evaluation of specific compensable
factors. Total scores are also unreliably evaluated by single evaluators,
although total evaluations from pooled assessments of five or more indepen-
dently derived judgments tend to be reliable.
As one fairly typical example of this sort of research, Lawshe and Wilson
(1947) had 10 raters independently evaluate 20 production jobs on an 11-
factorpoint system. Average correlations between ratings of pairs of evalua-
tors ranged from .34 to .82 for the individual compensable factors, and the
average for the total score was r = .77. When the average ratings of 5 of
these raters (randomly chosen) were correlated with the pooled ratings of the
remaining 5 raters, the resulting correlations among compensable factors
ranged from .72 to .96, and the reliability coefficient for the total score was
.94. Schwab and Heneman (1984) recently assessed the reliabilities
obtained from groups of 3 evaluators using consensus procedures to derive
ratings of 53 jobs. The intergroup reliability coefficients resulting from this
procedure ranged from .39 to .99 on 10 compensable factors, and the relia-
bility coefficient for the total score was .99.
2. Predictability of wage distributions. A large number of demonstra-
tions have been made to show that compensable factor scores (e.g., Chester,
1948;DavisandTiff~n, l950;Dertien, l981;Fitzpatrick, 1947;Fox, 1962;
Schwab and Heneman, 1984) and quantitatively derived job analysis scores
(e.g., McCormick et al., 1972; Robinson et al., 1974; Tornow and Pinto,
1976) can be weighted (typically using multiple regression) to predict wage
distributions with moderate success. By way of illustration, Tornow and
Pinto developed a wage prediction model by regressing current wages of 433
managers on 13 evaluation dimensions derived from the Management Posi-
tion Description Questionnaire. The resulting mathematical model was then
used to predict current wages of 56 managers not included in the original
1 See also Schwab ( 1980b) and Treiman ( 1979) for review of portions of this research.
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sample. The model accounted for 81 percent of the wage variance in the
latter group (R = .901.
3. Convergence between evaluation systems. Several studies have
investigated the extent to which different job evaluation systems yield simi-
lar results (Atchison and French, 1967; Chester, 1948; Dunham, 1978;
Robinson et al., 1974; Snelgar, 19831. Table 1 summarizes the results of
these studies by showing the lowest and highest degree of convergence (in
correlational terms) between different job evaluation systems. As can be
seen, results vary widely, with correlation coefficients between systems
ranging from a low of .59 (Atchison and French, 1967) to a high of .99
(Sneigar, 1983~. Unfortunately, the studies generally do not describe the
systems investigated very thoroughly, so it is difficult to understand why
there is so much variability in results.
4. Redundancy in compensablefactors. Point systems often have 10 or
more compensable factors on which jobs are evaluated. Using factor analy-
sis or stepwise multiple regression procedures or both, investigators have
repeatedly shown that much of Me total variance generated by such systems
can be explained or accounted for by just a few factors or dimensions (e.g.,
Davis and Tiff'n, 1950; Grant, 1951; Howard and Schutz, 1952; Lawshe,
1945; Lawshe and Maleski, 1946; Lawshe et al., 19481. As one example,
Lawshe et al. (1948) found that just 3 compensable factors were necessary to
account for from 86 to 96 percent of the variance in the total scores generated
from a system of 11 compensable factors used in three firms. This sort of
finding is obtained because compensable factors in point systems tend to be
highly intercorrelated (colinear).
5. Impact of rater characteristics on evaluation scores. Finally, there
have been investigations of whether traits or situational characteristics of
evaluators influence mean ratings or reliability. Although there is some
TABLE 1 Convergence of Results Across Alternative Job Evaluation
Systems
Range of Correlation
No. of Coefficients
Study Plans Low High
.
Atchison and French ( 1967) 3 .54 .82
Chester ( 1948) 3~' .85 .97
Dunham (1978) 6 .89 .97
Robinson et al. (1974) Sa .82 95
Snelgar(1983)b 16 .77 .99
a Includes Market Wage Sulvey as a "system."
b Includes a sample of "heterogeneous" and a sample of "homogeneous" jobs.
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JOB EVALUATION RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS
41
1
evidence that evaluators' familiarity with jobs influences mean ratings
(Madden, 1962, 1963), research does not suggest that evaluations by man-
agers differ appreciably from those by incumbents (Chambliss, 1950) or
union representatives (Lawshe and Farbo, 19491. Of more direct relevance
to the comparable worth controversy, a few studies have found that evalua-
tions (Doverspike et al., 1983; Schwab and Grams, in press) or quantitative
job analysis scores (Arvey et al., 1977) do not differ as a function of the sex
of the evaluator.
RESEARCH AGENDA
The paucity of research on job evaluation reviewed here may come as a
surprise, given the significance of job evaluation to compensation adminis-
tration. Clearly, there are a large number of relevant research issues even
without the challenges of comparable worth. Questions raised by advocates
and critics of comparable worth simply compound that number. What fol-
lows is an attempt to suggest important questions that require research
answers, especially if job evaluation is to be considered as a mechanism for
achieving comparable worth (however defined). It begins with issues that
have been raised specifically in a comparable worth context, issues that
follow closely from the applied measurement perspective. These are fol-
lowed by a set of broader, more descriptive questions, which reflect to a
greater degree the institutionalist perspective.
Issues Stimulated by Comparable Worth
While advocates of comparable worth have raised many specific criti-
cisms of current job evaluation, their major concerns fall within two broad
categories. The first and most important concern has to do with the criterion
used to weight compensable factor scores. The second has to do with biases
that may occur in the evaluation process itself. Each of these as well as
potentially useful research to be performed is discussed below.
The Criterion
As currently used in the private sector, job evaluation is typically validated
against a wage criterion (e.g., Schwab, l980b; Treiman and Hartmann,
19811. That is, the acceptability of job evaluation results are initially deter-
mined by the correspondence between the job hierarchy produced by the
evaluation system and some existing distribution of wages for those jobs.
Sometimes this is done via "policy capturing," wherein the compensable
factors are formally weighted to maximize the relationship between evalua-
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lion results and wages (Treiman, 1979) . In all probability the process is more
often done less formally, but, in any event, correspondence between evalua-
tion results and current wages is an important element in determining the
acceptability of the system to the employer.
Advocates of comparable worth have, of course, raised objections to the
use of wages as the criterion, because they conclude that existing wage
distributions are biased against jobs held mainly by women (e.g., Blumro-
sen, 1979;TreimanandHartmann, l9811.Ifwagesarebiased,andifwages
serve as the criterion for job evaluation, that bias will be reflected in the job
evaluation results (Schwab and Wichern, 1983~.2
As a consequence, some analysts have suggested that wages not be used as
the criterion or, if used, "corrected" for sex bias (e.g., Ellumrosen, 1979;
Treiman and Hartmann, 19811. Although these recommendations are far
from universally accepted (see, e.g., McCormick, 1981; Milkovich, 1980;
Milkovich and Broderick, 1982; Nelson et al., 1980), empirical research
and theory addressing the criterion question are clearly appropriate. What
are alternatives to using wages for weighting compensable factors, and what
are the implications of such alternatives?
A not inconsequential advantage of an observable criterion such as a wage
distribution stems from the fact that it simplifies and makes "objective" the
weighting of compensable factors. Once the criterion is agreed on, the
procedure for weighting and for determining how well the resulting model
"fits" the criterion distribution can proceed statistically. Job evaluation
implemented in this manner represents a form of criterion-related (empiri-
cal) validation. Alternatively, specification of an unobservable conceptual
criterion such as worth casts the problem into the domain of construct
validation (Schwab, 1980b). Not only is establishing construct validity more
difficult, but also the standards for deciding when adequate validity has been
achieved are less amenable to unambiguous interpretation and hence agree-
ment (see, e.g., Schwab, 1980a).
It would appear highly desirable, therefore, if observable criteria could be
generated against which job evaluation instruments could be developed and
validated. Unfortunately, comparable worth advocates generally have not
made suggestions regarding alternative observable criteria. What follows is
thus highly tentative; it is only a suggestion for how research investigating
observable criteria forjob evaluation might proceed.
A starting point might be to focus on the objective of job evaluation, a
conceptual criterion that commentators agree on, namely, acceptability of
2 An obvious question pertains to the veracity of the comparable worth conclusion. Are market
wages biased against jobs held mainly by women? Issues pertaining to this question are not
considered in the present paper.
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JOB EVALUATION RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS
43
the outcomes to the participants (see also Munson, 1963, on this issue).
Could participants agree, for example, on compensable factors and weights
that produced perceptually equitable job hierarchies?
The existing job evaluation literature will probably be of little help in
identifying likely compensable factors for such a criterion. There seems to
be general agreement that existing job evaluation plans have emerged with-
out much thought or research (e.g., Belcher, 1974; Nash and Carroll, 1975) .
In the historical evolution of the procedure, compensable factors were found
that "predicted" market wages; little further development took place, since
the major organizational objective was easily achieved.
Equity theoIy (e.g., Adams, 1963) may be of greater value foridentifying
compensable factors that will produce perceptually equitable job distribu-
tions. Although most research in an employment context has focused on
behavioral consequences of inequity (for a review see, e.g., Campbell and
Pritchard, 1976), a growing body of literature has examined equity determi-
nants, particularly in a compensation context (e.g., Belcher and Atchison,
1970; Birnbaum, 1983; Dyer et al., 1976; Goodman, 1975; Lawler, 19661.
Although these studies have emphasized individual rather than job charac-
teristics, they nevertheless may serve as methodological models for job-
evaluation-oriented investigations.
One model appears especially well suited to the problem at hand. Specifi-
cally, once compensable factors have been tentatively identified, policy
capturing (see, e.g., Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971) could be employed to
specify weights and to ascertain the degree of agreement within and between
representative samples of management and employee groups.
If this line of inquiry appears fruitful (i.e., if compensable factors can be
found and weighted to predict perceptually equitable job hierarchies), sub-
sequent research can compare results with those obtained from more tradi-
tional job evaluation methods and with existing wage distributions.
Judgments could then be made about whether the results would be accept-
able in terms of political and economic considerations.
Evaluation Bias
The second general concern expressed is the possibility thatjob evaluation
is developed or implemented so that the resulting job hierarchies lead to
wage underpayment for predominantly female jobs . "It is likely that most, if
not all, job-evaluation systems contain sex bias" (Collette, 1982: 154~. Such
bias could be manifested in several ways.
One potential difficulty discussed has to do with the compensable factors
included in the job evaluation system. It has been frequently hypothesized
that compensable factors in conventional job evaluation plans favor work
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none in predominantly male jobs (e.g., Blumrosen, 1979; Grune, 1982;
Remick, 1981; Thomsen, 1977; Treiman, 19791. Evidence supportive of
this hypothesis, however, is scarce. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a
methodology that would test this hypothesis unambiguously.
For example, Doverspike and Barrett (1984) compared sets of predomi-
nantly female with predominantly male jobs on 15 compensable factors.
They then took as evidence of bias any difference between the male and
female job sets on a number of psychometric characteristics (e.g., reliabil-
ity, mean differences, and so forth). However, to assume that bias in this
instance means anything other than difference, one must additionally
assume that (a) ratings were not a function of raters (i.e., no rater bias), and
(b) the two job sets were psychometrically identical in some "true" score
sense. Given the degree of occupational sex-related segregation known to
exist, the latter assumption is particularly hard to accept. Consequently, it is
difficult to conclude from such an exercise that anything very meaningful
has been learned about potential bias in compensable factors.
A second hypothesis about an error source that could be to the wage
disadvantage of predominantly female jobs has to do with bias in either the
description or the evaluation of jobs. Analysts or evaluators may deliber-
ately or inadvertently denigrate jobs performed predominantly by women
(Grune, 1982; Remick, 1981; Schwab, 1980b; Thomsen, 1981; Treiman,
1979; Treiman and Hartmann, 19811.
This hypothesis has been addressed from two perspectives. As already
noted in this review, several studies found little evidence that judgments of
jobs vary as a function of the sex of the evaluator. If sex stereotypes about
jobs exist, they apparently transcend the sex of the individual making the
judgment. Several studies have also been performed that have tried to
directly identify sex stereotypes. Arvey et al. (1977) investigated bias in job
analysis by having subjects evaluate two jobs identical in all respects except
that one was characterized as female, the other as male (manipulated with
photographs). They found no differences as a function of the sex characteri-
zation of the job. Three studies have addressed sex bias in the evaluation of
jobs. In a correlational study Mahoney and Blake (1979) found that the
perceived femininity of an occupation explained a small but statistically
significant amount of recommended salary variance after controlling for
effects due to job characteristics. Experimental studies alternatively have
found little evidence that student evaluators were influenced by the sex
composition of a set of jobs (Grams and Schwab, 1985) and no evidence that
experienced compensation specialists or administrators were so influenced
(Schwab and Grams, in press).
Thus, the evidence to date does not provide much support for the hypothe-
sis that the sex of the job per se influences job descriptions or evaluations.
This evidence, however, is limited, and there is an obvious need for addi-
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JOB EVALUATION RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS
45
tional research. It is especially important that these sorts of investigations
study alternative types of job analysis and evaluation instruments and that
they manipulate job stereotypes in alternative ways.
A potential source of bias that has not been previously considered in the
comparable worth debate did obtain support in both the Grams and Schwab
(1985) and Schwab and Grams (in press) experiments. Specifically, both
studies found evidence that evaluations were substantially influenced by the
current salary reported for the jobs studied. While more research is again
called for, the implications of this finding for wage fairness are potentially
profound. For if there is sex bias in current wage structures, replicated
evidence that wage rates influence evaluations suggests that bias could enter
evaluation results even though salaries are not used as an explicit external
criterion in validating the system.
Contextual Issues
The research questions posed above are understandably narrow in the
sense that they focus on differential job evaluation results as a function of the
predominant sex of the job incumbents. They are also narrow, it seems to
me, in the assumptions they make about the job evaluation process as it is
conducted in organizations. The issues identified below are illustrative of
contextual and more basic information needed to thoroughly understand
how job evaluation is used by organizations and how it affects resulting wage
structures.
Despite the presumption that job evaluation is widely used by organiza-
tions and that its use is increasing (e.g., Nash and Carroll, 1975), few
reliable data exist on the number of fimns using it, the types of systems used,
the jobs included, or the employees covered. Descriptive information on
such questions tends to come from ad hoc surveys that have been conducted
only periodically. Inferences about general usage have often been drawn
from samples of unknown populations.
As a result, a reasonable foundation for a systematic investigation of job
evaluation might well begin with comprehensive descriptive data on its use,
especially in the private sector. Such a survey should go beyond merely
documenting types of plans (point system versus classification, and so forth)
and obtain information on the specific procedures used to evaluate and price
jobs.
Evaluation Processes
An illustration may be helpful in suggesting the type of information that I
believe is needed about how job evaluation is conducted and the importance
of obtaining such information for subsequent research. Investigations to
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date have tended to use similar methodologies to study job evaluation. The
studies described above have nearly always had evaluators independently
examine one or more written job descriptions and then evaluate those
descriptions using some variant of a common point system. To what extent
does this procedure describe organizational practice?
My experience with organizations implementing job evaluation is that the
evaluators frequently begin by generating the job descriptions and that, in
the process, they obtain information from incumbents, supervisors, and
other sources. Schwab and Grams (1983) provide a somewhat more repre-
sentative confirmation that evaluators typically have substantially more
information than is provided by written descriptions when making judg-
ments about jobs. Whether these data increase evaluation accuracy or
merely add error variance is largely unknown at this point, but certainly their
presence raises questions about the external validity of the research that has
been performed.
Pricing lobs
Descriptive information is also needed about the mechanisms that organi-
zations use to price job hierarchies following the initial evaluation process.
Treiman (1979) reported that it is customary for organizations to weight
compensable factors so that the relationship with some wage distribution is
maximized. To what extent does this actually apply? What procedures are
used to maximize the relationship (reevaluation of jobs, changes in the
evaluation instrumentation, elimination of outlierjobs, and so forth)? What
criteria, if any, are used when wages are not employed in this fashion?
Inferences about what job evaluation accomplishes will not be very
informed until we have more data on how organizations use it to make
compensation decisions.
It is especially important to obtain information about pricing decisions
following initial implementation. Regardless of how the job hierarchy is
priced when the system is first installed, what happens to wage structures
over time and what adjustments in other personnel or human resources
systems are made to accommodate the job evaluation system? Livernash
(1957) noted that pressures emerge on the job evaluation system as changes
occur eitherin the external wage contours of the organization (e.g., changes
in differential labor demand patterns, modifications in union relationships)
or in internal job content (e.g., as a function of product or technological
change).
On the basis of field observations, Slichter et al. (1960) and Kerr and
Fisher (1950) reported that job evaluation systems can easily fail unless
administrative procedures and practices account for these changes. Kerr and
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JOB EVALUATION RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS
47
Fisher in particular suggest not only that alterations are made in the wage
structures emerging from job evaluation, but also that other personnel or
human resource systems are modified to accommodate wage structure pres-
sures. In the air manufacturing industry, for example, they observed not only
job reevaluation, inflation of job descriptions, and demoralization of the
merit pay systems but also changes in training programs, recruiting prac-
tices, and job redesign. Personal conversations with compensation adminis-
trators suggest that these responses are far from unique.
If organizations routinely modify wage structures following implementa-
tion,3 problems are necessarily increased for those who wish to achieve any
sort of specific objective through job evaluation (e.g., a homogeneous stan-
dard of internal equity). The research of the institutionalists suggests that in
order to respond to the multiple and potentially conflicting claims of equity,
job evaluation systems must remain flexible (i.e., to some extent they must
tolerate distortion). Clearly, current and more representative evidence is
needed regarding this important possibility.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Job evaluation has been thought about and studied from two perspectives.
One of these, emphasizing the importance of applied measurement, views
job evaluation largely as a scaling system for generating "true" job scores on
compensable factors. The other perspective, the institutional view, empha-
sizes the role of the job evaluation system in dealing with the conflicts that
occur between internal (organizational) and external (market) forces and
values.
Research on job evaluation has been dominated by the applied measure-
ment perspective. Thus a good bit of research has been conducted on the
quality of the scores emerging from the evaluation of jobs on compensable
factors. In particular, research has been performed on the reliability of
scores, the validity of those scores for predicting current wage differentials,
convergence between alternative evaluation systems and between compen-
sable factors, and the degree to which scores are a function of the individuals
performing the evaluations.
Research questions suggested by the comparable worth controversy so far
have fallen largely within the purview of the applied measurement perspec-
3 Indeed, Kerr and Fisher (1950) argued that such modifications are necessary if the job evalua-
tion system is to remain viable. "The more fixed, definite, and self executing the formula [the
formal job evaluation plan], the less will it allow for the other end perhaps more important pressures
to which wage rates respond" (p. 94).
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five. Questions have been raised especially about the quality of the criterion
used to weight compensable factor scores and about the possibility that such
scores are biased in various ways to the disadvantage of jobs held largely by
women.
These are certainly appropriate questions, and a number of suggestions for
how such research might proceed are offered in this paper. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that the more fundamental challenge to an understanding of job
evaluation rests in the institutional perspective. Job evaluation is a complex
system, complexly related to a number of other personnel systems (e.g.,
wage surveys) in the organization. A great number of judgments are neces-
sa~y to set up such systems and to maintain them over time. Until we learn
much more about how these judgments are made, about their consequences,
and about the exogenous factors that influence them, we run the risk of
establishing policies that will not accomplish the objectives sought.
A number of the research questions suggested in this paper fall within the
institutional domain. These, it seems to me, are more basic than the applied
measurement issues that have so far dominated the comparable worth
debate. However, no claim is made that the institutional issues raised here
are exhaustive, or that they are even the most critical to our understanding of
job evaluation processes. So bereft are we of views of job evaluation from an
institutional perspective that farther work needs to be performed just to
specify a reasonable research agenda.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Financial assistance from the Graduate School of Business and the Gradu-
ate School, University of Wisconsin-Madison, is gratefully acknowledged.
Helpful comments on an earlier draft were made by Chris Berger, Bob
Grams, Heidi Hartmann, and Tom Mahoney.
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, .
Representative terms from entire chapter:
compensable factors
