subject of separate diplomatic discussions when specific issues arise. Given economic realities, the governments of the successor states inevitably give less weight than would the United States to restricting trade with nations that pose proliferation risks. The involvement of strong nonproliferation advocates in the FSU in interagency deliberations can help ensure that appropriate attention is given to international security concerns in export control decisions.
Recommendation: Ensure that continuing consultations on the importance of export control activities in meeting nonproliferation objectives become an integral component of U.S. bilateral relations with the successor states in both the short and the long terms, as has been the case with relations between the United States and its traditional allies.
Recommendation: Promote bilateral discussions of the relationships between exports of sensitive items and proliferation concerns in many forums, at the governmental and nongovernmental levels.
Recommendation: Support the development of cadres of nonproliferation specialists in the FSU who have strong linkages with both policy officials in their countries and colleagues abroad.
The returns during 1995 and 1996 on U.S. investments in bilateral programs in MPC&A and export control were significant. U.S. agencies now have in place an extensive web of international arrangements involving very supportive foreign counterparts. The base of international experience can facilitate future program efforts that contribute directly to nonproliferation objectives.
Cutting across all program elements is the need for the United States to emphasize cooperative rather than assistance programs. This approach will help ensure that the countries will be ready to assume full responsibility for upgrading and maintaining systems that are internationally acceptable.
Despite the progress through bilateral efforts, the size of the tasks in each of the countries remains great. Reducing to an acceptable level the risk of unsanctioned transfers of weapons-related items from the FSU to states of concern or to terrorists will require many years of effort at the international, national, and facility levels by governments and specialists throughout the region. Continued participation by American specialists in the activities of these countries can accelerate the process while also providing the United States with valuable linkages to important organizations and institutions. American national security interests will be well served by a continuation of these two relatively inexpensive programs.